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THE ATTEt4PT OF SOCIALIST CZECHOSLOVAKIA TO ASSIMILATE ITS 
GYPSY POPULATION : ABSTRACT. 
The attention of the post-War Communist government in Czecho- 
slovakia was soon drawn to the Gypsies by their massive rural-to- 
urban migration from their segregated shantytowns in rural Slovakia 
to the heavy industrial centres of Bohemia and Moravia. While 
approving the Gypsies' entry into the general labour force, policy- 
makers were alarmed by the emergence of virtual Gypsy ghettos in 
Czech cities. 
In 1958 the Party resolved that the Gypsies' 'backward way of 
life' was incompatible with socialist living standards and should be 
eliminated as rapidly as possible by means of the Gypsies' total 
assimilation. Although an appeal to Marxist-Leninist nationality 
theory was made to legitimate the decision, this thesis argues that 
the Czechoslovakian interpretation was a distortion of the theory to 
suit the policy-makers' own political ends. 
Ambitious steps were taken to prevent all natural migration by 
Gypsies and replace -it by planned dispersal, where local authorities 
were to agree among themselves on quotas of Gypsies to be transported 
from Slovakia to the Czech lands. The transfer programme ground to a 
complete halt in 1968 and shortly afterwards the whole campaign was 
abandoned, having failed for much the same reasons as a'remarkably 
similar attempt to assimilate Gypsies on the same territory two 
centuries earlier. 
The demoralised government reversed its previous policy and 
allowed Gypsies to form their own socio-cultural associations but 
this promising experiment was ended in 1973 when these organisations 
were ordered to disband. 
Part One of the thesis describes and analyses these events with 
the aid of government and local authority documents while Part Two.,,. 
complements this with the experiences of the inhabitants of a 
segregated Gypsy settlement in Slovakia. 
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THE HISTORY OF THE ASSIMILATION CAMPAIGN. 
Two Gypsy Blues. 
1. No-one respects me, 
For I am a black Gypsy. 
Hungry and discouraged, 
I belong nowhere. 
Yes, even a black heart 
Needs love too. 
God - how hard, how hard 
This Gypsy life. 
2. I don't beg for bread, 
Even though I'm hungry. 
Just give the Gypsy 
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The aims and treatment of the thesis 
The single main aim of the thesis is to recount the series of 
related events during the decade from 1958 to 1968 that constituted 
the ambitious government-led campaign to assimilate the Republic's 
quarter of a million Gypsies as rapidly as possible by dispersing 
them geographically - throughout the country - and socially - 
in 
housing, at work, at school and in leisure activities. 
The main body of the thesis - on the detailed implementation of 
this policy - will be treated as relatively straightforward historical 
narrative for the reason that, unlike a chain of events such as the 
'Prague Spring' and subsequent Russian invasion, very little has 
been written of value about the Gypsies - largely because hardly any 
of the primary material on which such studies should be based has 
been published either inside or outside of Czechoslovakia. Therefore 
the presentation of much of the basic documentation` relevant to the 
assimilation campaign in an ordered and coherent way seems tome to 
be of great importance and takes precedence over an approach which 
might'take as its starting point an analysis of the social oreanisation 
of Gypsy communities etc. This is my principal justification for 
treating my material 'historically' rather than in the 'social 
anthropolmgical' way usually adopted in studies of Gypsies. `, 'In any 
case I would want-to argue that many features of-Gypsy life within' 
these communities are explicable only in the broader context of their 




and that the more customary approach would involve a serious risk 
of underemphasising or distorting the central importance of this 
relationship. 
However, all this is only another way of saying that the subject 
of the thesis is not Gypsies, as such, but their relationship with 
the majority population and more particularly the actions of the 
agencies of central and local government specifically aimed at 
containing and modifying their behaviour to ensure their swift and 
total disappearance as a distinct ethnic group. 
This chronicle of events was intended at the outset to provide 
a well-documented analysis of the recent treatment of Gypsies in 
Czechoslovakia for the use of the newly-formed Gypsy associations. 
During the early part of my research I collaborated closely with 
these organisations and hoped that my efforts might aid them in their 
criticism of the rationale and the practice of previous policy towards 
the large and growing Gypsy pinority. For this reason th naterial was 
cast in a mould readily intelligible to Eastern Europeans in order to 
contribute to the continuing debate on nationality problems in terms 
of Marxist-Leninist theory, rather than in a form more oriented. to 
Western theories of race relations. However it, was hoped that. the 
relatively straightforward presentation would allow further comparative 
analysis at some later date. 
After the associations had been ordered to disband themselves 
early in 1973,1 decided to retain the original approach in the hope 
that some day active Gypsy organisations might re-emerge in Czechoslovakia 
and the only structural modification to the first draft has been the 
removal from the main text to appendices of sections on Marxist- 
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Leninist nationality theory and the development of nationality 
problems in Czechoslovakia. 
The general approach might seem unsophisticated from the vantage 
point of Western sociology but in view of the great scarcity of 
detailed, reliable material on the treatment of minority and racial 
problems in the socialist bloc, first priority has been given to 
the 
preservation of official records. This thesis is possibly their only 
safe repository, which explains and justifies its undue length. 
Of course, to give a completely objective account would be an 
impossibility since even the simplest presentation of 'facts' would 
embody elements of interpretation and explanation, but as regards 
the assimilation policy it is necessary in any case to look beyond its 
implementation to try to understand why such an extreme strategy 
should have been adopted in preference to other possibilities. This 
involves a separate chapter in which the proclaimed ideological 
rationale of the policy is examined in detail and then set against 
other more immediately pressing yet unstated reasons of a political 
nature which might have been more influential than the explicit 
justification in leading policy-makers to opt for the assimilation 
plan. To complete the task of locating the decade of assimilation in 
its historical, political and human context, the thesis opens with an 
initial chapter on the experience of Gypsies on Czechoslovak territory 
from their first arrival in Slovakia during the fourteenth century to 
their migration to the Czech industrial regions in the years following 
the Second World War. % 
t 
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Part Two has been added to the general history of Part One to 
illustrate how these same events were experienced by the inhabitants 
of a cluster of Gypsy settlements in East Slovakia and as such it 
complements the broad generalisations with its concrete examples. 
However, it goes beyond this limited purpose in two important 
ways; the detailed field-data shows that Gypsy motivation was rational 
and intelligible and not at all the 'primitive impulses' so arrogantly 
assumed by remote government policy-makers. Furthermore fuller sketches 
from this data reveal something of the flavour of Gypsy settlement 
life and in particular the human costs of the insensitive and mis- 
directed 1958 policy. As in the case of Part One, such material is 
unlikely to be published in Czechoslovakia. 
Although ethnographic in style Part Two is not intended as a 
complete study' in itself for its aims are more specific and limited. 
Consequently much of the subject matter of a traditional social 
anthropological monograph is omitted or appears only peripherally. 
I 
# Horvathova and Kara, both quoted extensively below, go some 
way towards meeting the need for ethnographic studies. 
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The contents of the thesis. 
PART ONE - THE HISTORY OF THE ASSIMILATION CAHPAIGN. 
rrv n r-msD m;, =n 
THE HISTORY OF THE GYPSIES IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. 
(14th century-1945) 
Apart from satisfying a natural interest in the development of 
Gypsies and of official policy and public attitudes towards them 
during their six centuries' residence on the territory of present-day 
Czechoslovakia, there are other more specific reasons for looking at 
aspects of Gypsy history in greater depth. As well as giving a 
historical introduction then, this chapter serves the important 
function of providing information which is relevant and necessary 
for an adequate assessment of the assimilation policy, for both its 
underlying rationale and central legislation rested on a generalised 
historical explanation of Gypsy development. 
i) According to this account certain characteristic-and, 
undesired features , of. 
Gypsy life, had derived originally from the 
domination , to, which Gypsies had been 
so long' subjected. However, 
in post-war socialist society such patterns could only be an anachronism - 
attributable to a cultural-'time-lag-for the socialist revolution had 
supposedly eliminated the oppressive social relations that were their 
basis. 
Ah alternative explanation for the persistence of these patterns 
(that they might also have been perpetuated to some extent by new 
lt 
kinds of oppressive relationships within the socialist state) was 
not considered, although a few official documents did concede that 
traditional discriminatory attitudes could be found among local 
authorities entrusted with carrying out the assimilation policy. 
'ore seriously and irrespective of lapses by individuals, it can be 
argued that the fundamental elements of the policy itself were 
, 
discriminatory and not entirely dissimilar from previous forms of 
domination, although appearing in new and muted fashion - outright 
persecution being replaced by bureaucratic direction. 
ii) In addition to the general relevance of the Gypsies' 
historical experience, it is particularly helpful-to be able to 
compare the, 1956 campaign with a much earlier attempt to assimilate 
the Gypsies on the same territory, undertaken by the Habsburg 
monarchs Maria Theresa and her son and successor Joseph II during 
the second half of the eighteenth century. This attempt was remarkably 
similar to that of two centuries later - in conception, implementation 
and-particularly in the reasons for which it failed, namely:. 
- The central policy-making and co-ordinating body in the 
capital had inadequate control over the local authorities 
whose task it was to execute the plan. 
- The local authorities exploited their relative freedom 
from effective control to resist measures contrary to 
their own interests. 
The Gypsies themselves, although not implacably opposed 
to many of the overall aims of the policy, found the 
practical measures to achieve these ends unacceptable 
and consequently vigorously resisted them. 
iii) -Among the features of, Gypsy life-condemned as 'anachronistic 
remnants of previous social orders' was that of 'nomadism' - by which 
was meant not only the wanderings with horse and cart of the distinct 
and relatively insignificant sub-ethnic group of Vlach Gypsies but 
also the post-war migration of settled Gypsies to'the cities. While 
%' 
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it is probable that the 1958 legal categorisation of such Gypsy 
migrants as 'semi-nomadic' was partly to avert possible charges of 
discrimination (by referring to Gypsies in terms of a way of life 
rather than specifically by name as an ethnic group), there is over- 
whelming evidence that their movement was regarded as something 
peculiar to Gypsies. 
To refute this influential argument it must be demonstrated 
conclusively that the post-war Gypsy migration was quite unlike any 
pattern normally described as nomadism but far more akin to rural-to- 
urban migration, but in addition it is equally necessary to show that 
the historical development of most Gypsies in Czechoslovakia had been 
to settle and integrate from their first arrival and therefore that 
the post-war migration was a natural continuation of this path rather 
than due to any mysterious genetic regression. 
-iv) It is sometimes implied, in criticisms of the Gypsies' 
experience under socialism (viz. Ulc in 'Soviet Studies'), that. they 
fared better under the inter-war First Republic. However even a 
brief examination of this period is sufficient to establish. that 
apart from a few humanitarian efforts trade on their behalf by a group 
of doctors, their general lot was incomparably worse under 
bourgeois 
democracy. The exploitation, segregation,, legal persecution and 
occasional pogroms of the 1920s and 1930s, contained the seeds, of 
the system of forced labour,, apartheid and ultimately genocide unddr 
which the Gypsies, were ; to suffer during; the SecOnä World War. 
i ,. ý' 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE 'GYPSY C? UESTI01`i' (1945-1958). 
This chapter carries the historical narrative from the end of 
the Second World War until 1958, tracing how the Gypsies came to be 
seen as an urL-ent problem when they flooded to the industrialised 
Czech lands in their thousands to take advantage of the severe labour 
shortages there. The newcomers did not vanish among other town- 
dwellers but tended to concentrate in the dilapidated urban cores 
and by the mid-1950s, some areas were already on the way to becoming 
Gypsy ghettos. This build-up caused mounting official concern and 
was also an unwelcome reminder of the tend. of thousands of Gypsies 
still living in their isolated and insanitary home settlements in 
rural Slovakia. 
The Czechoslovakian policy-makers of the late 1950s characterised 
the 'gypsy question' primarily as a social problem, describing its 
manifestations in a way very similar to that of Western sociologists 
who adopted a 'culture of poverty' approach. However, in socialist 
Czechoslovakia such a situation could not be lamented as part of the 
natural order of things and then ignored in practice, as so often in 
the capitalist West, especially since the increasing visibility of 
urban Gypsies co-incided with the politically sensitive transition to 
the status of a socialist republic (in 1960). It was necessary, 
therefore, to find a swift resolution to the glaring contradiction 
between the Gypsies' 'backward way of life' and the improving cultural, 
social and material standards of an advanced socialist society. 
It was argued that the specific 'gypsy way of life' had been 
deformed to such an extent by centuries of oppression under feudalism 
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and capitalism, that any attempt to refashion a positive 
Gypsy 
identity would be futile and could only result in the perpetuation 
of the Gypsies' social isolation from the rest of society. 
Accordingly, 
it was decided that the only way to achieve the rapid socio-economic 
equalisation of Gypsies with other citizens would be to assimilate 
them entirely into the surrounding Czech and Slovak communities, even 
though some Gypsies might not at fifst appreciate the wisdom of 
this 
course of action. 
The policy-makers pre-empted any Criticism that their plan was 
discriminatory - in that it represented an arbitrary alienation of 
the Gypsies' group rights - by an appeal to Marxist-Leninist nationality 
theory. In their interpretation the only ethnic categories to be 
guaranteed such rights during the transitory period of socialism were 
those of nation and national minority. Since the Gypsies failed to 
satisfy the criteria for either status (lacking at least one of the 
necessary characteristics of "language, territory, economic life ... 
and culture") they were ineligible for such rights in theory and, in 
any case, were undergoing an objective process of natural assimilation 
like all other minor ethnic groups in this period. In this light the 
practical measures of dispersing and later 'transferring' the Gypsies, 
in order to achieve their rapid assimilation, could be presented as 
merely accelerating the already visible disintegration of separate 
Gypsy communities. And even if the policy were discriminatory, as a 
government document half-conceded in 1967, this was justified by the 
fact that the intention was to help the Gypsies. 
As well as casting doubt on this ideological legitimation by 
arguing that it depended on a simplistic and one-sided interpretation 
of Marxist-Leninist nationality theory, the final sections of this 
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chapter also question the stated motivation of the assimilation policy. 
Given the fact that one aim of the Stalinist regime of that period 
was the complete ethnic and social homojeneity of Czechoslovakia's 
population, it is evident that the growing Gypsy minority formed an 
irritating and intractable obstacle and it seems plausible that the 
specific measures to deal with Gypsies were not isolated phenomena 




THE ASSIMILATION POLICY IN ACTION (1958-1965) 
Chapters Four and Five constitute the main body of the thesis 
and these record and evaluate the faltering progress of the 1958 
Gypsy policy throughout the decade of assimilationism. 
Chapter Four deals with the initial attempt to promote assimilation 
through the realisation of three main policy aims: 
- the integration of Gypsies into the labour force 
to ensure both an economic base for a higher 
standard of living and the most effective re- 
education. 
- the maximum dispersal of Gypsy population con- 
centrationsto prevent 'the perpetuation of the, 
previous backward way of life' and to allow 
contact withrew, progressive living, patterns. 
- complete control over natural migration so that 
dispersal plans should not be thwarted and to 
aid the successful completion of re-education 
by work. 
The chief instrument in this first phase of the campaign was a 
law banning`nomadism', backed up by a comprehensive register of all 
nomadic persons, but because of the onerous duties this law imposed 
upon local authorities, it was rarely used by them and natural' 
migration continued virtually unchecked. tleanwhileflocal authorities 
made little effort to disperse their unwelcome Gypsy populations but 
instead sought`'to contain them. 
Central government seemed powerless to. prevent the frustration 
of its plans and a 1964 Slovakian survey confirmed what-had long been 
evident - that there had been significant progress towards the first 
policy aim alone. 
17 
This failure was dwarfed in importance by the contemporaneous 
collapse of the third five-year plan (1961-5) but while planners 
in 
the broader sphere of the economy were realising that the breakdown 
of grandiose and unworkable schemes necessitated a radical rethinking 
of fundamentals, this painful lesson had not yet permeated to the 
peripheral area of Gypsy policy by 1965. There, the response to 
failure was still the instinctive dirigiste reaction; to intensify 
the policy that had foundered by redoubling the detail of the plans 
and compounding the bureaucracy to administer them. Instead of re- 
examining the assumptions of 1958, the policy-makers simply reaffirmed 
the previous aims and added a fourth: 
- effective central control over local authorities 
to ensure that they carried out their duties 
properly. 
CHAPTER FIVE: 
THE BREAKDOWN OF THE ASSIMILATION POLICY (1965-1968). 
Action to remedy the stagnant situation seemed bold and impressive 
at first sight. Whereas formerly there had been a naive expectation 
that dispersal could be carried out locally without special funds or 
central supervision, it was decided in 1965 that the disproportionate 
burden of Slovakia should be shared with the Czech lands, that additional 
resources should be released from the exchequer and that to co-ordinate 
and monitor the whole programme a separate 'Government Committee for 
Questions of the Gypsy Population' should be established. 
S 
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A detailed timetable giving annual quotas of Gypsies to be 
'transferred' from Slovakia was agreed between the relevant local 
authorities and approved by the Government Committee and at the same 
time plans were made to improve basic amenities in Gypsy settlements. 
To prevent continuing natural migration the nomadism law was to be 
amended but in the meantime local authorities were instructed to 
treat "every unplanned, unorganised, unconfirmed transfer of a gypsy 
person or family" as "undesirable migration" and to send such Gypsies 
home at their own expense. 
In practice, however, the government plans fared little better 
than in the preceding period for the re-organised administrative 
structure, on which the success of the 1965 measures depended, proved 
wholly inadequate to the task. The impotence of the co-ordinating 
Government Committee was evident in the declining rate of transfer 
and dispersal and even more so in the low level of budget utilisation 
by local authorities. "This meant, among other 
things, the deterioration 
of conditions in the settlements as the growing population levels 
steadily increased pressure on Fill scarce amenities., 
The attempt to-eliminate natural migration. suffered-a. similar 
fate for the Constitutional Law Committee 'of the National, Assembly` 
ruled that the proposed modifications to , 
the nomadism law infringed 
the constitutional rights of Czechoslovakian citizens.,, Although the 
decision clearly undermined the legal basis of the whole campaign from 
1958 onwards,; 
_this 
disturbing possibility was not investigated further. 
Eventually, against a background of general political dis- 
integration 
, 
following the August. 1968 invasion of. Czechoslovakia by 
the Warsaw Pact armies, the 'dispersal and, transfer'. programme ground 
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to a complete halt and the formal dissolution of the Government 
Committee in November 1968 marked the end of the assimilation 
campaign. To attribute this final collapse to the external situation 
would be mistaken : local authorities had effectively sabotaged the 
initial phase and there was no real reason why they could not repeat 
their earlier success. 
CHAPTER SIX : 
AFTERMATH : RECONSIDERATION OF THE 1958 POLICY (1968- ) 
The abandonment of the assimilation campaign left an extremely 
confused situation in which several main elements played an important 
part - nationalism, federalisation, official despair, the re- 
establishment of political control and Gypsy aspirations. This chapter 
tries to show their complex interrelationship in determining the 
future of the Gypsies. 
The outcome of mounting nationalist pressures which culminated 
in 1968 was a substantive improvement in the legal position of major 
nationalities in the lbpublic in relation to their strength; the 
formal status of the Slovak nation was revised by federalisation of 
the state, the more important national minorities were given additional 
protection by a new law whilst the large yet least mobilised Gypsy 
community was considered for national minority status but rejected 
as 'an uncrystallised ethnic group'. 
Eventually, a peculiar compromise was adopted in the Gypsies' 
case; they were granted the privileges of a national minority, but 
with no guarantee that these would continue. In the same month in 
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which the Government Committee was dissolved, permission was granted 
by the Ministry of the Interior for the formation of Gypsy associations 
in the Czech lands and Slovakia. 
This complete reversal of previous policy was not a clear and 
decisive step as had been the case in 1958; it was tentative and 
uncertain of its theoretical justification. The key decision to 
permit Gypsy associations did not stem from any conviction on the 
part of central government that it had been fundamentally mistaken 
in the past but appeared to have been taken opportunistically in a 
mood of despondent resignation. Bankrupt of ideas after the break- 
down of the transfer programme, officials hoped that perhaps the 
direct involvement of Gypsies in some organised fashion might prove 
beneficial. 
There was another sutsidiary reason why the associations. were 
permitted - political expediency. At a time when the government of 
'normalisation' was in desperate need of public support, orbanisations 
willing to proclaim their loyalty to the regime. and their approval 
of Soviet intervention were hard--to find. Although the-Gypsies' pro- 
Soviet stance derived from the fact that the-Red Army-had saved 
them from physical extermination, the short-lived rise of their 
associations proved to be a sad repetition of the Gypsies' accustomed 
historical role as a tool in'the service of reactionary and unpopular 
rulers. 
For a time the associations' strategy of cautious ingratiation 
paid off handsomely but once complete political control had been 
re-established these organisations became an irrelevance to be 
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discarded after a decent interval. When their inevitably erratic 
progress irritated the regime, the 
associations were simply ordered 
to disband themselves in 1973, for having'failed to fulfil their 
integrative function'. The original bureaucratic decision went 
unrecorded and against it there was no possibility of appeal. 
PART TWO - THE EXPERIENCE OF ONE SETTI MENT 
Part Two has been split into four main chapters, although the 
overlapping themes and material make the division appear somewhat 
arbitrary at times. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
POLOMKA - PAST AND PRESENT. - 
is mainly historical and tries to give an overall picture of the 
development of the -settlement against the broader background of 
Part One. The earlier part of the chapter shows a development pattern 
not dissimilar from the general account given in Chapter Two. The 
painfully slow provision of basic amenities in the post-Second World 
War period is then linked to the local council's apparent refusal 
to take any positive action to implement the assimilation policy. 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
- MAKING A LIVING 
challenges the simplistic government view of the 'gypsy question' and 
in particular distorted assumptions about Gypsy motivation which are 
best exemplified by the central and related myths that continue to 
flourish in official reports and popular belief. In place of the 
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stereotype Gypsies - wandering aimlessly around the country, work- 
shy and content to subsist on family allowances -a clear pattern 
emerges of chain-migration between the settlement and selected 
industrial centres which bears little resemblance to any typically 
Gypsy nomadism but instead appears a quite characteristic form of 
rural-to-urban migration, motivated principally by the hope of better 
economic and social conditions. Far from confirming the notion of 
Gypsies as idle parasites these sections show Gypsies often working 
themselves to exhaustion, ruining their physical health and family 
life in the process. 
CHAPTER NINE 
RT. 3Ctf MTh t T4TTF! 
probes the difficult but crucial area of Gypsies' self-perceptions - 
as Gypsies in general, as inhabitants of a specific settlement and 
as members of particular families. Short sections on feuding and 
status divisions within the settlement examine the fragmenting 
effects of Gypsy subordination to enclosing white'society and the 
chapter concludes with a discussion of whether ethnic relations in 
the village of Folomka can be characterised' justifiäbly as'a"form 
of apartheid. 
CHAPTER TEN 
- POSSIBILITIES OF CHANGE - 
tries to sketch the very different situation in settlements irihe 
vicinity of Polomka and also in the industrial city. 
-The optimism 
in Sedlice and Podhradie is in complete contrast to the despondent 
pessimism that fills Poloinka and is of especial importance because it 
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arose in a manner quite contrary to the expections and recommendations 
of the 1958 policy-maker. As such, the solid achievement in these 
settlements strengthens the case for a pluralist rather than 
assimilationist approach to the problem of socio-economic equalisation. 
Finally, more as a postscript than a conclusion, three sketches 
are included to show the impossible conditions under which the Gypsy 
associations attempted to function and which severely hampered them 
as a force for change. The examples are taken from local, district 
and regional level and co: plement the account of the demise of the 
national organisationsas a whole at the end of Chapter Six. 
CHAPTER ELEVEN 
- CONCLUSION - 
summarises the general shortcomings of the assimilation policy and 
then re-iterates the differential effects of national and local 
government practice on the Gypsy inhabitants of the Polomka, Sedlice 
and Podhradie settlements in East Slovakia. Although providing a 
narrow basis for generalisation, the experience of these settlements 
suggests that an alternative policy of strengthening Gypsy identity 
would have been far more fruitful. 
Nevertheless, in spiterof the vagaries of official policy, the 
material conditions of many Gypsies improved steadily after the Second 
World War, mainly as a consequence-of the Gypsies own willingness to 
seize the new work opportunities offered them by an expanding economy. 
Their achievement has created a solid basis for further advance and 
at the same time-has raised the aspirations-of the broad mass of . 
" 
Gypsies and particularly of the younger generation. How these new 
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hopes will find expression is problematic but, given the previous 
historical development in Czechoslovakia, it is a distinct possibility 
that they may eventually be articulated by a Gypsy nationalist 
movement forming part of a broader socialist opposition to the 
cynically manipulative brand of Stalinism that the Warsaw pact 
invasion re-established in Czechoslovakia. 
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APPENDIX ONE : 
- MARXIST-LENINIST NATIONALITY THEORY - 
aims to substantiate the claim made in Chapter Three that, rather 
than consisting of a single unified body of doctrine on which all 
leading theorists are in agreement, Marxist-Leninist nationality 
theory contains two alternative and conficting interpretations which 
have been opposed in Marxist debate from the time of 
M°' ant 
E hjels until the present-day polemics of Soviet academicians. 
These rival approaches to ethnic community development point to 
diametrically opposed policies to be pursued by a socialist state. 
THE ASSI14ILATIONIST APPROACH sees nationality as little 
more than a temporary by-product of class formation and, 
as such, having no value other than as a possible means 
to hasten the socialist revolution. Nationality and other 
forms of ethnicity consequently have no positive signific- 
ance when the socialist era is reached and will disappear 
rapidly before the communist phases 
The Policy for a Socialist State should therefore be to 
encourage the assimilation 'merging') of national and 
ethnic minorities, interpreting any resistance by them 
as due to reactionary elements, guilty of bourgeois 
nationalism. 
THE PLURALIST APPROACH acknowledges a greater continuity 
of ethnic identity under pre- and post-capitalist 
conditions. Capitalism created great inequalities between 
nations and between nationalities and consequently interests 
and accompanying loyalties often followed ethnic rather 
than class lines. The socialist revolution,. in, itself, 
does not eradicate these inequalities automatically and 
further deterioration of relations can only be avoided by 
a conscious and determined programme to redress the 
balance. Any assimilation during the socialist"period 
will only take place if entirely voluntary and probably 
only after, a virtual renaissance of ethnic communities. 
The Policy for a Socialist State should therefore be to 
encourage the development 'flourishing'), of, national and 
ethnic minorities, - interpreting any resistance by majority 
groups as due, to reactionary elements, guilty of "great 
power chauvinism decked by a mask of internationälism. tI 
(Stalin); 
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APPENDIX TWO : 
NATIONALITY PROBLEMS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. 
It is difficult for most Western readers to appreciate the 
complexity and intensity of inter-ethnic relations in central Europe 
and in particular the deep roots and continuing relevance of ethnicity. 
Czechoslovakia is no exception for throughout its brief half- 
century of existence as an independent state the ethnic diversity of 
its inhabitants has been a major consideration governing policy and 
during the Republic's severest crises has played a crucial role. 
For this reason, if for no other, the 'gypsy question' should be 
seen against the background of the broader problem of ethnic relations 
and not, as is customary, as some unique and isolated problem in its 
own right. 
Chapter Three has already-given some idea of the contemporary 
political context of the 1958 policy which indicated that there was 
a general assimilatory approach towards national minorities in post- 
War Czechoslovakia where, as the local authority manual declared, 
"the national question. .. is subordinated to the tasks of building 
socialism in our state". 
The origin of these assimilatory pressures is not to be found in 
a desire to establish complete and unified control over the country 
which was in any way peculiar to the post-War communist administration 
but can be traced to the contradiction inherent in the 1918 creation 
of the First Republic as a purported nation-state composed largely of 
national minorities. The rulers' fear of the divisive power of nation- 
alism, so evident in the 1950s, was no new phenomenon in Czechoslovakian 
history but the continuation of an unbroken tradition of inter-ethnic 
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rivalry, ultimately deriving from the unequal development of the 
Habsburg Empire. 
As such the development of Czechoslovakia is an interesting 
case-history to set against the general Marxist-Leninist nationality 
theory outlined in the previous appendix. 
APPEI' DIX THREE : 
- MINORITIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
first examines the vain search by political theorists to discover 
objective criteria or nationality or minority status and then makes 
a brief comparison of the attempt of the United Nations to guarantee 
minority rights to that of Marxist-Leninist nationality theory. 
APPENDIX FOUR : 
- PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT GYPSIES - 
gives examples of the extreme hostility of Czechs towards Gypsies, 
expressed in a public opinion survey conducted in Ostrava in the 
late 1960s. This is of particular interest since such opportunities 
to vent feelings on sensitive issues are rarely offered by the 
strictly-controlled media of the socialist bloc. A slightly later 
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CHAPTER TWO. 
THE HISTORY OF THE GYPSIES IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. 
The historical material in this chapter is presented 
as a necessary introduction to the later policy pursued 
towards Gypsies in post-Second World War Czechoslovakia. 
The chapter also seeks to locate Czechoslovakian develop- 
ments in a wider European context and to dispel certain 
misconceptions about Gypsies widespread among both 
writers and legislators. 
To aid the reader in following the narrative against 
a background of shifting political boundaries and ethnic 
balance a table is provided at the end of this chapter 
laying out the major changes in this complex region. 
Ways of Looking at Gypsy History. 
Any general historian of the Gypsies is faced with the problem of 
attempting the overall account of a population estimated at more than 
seven million (Puxon : 4)* and spread throughout the world in a diaspora 
only equalled by that of the Jews. Confronted with such an inevitable 
divergence of historical experience it is hardly surprising that the 
chronicler has usually sought some unifying theme to bind together his 
widely varied material. 
By far the most common device has been to focus on cultural 
homogeneity, arguing that wherever they have travelled the Gypsies have 
retained their ethnic distinctness by deliberately preserving a specific 
culture and, with it, a consciousness of themselves as a separate, 
secret'-community, systematically shunning the"largely hostile non-Gypsy 
societies that surrounded them - apart from the minimum contact necessary 
All references are given in full at the end of each chapter. 
QrýVýßý 
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to gain a livelihood. In this vein Jean-Paul Clebert, perhaps the 
most widely read modern historian of the Gypsies, wrote: 
the Gypsies ... are the unique example of an ethnic 
whole perfectly defined, which, through space and time 
for more than one thousand years, and beyond the 
frontiers of Europe, has achieved success in a gigantic 
migration - without ever having consented to any alter- 
ation as regards the originality and singleness of their 
race. 
(Clebert : 17) 
This type of approach was first developed in the nineteenth century 
when the Gypsy was presented as a home-grown version of the 'noble 
savage', an exotic primitive who scorned to become an agricultural or 
industrial labourer and wandered at will through the countryside communing 
with Nature. Although loosely based on the nomadic Gypsies of western 
Eirope this romanticised stereotype owed as much to an emotional 
rejection by the Gypsiologist of routine life in industrial society as 
it did to his knowledge of Gypsy communities. * The predominance of the 
stereotype proved a mixed blessing for whilst a number of gifted 
enthusiasts were attracted to Gypsy studies, they usually came with 
pre-conceived notions of the Gypsy's significance as a symbol of freedom 
and consequently the manner in which they presented their findings often 
served to perpetuate the illusion of a people strangely untouched by 
wider society. This helps to explain the rather puzzling inflexibility 
that characterises assertions of the unitary nature of Gypsy culture but 
more particularly the insistent identification of nomadism as its kernel. 
It is hardly fortuitous that the most rapidly industrialising 
country,, England, should. have generated the greatest interest 
in Gypsies. -(e. g. the founding of the, Gypsy Lore Society in 
i 888) "ß__.. ... 
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On the whole the legacy of this approach has been a sad one for 
even in the case of England - the paradigm - the popularisation of a 
myth in the nineteenth century helped to obscure the complex and 
developing relationship between Gypsy and industrial society. Some of 
the bitter confusion in the twentieth century derives directly from the 
contradiction between the stereotype, static and artificial even at the 
time of its creation (and yet which permeated the consciousness of 
legislators), and the conflicting reality of a dynamic Gypsy economy 
which has continued to respond to industrial development. 
Elsewhere in Europe this approach has proved more obviously 
inadequate to explain the general development of Gypsy history, presenting 
writers with the dilemma of either abandoning their quest for the unitary 
culture or else providing special, alternative explanations of patterns - 
which diverge from their chosen model. Yet it is indicative of the 
entrenched influence of this approach that even so careful and authorit- 
ative a researcher as Clebert, who explicitly rejected the romanticised 
stereotype (ibid.: 123), should still have followed the dubious path of 
seeking a "common denominator" of Gypsy culture,, (ibid.: 20,201). This 
he located in "their ancestral nomadism" (ibid.: 222), arguing that 
"the Gypsy is primarily and above all else a nomad. His dispersion 
throughout the world is due less to historical or political necessities 
than to his own nature". (ibid. : 246). 
Where settling had occurred, it was attributed to degeneration. 
The sedentary Gypsies are generally'excludedýpeople, " 
groups or families or couples who have founded a 
family and who have been banned'from the clans or 
made 'maTime', that is 'unclean' because of serious 
violations of the Tradition. 
(ibid. : 246). 
i 
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The implausibility of this as a general explanation is apparent when 
it is'realised that the countries with the largest Gypsy populations are 
in eastern birope where the majority of Gypsies are not only 'sedentary' 
but have been so for centuries and therefore that Clebert's "groups or 
families or couples" in fact must number more than a million people. In 
Clebert's awkward reformulation - "the great majority of authentic Gypsies 
are-still uncompromising nomads". (ibid. : 247) 
1 
my emphasis] - he 
unconsciously conceded that his thesis of cultural unity was saved more 
by his action as self-appointed custodian of 'authentic Gypsy culture', 
as he conceived of it, than as a chronicler of choices actually made by 
Gypsies in concrete historical situations. 
Another, relatively modern, way of seeking to unify the range of 
Gypsy experience has been to focus not on their supposed cultural homo- 
geneity but on the almost universal discrimination they have suffered as 
a despised minority. This method was adopted by Kenrick and Puxon with the 
justification that: 
Attitudes right across western and northern Europe 
varied little and we have for this reason generally 
ignored political frontiers. We have not attempted 
to follow national trends in anti-Gypsy thought and 
action; it is a European phenomenon with which we 
are dealing in which the different social groups -, 
peasants, clergy and'nobility - have played their 
part. 
(Kenrick and Puxon : 18)' 
Although effective in revealing the extent and continuity of hostility 
towards Gypsies, this approach also carries the suggestion that the 
persecution of Gypsies was somehow undifferentiated and consequently 
inexplicable in-historical terms. If they were persecuted'no matter what 
the conditions or the situation, how could ofie... start trying to understand 
this persecution? And what would be the point anyway, °for"perhaps it"would 
always be there? 
1 
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A more fruitful approach would seem tobe to probe the variety of 
Gypsy experience in specific historic situations rather than stressing 
its universal nature. For example; under what conditions did Gypsies 
settle? in what circumstances were they persecuted in certain ways? 
General answers are difficult to provide but even particular answers 
are not easy, largely because of the way in which much previous data has 
been presented. Historians almost invariably, and understandably ignored 
Gypsies. Gypsiologists frequently, and unforgivably, ignored history. 
They wrote myopically about these people almost as if the Gypsies were 
the sole arbiters of their fate whereas, as a dispersed and vulnerable 
minority, it was far more likely that their history would be more a tale 
of what was done to them than of what they themselves had done. Even 
this tale has to be considered in a broader context, for most authorities 
had far more pressing difficulties to contend with than complaints against 
a few Gypsies, so when action was taken against them perhaps this was 
only part of an attempt to resolve more general problems. The possibility 
is worth bearing in mind. 
The Important Case of Czechoslovakia. 
A survey of the history of Gypsies in Czechoslovakia has the 
additional advantage of possessing a more general significance, for the. 
territory of the present-day Republic straddles the-frontier,, of, what . 




To the west, in the Czech lands of'Bohemia and Moravia, the pattern 
has been similar to. that in. Germany, -France and England where Gypsies---v, - 
were usually regarded as, worthless pests by the authorities, who either 
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ignored them or legislated savagely to expel and execute them in order 
to deter further immigration. In western Europe Gypsies are still 
largely nomads to this day. 
However in Slovakia, the eastern part of the Republic which until 
1916 was part of Hungary, * the pattern resembles that of the Danube 
lands and the Balkans. From their first appearanae there Gypsies were 
often seen as potentially valuable, for their labour power and as taxable 
subjects, and in consequence they were permitted, encouraged and even 
forced to settle by local authorities or the state. This development 
is fully compatible with the relatively heavier norms of feudal 
exploitation in eastern Europe. (Anderson : 313). It is these areas 
that still have the largest Gypsy populations, mainly settled, although 
there have always been some nomadic groups. 
To what extent these divergent patterns can be attributed to 
dissimilar Gypsy aspirations and to what extent to the limited options 
available in different socio-economic conditions is a c_anplex problem 
beyond the scope of this chapter. If it were soluble it would require, 
at least a set of detailed historical studies explaining Gypsy relations 
with various social classes and groups during successive periods. and 
seeking to link those relations to more fundamental developments. 
Probably the major differences between the western and eastern patterns 
are due to underlying modes of economic development (capitalist industrial- 
isation/feudal ruralism) and associated methods of state formation 
(nation. - states/multi-national states) but this would need careful 
demonstration (viz. Kenrick and Puxon t 43,; Anderson : 303). 
See the note at the end of this chapter for a table of states and 
peoples inhabiting them. 
N 
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It is not suggested, of course, that all Gypsies or all authorities 
always conformed to the pattern appropriate to their geographical area, 
but that as a model these rough generalisations prove helpful in under- 
standing the varied trends of Gypsy history in Europe up to the present. 
It is particularly important to the later argument of this thesis 
to show that, for whatever reason, the history of Gypsies in Slovakia - 
the homeland of virtually all adult Gypsies in Czechoslovakia today - 
has not been that of uncompromising nomadism as in the Czech lands. 
Instead it has been akin to that of settled immigrants attempting to 
penetrate the host economy, although blocked beyond a certain point by 
a system of social relations which imprisoned them in an inferior, caste- 
like position. As one of its principal themes, therefore, the first 
part of this chapter shows the early establishment of these two different 
patterns in the Czech lands and Slovakia. 
The administrators who framed the 1958 assimilation policy failed 
to appreciate this crucial difference because, in spite of their allegedly 
historical approach, they also shared some of the tenets of the romanticis- 
ing view. Although claiming to explain the development of the Gypsies as 
a response to oppressive socio-economic conditions, they clung neverthe- 
less to the belief that there was an inner, untouched core of Gypsy 
culture, central to which was the trait of nomadism, that had been 
preserved by centuries of social isolation and was still relevant to 
their present-day behaviour. 
It was this conviction that led them to identify the post-Second 
World War mass movement of Gypsies, from their segregated settlements 
in rural Slovakia to the industrial regions of the Czech lands, as self- 
evidently nomadic; a minimum of research would have suggested the more 
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plausible alternative characterisation of rural-to-urban migration. 
Indeed, given the analysis of Gypsy history in Slovakia as a pattern of 
early and continuing settlement, the phenomenon of such migration would 
be a natural extension of the prior trend towards increased integration, 
made possible for the first time by a revolutionary change in social 
relations. 
However the 1958 policy-makers were by no means unique in their 
belief in inherent Gypsy nomadism and while their approach bears a closer 
overall resemblance to the eighteenth century Ha4sburg attempt at total 
Gypsy assimilation than to the intervening partial solutions of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the 1958 legislation has 
features in common with the western-style 1880s'and 1927 measures, 
designed in the industrialising Czech lands with nomadic Gypsies primarily 
in view. For this reason the second part of this chapter also traces the 
development of the 'modern' policy of harassment of Gypsies, common to 
almost all westdrn European countries, as well as showing the continuation 
of the previous patterns of nomadism in the Czech lands and settlement 
in Slovakia until the outbreak of the Second World War. 
rýf-ýFf 
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PART ONE - EARLY HISTORY. 
Early Settlement in the Danube Lands. 
The Gypsies left their original homeland in northern India around 
1000 A. D. This much has been established by linguistic and later, genetic 
research, but their precise origin, their form of society and the reason 
for their exodus westwards will probably never be known. They reached 
Europe by the early fourteenth century, crossing from Asia Minor by way 
of Crete and the Peloponnesus, and continued their diaspora westwards 
and northwards. 
By the end of the fourteenth century they were already settled in 
large numbers in the Balkans and Danube lands where a relatively 
undeveloped economic structure and primitive technology gave Gypsy 
smiths and cobblers the chance to compete with local artisans. Rhlers 
soon incorporated the newcomers into their social and economic order by 
permitting them to work and imposing taxes or-else simply by making 
serfs of them. 
From their first appearance in Serbia (1348), Gypsies were "shoeing 
smiths or harness makers, paying an annual tribute of forty horse-shoes" 
(quoted Clebert : 56) and soon "in Serbia at least they largely replaced 
local smiths because their handiwork proved superior". (Kenrick and 
Puxon : 24). Although economically integrated, Gypsies remained a 
separately identifiable group and like other ethnic communities in the 
Balkans, they often formed their' own'quarter in towns, specialising in 
a limited number of occupations. Despite their initial success the 
Gypsies proved unable to maintain their position since their competitors 
were better placed to utilise state power in their own interests. Con- 
sequently "Serbian coppersmiths held a protected monopoly in the Banat''' 
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during the seventeenth century, Gypsies being barred by law from 
manufacturing copper utensils". (ibid : 55). Yet probably because 
of the slow rate of economic development there was a need of Gypsy 
productive capacity for many centuries and rather than banning their 
metal-working outright, the more usual way of controlling their 
competition was to limit their production to that of simpler and less 
profitable items. 
The Guild of Locksmiths at Miskolc in 
[northern] Hungary 
canvassed successfully in 1740 for an order stopping 
Gypsies doing any metalwork outside their tents. As can 
be imagined this restricted them to small operations. 
(ibid : 55) 
Some of the earliest references to Gypsies in the Danube states 
mention them as serfs. In 1340 a Serbian vejvoda (local ruler) presented 
Gypsy faOilies to a cloister as serfs and in 1387 the ruler of upper 
Wallachia presented another cloister with forty Gypsy families. (Horväthovä: 
35). It is impossible to estimate what proportion of Gypsies became 
serfs; however, documents suggest that the drive to enserf them was 
strongest in Wallachia and Moldavia (present-day Rumania),, where the 
flourishing fourteenth-century transport trade to the Black Sea ports 
created serious labour shortages in other sectors which Gypsies were 
used to meet - as smiths, weapon-makers, masons and brick-layers. (viz. 
Panaitescu : 58-72 esp. 64,65). In Rumania Gypsies were finally freed 
from slavery only in 1864. 
A mixed system apparently operated in Hungary (and Serbia), according 
to the numerous records of them in Hungary during the fourteenth century 
(e. g. 1329,1377,1381,1400 etc. ) and a knight from Spis (east Slovakia) 
noted in a contemporary chronicle that Gypsies wandered in the nearby 
woods, obviously not serfs. (Horväthovä : 36). However the most widespread 
39 
early pattern in fourteenth and fifteenth century Slovakia was for 
Gypsies to settle around feudal castles. There are frequent references 
to Gypsies as castle musicians and smiths and they provided a complete 
v 
range of services at the important Spis castle ( where, in 1423, Emperor 
Sigismund furnished a letter of safe-conduct to one of the first Gypsy 
groups to enter western Europe). Previously at Spis various tasks such 
as wood gathering, preparing and serving food and grooming horses and 
hunting dogs had been performed by the villagers of nearby Beharovce to 
such an extent that castle servants were known as 'Beharr, but during 
the fifteenth century these peasant 'Behars' were replaced by Gypsies. 
(horvathova : 97). 
The most frequehtly mentioned male Gypsy occupation at this time 
was that of soldier especially during the latter half of the fourteenth 
century following the Turkish invasion of Hungary. The Hungarian 
vejvoda Drakula used Gypsy soldiers against the Turks in 1462 and the 
Hungarian kings commented favourably about Gypsy soldiers in 14,76 ; 1487, 
1492 and 1496. (ibid. : 97). 
Not all Gypsies settled, though, for fifteenth century sources 
refer to nomadic bands living by fortune-telling, magical healing and 
theft. At the start of the sixteenth century various robber bands, 
including Gypsy groups, preyed on the important Polish-Slovakian trade 
route and in-1500 the accounts book of the town of Bardejov'(east 
Slovakia) recorded payments-made in compensation to traders robbed by 
Gypsies. (ibid : 98) 
Social differentiation was therefore extreme among Gypsies from 
their first appearance in Slovakia for while some lived the precarious 
life of robbers in the woods, others sought employment and protection 
from the ruling nobility and were fortunate that conditions permitted 
their skills to be utilised. ' A few won social standing and occasionally 
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even knighthood for distinguished service as soldiers or musicians and 
contemporary portraits of celebrated Gypsy violinists show them dressed 
in the fashion of lesser Magyar nobility. Gypsies, like many immigrant 
groups elsewhere, naturally saw their best chance to establish them- 
selves in professing loyalty to the ruling group, but the-isolation of 
such newly-settled Gypsies from the Slovak and Magyar* peasantry made 
them vulnerable to manipulation by their protectors, a situation which 
feudal lords were not slow to exploit. 
A major Hungarian peasant uprising which had spread to southern 
Slovakia was crushed in 1514 by the Palatine, Jan Zapolsky. He then 
executed the 'peasant king', as the leader of the revolt was ironically 
called, by seating him on an iron throne, which was then heated, and 
finally placing a red-hot iron crown on his head. These gruesome torture 
implements were forged by a large group of travelling Gypsy smiths who 
had previously manufactured weapons for the Archbishop of Pecs in 
Hungary. (Horväthovä : 99). "Some time later the Lord of Czernabo, 
an enemy of Zäpolsky, had these same Gypsies imprisoned and impaled 
alive". (Clebert : 101). 
Zäpolsky was later (1526) an unsuccessful contender for the throne 
of Hungary and to revenge himself on the Slovakian towns which had 
supported his Ha$sburg opponent, he used Gypsies to set fire (in 1534) 
to four of the most important Slovakian towns; Kosice, Levoca, Sabinov 
and Bardejov. Some of'the Gypsy incendiaries were captured and confessed 
that they had orders from Zapolsky to burn a total of thirteen Slovakian 
towns, which was confirmed by written instructions found on them. 
(Horväthova : 100). 
Viz. footnote on page 100. 
41 
Such manipulation of Gypsies by feudal lords in the class struggles 
of the sixteenth century must have worsened relations with the Slovak 
peasantry and burghers, but evidently not to the extent of preventing 
further settlement by Gypsies around Slovakian towns and villages, as 
many documents testify. For example, in 1563 Gypsies were permitted to 
settle at Liptovsky Hrädok (central Slovakia) by the regional authorities 
to work as smiths, making simpler implements for local farmers as well 
as weapons for the bight watchmen. (ibid. ) 
As well as an apparent increase in the numbers of Gypsies voluntarily 
settling during the 16th century, feudal lords renewed their attempts 
to enserf them. In 1538 Zpolsky ordered the nobility to respect the 
'traditional freedom of Gypsies', although this was probably in order to 
monopolise them himself. In 1557 his widow appointed Hungarian nobles 
as 'vejvody' of the Gypsies, which was merely a device for taxing 
Gypsies at the rate of one florin annually per head. 
First Arrivals in Western Europe. 
The early history of the Gypsies in westerh Europe'is strikingly 
different. The first undisputed reference to Gypsies in the Czech lands 
was, significantly, the 1399 entry in the Book of Executions of the 
Lords of Rozmberk where "as well as some-Germans from Austria-in the 
robber band in South Bohemia was some black gypsy, the groom of Ondrej". 
(Davidovä : 15)" 
From the beginning of-the fifteenth century references to Gypsies 
became more frequent and more detaile46til in 1417, a remarkable group,. -`. 
several hundred strong, appeared in Hungary. After travelling westwards 
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across Slovakia and Bohemia, * the large company divided into groups which 
were later to appear in North Germany, Bavaria, Rome, Paris and Barcelona. 
Posing as penitents from Little Egypt* on a pilgrimage of expiation, these 
travelling groups aroused the attention of western Europe, partly because 
of their unusual appearance and the apparent nobility of their leaders 
but also because they were supported by impressive letters granting them 
safe-conduct and jurisdiction over their own people. The Gypsy bands 
made a livelihood by soliciting alms, performing magic, telling fortunes, 
buying and selling horses, dancing and tumbling, and also petty thieving; 
all occupations compatible with, or even requiring, homadism. 
Their obvious difference from Gypsies previously settled in eastern 
Europe has usually prompted the explanation that they were simply a 
different tribe of Gypsies. 
Itampach, 
a noted Czech Gypsiologist, believed 
that "they did not come from Hungary, where Gypsies were already established, 
but from the Orient to Europe with the Turks". (quoted Horvathovä : 44). 
However, a straightforward account of their appearance as the unplanned 
intrusion of a primitive nomadic tribe practicing their traditional 
occupations is inadequate, as Horvathovä has convincingly argued, because 
the newcomers seem more, rather than less sophisticated than most Gypsies 
in the Balkans at that time. 
It almost appears as if they made a careful market survey before 
their arrival for they knew western European languages and soon possessed 
accurate maps and almanacs indicating fairs (Clebert : 68) and their 
Hence the names for these Bohemien Gypsy, 
, 
people 
_s gitan, gitano etc. 'Little Egypt' may derive from the contemporary German' term 
for the Turkish-dominated Middle-East - 'Klein Egypten' (Acton : 61). 
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numbers included craftsmen who could make seals and copy official 
documents. Even more remarkable was their initial success in obtaining 
powerful-letters from such rulers as the Holy Roman Emperor Sigismund 
and Pope Martin V by means of an explanation of their origin and nomadism 
which was not only plausible but even meritorious in terms of current 
European values. A compromise explanation is that perhaps these Gypsies 
had travelled directly from 'Little Egypt', where they had previously 
learned of the possibilities of western Europe from Crusaders. 
However, whatever their origin, it is probable that any attempt 
to follow the eastern pattern would have been unsuccessful in western 
Europe at that time, because of the differing conditions. The more 
developed craft industries were better organised to resist penetration 
by intruders and likewise prospects for settling would have been bleak 
during a period when hordes of beggars, discharged soldiers and pedlars 
wandered the roads (ibid. : 63,134). 
Whether they had any feasible alternative is doubtful but the 
strategy they adopted could only have succeeded in the short term. 
Inevitably it was soon recognised that their professions (e. g. fortune- 
tellers and magicians) were hardly compatible with their claim to be 
Christian penitents and consequently, the all-important letters of 
protection were not renewed. Deprived of the privileged exemption they 
had previously enjoyed from the harsh anti-vagrancy statutes of-the time, 
Gypsies found their status transformed dramatically from protected 
guests to persecuted outlaws. , 
Within a century of_the first appearance 
of the Gypsies, most countries in western trope had passed savage laws 
to expel them,, often on penalty of death. (viz. Kenrick and Fsixon : 42,43). 
In German lands legislation expelling Gypsies as alleged Turkish 
spies was enacted at the end of the fifteenth century, but it was not 
44 
until the mid-sixteenth century that similar measures were taken in 
the neighbouring Czech lands, when Gypsies were accused of aiding the 
invading lurks by starting the fires which broke out in Prague in 1541. 
Official lethargy in implementing such laws is evident from their 
frequent renewal and despite a not unrealistic fear of hired incendiaries, 
it is possible that the legislation was intended more as a sop to public 
opinion, a convenient way of demonstrating that the authorities were 
taking some positive action against the growing Turkish threat. At 
times popular feeling must have been extreme, for in 1556 it was necessary 
to forbid the drowning of Gypsy women and children (Horväthovä : 59); 
yet during the same period there are records of alms and letters of 
commendation granted to Gypsies by Czech town councils. (Horväthovä : 58; 
Smerglovä : 46). Although some Gypsies were killed or driven out, 
others continued to travel the Czech lands, plying their usual trades 
as fortune-tellers and horse-dealers. 
Gypsy Persecution and Economic Development in Western Dirope. 
All over western &rope the level of Gypsy persecution, which had 
been rising since the early sixteenth century, seemed to reach a crescendo 
in the seventeenth century but then to diminish sharply again in the 
eighteenth. It ran parallel, in fact, to the growth and then virtual 
disappearance of the associated problems of vagrancy and banditry as a 
centralised, national authority was gradually established and those who 
had been displaced from their holdings by war, famine and changes in 
land tenure were gradually reabsorbed, into the new class and social 
structures of the developing capitalist economy. 
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While the Gypsies were seen by the authorities as perhaps the least 
tractable element in the troublesome, chronic condition of banditry that 
accompanied the transition from a pre-capitalist to a capitalist system, 
punitive action against them was deemed necessary. Once the social 
transformation had destroyed the kind of agrarian society which gave 
birth to bandits and the kind of peasantry which nourished them and the 
great age of social banditry (from the sixteenth to the eighteenth 
century) was past (Hobsbawm : 23), the Gypsies remained as a minor and 
isolated irritant to be dealt with on an 'ad hoc' local level rather 
than meriting major national legislation. 
In France Louis XIV enacted a law in 1660 to regulate the carrying 
of firearms by "foreigners and strangers, 
[including "those who are 
called Bohemians or Egyptians"], ... in order that, above all, the 
open country shall be safe and the main highways rendered free and safe 
for the freedom of commerce and travellers". Acknowledging the failure 
of earlier measures to rid the countryý, of Gypsies, a 1682 declaration by 
the same monarch condemned Gypsy men to the galleys 'in perpetuity', 
women to have their heads shaved and subsequently flogged and banished 
if rediscovered, and children to the poorhouse. "This was the first 
time that these people became in France the object-of prosec7ations'as a 
[specific, 
minority group", as opposed to being covered'by general 
legislation against vagrancy. ' I (Clebert: 69,90). Less than a decade 
after issuing this declaration, Löuis was to make use of Gypsy incendiaries 
to burn Prague. 
Although the' 1682 measures were repeated in 1740, by this time the 
" Gypsies were not to be expelled but were commanded "to take jobs, to put 
themselves in a fit condition to serve in them, or to go to work cultivating 
the land, or engage in other kinds of work or in trades of which they are 
capable". (quoted Clebert : 90). 
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Measures against Gypsies in Britain generally matched those in 
force against vagrancy, although a Scottish law of 1609 - offering 
Gypsies the alternative of banishment or death - resulted in a temporary 
spate of mutilations and executions. 
In 1627 there was inaugurated a policy of pressing 
the gypsies for military service abroad ... but 
they offered armed resistance to the attempts to 
impress them, and some took refuge in Ireland. 
(Tinkers in Scotland : 7). 
Thereafter the expedient of transporting Gypsies to the labour-starved 
colonies was more commonly adopted, as it was by the other western 
European colonial powers, in this way continuing the Gypsy diaspora., in 
particular to the Americas and Australasia. 
Special anti-Gypsy legislation fell into disuse during the eighteenth 
century and "the last trial in which the charge of being Egyptians formed 
part of the indictment was ... in 1770". (Simson : 133). 
The situation in Prussia was exacerbated by the Thirty Years' War 
and its protracted aftermath. In an attempt to deter vagrants and 
Gypsies from entering his kingdom, Frederick William (1713-1740) erected 
signs depicting ga11owson the frontiers to warn them of the consequences. 
(Horvathova : '57)o In desperation, 'since arrest meant death`anyhow, some 
German Gypsies formed themselves into combat groups for self-preservation. 
One of the biggest confrontations occurred in 1722 when a thousand armed 
Gypsies, 
-bringing with . 
them a light artillery, fought a battle against 
regular soldiers! '., "(Kenrick: and Puxon : 47). 
11 Iater'in the eighteenth century the persecution of Gypsies 'was" 
abandoned'in favour of attempts'to settle them, as had become the""" 
practice in the neighbouring Habsburg lands. ' 
I- 
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The Czech Lands and Slovakia in the Age of Darkness. 
The advent of capitalism was greatly retarded under the Hapsburg 
rule throughout the Erpire's central European lands but the pattern of 
Gypsy development in the Czech lands resembles that of other western 
European countries during this period, although the policy reversal 
from persecution to a degree of tolerance in the mid-eighteenth century 
was more dramatic than elsewhere. The savagery of the late seventeenth 
century.. measures was unmatched in Europe at the time, with the possible 
exception pf Prussia, and was succeeded by the benevolent yet determined 
assimilatory attempt of Empress Maria Theresa. Meanwhile events in 
Slovakia and the rest of Hungary, although reflecting the turmoil in 
the Czech and German lands to the west, represented a continuation of 
the previous 'eastern' development. 
The period of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century is 
known to Czechs as the 'Age of Darkness' for the disastrous defeat at 
White Mountain near Prague in 1620 marked the beginning of three centuries 
of subjugation under Austrian rule, while the subsequent Thirty Years' 
War (1618-1648) left the country'in a state of utter devastation. The 
economy was shattered, about a third of agricultural land lay uncultivated, 
plague and famine were rife'and the population in Bohemia stood at only 
half its pre-war level. 'ý `ý ' 
During these troubled years the great lords had increased their 
landholdings from a third (before 1620) to nearly two thirds of all the 
Czech lands and the conditions of the remaining serfs rapidly worsened as 
these landowners tried to compensate for the labour shortage by raising 
the labour rent ('robota')'from three tonine days'a year (before 1620), 
to a massive threeto five days a-week. '(Atlan t'19). These' increased 
N 
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demands sparked off widespread peasant uprisings in 1680,1695,1711, 
1713 and 1732, which were violently suppressed by imperial troops and 
answered by corvee edicts confirming the serfs' loss of rights in 1680, 
1717 and 1738. 
In the aftermath of war those uprooted from their homes, runaway. -- 
serfs and discharged soldiers wandered the roads of centräl Europe as 
beggars and vagabonds or else formed "a network of robber bands some of 
which persisted for at least another century". (Hobsbawm : 22). Some 
Gypsy groups also gained their livelihood from armed robbery, continuing 
in this way of life until well into the eighteenth century. (Horväthovä 
56)" 
To complicate still further the internal difficulties of the Czech 
lands there was a threat of foreign invasion by the French; meanwhile 
the Turks mounted fresh and more menacing attacks, seizing the southern 
part of Slovakia and then penetrating south Moravia in 1683. 
This same period could well be called the 'Age of Darkness' by 
the Gypsies too, for, as part of the general attempt to re-establish 
order throughout the Czech lands,, determined efforts were made to 
exterminate them if they could not be expelled. The first of a new wave 
of expulsion decrees. was, issued in 1645, three years before the end of 
the War, but this seems to have been as ineffectual as its predecessors. 
Indeed Gypsies served in royal armies during the War, at the same time 
that legislation to, expel them was in force. This had happened before 
and possibly eiisting legislation was used occasionally as a threat to 
press them to enlist. 
In`1686 Leopold fbanished gypsies once more and'a year later the 
proviso was added that every Gypsy, who'did not leave within' three days 
would be hung without mercy. This followed the arrest of incendiaries, 
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including Gypsies, who had set fire to Prague on the orders of the 
French King Louis XIV. * (SVmerglovä : 50). 
Leopold eventually outlawed Gypsies in 1697. Although similar 
legislation in the sixteenth century had been followed by the sporadic 
killing of some Gypsies, this could not compare with the slaughter 
resulting from the 1697 decree. Statistics are not available but accounts 
tell that whole groups were hung, shot or drowned and, especially along 
frontier roads, their corpses were hung from wayside trees as a warning 
to any other Gypsies who might think of entering the country. Later, 
signs were erected, as in Prussia, at state and regional frontiers depicting 
a gallows and bearing the inscription : "This is the penalty for Gypsies 
entering Bohemia". These signs were still widespread on Moravian and 
V' 
Silesian highroads in 1721. (Smerglova : 50,51). 
Another law of 1721 decreed that Gypsy women too should be killed 
and their children placed in orphanages but an amendment of five years 
later decreed that youths and girls were to be mutilated instead. In 
Bohemia the right ear was to be cut off, in Moravia the left, but should 
they return a second time they were to be put to death. (Horväthovä : 
60,61). 
Conditions in Slovakia, as in the Czech lands, deteriorated rapidly 
during the seventtenth century as. a consequence of the Thirty Years' War. 
These difficulties were aggravated further by, an influx of vagrants and 
nomadic Gypsies fleeing the stringent pacification measures of the Czech 
lands and beyond, which provoked retaliatory legislation. Regional. ', - 
Similarly in Slovakia, Gypsies were arrested for setting fire to 
Potok in 1676 andýit"was discovered that a 'French spy had lived nine 
years among them and planned to burn down nearby strongholds. (Horvathovä :. 106). "' ,, I, -.,... ,_. 
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authorities passed numerous decrees expelling Gypsies from towns, villages 
and from the region on the grounds that they were robbers, smugglers, 
plague-carriers, horse-thieves, counterfeiters and beggars. 
However there was a significant difference in the scale and purpose- 
of repression in the Czech lands and Slovakia which is well illustrated 
by the signs erected on the borders of both countries depicting the 
execution of Gypsies. In the Czech lands this fate awaited any Gypsy 
who entered the country, while in Slovakia the threat was to "all nomadic 
Gypsies who did not settle within three weeks of entering Slovakia". 
(Horväthovä : 113). 
This differential treatment of Gypsies cannot be explained by 
greatdr devastation suffered by the Czech lands, for Slovakia too was 
a constant battleground in the triangular struggle between Turks, 
Hapsburg and Hungarians, a situation complicated still further by peasant 
risings and banditry. 
With the eventual defeat of the Turks, the Hapsburg troops were 
withdrawn from Hungary. but this only created the chance for further 
disturbances for: 
... the landowners who made up the Hungarian nation 
were determined to escape the. fate of Bohemia : liberated- 
from the Turks, they rebelled against the Habsburgs and 
in 1707., deposed their, Habsburg king. : The battle of. the ¢:. 
White Mountain was not, however, repeated at their 
.; expense; ;, 
the Habsburg. forces were fully engaged in the,, 
War of the Spanish Succession (1702-13) and could not 
be diverted, to subduing the Hungarian nobles. 
(Taylor : 16). 
,,,, The-inevitable economic disruption-and-breakdown'of law and order 
during, such tumultUous times provided, the motive and the opportunity for 
peasant bandits groups, as well as for marauding gangs of professional 
robbers among which were Gypsy. gangs. This was the heroic age of peasant 
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resistance and the legendary Janosik, a bandit executed in 1713, is 
still remembered in folk song, dance and costume. 
Considering the times it is indeed strange that severer measures 
against Gypsies were not adopted as in the neighbouring Czech lands. 
The explanation lies in the way Gypsies were seen, which in turn derived 
from their different pattern of historical development. 
In the Czech lands to be a Gypsy was inevitably to be nomadic and 
probably unknown to the authorities, more seriously it was to be labelled 
automatically as a worthless and dangerous vagabond or robber and there- 
fore liable to immediate execution. 
Meanwhile, although adopting comparable regulations to expel all 
Gypsies, the Slovakian authorities applied them selectively to allow 
known and useful groups (often settled) to remain, while forcibly 
ejecting suspect newcomers. In 1691, for example, the Novohrad authority 
(central Slovakia) decided that Gypsies already settled could remain, 
provided they remained in one place and obeyed their 'vojvody', who were 
responsible to the regional deputy governor for the good conduct of 
their groups. 
The economic basis for this policy difference is evident from 
contemporary documents listing professions of settled Gypsies (e. g. 
smiths, musicians, basket-, trough- and brush-makers, and exceptionally 
lime-kiln workers and quarrymen) but, equally importantly, showing the 
spread of taxation of Gypsies both by regional (i. e. 'state) and district 
(i. e. feudal) authorities. (Horvathova': 103,104). 
In 1734 in the district of Trebisov (east Slovakia), for example, 
lived twenty-two Gypsy families under their vajdove Peter and Ferencz. 
They appear to have been nomadic although only within the boundaries of 
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the district, owning eleven carts and twenty-two horses (Ferencz alone 
owning seven horses). One family even owned a pair of oxen, which was 
unusual for Gypsies. 
Their duties towards the district were already firmly established. 
In general they made a living as itinerant smiths but regularly once 
a week, one family was required to go to the town of Trebisov to work 
metal, while at harvest time they had to carry water to the fields. At 
Easter the whole group had the pleasanter duty of purchasing a barrel 
of wine from the district. (ibid. : 112). 
Elsewhere taxation was made by regional authorities on behalf of 
the state entirely in money form rather than in services. In 1731 in 
the Gemerskä region (east Slovakia) Gypsy families possessing a tent, 
horse and cart were taxed two gold pieces annually, whilst those without 
horse and cart had to pay one gold piece. Evidently these heavy taxes 
were collected, even from relatively-poor Gypsies. In 1738 twenty-eight 
Gypsy families shared sixteen tents in the Sirk district (Gemerskä region) 
and paid a total of forty-three. gold-pieces. 
It would be a mistake to see this progressive taxation as an 
example of specifically anti-Gypsy legislation for during this period 
in Slovakia there was a great increase in the burden of all tax-payers 
(i. e. commoners, for one of the zealously defended privileges of the 
nobility in Hungary was exemption from state taxes). Previously only 
those with possessions worth at least ten gold pieces were taxed but in 
1737 this threshold was lowered to six gold pieces. At the same time the 
annual tax of one gold piece was ' doubled, ' so that it was`p'ossible for a 
commoner to pay up to a týird of the value of his' possessions in taxes 
each year. (Horväthovä ': 113). 
"-ýý-`. 
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The special, flat -rate taxation of all Gypsies was probably an 
administrative solution to the considerable problem of assessing the 
taxable value of Gypsy possessions. 
The Age of Enlightenment. 
As a consequence of their effective rebellion at the start of the 
century, the Hungarian nobility had been able to conclude an advantageous 
peace, the terms of which were again confirmed by the Pragmatic Sanction 
of 1723. In return for recognising the Habsburg monarch and the nominal 
unity of the Empire, 
Hungary preserved its feudal Diet, its deparate 
existence, and privileges of its landed class. 
Above all, it preserved the 'comitat', the 
institution unique in Europe, of autonomous local 
government. Habsburg administration stopped at 
the Hungarian frontier; Hungary, even in periods 
of absolutism, was administered by elected com- 
mittees of the country gentry, and these would 
never operate measures which ran against their 
privileges. 
(Taylor : 17). 
Two humiliating military defeats at the hands öf'Prussia, `a state 
with only a 'third of the'treasury and'a sixth-of thepopulation of 
Austria, "precipitated two drastic bouts of reforms within the'Hapsburg 
state under 
[the ý2npress ] Maria Theresa: : with the aim of'renovating 
the whole apparatus of 'government". (Anderson : 318)°. 
However the continued autonomy of the Hungarian lands was to 
frustrate her sustained endeavour during the latter half of the century 
to-refashion- the disparate Habsburg lands into ä'nodern, 'centralised 
state, 'thus translating ` the legal unity proclaimed by°the Sanction-into 
54 
a reality. Hungary managed to resist the centralising pressures and 
retain its separate Chancery, its local administration and the immunity 
of its nobility from imperial taxation. To raise money from her 
Hungarian lands, Maria Theresa was forced to resort to a variety of 
indirect means. 
Hungary was treated economically as an Austrian 
colony in mercantilist fashion. Since the Hungarian 
landowners paid no taxes, money was extracted from 
Hungary by heavy taxes on goods imported into Hungary 
from the other Habsburg dominions; and, to maintain 
the yield of these taxes, Hungary was prevented from 
importing from elsewhere or` manufacturing goods her- 
self. This system suited the Hungarian aristocrats; 
the impoverishment of their country was a small 
price to pay for the maintenance of their privileged 
position. 
(Taylor : 19). 
In the Czech lands the Bohemian Chancellery was abolished and 
replaced by a new bureaucracy in Vienna which appointed its own agents 
(Kreishauptmann) in the Czech lands and Austria to enforce central 
justice and administration independently of the provincial Diets of local 
gentry. (Anderson : 318). , 
Relatively a minor part of the overall rationalisationof her realm, 
Maria-Theresa's ambitious plan to settle all Gypsies was none the less 
momentous for it represented a complete reversallof the policy, of expulsion 
and extermination that had been followed undeviatingly; by all her, 
: Habsburg predecessors. In fact, <it had been during the reign of 
; Ferdinand I, the first, Habsburg to rule over the Czech lands, that the 
Congress of, Augsburg had declared, the, murder of a Gypsy to be, no, crime, 
in this way initiating two centuries-of Gypsy persecution. (Smerglovä : 
44).. 
... ýý ._,. 
In place of eliminating`Gypsies forcibly, Maria Theresa hoped=to=ý== 
"achieve a final- solution-, of the perennial- 'Gypsy`-problem' by assimilating 
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them into the peasantry and transforming them into productive workers 
and taxpayers. Although the measures adopted seem intolerably repressive 
by present-day standards they were enlightened for the times, being 
founded on the belief that integration of these ethnic pariahs could 
only be accomplished by firm steps to ensure their effective settlement, 
employment and education. The settlement policy was a dramatic departure 
from previous practice in the Czech lands but was, in principle, compatible 
with long-term developments in the Hungarian lands, which included 
Slovakia. It could even be regarded, with some justification, as the 
attempted acceleration of an already existing trend by means of rational 
planning and control. As such the policy offered a 'prima facie' hope 
of success in those areas inhabited by the vast majority of Gypsies, 
whereas the prospects in the more thinly populated Czech and German lands 
were problematic. 
This sytearatic attempt to integrate Gypsies into eighteenth century 
society is described in some ddtail for itý. is fascinating in its own 
right as well as in the uncanny resemblence it sometimes bears to its 
counterpart in Czechoslovakia two hundred years later, both as regards 
the plan and the reasons for its failure. 
Until the mid-18th century Gypsies generally came under the 
jurisdiction of the centrally appointed regional governor, although even 
in the 17th century many groups of mainly settled Gypsies had already 
-become the responsibility of local gentry. In 1758 the Imperial 
Governor's Council in Bratislava, the capital of Slovakia, issued a 
decree that all Gypsies should henceforth come under the direct jurisdiction 
of the noblemen on whose lands they lived. Nomadic Gypsies should seek a 
lord and any not so doing were to be expelled. Again in 1760 the Council 
instructed noblemen andbailiffs of Imperial estates to allow Gypsies, who 
had as yet no permanent residence, to enter serfs'-villages. 
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This Council, first established in 1723 following the Sanction, was 
to remain the main instrument of Maria Theresa add later of her son and 
successor, Joseph II, for overall administration of Gypsy affairs, 
sending frequent instructions to local Diets and receiving from them in 
return detailed progress reports. From 1758 onwards until the death of 
Joseph II in 1790 the Council pursued a consistent policy advocating the 
settlement and employment of all Gypsies; but it left the local gentry 
and their Diets responsible for on-the-spot implementation. 
The main programme for assimilating the Gypsies throughout the 
Habsburg lands was contained in the 1761 legislation that sought the 
swift destruction of their previous ways of life by a series of wide- 
ranging measures. Gypsies were prohibited from leading a nomadic life, 
from living in huts and tents, from owning horses and horse-dealing, 
from having their own leaders, from eating carrion, from wearing out- 
landish clothes and even from speaking their own Romani language. 
Instead they were to settle in towns and villages; ` living in houses, 
working and dressing like the peasants they were hopefully shortly to 
become. To mark the change - that'Gypsies no longer'existed as such--" 
they were renamed 'Neubauern' (new farmers) or 'Ujmagyar' (new, Hungarians) 
andindividually'were required to adopt-a`"Christian" name (i. e. surname 
and forename) like other people. " (Davidovä': '20; Horväthova, 118-9). 
The same measures were repeated in stricter form in 1773 and again 
by Joseph II in 1782, with the addition that Gypsies were not to be given 
permission- to` marry unless they could prove' their capacity to provide 
for ä wife and-children. ' Most" stringent of all was the' provision' that 
where there were doubts that the chi)dren'would'receive a'disciplined, - 
and Christian upbringing, they were to be taken forcibly from their 
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parents and fostered by the families of Catholic farmers or artisans to 
safeguard their spiritual and moral welfare and so that they might learn 
agricultural work or a trade. In such cases the parents were not allowed 
to visit their children and should they attempt this they were to be 
beaten or imprisoned. 
Foster parents were to be paid twelve gold pieces annually for a 
boy under twelve and a girl under ten years of age and four pieces for 
a girl between ten and fourteen. Girls over fourteen were to work as 
servants in the houses of gentry, burghers or farmers while sturdy boys 
over sixteen were to be enlisted as soldiers. Boys between twelve and 
sixteen or physically weak older boys were to be enrolled with a guild 
to serve as apprentices. The Guilds were required to accept young 
Gypsies without objections and were held responsible for them by the 
local authorities. 
The new houses were to be built on plots provided by their masters 
among the houses of non-Gypsies and the towns and villages were required 
to assist in their construction, financed by the local Diets. The 
previous huts of the Gypsies were to be destroyed and those Gypsies who 
attempted to remain were to be forcibly removed to ordinary houses. 
Gypsies previously living in the woods and mountains were to be moved 
to the plains to limit their opportunities for concealment and possible 
thieving. 
More than one family was forbidden to share the same house for the 
stated reasons of diminishing the numerous feuds among Gypsies and 
reducing the possibility of incest. After the measure of forcibly 
, removing 
Gypsy children had been abandoned, children of different sexes 
were required to sleep innseparate rooms. 
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In place of their previous leaders Gypsies resettled in villages 
were placed under the authority of the village headman, who was also 
responsible for their regular church attendance and their morals, for 
earlier decrees had required Gypsies to marry in church and remain with 
their lawful spouses. Gypsies could only leave their village with a 
pass issued by the village headman or a higher authority, and should 
they neglect to obtain this the penalty was imprisonment. 
As well as the important educative influence of the Church and close 
contact with non-Gypsies, work in itself was intended to play an important 
transforming role. All Gypsies previously unemployed, both men and women, 
were to work in the fields. Local Diets were also to use them for public 
works such as road repairs, ditching, bridge-building etc. The Diets 
had to take particular care "that no Gypsy wasted time on music. When- 
ever he had nothing to do and even his master had no work for him, he 
" was to serve another for wages". If he worked badly he was to suffer 
corporal punishment. (Horväthovä : 119-123). 
It is very difficult to make an accurate assessment of the effects 
of the settlement plan, not for lack of data but because of its unreliab- 
ility. Although local Diets provided frequent progress reports to the 
Imperial Council in Bratislava, these are suspect. " J. H. Schwicker has- 
pointed out what can only be explained as deliberate discrepancies 
between crude census figures compiled by local Diets acid the amended 
totals supplied to the Council. " In the originals the numbersvof Gypsies 
listed as beggars, thieves, musicians and nomads were'higher, -and those 
listed as peasants correspondingly lower, than in the final versions. 
In many cases there is a suspicious absence ýof crude totals. According 
to the regulations the gentry were' expected', to visit all the Gypsies-. 
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settled on their lands every three months and report to the Diet on 
progress in assimilating them. In practice, 
... at best they entrusted this task to the village 
headmen, asking them for the required information. In 
answer to the Imperial Council's questions ... the 
Diets for the most part automatically indicated a 
level of assimilation that they felt would be judged 
as acceptable, even when the situation was far from 
satisfactory. 
(Horväthovä : 124). 
On the other hand numerous court records confirm that vigorous 
action was often taken to fulfil straightforward regulations that 
involved little expense. Speaking Romani and eating carrion were 
punishable by twenty-four strokes of the rod and the more serious 
offences of bigamy and concubinage were usually dealt with in a similar 
way, as the following trial attests. 
[In 1771], Juraj Mika ... was found guilty of 
living with a Gypsy women without being married 
to her and by whom he had children. The court 
sentenced him to sixty strokes of the rod. His 
wife was also brought before the court and when 
asked why she lived with a man without being 
married to him, answered that she loved him. It 
appears that this honest answer angered the judges 
for they gave her, a harsh sentence - thirty days 
in prison and thirty lashes. 
(Horväthovä : 117). 
Most writers on the subject consider the settlement attempt to have 
been asfailure and ; leaving'to-one side the question of-problematic 
official'stätistics, there are certainly good reasons'why the policy 
was unlikely:. to succeed. At the outset it antagonised those whose support 
was vital for its, success.: Nor was this just a, matter of clumsy 'social 
engineering! for, given_, the sharply conflicting class interests within 
the Empire of that period,, it is difficult to see anyway in which a plan 
to settle'Gypsies would not have become yet another counter in the 
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continuing struggle between the Habsburg throne and the gentry, between 
central administration and local authorities. 
Although landowners might have been expected to welcome the prospect 
of new labour-power and feudal rent, they would only attain this if 
nomadic Gypsies could be successfully settled and put to work. The 
initial prohibitively high costs (new housing and training, as well as 
regular payments to foster parents of Gypsy children) were to be met 
entirely by the landowners' Dietsywhile the first rewards went to the 
Imperial coffers in the form of the state tax payable by commoners. In 
view of these factors it is likely that many gentry made a careful 
assessment of investmefit prospects before trying to settle groups of 
nomadic Gypsies; those who appeared a bad risk were simply moved on, 
despite Council instructions to admit them to the serfs' villages. 
In evading their responsibilities the gentry were safe in the 
knowledge that, in its co-ordinating rather than executive role, the 
Imperial Council was in no position to exercise adequate control of 
their Diets. Indeed the Council could only evaluate their performance 
on the basis of evidence that these Diets chose to supply. In this way 
the-very authorities designated as the, main. agents of the policy were 
probably its most effective opponents. 
The lack of. enthusiasm shown by. landowners'was matched, for similar 
reasons, by-that of artisans with whom Gypsy youths were to serve 
gpprenticeships. 
Guild masters defended themselves by every means 
possible from taking Gypsy apprentices. They 
pleaded to the Diets that business :: was so bad-that- 
they could not train even their own sons, let alone 
apprentices from outside. Even when some master 
was forced to accept Gypsies, usually they did not 
not remain'. long, escaping-at thefirst opportunity. - . 
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Understandably the masters did not demand their 
return, rather the opposite - they helped them 
escape. 
(Horväthova : 124). 
Nor can the policy have had great appeal for many Gypsies. The 
forcible nature of many of the measures were unlikely to persuade 
such a people, with its deep historical experience of persecution, 
that a new era of integration had arrived. On settling those things 
dearest to them - their homes, their animals, their music, their 
language and above all their children - were immediately taken from 
them. In their place they found the dreary routine of peasant life, 
burdened with feudal rent, taxes and the constant threat of beatings. 
After arranging such a traumatic beginning to the Gypsies' settled 
life, the planners, 
wanted to achieve great success in a short time. 
They did not even consider the fact that the 
Gypsies had lived a quite different life for 
many centuries and a few years were insufficient 
to change completely their previous way of life. 
. 
(Horväthova 
The strength of their attachment-to"what would appear to-an outsider an 
utterly wretched existence, is'evident-from.: a 1775'report from the 
vicinity of Bratislava. 
New houses were built for them in the town 
and they were moved into them.,, The huts and, 
shacks outside the town where they had previously 
lived were destroyed.. As. soonas they could, the, 
Gypsies escaped from the new houses and returned 
to their demolished huts.,. 
- . z_ (Horväthovä : 124). 
There is also evidence to support the reasonable supposition that 
many Gypsies tried to escape the measures. - Schwicker argued that after 
1781 the census returns show a marked rise in Gypsy population for those 
regions more lax in enforcing the policy (Mainly in south-west Slovakia) 
and a decrease where Diets were stricter (including Spis). (Horväthovä i 135)" 
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As well as the nomads, those Gypsies already settled opposed the 
policy since they saw any increase in numbers in their own locality as 
a threat to their precarious social position and livelihood too, through 
increased competition. They occasionally petitioned Diets to move bands 
of nomadic Gypsies from the district, usually with justifying accusations 
of theft. 
Yet despite this widespread opposition, it is clear that many 
nomads did settle and that many already settled Gypsies were moved to 
towns and villages during this period. Also, even though Hungary was 
relatively autonomous, local Diets still felt it advisable to make a 
show of conforming to the Council's instructions, at least to the extent 
of submitting reports and statistics, albeit falsified. This was 
especially true of the 1780s when Joseph II made a determined effort to 
bring Hungary finally under the rule of German bureaucrats (Taylor : 20). 
In giving a generalised survey of this period it is necessary to 
bear in mind that local conditions varied greatly and for this reason 
a more concrete idea of. Gypsy settlement can be gained from local census 
data. This is not, complete but indicates that in the early 1780s there 
were possibly 2,500 Gypsy families settled, on Slovakian territory (i. e. 
10,000 to 12,000 persons), with over,. half of, these concentrated in. the 
rich Danube plain and lower. Vah valley, in the south-west. (Horväthovä 
125-133). As might be expected many Gypsies were employed as agricultural 
labourers in these flatter, wheat=growing areas, while in the more 
mountainous northern and eastern regions artisan work predominated. 
-. The_range of contemporary conditions was considerable as is evident 
from the. neighbouring Spisska*, and Gemerska regions in easthrn Slovakia. 
The region of the 1969-79. fieldwork (see Chapter 7 etsq ). 
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The 1775 census of Spis showed 197 scattered families, with only one or 
two families per village; exceptions were Monsek with thirteeh, 
Smizany with nine and Helcmanovce with eight. Settlement was denser in 
the more nounta. Tnourand industrial south (146 families) than in the poorer 
north (51 families). The Gypsies appear to have been relatively integrated 
for all the families were said to live in houses, obey the village head- 
man, not deal in horses or eat carrion, and almost all the families 
paid taxes of around one gold piece annually. More than three-quarters 
dressed in peasant fashion. 
The great majority of families gained their main livelihood as 
smiths (146) but a significant minority as musicians (34), while only 
very few as agricultural labourers (5). One family alone were listed as 
V 
beggars! In the 1780s the Spis Diet considered establishing a large 
workshop, where Gypsy smiths would make and repair implements for the 
region's important iron-ore mines, but in spite of the personal interest 
shown in the scheme by Joseph II, it was never realised. 
Of the Gypsies' 456 children, 124 remained at home with their.. 
parents for stated reasons like deafness, debility and epilepsy, while 
others were taken away from their. parents. Ninety-five boys and 97 
girls worked as servants,. 21 boys learnt a, trade and three were enlisted 
as soldiers. Only three girls attended school. 
In contrast the neighbouring'Gemerskä region' reported 275-Gypsy 
families in"1776'of which onlyýone'lived'in a house in ' the' village' and', 
the remainder in huts ortentsý(29'families) outside the villages. The 
main occupations were'smiths, musicians, agricultural labourers'and '-ý 
beggars. The majority still dressed "in Gypsy fashion', ate carrion"and 
dealt in horses and althoügh. taxed, -paid little because of their poverty., 
All of the children were left with their parents. 
64 
Possibly these different reports reveal more about the attitudes of 
the respective local authorities than they do about the actual conditions 
of the Gypsies living in their regions. 
In the Czech lands the plight of the Gypsies had not altered 
immediately with the accession of Maria Theresa in 1740 for although 
their outlaw Status was revoked in 1744 unsettled cohditions in the wake 
of another war prompted the 1749 Imperial Patent "on expelling Gypsies, 
vagrants and foreign beggars from the land". However, when the full 
settlement policy was applied to the indigenous nomadic Gypsy population 
a decade later it is probable that their numbers, at an times relatively 
small, were considerably below the former levels, since Gypsies had 
regularly fled eastwards throughout the previous hundred years to escape 
successive waves of persecution. 
In most cases the authorities in the Czech lands must have been too 
pre-occupied with the resistance of the serfs to their crushing conditions 
to pursue any major integration of Gypsies into the peasantry during the 
late eighteenth century. As well as being subject to rent and heavy 
labour obligation, serfs were often not allowed to marry, seek' employment 
outside their estate, or send their children to study without the 
permission of the lord. (Salzmann : 5). After a quarter of a million 
people, or one tenth of the population of Bohemia, had died of famine or 
disease following crop failures in the'early 1770s, the'mounting unrest 
culminated in the widespread uprisings of 1775. Although the rebellion 
was suppressed militarily within two months, Maria Theresa granted a 
"general pardon" and thereafter sought . to abolish the labour obligation 
and to redistribute manorial land to the peasantry. "The noble land- 
owners, jealously guarding their, privileges, were anything but co-operative 
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in this effort and managed to frustrate whatever constructive moves the 
government initiated" to such an extent that the reforms "could be carried 
out only on estates under state control". (ibid : 7,8). 
Joseph II managed to abolish labour obligation throughout the Empire 
in 1789 but this reform was short-lived and the final emancipation of 
the serfs (including many Gypsies) only came with the revolutions of 
1848. However Joseph's guarantee of peasants' security of tenure 
remained in force, as did his restriction against the transfer of 
peasants' land to the nobility. "His principal motive was, no doubt, to 
prevent the increase of 'dominical' land, which paid less taxes and in 
Hungary none; the effect, none the less, was to preserve 
Ca landholding] 
peasantry ... and, paradoxically, the great aristocracy ... 
{for 
with the] shift to a money economy ... the great nobles received large 
sums and turned capitalist with them". (Taylor : 21). 
For all their greater control of local government in the Czech 
lands, the Habsburgs' Gypsy policy proved insufficient, in itself, to 
reverse the previous nomadic trend and when the policy eventually 
lapsed with the death of Joseph II in 1790, Gypsies continued, to wander 
much as they had before. There were some isolated successes in 
settling Gypsies$ particularly in south-Moravia (Noväcek :, 19,86) and 
it is significant that the leaders of the emerging Czech Gypsy - Rom 
Association of the'late 1960s were descended-from inhabitants, of these 
settlements. 
As this historical account-shows, 'the reasons why the Habsburg 
Gypsy policy failed are many and varied. ' Were adequate and 'reliable 
evidence available a fuller sociological"explanation would require a 
thorough analysis of: the conflicting interests of the principal social 
11 
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elements involved - monarchy, gentry, peasantry and Gypsies - and, in 
addition, a study of the manipulation of the politico-economic levers 
at the disposal of the agents of the two most powerful contestants, the 
Imperial bureaucracy and the feudal Diets. 
Yet even from this brief examination it is evident that the 
reduction of such a many-sided struggle to the most commonly accepted 
stereotyped explanation - of well-intentioned but uncomprehending 
government action thwarted by uncompromising Gypsy 'traditionalism' - 
is to ignore and distort its complexity. Clebert's simplistic assessment, 
that "Maria Theresa had very good feelings [but ý. .. a complete lack 
of understanding in regard to Gypsies and their way of life" (Clebert : 
102), follows from his pre-conceived belief in inherent Gypsy nomadism 
but takes little account of actual conditiohs in the Hungarian lands 
where the prevalent trend was for Gypsies to settle and yet where 
further settling of nomads was resisted by those Gypsies already 
established in an attempt to prevent erosion of their social and-market 
position. More importantly, it overlooks the practical considerations 
behind the policy, for, allowing Maria Theresa her 'good feelings', 
her efforts can also be seen on a different level as yet another move 
in the long drawn-out struggle by the Haýsburgs to establish central 
control over their Empire and, particularly in the case of their wayward 
Hungarian lands, to extract increased revenue at the expense of the 
gentry. 
Perhaps the least misleading of all the simplifications possible 
is that the policy failed because the two main social elements essential 
to its success, the gentry and the Gypsies, were on the whole hostile 
and against their opposition the Kreishauptmann in the Czech lands and 
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the Imperial Council in the Hungarian lands were both powerless to impose 
the imperial will. However this was no isolated defeat but rather only 
part of the Haýsburgs' general failure to impose a comprehensive range 
of reforms. For while the independence of the monarchy and its bureau- 
cracy from the landowning aristocracy made possible the adoption of 
government policies against the interests of this ruling class, notably 
land reform, it was this same separation that led irrevocably to the 
downfall of these policies since they could not be adequately ehforced. 
Internally, the social laws of nature of the absolutist 
state rigorously reasserted themselves, in an eloquent 
demonstration of the impotence of the personal will of 
the ruler, once it transgressed the collective interests 
of the class which Absolutism historically functioned 
to defend. 
(Anderson : 321). 
The Habsburg attempts to settle Gypsies were the most extensive and 
systematic ever undertaken but they were not unique; elsewhere in 
Europe at this time there were comparable developments. In Prussia 
Frederick II tried to establish Gypsy colonies; in Russia Katherine II 
attempted by force to settle nomadic Gypsies as serfs on royal estates 
in 1783 (Horväthovä s 57); while in Spain Charles III "wishing to 
imitate Maria Theresa`. `. . called Gypsies 'neo-Castilians "' in an 
edict of 1783. (Clebert : 118). ` 
So far it has been argued that the pattern of Gypsy development-,, in 
eastern Europe has been quite different, on the whole, from that in 
western Europe. However the case of Spain would appear to contradict 
this broad generalisation for although geographically part of western 
EZrope, the ddvelopment of Spanish Gypsies resembled the eastern rather 
than the western pattern in many important aspects. While there have 
always been many nomadic Gypsies in Spajn, there was also early 
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settlement and from the sixteenth century special quarters (gitanerfas) 
were set aside for them, especially in the towns and villages of the 
rural, undeveloped southern province of Andalucia. Also the policy of 
Charles III, described by Clebert as ih imitation of Maria Theresa, 
was more a continuation of previous policy, for legislation in Spain 
traditionally required Gypsies to settle and integrate rather than quit 
the country. 
On closer examination Spain appears less of an anomaly for linked 
with this un-western Gypsy development were broader ethnic and economic 
features more characteristic of eastern Europe. Dike Austro-Hungary, 
the Spanish state was formed as a conglomerate of distinct Christian 
kingdoms and peoples in the face of an Islamic threat to overrun them 
and yet the completion of the reconquest (in 1492) did not lead to ethnic 
amalgamation. Nor did economic development result in the formation of a 
homogeneous nation-state for, in spite of its position as an early 
colonial power, Spain stagnated economically from the sixteenth century 
onwards and only started on a path of capitalist development late in 
the nineteenth century. 
Possibly the isolated example of Spain is the exception which, 
while insufficiently documented to prove the rule, at least strengthens 
the case that among the complex of factors that undoubtedly played a 
part in determining whether Gypsies remained nomadic or, settled, the 
mode of economic development and state formation were probably predominant. 
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PART TWO - THE MODERN AGE. 
The Appearance of a 'Modern' Gypsy Policy in Western Europe. 
During the heightened repression in western Europe many Gypsies 
had altered their economic patterns in response to the worsening 
conditions. Among the survivors a perceptible occupational shift had 
taken place during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The early 
Gypsy arrivals had been generally entertainers of one sort or another, 
but these were gradually replaced by another generic occupational group - 
petty craftsmen - who worked in metal, horn and wood. This kind of work 
was by no means unknown before among western European Gypsies but now 
it attained a new ascendancy, having the advantage that it was more 
demonstrably 'useful' and productive than entertainment. 
For the most part these Gypsies remained nomadic; indeed their 
dispersed clientele and, in some cases, the restrictions laid on them 
by their competitors often made the continuance of nomadism by small 
family groups an economic necessity. In places their new intrusion into 
artisan trades was resisted by the vanishing guilds but, as had happened 
in the Balkans and Danube lands, a compromise was found in restricting 
Gypsies to less profitable work. 
At least in France ... guilds were organised and 
powerful enough'to"prohibit [Gypsy] competition. ' 
In the eighteenth century, for example, royal enactments 
regulated the conditions'of-those working as tin-'and 
coppersmiths and as makers of kitchen utensils. An 
edict-of 1735 'declared-. '. . 
runqualified 
smithsl were 
permitted only 'to plate and repair pieces ... at the doors ''and in the houses of"the particular people to 
whom the said pieces belong'. 
This order had a double effect : on the one hand, 
-, . 
it prevented the Gypsies from settling as-artisan- 
smiths.. .. and, on the other, it offered them the 
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possibility of engaging in an officially approved 
kind of work without thereby breaking their nomad 
circumstances. Very quickly the work done by the 
itinerant tinsmith, coppersmith and metal-plater 
tacitly became a Gypsy monopoly and remained so 
until the recent advent of mass-produced goods. 
(Clebert : 134). 
Elsewhere the guilds had succumbed to expanding industrialisation 
and in Britain some Gypsies were able to expand their trade to a point 
where settling became advantageous, as in the instance of the Gypsy 
foundry near St. Andrews in the late eighteenth century. 
On the whole, however, western Diropean Gypsies responded to 
industrialisation in the nineteenth century by seeking viable niches 
particularly in the periphery, as yet imperfectly served by the expanding 
road and rail networks, and it was not until late in the century that 
improved communications at last brought mass-produced goods, better and 
cheaper than the equivalent Gypsy-ware, within easy reach of all. 
After the making of horn. ,! spoons went out, 
the 
CGypsies ] still turned out very servicable tin- 
ware from the sheets of tin that they bought, 
but about 1890'the import of cheap, mass-produced 
tin-ware began, to kill this trade Gin the Scottish 
Highlands). 
(Grant :_ 249). 
This spread of factory-made goods created a growing crisis in the 
Gypsy economy and'as the first serious-inroads co-incided with the 
general-economic depression-towards the end of the century, this made 
the initial impact all the more severe. (The eventual solution was to 
be yet another protracted occupational shift, this time to-the-collection 
of metal and other waste material for industrial-recycling, which involved 
a corresponding population movement away from the periphery to the towns 
and cities that generathdthe waste and, the industrial. centres that 
reabsorbed it). 
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Perhaps these economic developments and associated demographic 
changes help to explain the mysterious official silence about Gypsies 
throughout western rope for most of the nineteenth century until the 
'Gypsy problem' re-emerged in its modern form almost simultaneously at 
the end of the century in a number of countries, diffused most probably 
by imitation. For perhaps a centgry, roughly from 1770 to 1670, the 
'western' view of Gypsies as worthless pests had been routed, although by 
no means eradicated; thereafter it reasserted itself with growing 
acrimony. 
The 'modern' policy to control nomadic Gypsies differed significantly 
from its predecessors. It neither sought to expel or exterminate them 
completely as in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, nor 
did it offer a comprehensive plan of integration in the spirit of Maria 
Theresa. Instead it seemed an altogether more piecemeal affair - an 
attempt to remove a relatively minor irritant, without recourse to 
unacceptably inhuman repression or expensive assistance, by means of 
persistent harassment. In place of governments legislating to drive 
Gypsies from their lands the pattern of the late nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries was to be an hxtended war of attrition, waged by local 
authorities and their police forces, * that would quietly wear down the 
Qrpsies' resistance and eventually discourage thetA to the point that 
they would abandon their nomadic habits and simply disappear into the 
rural and urban proletariat. 
This was the hope that led legislators to define Gypsies not as 
an ethnic community but in terms of a 'way of life'; once they had 
Such a policy had been technically,. impossible on this scale until the advent of modern police forces in the nineteenth century' 
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relinquished nomadism and become regular wage-labourers they ceased to 
be regarded as Gypsies. (Such a procedure was to be justified later by 
the frequent allegation that most of the nomads in question were not 
'authentic Gypsies' but degenerates and drop-outs : they did not correspond 
' to the stereotype popularised by nineteenth century Romantic writers). 
However western Europe's increasingly urban-based and consequently 
more visible Gypsies not only continued to travel during the twentieth 
century but aggravated the situation still further after the Second World 
War with their technological innovation of replacing horses and carts by 
lorries and caravans. This continuing concentration of motorised nomads 
on the outskirts of towns and cities eventually provoked a fresh outburst 
of official activity in the 1950s and 1960s as local authorities in 
France, Britain, Spain, Belgium and Italy sought to turn the tide of 
Gypsy urbanisation by forcible and often violent evictions. (viz. Puxon). 
This was to be the pattern of events all over western Europe during the 
twentieth century. 
The adoption of a modern policy in Germany may have been prompted 
by an influx of Gypsies, from the east during the latter. part of the 
nineteenth century following the final liberation from slavery of the 
Rumanian Gypsies in. 1864. (Panaite. Scu : 61). However by the turn of the 
century Gypsy urbahisation; was already a growing problem. 
At this time larger numbers of Gypsies'were gathering-' 
in the large towns which not only offered better work 
opportunities but more effective shelter from pursuit. 
Now Berlin, Frankfurt and Hamburg ... became the 
characteristic Gypsy centres. 
I. 4. 
(Mode : 168). 
Following the 1906 Decree on "Methods of Combat jng the Gypsy 
Nuisance" a'card register was established in Munich containing names, 
fingerprints and other data about all the two thousand Gypsies in Germany. 
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Travelling was only allowed after the police had issued a nomad's pass 
which specified permitted routes. This pass had to be renewed annually 
and could be withdrawn at any time. In addition Gypsies could keep 
horses and dogs only if the police agreed and under no circumstances 
were they allowed bears or monkeys. Finally Gypsy youths over sixteen 
years old could be taken by the police and set to work, according to 
their age and capacities. (Block : 199). 
After the First World War, when the Gypsies' numbers had increased 
to between six and eight thousand, new measures were introduced. (ibid: 69). 
A 1925 decree sought, to prevent further concentration of Gypsies, in 
the following year a nation-wide commission of the criminal police forces 
in Germany came to an agreement "on combating the Gypsy plague" and in 
1928 a natidnal law placed Gypsies under permanent police surveillance. 
(Mode : 168). Meanwhile the 1906 card register was updated continuously 
and this greatly eased the Nazis' task in herding German Gypsies into 
the concentration camps from which they were never to emerge. (Horväthovä: 
58). 
Measures to register Gypsies in France came a little later than in 
Germany. The 1912 law regarded all Gypsies as vagrants and required 
them to carry a detailed pass which had to be stamped in each village 
and town through which the family passed. In addition to the usual 
details of, name and-. date-of birth this 'carnet anthropometrique' also 
listed: 
The°'anthropometric' description of: the-bearer:.. 
height, chest measurement, breadth of head, - 
bizygomatic diameter, ýlength of right ear, length 
of fingers (left middle: and little'fingers), - length'from left middle'finger-to-elbow,: length 
of left foot, -colour of eyes . '. -. 'finger prints 
and two photographs-(full face and profile). 
(Cl'bert 257). 
This law remained in force until 1969. 
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In late nineteenth century England mounting pressure to deal with 
Gypsies and other nomads of the road, spearheaded by the crusading efforts 
of George Smith of Coalville, did not result in German- and French-style 
legislation. The threat was averted largely by the formation of an 
opposing pressure group with parliamentary spokesmen, the Showmen's 
Guild which was founded in 1891 and whose membership included many 
Gypsies. (Acton : 111-120). Following the final defeat of the Moveable 
Dwellings Bill in 1894, local authorities in England were forced to 
counter Gypsy urbahisation by partial means such as bye-laws and injunctions 
and this uneasy situation continued until the conflict escalated sharply 
in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Scotland represented a somewhat different example of a 'modern' 
Gypsy policy for overall legislation from the earlier period of repression 
still remained technically in force until 1906. However the 1609 Act, 
under which 'all Egyptians are to be banished on pain of death and those 
who harbour them imprisoned', was far too'drastic for nineteenth century 
use and so authorities resorted to indirect means of whittling away 
various freedoms to make life unbearable'on the road. 
The Trespass (Scotland) Act 1865 and the Roads and 
Bridges (Scotland). Act, ý, 1878, were;, designed to prohibit 
camping'. . . 'The Prevention of Crimes Act 1871, the 
Burgh Police Act 
. 
1892 and thejocal -Government (Scotland) Act 1908 were directed against 'persons 
wandering abroad'.. --The Public Health 
(Scotland)Act 
1897 [allowed] local authorities to make bye-laws on 
.. the habitable-conditions; of_, tents,. vans andsheds. rc, 
and the Children Act 1908 .". made it an offence for 
children-to be- inadequately clothed, fed, lodged or 
medically attended. Finally Section 118 of that Act 
compelled,. itinerants to put their children to school 
from October to March and to be able to produce 
certificates of a minimum of 200. attendances. 
.,; ý: Offenders were to have their children taken away and 
put into an ;. 'industrial school',,. 
(Fullerton : 2). 
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As in England no legislation directed specifically at Gypsies was 
enacted but a 1906 Government Committee recommended that they should be 
put into labour colonies. This proposal was rejected in a comprehensive 
1918 Government Report which noted the annual winter drift to the towns 
of Scotland's 3,000-odd itinerants and suggested that each family "should 
have a house in a locality where a means of livelihood was available, 
such as farming, roadmending, quarrying or afforestation, ideally in 
the country". (Gentleman : 12). For all its distinctive features, then, 
the Scottish approach was typical of the piecemeal way that the 'modern' 
policy generally was used to deal with the new problem of changing Gypsy 
occupations and their movement to towns. 
The Czech Lands add Slovakia in the Nineteenth Century. 
Economic development in the Czech lands followed a distinctly 
western Fäzropean pattern during the nineteenth century. At first there 
were setbacks when the Napoleonic Wars reached Moravia (the battle of 
Austerlitz) and produced an economic crisis-in the Austrian lands, 
causing the currency to drop to a fifth of its former value, but the 
exclusion of England from the continental market during the Wars favoured 
the growth of Bohemian textiles. Thereafter industry expanded rapidly, 
in the towns and especially around-the rich deposits of coking coal in 
northern-Bohemia and northern-Moravia. The. final abolition of serfdom 
during the, 1848 revolution released the peasants from their legal tie to 
the land and the country poor flocked to the towns where they were 
absorbed in the growing industrial proletariat., Eventually, by the.. time 
of the outbreak of-the First World'War, 75: -per cent of Austro-Hungary's 
industrial capacity was concentrated in the"Ceech lands. (Straka 69). 
.j 
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Against this background of industrialisation the Gypsies began to 
adapt as elsewhere in western Europe and consequently provoked a similar 
reaction from the authorities. This path of development was only cut 
short, as in Germany, by the Nazi gas-chambers. 
Although there was little official mention of Gypsies in the early 
part of the nineteenth century, there are occasional glimpses of artisan 
Gypsies, wandering more or less unmolested. 
Gypsies often visited the villages, the men selling 
chains, axes and gimlets, the women telling the 
fortunes of senseless women from cards or palms 
and casting spells. 
(quoted Horväthovä ; 73). 
However, as elsewhere in western Europe, they figured prominently 
in the Romantic literature of the time. The Romantic poet K. H. Macha 
(1810-1836), whose work was central to the Czech national revival that 
gathered momentum later in the century, wrote a novel entitled 'Gypsies' 
and this probably played a similar role to the works of his French, 
British and German counterparts (Hugo, Gautier, Baudelaire, Borrow, * 
Walter Scott and von Arnim) in forming "the myth of the child of Bohemia, 
the eternal wanderer". (Clebert : 123). Mächa's wandering Gypsy musicians 
of the title make their entrance singing: 
Heaven's vault spreads o'et me a canopy blue, 
Beneath dancing clouds are tossed by the breeze, 
Today here at midnight - tomorrow bound southwards, 
To the east - to the west - my land it ne'er sees. 
My nation lies scattered, unknown brothers spread wide, 
lamenting I wander by hill, heath and burn. 
Not twice, only once am I destined to pass here, 
Eternally onward - ne'er more to return. 
(Mächa `: 189). 
* Borrow is the great exception since he alone of these writers had 
considerable experience of living with Gypsies. Nevertheless he 
romanticised them and was, no less hostile than some of his more 
traditionally-minded Gypsy friends to current changes in nineteenth 
century English Gypsy society.,; 
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It may have been an influx of recently-freed Rumanian Gypsies that 
prompted the Home Office regulations of 1687 and 1888 for expulsion of 
foreign Gypsies was their first concern. However a more fundamental 
causal factor was probably the general European economic slump of the 
late nineteenth century which led to widespread unemployment and 
emigration and undoubtedly to an increase in thefts of crops and poultry 
by indigenous nomadic Gypsies. At any rate the measures were wide-ranging 
and constituted a modern policy closely resembling that adopted in Germany 
two decades later. 
The 1880s measures directed that foreign Gypsies be refused registration 
as residents and expelled from the country and that indigenous Gypsies who 
wandered without regular employment be prosecuted'as vagrants, for which 
the penalty was compulsory labour. 
Gypsies 'who can prove regular earnings' were to be issued with a 
nomad's pass specifying permitted routes. Each separate family in a 
band travelling together was to carry its own pass, which ould be con- 
fiscated if any offence was committed. The police were to be informed 
immediately on the arrival of a nomadic group so that the passes could 
be examined, and the Gypsies and their animals medically inspected. 
(Horvathova : 61-64). 
These regulations remained in force until the First World War when 
an unsuccessful attempt was made to enlist Gypsies into the Imperial 
armies. 
The economic development of Slovakia during the same period was 
quite different, mainly because 
the unique political history of Hungary had produced 
a social result, remarkable in Europe, unique in the 
Habsburg monarchy : the lesser landowners had survived. In Bohemia and the German lands there was nothing 
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between the great aristocrat and the peasant. In 
Hungary, out of a population of ten millions, half 
a million were 'nobles' ... and the holdings of 
these squires ranged from large estates, almost on 
the scale of those of the Oagnates, to smallholdings, 
inferior to those of many peasants. 
(Taylor : 30). 
After the death of Joseph II in 1790, his successor abandoned the 
vain attempt to direct the internal administration of the Hungarian 
lands and, yielding to pressure from the Hungarian gentry, also revoked 
Joseph's recent abolition of the labour duty on which the well-being of 
this ruling class depended. Joseph's land reforms remained in force 
but these were effectively frustrated by the Hungarian Diets with their 
cherished autonomy once more restored. Under the control of the gentry 
the Hungarian lands consequently remained predominantly rural during the 
nineteenth century and while there was a little industrialisation 
(mainly mining) in eastern Slovakia, this bore no comparison to development 
in the Czech lands. 
The first blow to the supremacy of the gentry did not appear to 
be such initially, for the 1848 Hungarian revolution put an end to the 
Imperial Sanction of 1723 and won Hungary dominion status, replacing the 
feudal Diet in Bratislava by a Parliament in Budapest. However, although 
the revolution was taken up by the gentry in Hungary, its groundswell 
was peasant discontent and as in the Prague and Vienna uprisings the 
abolition of serfdom was a successful revolutionary demand. 
Another defeat of Austria at the hands of Prussia in 1866 gave 
Hungary the opportunity to consolidate still further its independence 
within the Empire but although the Hungarian gentry were able to reassert 
their political dominance through'the long supremacy of the Liberal 
Party '(18? 5-1905)1 they'were powerless to*prevent their own rain'end'-. 
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at the same time, that of those less fortunate sections of Hungarian 
society -. peasants, artisans, Gypsies. There was no means of averting 
the collapse that engulfed the Hungarian lands' backward agricultural 
economy when the co-incidence of mass-produced grain in the United 
States and cheap transport (steamships and railways) finally put an 
end to Hungary's protected rural isolation. 
"A series of bad harvests in the 'nineties were the last straw, 
followed as they were by a steady decline in agricultural prices, owing 
to over-production in the world market . ... In the thirty years 
preceding 1905 the number of properties put up annually for sale as the 
result of bankruptcy grew from 9,600 to 21,100, ... the number of 
persons engaged in agriculture decreased absolutely by about 80,000 
(from 35 to 31%) and the floating agricultural population went up by 
leaps and bounds". (Seton Watson : 271). 
The beneficiaries were the large landowners, the magnates who 
bought up the estates of the ruined lesser gentry. 
CThey 
had] gained from the abolition of the 
[labour 
duty] and, 
capitalistically equipped, could weather the storm of world competition. 
Over one hundred thousand independent landowners vanished between 1867 
and the end of the century; over one third of Hungary was in the hands 
of the magnates". (Taylor : 199). 
The dispossessed gentry were saved from extinction by their continuing 
political power and the former squires entered, and soon commanded a 
monopoly in, government and civil service and the professions. 
For the no less-severely-afflicted peasantry. there was no easy 
solution.., The"usual. resort: of, the. rural poor, was. to abandon, the country- 
side for the towhs but stagnant Hungary. had little urban industry,, to 
so 
absorb them. Indeed many pauperised peasants and artisand made their 
way to Vienna but they found that-- "towns increased faster than the 
industries which provided employment and goods; and as a consequence, 
their growth led to a declining standard of urban life. ... In Vienna 
a 'proletariat' of landless labourers existed, but not yet the 
capitalists to employ them". (Taylor : 64). 
The alternative to internal migration was emigration and they went 
in their hundreds of thousands, many to the country whose superior mode 
of production had brought about their downfall. 
Over half a million Slovaks, nearly one-fourth of 
the population, emigrated to the United States in 
the quarter century preceding the First World War. 
Others streamed to Canada, South America and Russia. 
(Straka : 77). 
The predicament of the Gypsies was even grimmer for although having 
no land to be ruined in the same way as the lesser gentry and peasantry, 
they depended on these two classes for their livelihood and so shared 
their plight indirectly. 
During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. a sub- 
stantial proportion of the Gypsies had worked as landless-serf-labourers 
for the gentry but the emancipation of the serfs in mid-century threw 
them onto the open labour market atsa time, when conditions were 
deteriorating. As the recession deepened the Gypsies' former masters 
could no longer afford to employ them and when their estates passed to 
the magnates, ` these large ' landowners had little need of full-time 
unskilled Gypsy labour on their 'capitalistically equipped' farms, for 
their economic, survival in the' new, competitive world depended on 
eradicating the inefficient, labour-intensive and feudalistic methods of 
their predecessors. There was a certain need for seasonal, labour but 
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Gypsies must have often been excluded from even this limited employment 
by the competition of impoverished peasants. 
Perhaps some Gypsies followed the peasants to the towns of Austro- 
Hungary and it may have been such internal migration and not an influx 
of Rumanian Gypsies that provoked the 1887 and 1888 regulations to expel 
'foreign Gypsies' from the Austrian lands, but in any case this option 
was legally barred by the new measures. The other alternative, that of 
emigration, was even less of a practical possibility for the Gypsies 
since to emigrate required at least sufficient resources to pay the 
passage to the New World. * So while the lesser gentry turned bureaucrat and 
the peasantry poured overseas, the lowest and most trapped of all sections 
of Hungarian society - the Gypsies - survived the economic crisis by 
reverting to their former trades of artisan and musician. 
This account is supported by a comparison of late eighteenth century 
census statistics for four regions of Slovakia with large Gypsy populations 
(the 'zupy' of Bratislava, Nitra, Trencin and Spis) with statistics for 
the same four regions a century later. " While this data is not entirely 
reliable, for reasons given above in Part One of this chapter, the 
figures nevertheless show a dramatic and comprehensible'drop'iä the 
proportion of male Gypsies employed as labourers and a corresponding 
rise in the proportion of smiths and musicians. 
* This was also true-in the case of nineteenth century Ireland where 
the peasantry with more resources emigrated to the United States, 
while those with-virtually none migrated'internally, to Glasgow'and 
Liverpool. 
** In 1893 these four regions contained, over a third of Slovakia's 
Gypsy population and was representative of the national pattern for the limited purposes of this comparison. In fact the national 
proportion for-Gypsy-labourers-was somewhat -higher, but did not. --. -., - exceed 7%. 
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Changed Means of Subsistence of Male Gypsies in 4 Slovakian Regions. 
(Late 18th century - Late 19th century). 
Smiths Musicians labourers Beggars Others Total 



























i (Source for 1770s, 1780s Kara : 39; for 1893 Horväthovä : 138-141). 
Thus the first impact of capitalism on feudal Hungary did not have 
the immediate effect of integrating Gypsies further into the mainstream 
of production but instead pushed them back to its fringes. In this sense 
it is highly misleading to see the Gypsy artisans and'musicians of late 
nineteenth century Slovakia as constituting a static, 'traditionally 
Gypsy' economy; they are more truly the Gypsy equivalent of the landless 
labourers of the overflowing nineteenth century towns who, until they 
were eventually absorbed by developing industry, eked out a precarious 
living in a variety of ways. * 
In spite of economic hardship, the Gypsy population grew steadily 
during the nineteenth' century and clusters of huts"became larger 
settlements, mainly as a consequence of natural increase although sporadic 
settling of nomads evidently continued where local conditions permitted. 
An 1857 census revealed$more than ä quärter'of a million Gypsies in, all 
the Hungarian lands and soon after the 1880s'measures in the Austrian 
Ni z. Thompson,: 292 and Smout' : 371 for conditions in early nine- teenth, century London and Glasgow respectively. 
Rý 
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lands an 1893 census recorded around 36,000 Gypsies in Slovakia, three 
times the estimated 10,000 to 12,000 of a century before. Of the 11693 
total 2,000 Gypsies were recorded as semi-nomadic - that is they 
wandered during the summer months but returned each year to a fixed 
winter base :a camp or perhaps a hut - and only 600 
(less than 2 per 
cent) as nomadic. Even though a certain number of nomads must have 
escaped the census, it is clear that by this time the vast majority of 
Gypsies in Slovakia were already settled. 
As well as the occupational swing to artisan work already discussed, 
the census also showed the great range and extent of these trades - 
metal workers such as smiths, locksmiths, cauldron-, and bell-makers; 
wood workers such as trough-, spoon-, and basket-makers; and a whole 
variety of other crafts : shoemakers, ropemakers, potters, brick-makers, 
lime-kiln workers and masons. However there were remarkably few dealers, 
pedlars and the like - less than 500 in the whole country. There was a 
similar figure for male unemployed, unbelievably low for this period of 
acute depression, but this statistic undoubtedly concealed the fact that 
perhaps the majority of those recorded as self-employed artisans were 
able to work only sporadically. 
Excluding housewives, the number of Gypsy women unemployed was 
six times that for men. For those women whoworked, the commonest 
occupations were washerwoman, domestic help, servant and casual agricultural 
labourer. Many women were listed as beggars, considerably less as 
fortune-tellers and a few as prostitutes (22). A low figure was given 
for thieves (127, of which 85 were women) and even lower for vagrants 
(38, * of which 26'were women). 
The figures for the Spis region showed a total of 2,792 Gypsies of 
whom only 38 were, nomadic. As in the census for this region over a' 
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century previously, the overwhelming majority of men worked as smiths 
(660), a significant minority as musicians (98), while very few worked 
in the fields (11) or as pedlars (8). A considerable number of women 
worked as servants or domestic helps (275), while almost as many made 
a living by begging (244). (Horväthova : 137-141). 
The glut in labour power was ended by the First World War and as 
in the Austrian half of the Empire, attempts were made to conscript 
Gypsies in the Hungarian lands. In addition a 1916 Home Office regul- 
ation empowered local authorities to settle nomads and to use nomadic 
Gypsies for forced labour if they were unable to demonstrate a legitimate 
livelihood. Remaining nomads were to be issued with an identity card, 
without which they were not to be employed. They could only work in the 
district where their card had been issued and could only leave this 
district with police permission. F&r infringing these regulations 
offenders could be imprisoned for 15 days or be sent to a forced labour 
camp. 
However, nomadic Gypsies were also entitled to some support from 
the village where they had been settled if they were unable to work. 
This was to be given in the form of food and clothing not in money. 
Whether many Gypsies received such support is doubtful, especially in 
eastern Slovakia where half of them, lived, for this area was ravaged 
by front-line fighting. (Horväthovä.: 141-148). 
The First Czechoslovakian Republic and the Second World War. 
The military collapse of the Habsburg Empire led to its political 
dismemberment in 1918 into a number of smaller states includingq,, - 
Czechoslovakia, which politically, united the Czech and Slovak peoples 
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for the first time in a thousand years. However the emergence of this 
new republic also created a situation that was unique in Europe as 
regards Gypsy development, for it combined within a single state the 
industrialised Czech lands with their insignificant population of 
nomadic Gypsies and, more importantly, a western tradition of anti- 
Gypsy legislation to match and rural Slovakia with its large settled 
Gypsy population whose development had been entirely eastern in pattern. 
Yet the resulting ferment from the mixture of these two ingredients was 
initially inhibited by political and economic factors and was not to be 
released for a full quarter-century, until the eventual declaration of 
the Second Republic in 19+5. 
In the first years of the Republic the situation of the Gypsies 
was desperate after years of wartime privation and in 1921 the Slovak 
Peasants' Union complained that "since they have nothing, the Gypsies 
either beg or steal and as poverty cases they are a burden on the 
peasantry". (quoted Horvathovä : 154). 
Conditions varied locally as did local authorities' treatment of 
Gypsies. Whilst some Slovakian regions (like Spisv) reported that the 
majority of Gypsies worked in the fields, woods and building sites and 
cauged no major problems, others (like Oravskä) adopted firmer measures 
imposing compulsory labour and a7 p"m" curfew, after which Gypsies were 
not permitted tobe on the streets'-or"in -public places. 
In 1921 the Gypsies were recognised as a, separate nationality but, 
this; gesture evidently did not mark any change in official approach 
towards them for, in.. the same year .. 
the, government circulated the 1888,,., 
'regulations with the suggestions that these could be the basis for new 
legislation 
. 
to. control Gypsies. x Copies were passed to all regional 
86 
governors in Slovakia with the proviso that they must bear in mind the 
different conditions in the Czech lands with only nomadic Gypsies, 
whereas the majority were settled in Slovakia. In reply almost all 
Slovakian regions demanded that remaining nomads should be forced to 
settle. Eventually a detailed register of all Gypsies was compiled 
throughout the Republic in 1924 and the following year fingerprints 
were collected in the Czech lands and Slovakia was asked to follow suit. 
The register showed the extent to which the incorporation of 
Slovakia within an industrial capitalist state had eroded the artisan 
trades of settled Gypsies within a few years by the competition of 
cheap factory-made goods. Like some of the nomadic Gypsies of western 
Europe who were suffering the same fate, many Slovakian Gypsies turned 
to seasonal agricultural work and building work where it was available. 
v 
The case of Spis, where smiths had predominated in both the late 
eighteenth and late nineteenth century censuses, has already been 
mentioned and this trend is confirmed by a more detailed comparison of 
data from 1893 and 1924 for the Michalovee district of eastern Slovakia 
where 40 per cent of the country's Gypsy adobe brick-makers and potters 
had been located. 
Changed Means of Subsistence of Male, Gypsies in Michalovce district* 
of Slovakia. (1893 - 1924) 
(Source for 1893 Horvathova: 138-141; for 1924 Kara: 42, Horvathova: 156) 
ear 
brick- Adobe dobe 
potters 
Smiths, Musicians Labourers Others Total, 
893 39% 18% " 18% 2% '23% ., 1 
1924 15% 5ý 20% 60% 0% 100% 
* The areas compared are not exactly the same for the 1893 figures are for 
the larger Zemplinska region (zupa) which included the territory of the later Michalovce district (okres). 
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However work opportunities were widening for a small minority of Gypsies, 
as isolated entries indicated - locksmiths, shop assistant, midwife, 
medical student, seamstress, shoemaker and barber. (Horväthovä : 157). 
The report also revealed the crushing poverty of many Gypsies, as 
in a comment of the Vranov district of east Slovakia. 
The penalty of imprisonment has no effect on 
them, because imprisonment only improves their 
living conditions. It often happens that a 
Gypsy without resources commits a crime only 
to escape the pangs of hunger, 
(Horvathova : 155,156) 
Yet because of the slow recovery of the economy in backward 
Slovakia, the situation of many peasants was only marginally better and 
increasing numbers of them were forced to become itinerant pedlars and 
craftsmen in order to survive, often working for food instead of cash 
or sometimes simply bartering fruit for grain. These impoverished 
peasants added to the throng of nomadic and settled Gypsies already 
making a bare liveihood in this way, provoked a strong reaction from 
established shopkeepers and craftsmen who agitated through their 
influential trade associations for the elimination, or at least the 
regulation, of these virtually untaxed competitors. 
The lobby was successful and in 1927 the Minister of Trade suggested 
to his Slovak equivalent that the forthcoming law to limit Gypsy nomadism 
was a good opportunity to regulate all such itinerants. The suggestion 
was enthusiastically received by local authorities, many of whom 
proposed that itinerants` should be forbidden entry to towns-and villages 
where the same services were already provided by local people. Similarly 
trade associations declared their support for "measures which could be 
used unambiguously to limit the competition of itinerant traders and 
600 3 
craftsmen without regard to their ethnicity or nationality". 
(Horvathova : 158-160). 
Law 117, passed in 1927, was therefore broadened in scope and in 
the first paragraph "gypsy" was defined for legal purposes as a way of 
life, notwithstanding the contradiction that it was recognised as a 
nationality in the 1921 and 1931 national censuses. As anticipated, 
this law closely followed the 1888 regulations and made continued 
nomadism dependent on police and local authority permission, which could 
be withdrawn at any time. Another register was prepared and nomads' 
passes were issued which specified permitted routes for each family. 
Apparently 36,696 such passes were issued in the period until the 
V 
Second World War (Smerglovä : 65), * although it is unknown what proportion 
of these were for Gypsies. Since a 1927 census** of Gypsies in Slovakia" 
recorded 60,315 as settled and only 1,877 as nomadic (i. e. 3 per cent 
of the total) and a 1940 census gave 6,500 (Smerglovä 80) as the 
entire Gypsy population of the Czech lands, it is evident that the 
number of registered nomads must have included many settled Gypsies or 
non-Gypsies or, most likely, both. 
Soze newspapers justified the 1927 law as a new and humane approach 
to the 'Gypsy problem'; it was nothing of the sort. In reality it was a 
characteristic example of the modern policy of harassment, being in 
essence little more than an unimaginative re-iteration of the measures 
of forty years earlier, somewhat modified along the lines of subsequent 
laws in France and Germany. -- " ` 
* Davidovä gives'36,000 as the number initially issued and 60,000 as the total for the First Republic, but this appears too high. (Davidovä : 65). 
Kara mistakenly gives the date of this census as 1924. (Kära : 43) 
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The legislation struck at the livelihood of itinerants without 
offering in its place any alternative employment or accommodation and 
it completely ignored the plight of the vast mass of settled Gypsies. 
As had happened in the depression at the end of the nineteenth century, 
these Gypsies found themselves legally and economically trapped in 
their primitive, segregated settlements in Slovakia. * Once again 
demand dropped for their unskilled labour and with unemployment in the 
Republic rising to nearly a million in 1933, the chances of Gypsies 
finding new jobs were remote. Even the late nineteenth century 
'solution' of artisan work was not a practical alternative because so 
many of these trades had been technologically superceded by the spread 
of mass-produced goods. Meanwhile the Gypsies' numbers were steadily 
increasing and had nearly doubled in Slovakia since 1893" 
As had happened so often before in their history in times of post- 
war disruption or economic depression, the Gypsies' relations with 
surrounding communities deteriorated sharply when they, as the section 
of society with least, were forced to steal the crops of the scarcely 
more fortunate farmers and peasants in order to survive., In such a 
tense situation minor incidents could easily escalate to the level of 
bloodshed as in the 1928 Pobedim pogrom where, in reprisal for thefts 
of crops from the fields, Slovak villagers made an armed-night attack 
on the Gypsy settlement, razing the: huts-to, the ground, wounding eighteen 
and killing six Gypsies - including two young children. The strength of 
local feeling was such that it was not until the"following"afternoon 
Some Gypsies joined the wave of Slovak emigrants to the U. S. A. 
but changed U. S. immigration policy made this-much harder than 
before the First World War. 
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that the police were able to requisition, forcibly, the necessary 
transport to carry the seriously injured to hospital. The funeral was 
attended by five hundred Gypsies from nearby settlements but not a single 
Slovak villager was present except the officiating priest. 
The national daily newspaper 'Sloväk'* assessed the massacre in 
the following way; 
The Pobedim case can be characterised as a 
citizens' revolt against Gypsy life. In this 
there are the roots of democracy ... 
The Gypsy element, such as it is today, is really 
an ulcer on the body of our social life which 
must be cured in a radical way. The fact is that 
in the Pobedim case the Gypsies were provocative 
which lessens the guilt of the Pobedim farmers. 
(Noväcek : 25,26). 
The court evidettly shared the view of 'Sloväk', sentencing those 
found guilty of murder to sixteen months imprisonment and a derisory 
fitte. 
A year later a Gypsy robber band was accused of murder and 
cannibalism in the regional capital of eastern Slovakia. The second 
charge was eventually dropped but not before the press had inflamed 
public opinion with sensational and inaccurate coverage reminiscent of 
its role at a 1782-trial where forty Gypsies were tortured and executed 
having been found guilty of identical crimes, before an investigation 
ordered` by'Joseph'II'-discovered that all of the supposed victims- 
were still alive. In'the-case of-the, -1929"Kosice. 'Monster Trial', 
as it was popularly known, "? the publicity about--cannibalism convinced 
" The mouthpiece of the'-fascist`people's Party, the largest single party in Slovakia. 
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even erudite Gypsiologists who coin apologetics for it to this 
day. * `' 
Smerglova argued questionably that the whole trial and press 
coverage "were intentionally prepared and exploited by the ruling 
coalition of the gentry. The main aim was to arouse the public against 
all our Gypsies and prepare a suitable climate for the ... 1927 
V law". (Smerglova : 72). Her allegation was unsubstantiated but while 
there is no concrete evidence to suggest that the hostility against 
Gypsies was deliberately fomented by the government, nevertheless there 
appeared little official resistance to such developments and perhaps 
even some elements within the government welcomed them to divert some 
of the acute public bitterness over social and economic conditions. 
From 1926 the dominant party in the coalition was the Agrarian Party 
which eventually took office in 1932. Since this party represented the 
interests of predominantly landowners, farmers, and peasants, it was 
unlikely to have had much sympathy to spare for, Gypsies. 
Some of the contemporary proposals for dealing with Gypsies looked 
back with unashamed longing at the uninhibited solutions possible in 
earlier centuries. A 1930 publication by a police officer, entitled 
" 'Criminals by Profession. A Practical Handbook for Police Use', was 
chillingly explicit: 
6 
" Serboianu accepted that cannibalism occurred in the 1929 case, as did Clebert who pleaded in mitigation "that it was a matter of 
'Netotsi', pillaging and degenerate Gypsies, who are descendants 
of members of the first Transylvanian 'resistance movement' (who lived like wild: beasts... )! ': "(Clebert : 103). He was apparently 
misled into attributing a_'Netotsi' origin to Sandor Filek's band 
because their home village_in-East. Slovakia (Moldava) bore the 
same name as the Rumanian province. 
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It appears that this fact .. . 
[i. 
e. the Gypsies' 
love of their children] could serve as a guide on 
how to proceed against the Gypsy menace. The 
sentence is exceptionally cruel, however the trouble- 
some burden to the public of the Gypsy evil is still 
crueller. ... Let them die out! Proclaim that as 
soon as a Gypsy appears on the Republic's territory 
not only will his children be taken away, but the_ 
procreation of further children will be made 
impossible. In this way the Republic will become 
even more feared by Gypsies than when a gibbet 
stood at every cross-roads. 
(quoted Noväcek : 87). 
Ethnic relations continued to deteriorate and in the 1930s Gypsies 
were eventually forbidden entry to the larger towns, especially those 
with spa and tourist traffic (Horväthovä : 167), but more sinister 
developments than occasional outbursts of anti-Gypsy sentiment were to 
emerge from the deepening crisis. 
In Slovakia, worse living conditions than in the 
Czech lands, aggravated by the crisis and disastrous 
harvest failure of 1932, found some parts of the 
region on the verge of famine, a situation exploited 
by the fascist Hlinka [People's] Party to launch an 
anti-Czech and separationist campaign successfully. 
(Straka : 82) 
From the 1920s onwards this party captured between 25 and 40 per 
cent of the total Slovakian vote making it the largest single party in 
Slovakia and, unlike the Agrarians, an integral part of the party's 
stock-in-trade was the overt and calculathd incitement to hatred of 
Jews and Gypsies. (Saton Watson : 335). The movement's spiritual 
antecedent, lay in the warped Slovak nationalism of the late nineteenth 
century when, deprived of a secular middle-class by Magyar domination 
of all Hungarian government-appointed jobs, the Slovaks found their 
few spokesmen in Roman Catholic priests who made anti-Semitism the chief 
plank in their nationalism. (Taylor : 202). Nor was the situation 
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fundamentally altered with the formation of the Czechoslovakian Republic 
in 1918 for, to a large measure, Czechs took the place of Hungarians and 
the most backward, eastern parts of the new state, Slovakia and Ruthenia 
(now part-of the USSR), were left undeveloped and "were regarded more 
or less like colonies". (Noväcek : 22). 
The link between economic depression and the rise of fascism and 
associated manipulation of minorities as scapegoats is commonplace. 
As might have been expected therefore, pogroms against Gypsies were not 
limited to Czechoslovakia during this period but occurred also in 
i Austria, France and Germany. (Novacvek : 87). 
Despite the generally bleak outlook it would be wrong to see the 
Gypsies' situation as entirely hopeless during the period of the Republic 
for remarkable, if isolated, efforts were made to integrate them, 
especially in the field of education. 
In 1926 the first school especially for Gypsies was established in 
Uzhorod, the capital of Ruthenia, with the motto: 'Tie Gypsy is also 
human'. 
The idea of founding a Gypsy school first arose in 
1923 when ... a former teacher, put forward a 
bill before the local Council for establishing a 
Gypsy school out of local funds. The bill was 
rejected, however, owing to the opposition of 
Jewish and Hungarian members. In 1925 ... a 
school inspector took up this idea again, in co- 
operation with ... a , government representative, 
and when the Gypsies promised they would carry out 
the work and furnish the materials, the bill was 
carried. ' And'so the school'was built, and was 
opened in November 1926. 
('Lidove Noviny' 27.1.33) 
Soon afterwards similar, schools were established in several east 
Slovakian towns including Kosice and Levoca (the capital of theSpis 
9 
region). Meanwhile a number of Gypsy children attended ordinary schools 
although they rarely reached the higher grades. 
V 
In 1929 a group of Kosice doctors founded what was later known 
as the 'Society for the Study and Solution of the Gypsy Problem'. 
As well as concerning itself with health matters, the Society organised 
theatrical and musical performances by Gypsies, in the principal theatres 
of Kosice and Uzhorod and inspired the formation of a flourishing Gypsy 
football club, 'Roma', which toured abroad. In 1933 the Society also 
began to publish books and articles, including contributions by the 
Republic's most eminent Gypsiologists, Stampach and Lesny. These were 
often highly critical of the 1927 law and racist tendencies in 
v 
Czechoslovak newspapers. (Davidova : 26). Stampach however, for all 
his compassion for the Gypsies' situation, saw in them a potential 
political threat, writing: "From the political aspect Gypsies are 
certainly an element closest to the-Communists". This view was not based 
on fantasy for some settled Gypsies had already joined the Communist 
Party, no doubt influenced by the Party's opposition to. the 1927 law 
as well as by the condemnation in its press of mounting anti-Gypsy 
racism. (Novacek : 26,27). 
-,, _,. 
In spite of , their"courageous'effats during the 1930s to widen the 
Gypsies! educational and cultural opportunities and to strengthen their 
positive identity, localised and voluntary. action groups could not hope 
to make any real impact on the vast underlying problem of thousands of 
seriously underemployed Gypsy families, living for the most partFin 
segregated,, insanitary, shanty towns in the depths of rural Slovakia.., 
A determined national campaign backed by government funds would have 
been necessary but given the political slant of the ruling party and 
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the continuing recession, this was never a remote possibility. As it 
turned out subsequent events would have reversed any progress that had 
been made. 
The occasional pogroms of the 1930s were soon revealed to be only 
a precursor of the sustained terror of the Second World War when the 
Nazis placed Gypsies high on their list of racial and national minorities 
to be eliminated. Their intention to purge Europe of Gypsies by 
progressive stages is evident from the spreading annihilation. First 
to perish were the Gypsies in Germany where their fate had already been 
prepared in the years before the War. Then came Gypsies in territories 
occupied by the German army and finally those in friendly states. 
In fact Himmler had made preparations for the exemption of two 
Gypsy sub-ethic groupings: the 'Sinti', descendants of the first group 
to arrive in Germany and regarded as 'racially pure', and the 'Lalleri', 
which although not 'pure', came "from German-speaking parts of Bohemia 
and Moravia in earlier centuries. Most of them belonged to a tribe which 
was living in the Sudetenland when it was annexed to Germany 
[ from 
Czechoslovakia in 1938]8. (Ritter 1942) quoted Kenrick and Puxon : 89). 
Later the view of Bormann and Goebbels prevailed that all Gypsies 
should be exterminated without distinction. 
The development of the War did not permit the Nazis to complete 
their programme, nevertheless a, quarter of a million Gypsies perished 
at their hands. Most Gypsies in the Czech lands, a German protectorate 
from 1939, shared. the fate of; the German Gypsies and almost vanished 
as. a distinct group in the gas chambers of the concentration camps. 
In the Protectorate nomadism was banned in 1940 and two years 
latera law was enacted on January. lst, 1942 which stated: 
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In order to protect the community from all harmful 
persons, protective custody is herewith introduced... 
for anyone who, without being a professional or 
habitual criminal, endangers the public through his 
asocial behaviour, beggars, vagabonds, Gypsies and 
persons travelling as Gypsies. 
(Kenrick and Puxon : 131,132). 
'Protective custody' for Gypsies meant two labour camps specially 
for Gypsies at Lety (S. Bohemia) and Hodonin (S. Moravia). The camps 
were only open for eighteen months and a year respectively, during which 
time 2,400 Gypsies passed through, 459 dying in the process. After the 
closure of these camps Gypsies were sent direct to concentration camps 
in Germany, especially Auschwitz and Birkenau, where there was a special 
Gypsy block, BIIe. (Noväcek : 28; Kenrick and Puxon : 132-3)" 
A 1939 police report had estimated the Gypsy population of the 
Czech lands at around 13,000 (genrick and Puxon : 135) but a register 
in 1941 showed only 6,540, suggesting that at least sooe Gypsies had 
escaped to Slovakia while others were concealed by sympathetic non- 
Gypsies. Of these registered Gypsies, 6,490 were sent to concentration 
camps where most were gassed in 1944; only about 500 returned alive. 
(Smerglovä : 80). 
The far more numerous Gypsies of Slovakia were fortunate in 
comparison in the autonomous puppet state that had been established in 
1939 under the clerico-fascist Hlinka, Party., regime., Rather than plan 
their extinction, the first reaction of the new government was to extract 
forced labour from them. And so the initial, treatment of Gypsies in 
wartime Czechoslovakia resembled a grotesque parody of the 'western' 
and 'eastern' approaches - with. the_important difference that for the 
first time in history advocates of the former had at their disposal 
efficient means of mass destruction. 
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Legislation in 1940 imposed compulsory labour duty of four months 
annually on Jews and Gypsies, although "by Gypsy is understood ... 
only that member of the Gypsy race, both of whose parents are Gypsies and 
who, whether nomadic or settled, avoids work". Enforcement of the law 
varied greatly in different areas, for example in the Spis region no 
Gypsies were sent to the labour camps from the town of Smizany while in 
nearby ietanovice "the mayor tried to protect the Gypsies but the Hlinka 
Guards (Slovak fascist police) ordered him to send Gypsies to the 
forced labour camps. However he selected only two". (Kenrick and 
Puxon : 136). Elsewhere Gypsies were sent to work camps to build the 
Presov-Vranov railway line and to other camps including Dubnica, 
Hanusovice and Cemerne, most of which were in east Slovakia. (Davidova: 
29). 
The following year Gypsies were ordered to move their huts further 
away from towns and villages and where they already lived in houses 
amongst non-Gypsies, they were forced to abandon their homes and build 
new isolated settlements. They were permitted to visit towns only on 
specified days at fixed times and were to be completely excluded from 
cinemas, restaurants, parks and public transport. As with labour camps, 
compliance with these regulations was uneven and in 1944 , the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs wrote to district offices pointing out that they had 
not all complied with the 1941 law concerning the evacuation of Gypsies 
from towns and villages. All Gypsies had to be shifted to places well 
away from the roads and execution was to be the punishment for any 
refusing to 'Move. The order ended with the ominous words: 
'I wish to add that arrangements for concentration 
, working camps 
for Gypsies are being prepared. '" 
(Kenrick and Puxon : 13? ) 
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At intervals there were the inevitable bloody pogroms where Gypsies 
died at the hands of Hlinka guards. At Ilija (central Slovakia) the 
entire Gypsy settlement of 112 men, women and children were slaughtered 
vV 
and at Slatina, Cierny Balog, Krupina, Kriz nad Hronom and elsewhere, 
Gypsies were burned alive in their huts and machine-gunned when they 
burst out with their clothes aflame. (Noväcek : 29, Horväthovä : 171, 
Davidovä : 30, Kenrick and Puxon : 137)" 
Fleeing from this inhuman treätment many Gypsies joined the partisans 
in the mountains, sometimes attaining officer status, while Gypsy 
settlements frequently gave shelter to partisans and suffered the 
consequent harsh retributions. In Tisovec (central Slovakia) in 1944 
a French partisan was shot, together with fourteen Gypsies who had tried 
to protect him. (Noväcek : 89). Gypsies also played a part in the 
Slovak National Uprising in the summer of 1944 and were later decorated 
for their heroism. 
It is impossible to give an accurate estimate of the number of 
Gypsies who were killed in Slovakia during the War but probably it was 
in the scale of hundreds rather than thousands** At any rate there 
had been no mass extermination; the War had ended too soon for that. 
Following the liberation of the eastern part of the old Republic 
by the Soviet Red Army, a new government proclaimed the Kosice Government 
Programme in April 1945, which included among its main points a declaration 
/v N 
* Novacek gives the fantastic figure of 25,000 for Gypsy deaths in 
Slovakian work camps but gives no source. No other writer suggests there were large-scale deaths in these camps. (Novacek : 29). 
t 
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on the illegality of ethnic discrimination. For the Gypsies this was 
to be a landmark and the promise of a better future with, for the first- 
time in their history, the opportunity of actual not just formal equality 
with other citizens. 




Citizenship and Ethnicity in Austro-Hunary and Czechoslovakia. 
Considerable confusion can arise from the ethnic diversity of the 
peoples inhabiting the pre-1918 states of Austria and Hungary, which 
together comprised the bulk of the Habsburg Empire, and the post-1918 
successor states also. To minimise ambiguity I have tried to distinguish 
throughout this and the following chapters between the inhabitants' 
citizenship and ethnicity by the use of different terms in the following 
way - 
Pre-1918. 
STATE CITIZENSHIP ETHNICITY 
(greater) Austria Austrian various 
until 1918 including: 
- (modern) Austria it mainly German 
- the Czech lands (Bohemia and 
Moravia) it mainly Czech 
etc. 
(greater) Hungary Hungarian various 
until 1918 including: 
- (modern) Hungary , 
'... ' " mainly Magyar 







- the Czech lands mainlyCzech 
- Slovakia mainly Slovak * 
- Ruthenia (between. 1918 &-1938) mainly Ruth6ne 
(Ukrainian) 
" The adjective 'Slovakian', is occasionally used, to distinguish inhabitants of-Slovakia-as opposed to those of Slovak ethnicity; unfortunately there exists no convenient equivalent for inhabitants'- 
of the Czech lands. 
101 
MAIN SOURCES AND REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER TWO. 
a) Gypsies in Czechoslovakia. 
E. Davidovä - 'Be olib a siatrov'. Kosice. 1965. 
E. Horväthova - 'Cigani na Slovensku'. Slovenska academie vied. 
Bratislava. 1964. 
(For scholarship, detail and analysis Horväthovä's 
study is outstanding. The basic work on Czechoslovakian 
Gypsy history). 
K. Kara et al. - 1Ke spoldcenske problematice Cikanü v 
CSSR'. Ustav pro 
filosofii a sociologii 
6SAV. Prague. 1975. 
(Report of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences' 
research team. (1969-1975)). 
K. H. Mächa - 'Dilo K. H. Michy'. Plejada. Prague. 1929. 
J. Noväcek - 'Cikäni vicera, dnes a zitra'. Socialistickä akademie. 
Prague, 1968. 
V. Predmersky - 'Rasta" nam novi l'udia'. Slovenske pedagogicke nakl. 
Bratislava, 1961. 
J. H. Schwicker - 'Die Zigeuner in Ungarn und Siebenburgen'. 
Vienna and Teschen. 1883- 
J. Sucht' - 'Die Zigeuner' in 'Rassengeschichte der Menschheit'. 
Oldenbourg. Munich and Vienna. 1968. 
Z. Jamnicka-Smerglova - 'Dejiny nasich ciknu. ' Orbis. Prague, 1955" 
F. Stampach - 'Cikani v 
ceskoslovenske republice'. Prague, 1929" 
b) Gypsies in Europe. 
T. Acton - 'Gypsy Politics and Social Change'. Routledge-and 
Ke,. gan Paul, London, ' 1974. 
M. Block - 'Zigeuner, ihr Leben und ihr Seele'. Ieipzig, 1936. 
A. Clarke - The Sero-anthropology of Human Population Groups, 
with Special Reference to Gypsies'. Proceedings of 
= N. G. E. C., Oxford, 1971. 
J. P. Clebert - 'The Gypsies'. Penguin. Harmondsworth, 1967. (This source. is the best-known general history of the , Gypsies available in English. Despite repudiating 
the romanticised view of Gypsies, Clebert falls into 
this trap himself. For this reason, as well as for the valuable-historical information it contains', I 
ry have quoted this book extensively). 
102 
H. Fullerton - 'The Health and Welfare of Travelling Families'. 
Royal Sanitary Association of Scotland. Inverness, 1969. 
H. Gentleman and S. Swift - 'Scotland's Travelling People'. HMSO. 
Edinburgh, 1971. 
I. F. Grant - 'Highland Folk *. -ays'. Routledge and Keögan Paul, 
London, 1974. 
D. Kenrick and G. Puxon - 'The Destiny of Europe's Gypsies'. Heinemann, 
London, 1972. 
H. Mode and S. Wölffling - 'Zigeuner'. Koehler und Amelang. Leipzig, 1968. 
P. N. Panaitescu - 'The Gypsies in Walachia and Moldavia :A Chapter 
of Economic History'. Journal of the Gypsy Lore 
Society. Vol. 20 (Pt, 2), 1941. 
G. Puxon - 'Rom : Europe's Gypsies'. Minority Rights Group, 
London, 1973. 
W. Simson - 'History of the Gypsies'. New Stat. Acct. Kirk 
Yetholm. 1847. 
Tinkers in Scotland - 'Report of the Departmental Committee on Tinkers 
in Scotland'. HMSO, Edinburgh, 1918. 
c) General History. 
P. Anderson --'Lineages of the Absolutist State'. New Left Books, 
London, 1974. 
Atlas - 'Skolni atlas 
ceskoslovenskych dejin'. Ustrednf 
spräva geod4zie a kartografie. Prague, 1965" 
E. J. Hobsbawm - 'Bandits'. Penguin. Harmondsworth, 1972. 
V. Husa - 'Dejiny 
ceskoslovenska'. Orbis, Prague, 1962. 
ed. J. Macek - 'Ceskoslovenskä viastiveda del II - Dejiny svazek I'. 
Orbis, Prague, 1963- 
Z. Salzmann and V. Scheufler - 'Komärov -A Czech Farming Village'. 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc., London 1974. 
R. W. Seton Watson - 'A History of the Czechs and Slovaks'. Hutchinson, 
Landon, 1943" 
T. C. Smout:. 
_ - 
'A History of the Scottish People. Fontana, London, 1972" 
ed. V. Straka - 'Czechoslovakia Today'. Artia, Prague, 1964. 
A. J. P. Taylor - 'Tie Habsburg Monarchy'. Penguin. Harmondsworth, 1964. 
E. P. Thompson 'The Making of the English Working Class'. Penguin,. ' 
1968. 
S. H. Thomson - 'Czechoslovakia'in E1 ropean History'. Cass. London, 1965. 
103 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE 'GYPSY QUESTION'. 
Page 
Post-War Migration in Czechoslovakia and Cohtemporary to 
Developments Elsewhere in Europe ... ... ... ... ... 
The Problematic Level of Post-War Gypsy Immigration 
to Czechoslovakia ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
1(1 
The Emergence of the 'Gypsy Question' in Czechoslovakia... 117 
The 1958 Central Committee Decree ... ... ... ... ... 
131 
- Some Problems of Documentation ... ... ... ... 
X31 
- The Nature of the 'Gypsy Question' ... ... ... 
133 
- Origins and Persistence ... ... ... ... ... 
133 




... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
}' 
t4.6 




THE 'GYPSY QUESTION'. 
Post-War Migration in Czechoslovakia and Contemporary 
Developments Elsewhere in Europe. 
If the formation of the First Republic in 1918 had created a unique 
potential by juxtaposing 'eastern' Gypsies and 'western' industrialisation, 
it was the estahlishment of the Second Republic in 1945 that released 
the legal and economic constraints which had stifled any new development 
between the Wars. 
Politically the crucial factor was the post-War dominance of the 
Communist Party. As leaders of the resistance movement during the Nazi 
occupation, the Communists played a major part in framing the national 
coalition government plans (the 1945 Kosice Government Programme) which 
included nationalisation of all natural wealth, sources of power, large 
industries, banks and insurance companies as well as the expulsion of 
most of the Sudeten Germans and the expropriation of their property. 
Among the full democratic rights proclaimed in this Programme was a. 
pledge to prohibit ethnic discrimination which automatically cancelled 
the 1927 legislation that'had effectively restricted Gypsy movement and 
employment. (Straka : 92,93). 
The Communists' leading position was confirmed in the 1946 election 
from which they emerged as°the°largest-single-party with-38-percent-of- 
4 
the overall vote and this-victory enabled them to forma majority 
government together with the Social Democrats. Their popularity stemmed- ,- "ý 
from their previous rejection of the 1unich agreement, their organised 
wartime resistance to the Nazis, their positive programme for post-War 
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reconstruction and also from their link with the Soviet Union which 
had liberated most of the country. On the other hand the previously 
dominant bourgeois parties were popularly associated with pre-War 
unemployment, the disastrous reliance on western allies which had 
culminated in helpless acquiescence to the Munich decision to dismember 
the Republic and the lack of any political philosophy other than the 
restoration of the status quo. 
However the economic effects of this shift in the political centre 
of gravity were probably overriding in the case of the Gypsies. At the 
end of the nineteenth century and between the Wars the Slovak peasantry 
had been unencumbered by the kind of legislation that restricted Gypsy 
movement within the country* and yet had been forced to emigrate rather 
than migrate internally to escape poverty, because of the current 
depressed level of Czech home industry. After the First World War it 
had taken until 192ö for the Republic's industrial production to regain 
the 1913 level -a full ten years - and soon afterwards industry was 
plunged into recession once more during the 1930s. 
The contrast after the Second World War was striking. From the 
situation where "industrial production in September 1945 was only about 
half that of 1913 ... the first Zwo-Year Plan (1947-1948) succeeded 
not only in restoring the economy (with changes), but in surpassing the 
1937 level of industrial output, by around 10 percent". (Wheeler : 25). 
However there were the "stringent emigration laws of 1903 and -1908, [but these 7. proved quite' unavail . 
ng to check ... the flow of 
emigrants, who were almost exclusively peasants ... In 1907 [alone] 
",. 
203,000 [emigratedl, out of, a -total, rHungarian] population of 
19,000,000",. (Seton Watson : 280). 
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This remarkable recovery was achieved despite the death of almost 
360,000 people in Nazi concentration camps and the loss of two and a 
half million Germans from the border regions of Bohemia and Moravia who 
either fled or were expelled and many of whom were productive workers. * 
(Straka : 91). 
The Communist programme included plans for the eventual industrialis- 
ation of Slovakia, which in 1937 had produced less than seven per cent 
of the Republic's total industrial production, but the equalisation of 
such a severe imbalance would obviously require years of correction 
while the immediate post-War need was to regenerate the existing mines 
and factories in the Czech lands to increase production of energy and 
steel as a base for further expansion. 
The population loss, particularly severe in the heavy industrial 
border areas of north Moravia and north Bohemia, combined with continuing 
industrial expansion to produce a sustained demand for industrial workers 
and rural Czechs and Slovaks went in their thousands to the city of 
Ostrava and its satellites (N. Moravia) that produced three quarters 
of the Republic's black coal, iron and steel and to towns like Most 
(N. Bohemia) where three quarters of the country's brown coal deposits 
were located. 
To-these same destinations went the Gypsies in what can only be 
described as a mass migration. Ingthe immediate post=molar years thousands 
of Gypsies left their isolated settlements in rural Slovakia where they 
had been virtually imprisoned for centuries to seek work in the labour- 




starved industrial areas of the Czech lands. For the first time in 
history Gypsies were entering the general labour market on a large 
scale, usually as unskilled factory and construction workers and also 
as miners. 
Already by 1947 there were 16,752 Gypsies in the Czech lands of a 
V 
total Gypsy population of 101,200f (Smergiova : 86). These comprised 
over 16 per cent, nearly double the pre-War proportion and, for an 
obvious tragic reason, they were almost all recent immigrants from 
Slovakia. By 1958, although no precise figures are available, the Gypsy 
population was estimated at between 120,000 and 150,000 of which perhaps 
a quarter were in the Czech lands. 
It is possible to see this post-War migration of Sldvakian Gypsies 
as a counterpart to the urbanisation of the largely, nomadic western 
European Gypsies which had been continuing throughout the twentieth 
century but which accelerated significantly after the Second World War. 
Such a comparison is misleading and must be treated with extreme caution 
for the common causal factor in these parallel movements was not a 
shared Gypsy identity, understood in any racial or cultural sense, but 
rather a similar economic predicament. Moreover, although containing 
the same ingredient of{a-population shift to urban areas, the solutions 
were fundamentally different as might have been expected from the 
dissimilar developinent'patternsýin east and west. This is'quite evident 
from closer examination of some oftthe more important examples of large- 
scale Gypsr' population movethent in twentieth century Europe. 
These figures were given in, -a Criminal Headquarters. report-(9.7.48) 
and were : 
possibly compiled using residence registration cards. 
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Gypsies in Czechoslovakia, as in western Europe generally, had 
seen their niche as artisans progressively destroyed by competition 
from the mass-produced goods of the advanced industrial economies in 
which they lived. However, while the house-dwelling Slovakian Gypsies 
had adopted the, customary solution of rural landless labourers and 
had migrated to become part of the urban industrial proletariat, the 
western European nomads had moved towards the population centres with- 
out abandoning either their characteristic self-employed and family- 
based economy or their nomadism. 
A much closer western European parallel to-the post-war migration 
of Slovakian Gypsies is provided, not by the urbanisation of the 
indigenous nomads, but by the influx of many settled Gypsies who joined 
the flood of southern European migrant workers - from Jugoslavia, Spain 
and Turkey, where there had been a comparable eastern pattern of 
development. Like other 'guest workers' they inhabited shanty-towns 
('bidonvilles') or barracks on the fringes of the industrial zones that 
employed them. (Puxon : 8). 
However. the nearest equivalent to Czechoslovakia's, experience* 
was that of Poland where - in spite of more vigorous extermination'of 
Gypsies during the War, a higher proportion of nomads and a greater 
number of. post-War Gypsy, immigrantsafrom the, East - many,, Gypsies migrated 
internally to. the, coal-and steel belt. of Upper Silesia, (K'atowice and 
Nowa Huta). which lay only, a few miles to the north-east of the Ostrava- 
Karvina coal basin, its Czechoslovakian counterpart. (Kaminski), 
Elsewhere in eastern Europe the predominantly agricultural economy 
and relatively low level of heavy industrialisation-precluded, -t,. - internal Gypsy migration (as in Czechoslovakia and Poland), 'while-'. 
stringent restrictions on,, foreigntravel-to the West prevented 
migration to Germany and France (as-from Jugoslavia). 
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In western Eitrope the effect of the growing urbanisation of 
indigenous Gypsies after the Second World War and in particular of 
the increased visibility of these nomads, due to their widespread 
adoption of motor lorries and trailer caravans, was to provoke official 
action. At first local authority attempts to dislodge them from larger 
urban concentrations went unreiisted but as more intensive land use 
during the 1950s and 1960s made stopping-places progressively harder 
to find, the Gypsies began to hold their ground and the level of 
conflict escalated sharply when local authority evictions were countered 
by activist groups. After the brutality involved had been effectively 
publicised by the new medium of television there were moves, especially 
in Britain and France, to achieve the same aim of preventing Gypsy 
urbanisation by administrative means which would concede the presence 
of a limited number of Gypsies in urban areas in return for the power 
to exclude the remainder. 
In England, for example, the 1959 Highways Act renewed the 1835 
prohibition on Gypsies camping along the roadsides and in 1967 the 
Lord Chief Justice pronounced that in law 'gypsy' meant no more than 
"'a person leading a nomadic. life with no"fixed employment and with no 
fixed abode". ` This ruling in'terms ofa, way of life rather than an 
ethnic identity. was`fully compatible with the 'modern' approach of 
harassment to promote assimilation, outlined in the previous chapter, 
and had the consequence that Gypsy organisations were effectively 
prevented from fighting discrimination on the grounds that it 
infringed the 1965 Race Relations Act. (Fraser : 75-77). 
After a number-of violent confrontations in the industrial Midlands 
and North had: heightened'public concern, : the, 196 Caravan Sites Act'was' 
introduced, requiring urban local'authorities to provide camping 
facilities- for' a minimal-fixednumber of caravans while leaving their 
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rural counterparts with a relatively open-ended committment. Once 
these conditions had been satisfied, councils were promised 
'designated' status - i. e. they were to become no-go areas with the 
power to impose swingeing sanctions on any additional Gypsies that 
should venture onto their territory. Site proyision was painfully slow 
and in spite of the fact that a 1965 census had recorded 3,4O0 families 
on the road in England and Wales, * the number of sites "had just passed 
fifty in 1972, representing barely 20 per cent of the overall need". 
(Puxon : 10). 
In France, however, the 1912 law remained in force until 1969 when 
a new law replaced the grotesque ''carnet anthropometrique' by a more 
streamlined 'carnet de circulation' and, at the same time, gave LPrefets 
i des Departements' the power to assign France's 80,000 nomadic Gypsies 
to specific local authorities. However such legal attachment did not 
imply any right to a place to live. As in the case of Scotland, attempts 
at persuasion by central government brought negligible results: 
The French Government, like their counterparts 
in Italy and Spain, have at infrequent intervals 
--. 
issued circulars suggesting but which do not 
oblige district authorities to set up caravan 
sites. Less than a dozen have responded and 
existing camping grounds consist usually of 
wasteland next to rubbish tips lacking even a 
water supply. 
(Puxon 8). ` 
As in western Europe it was post-war urbanisation of Gypsies that 
prompted official action in Czechoslovakia but although the pattern of 
movement from Slovakia villages to Czech cities was so unlike that of 
* The English Caravan Sites Act was not, extended to Scotland because 
the Scottish Office preferred persuasion by-circular rather than 
coercion by law in dealing with its local authorities. In con- 
sequence Scotland had one temporary local authority site for fifteen 
families in 1975 although a census in August 1969 had recorded 344 , families on the road. (Gentleman : 19). Meanwhile the 1865 Trespass 
-Act, which'makes trespass in Scotland a criminal instead ofa civil 
offence as in England, still remained the principal means of evicting 
nomadic caravan dwellers. 
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nomads in England and France, the Czechoslovakian authorities were 
unable to shake themselves free of their preconceived notion of Gypsies 
as inveterate nomads. This was a major reason why the Czechoslovakian 
policy of assimilation had features in common with contemporary policies 
in western Europe, even though it resembled far more closely the much 
earlier assimilation campaign of Maria Theresa. 
The Problematic Level of Post-War Gypsy Immigration to Czechoslovakia. 
Given the analysis of Gypsy population movemeht primarily as a 
response to economic development - though mediated by political conditions, 
it would not be surprising if in addition to internal Gypsy migration 
from Slovakia to the Czech lands, there had also been considerable 
immigration of foreign Gypsies from other eastern European countries to 
Czechoslovakia in the immediate post-War years. Indeed, 'in the best- 
known study of Czechoslovakia's Gypsy policy to have been cublished in 
the West, Otto Ulc* argued that such an influx occurred on a large 
scale and consequently that much of Czechoslovakia's present Gypsy 
population consists of ' post-War immigrants. --"` 
LThe Gypsies] number gained greatly through largely 
illegal immigratior.. following the cessation. of, 
`hostilities in 1945. Their brethren from the'ravaged 
, _, lands of Eastern Earope sought a domicile in relatively 
unscathed Czechoslovakia. 
., _ _. 
(Ulc :. 423). 
For all the: prima facie plausibility of such a phenomenon the 
evidence must be treated with great caution. -"r. - 
* 0. Ulc in 'Soviet Studies', Aril 1969. PA more recent, study s drawn from this thesis,. is included in Rehfisch etäl. (1974)., 
_. - 
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Ulc's main argument to support his claim is based on demographic 
data. 
Whereas, according to the 1930 census there were only 
some 32,000 Gypsies in Czechoslovakia. .. the first 
postwar census of 1966 which included the Gypsies 
registered a sevenfold increase ... 
[In spite of the 
high birth rate] the sevenfold increase of Gypsy 
population in 20 yeaks [sic) seems a biological 
impossibility. 
(ibid : 421,423). 
Apart from the careless slip of mis-stating the time interval 
between the two censuses as 20 years instead of 36, Ulc's argument is 
flawed by the mistaken choice of the 1930 census total as a base from 
which to calculate Gypsy population increase for comparison with other 
totals for Gypsies immediately suggests that the 1930 figure was far 
too low to be remotely possible. The"1893 census had recorded around 
36 thousand Gypsies in Slovakia alone (i. e. 4 thousand or'11, per cent 
more than Ulc's figure for 37 years later) and an-almost contemporaneous 
1927 census gave the Slovakian total'as, 62 thousand: - 
Ignoring the suspect 1930 figure for the moment, the Slovakian 
F +6 " 
Gypsy population appears to have grown between 1893 and 1927 at an 
average annual rate of 2.1 per cent and continued to increase at the 
higher yet comparable rate of 2.8 per cent until 19479 whe'n'a'total'of 
102 thousand was recorded. * Over the next twenty years the average rate 
increased sharply to around'6 per cent, as modern medicine and an 
improved diet rpade'their' usual impact on infant mortality. ' This could 
be seen in the altered demographic structure for whilst in the--1947 
* Although : this figure represented theGypsy population of the whole Republic, the mass extdrmination of Czech Gypsies during the µWar 
meant-that all'but'a few hundred were ofSlovakian"ý'origin. 
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census 38 per cent of the Gypsy population was under fifteen years of 
age, by 1970 this proportion had risen to 51 per cent. (Kara : -50). 
In the two decades between 1947 and 1967 the Gypsies' number more 
than doubled to 224 thousand but although this was a staggering rate 
of growth for a Earopean country, it was not unusual in the Third 
World. Therefore it was by no means the 'biological impossibility' 
that Ulc claimed, requiring the additional factor of immigration to 
explain it. 
There still remains the problem of the 1930 fig-are : why was 
it so low? 
Unlike the other totals listed above, which were derived from 
surveys limited to Gypsies, the 1930 figure was taken from a general 
census of the entire population of the Republic and, as such, simply 
recorded the number of Gypsies who had declared themselves 'of Gypsy 
nationality' to the censustaker. Although'a'poor guide to real Gypsy 
population levels the 1930 figure, taken in conjunction with the more 
reliable 1927 figure, did indicate the extent to''which Gypsies had been 
intimidated, into denying their origins by ominous contemporary events 
such as registration and fingerprinting, 'the 1927 law against nomadism, 
pogroms like that at Pobedim and the 1929 'Monster Trial' of Gypsies 
for cannibalism. 
(A similar phenomenon occurred in the national census of 1970 
which some Gypsies f"2 ared to be a 'disguised attempt to compile another 
1958-style 'nomads' register' . 
* This-fear, was expressed-by many -Gypsie's during my field-work 
(1969-1972). 
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The preliminary results of the 1970 National Census 
showed an apparent loss of almost 25,000 Gypsies from 
the previous year 
['s special Gypsy census], but the 
Federal Statistical Office explained that 'not all 
Gypsies acknowledge their origin' ... 
(Davidova and Guy : 83). ) 
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Ulc attempted to back up his demographic argument with empiric&l 
evidence that Czechoslovakia's Gypsy population had been enlarged by 
the inclusion of Gypsies in the post-war population transfers. 
Governments, traditionally unenthusiastic about 
their Gypsy population, also tried to dispose of 
the problem under the minorities exchange agreements. 
Thus, the Hungarian government managed to smuggle 
these people as 'Slovaks' in the transport trains. 
Prague, in turn, countered by mingling the unwelcome 
guests with the Sudeten Germans liable for expulsion 
from the country. Some of the transports with 
fictitious Teutons went through, some were returned. 
This back-and-forth involuntary nomadism also con- 
tributes to an explanation of the relatively large 
Gypsy population-in today's Czech borderlands. 
(IIlc : 423 footnote). 
While it is probable that both sides included Gypsies in the 
transfers between Hungary and Slovakia, there is no evidence to suggest 
that this resulted in a net increase in the Gypsy population of 
Slovakia. However, there is no conceivable' way in'which the other major 
population transfer, that of Sudeten Germans to Germany, can"contribute 
to an explanation of the relatively large Gypsy-population in today's 
Czech borderlands'. In the Czech lands, as in Austria and Germany, 
the indigenous largely nömadic`Gypsies had been almost wiped out and 
therefore any, Gypsies in the Czech borderlands who might have been 
transported. must°have been post-War migrants from Slovakia. * It seems 
unlikely that the, lCzech authorities could have 'hoped 'to' pass off dark- 
* Even today there are a few German speaking Gypsies ('Sinti') in the Czech lands who survived the War but they, amount to a handful only. 
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skinned, non-German speaking Gypsies as Sudetens but even if they-had 
been successful, this would have resulted in a population loss from- 
the borderlands and not a gain. 
It might seem unnecessary to refute at such length the claim that 
a significant part of the post War Gypsy population of Czechoslovakia 
consisted of recent immigrants, but it is important to realise the 
sinister purposes often served by this argument. Some Czech local 
authorities accused the incoming migrant Gypsies from Slovakia - 
ignorant of their rights and with their papers frequently incomplete 
or in disorder - of being illegal immigrants and consequently not 
entitled as Czechoslovakian citizens to full legal and welfare 
protection. While some excuse might be made for the Czechs, innund ted 
by a completely different kind of Gypsy than they had known hitherto, 
no such justification can be made for their Slovakian counterparts who 
later reported to central government that their own local Gypsy 
settlements were of very recent origin. * 
On the whole these tactics were variants of the familiar device 
universally adopted by western European local authorities who refuse 
to make any'provision for nomadic Gypsies on the grounds tint they are 
unknown and recent newcomers, even if the Gypsies in question are able 
to prove long-established residence in the'area. 
" See the following chapter for examples where local authorities 
in Slovakia : 
"[listed Gypsy] settlements allegedly founded in the 1930s yet 
which local informants ... remember as already long-established 
in the 1890s"and which parish records'show to be at least-150 
years old". (Guy : 216). 
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To their credit the 1958 policy makers did not hint at any influx 
of foreign Gypsies but the unprecedented scale of internal migration, 
supported by the myth of Gypsy rootlessness, prompted a popular belief 
to this effect. 
The best and most balanced summary of this whdle question is that 
given in the autho±itative 1975 study, 'Concerning the Problem-Area of 
Gypsies in Czechoslovakia' (Kara et al. ), by an experienced research 
team at the Czechoslovakian Academy of Sciences. 
[After the war some Czechoslovakian Gypsies returned 
from abroad j- from concentration camps, ... from 
work camps, ... or from the battlefield. ... 
With them came a small number of foreign Gypsies - 
mainly from the Balkans --who usually claimed to be 
nomads from pre-war Czechoslovakia. (. .. The movement 
of Gypsy groups between our own and neighbouring 
countries during this period has not been researched; 
evidently, however, it did not involve a great-number 
as is popularly believed. ) 
(Kära : 49). 
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THE EMERGENCE OF THE 'GYPSY QUESTION' 
IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. 
While the government grudgingly approved of the initial movement 
of Gypsies to the Czech lands it was uneasy about the duration and 
complexity of the migratory flow. Frequent official complaints about 
Gypsies 'fluctuating' showed little comprehension of the migrants' 
problems of adjustment or of their undoubtedly deep ambivalence about 
the changes for, whether in Slovakian village or Czech town, life could 
never be the same again for the Gypsies; the fact and continuing possibility 
of migration had revolutionised their perspectives. 
It was also noted with apprehension that in spite of the post-War 
developments Gypsies still lived a largely separate life - in their 
original settlements or, in a few cases, in carts and tents along the 
roadsides or even in new urban homes. Moreover, whether this segregation 
was self-sought or imposed on them, the majority of Gypsies still lived 
in a noticably different way from their non-Gypsy fellow citizens. 
In Slovakia many rural Gypsy settlements seemed to have barely 
changed in outward appearance from how they must have been in the 1930s, 
or even earlier. They ranged in size from hamlets of two or three huts 
to teeming shanty towns of several hundred and were usually physically 
separated from the nearest Slovak settlement, ) sometimes by only a few 
yards so that the Gypsy dwellings formed a quarter of the village proper, 
but more commonly by up to amile.,, In such cases the settlement was 
often hidden away out of sight, set behind a wood or in a hollow, and a 
rough track impassable to motor vehicles was the only means of access 
to the outside world. 
t 
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The huts themselves varied greatly since they were built of whatever 
local building material lay to hand. In the lowlands the walls were 
frequently of uneven, home-made adobe brick, while in upland forested 
regions primitive log-cabins were commoner. As in shanty-towns the world 
over, flattened oil-drums were a popular method of roofing. In a very 
few areas Gypsies still lived in 'zemljanky', semi-subterranean dwellings 
that were little more than large burrows hollowed from the hillside and 
blocked-off with a ramshackle wooden house-front. 
Iviost of the huts were small yet two-roomed. If they had furniture 
at all the kitchen contained a large wood-burning stove for heating and 
cooking while the bedroom was almost filled by a large double-bed in 
which slept the parents and smaller children. Older children and 
occasionally a grandparent crammed into one or more single beds in the 
kitchen or else slept on the floor. The overcrowding was extreme and 
getting worse but it was relieved to some extent by the fact that people 
spent much of their spare time out of doors - gossiping, playing cards, 
singing, arguing. 
Tie Gypsies' awareness of the insanitary conditions was dulled by 
familiarity - the inadequate earth closets that some did not bother to 
use, the lack of any refuse collection, the rats, the pools of stagnant 
water, the lack of electricity and the murky well polluted by surface 
drainage that was the only source of drinking water for the whole 
community. Likewise the consequent disease was accepted fatalistically - 
skin infections, trachoma, lice, T. B., dysentery and exceptionally cholera - 
as well as the high infant mortality rate and shorter life expectancy. 
The physical separation of the Gypsy and non-Gypsy settlements had 
been and still was a measure of, the social gulf between the two communities. 
In a few places Gypsies were accepted as fellow-villages but more generally 
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a semi-apartheid system operated. Sometimes Gypsies were excluded from 
the village pub and where their children attended school they were often 
seated separately and did not mix spontaneously in play. In general, 
social intercourse between the two communities was minimal and was 
limited towork situations. 
It was at work that the greatest changes had taken placesfor Gypsy 
men were now employed on equal rates in the recently collectivised or 
nationalised agricultural enterprises, in the state-owned forests or 
in associated industries such as sawmills and paper mills. However their 
womenfolk could usually find work only as before, as seasonal harvesters 
or privately as domestics, cleaning the villagers' houses. 
Signs of the Gypsies new wealth were visible in new, fashionable 
clothes, the spread of radios that were left blaring all day at full 
volume in the settlement - hitherto they had made their own entertainment; 
songs, music, dances, riddles and fairy stories - but most spectacularly 
in the new, brick houses that were springing up even in the most isolated 
settlements. 
These houses were mostly the work of returning migrants who had 
made their journey to the Czech lands for reasons of expediency -to earn 
the high wages of an industrial worker that were generally not available 
locally. But their savings were not all they brought back with them for 
they had new experiences of life in the city; of factory-work alongside 
non-Gypsies where the status of work-mate often took priority over 
ethnicity, of money in their pockets and of places to spend it - department 
stores, cinemas, dance-halls and cafes where the waiters were too busy, 
to care whether. the customer was Czech, Pole or Gypsy. 
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On their return home the settlement and the village seemed smaller 
and more confining than they had remembered and confronted by the Slovak 
villagers' continuing monopolisation of the few communal resources, they 
were unwilling to submit to their former subordinate position. Inter- 
ethnic arguments and fights broke out occasionally but did not escalate 
to the level of pogroms as they had done before the War. for now the law 
was not automatically loaded against the Gypsies. 
For some, readjustment proved too difficult and after selling their 
new houses to a relative they set off for the Czech lands-once more, 
adding their numbers to the constant stream of younger Gypsies migrating 
for the first time in search of the adventure of the wider world as well 
as independence from their ever-present parents and relatives. Other 
returned migrants would have gladly left again but were unable to find 
a buyer in the settlement for their newly-built houses or else stayed 
for family reasons -a sick parent or a jealous wife, fearful of the 
greater freedom of urban life. Yet many were simply glad to be home in 
the country again, far from the confused tumult of the strange, 
industrial city and now living in a fine brick house to be envied by 
relatives and neighbours. 
The life of the Gypsy migrants in the Czech lands was not without 
its difficulties. Unlike the home areas they had left, there was well- 
paid work in plenty3and Gypsies were generally recruited as unskilled 
heavy labourers to dig trenches, clear building-sites, collect refuse, 
repair railway lines, reline blast-furnaces and mine coal. The women 
too could work in-the urban equivalent of their former village role - as 
cleaners and street-sweepers. As the socialist state rewarded such male 
shock-workers with higher wage-rates the Gypsies were pleased that they 
I 
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could save so quickly, but this did not make their jobs any less 
monotonous, dirty, exhausting or dangerous. 
Czech employers viewed their new Gypsy workers with mixed feelings. 
They were glad to have labour for such arduous tasks 
J 
but also they -- 
complained that Gypsies were unreliable and undisciplined employees who 
turned up late, missed shifts, feigned sickness, changed jobs without 
good reason and, when on holiday, vanished without trace to Slovakia to 
reappear weeks or months later than required - or not at all. 
As young Gypsies continued to follow their parents into unskilled 
jobs, attracted by the pay and lacking the educational qualifications' 
for alternative employment, official anxiety was expressed that Gypsies 
might remain a caste of illiterate manual workers. Poor progress of 
Gypsy pupils in Czech schools only strengthened such fears and in spite 
" of the children's imperfect knowledge of the teaching language their 
failure was often attributed to inadequate family support. Gypsy parents 
were accused of neglecting their children by failing to feed, clothe or 
supervise them properly; instead they were thought to spend their spare 
time in drinking, gambling and fighting, the supposed central ingredients 
of Gypsy social life or 'culture'. 
Housing too was a major problem because complete fagilies often f 
migrated and not only the economically active. In the late 1910s the 
expulsion of the Germans and the construction, as part of the first Two- 
Year Plan, of 250,000 new homes to replace a similar number destroyed 
during the War had meant that for a time Gypsy migrants could generally 
be allocated local authority housing but thereafter the continuing 
expansion of heavy industrial capacity during the 1950s and the consequent 
diversion of resources from home to factory and office construction led 
/ 
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to an increasingly severe housing shortage in the towns. The vacancies 
that did occur were naturally most frequent in the less desirable 
districts/and consequently Gypsies were usually allocated dingy tenement 
flats or dilapidated older buildings. 
While growing pressure on urban housing stock was important in 
determining Gypsy settlement patterns, of even greater significance was 
official housing policy. In the coal and steel centre of Ostrava, for 
example, two completely new satellite towns were built to house the 
city's mushrooming population but although intended for incoming workers 
and their families, very few Gypsies came to live there because local 
authorities evidently felt such modern housing to be unsuitable for 
Gypsies straight from primitive settlements in Slovakia, Perhaps 
because of some unfortunate early experiences many local authorities soon: 
practically ceased to house Gypsies in decent flats 
in acceptable residential districts. Instead, as a 
matter of standard practice, they began to allocate 
to all Gypsy arrivals flats that were either cramped, 
dirty and mouldering or else cold and cavernous, 
located in houses long destined for demolition and 
which stood in shattered, depopulated back-streets. 
(Smerglova : 89). 
Some Gypsies actively sought local authority housing in poorer 
districts for its. cheapness allowed them to save more and although 
amenities were sub-standard for Czech towns, even the bare provision of 
a cold-water. tap and a_shared flush-toilet was an improvement on the 
huts they had recently left. Those' migrating to towns where kinsmen 
were already established wanted to live nearby and in some cases local 
authority flats were passed on within Gypsy families. 
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Later, when local authorities became unwilling to allocate any 
public housing to Gypsies, the same ugliness and lack of amenities made 
private flats in these same areas relatively heap and consequently 
popular with Gypsy purchasers. 
All of these factors tended to concentrate Gypsy migrants to the 
Czech lands most heavily in the decayed urban cores where, by the late 
1950s, they formed what were evidently becoming minor ghettos. In these 
concentrations their distinctively dark skin and expressive behaviour 
made them highly visible. Like all country migrants to the city they 
made an attempt to re-create something of their former village life which, 
in the Gypsies' case, took the form of a continuous occupation of 
selected parks by Gypsy women who argued vociferously while their children 
and grandchildren played football over the flower-beds. The other 
inhabitants of Ostrava wryly nicknamed one central park 'Kesely plat' 
(Kesely Square) in an unenthusiastic tribute to one of the largest 
Gypsy families in the neighbourhood. 
Meanwhile small bands of truly nomadic Gypsies, known as '0lach' 
or 'Vlach' because they had originated in the Rumanian province of 
Wallachia, still travelled the Republic with horses, carts and tents 
making a variable livelihood as horse-dealers and fortune-tellers. This 
sub-ethnic minority regarded themselves as distinct and kept themselves 
separate from the far more numerous settled Gypsies, from whom they 
differed in Romani dialect, in dance, in music and in economic patterns. 
As the build-up of Gypsies in urban areas was consolidated during 
the 1950s, the authorities became increasingly alarmed that the majority 
of these migrants were not vanishing amongst other town-dwellers but 
remained a distinctive and to sonie extent separate community. Post-War 
developments had not resulted in the swift elimination of undesirable 
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social features but instead the ever growing population concentrations, 
both in the Czech lands and Slovakia, were tending to perpetuate what 
was termed 'the backward gypsy way of life'. 
The benign influence of civilised socialist surroundings was 
further diminished by the instability of these concentrations, the 
frequency with which Gypsies changed their residence and workplace. The 
complex migratory flow did not appear to be lessening and if the early 
movement to the Czech lands was acknowledged in the case of some Gypsies 
as a positive response to new opportunities "which they made use of ... 
by taking regular employment and settling permanently" (Manual : 6), 
any subsequeht movement was regarded as a repetition of former patterns, 
peculiar to Gypsies and only recently discontinued, and as proof that 
the nomadic urge was still powerfully present in these people. 
After 1958 a sharp distinction was drawn between 'settled' Gypsies 
who had changed neither flat nor job after their arrival in the Czech 
lands (or else who had worked with corresponding regularity in Slovakia) 
and those who, "although having a permanent residence somewhere in 
Slovakia, nevertheless continually fluctuate between Slovakia and the 
Czech lands and from one Czech region to another. Because of this 
characteristic feature such Gypsies 
[were identified] as 'semi-settled' 
or 'semi-nomadic'. ' In this category were also included those few 
gypsy families who followed itinerant trades such as knife-grinders 
and tinkers without permission". (Manual : 34) 
In spite of overwhelming historical evidence that the vast majority 
of Siovakian Gypsies had been settled for centuries and that as early as 
My quotation marks 
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tie late nineteenth century only 2 per cent were nomadic and less than 
6 per cent semi-nomadic (see Chapter Two), it was confidently asserted 
to the contrary that settling was an extremely recent phenomenon and 
that the majority of Gypsies continued their semi-nomadic way of life 
until 1958 and beyond. 
Settled Gypsies 
To this category can be assigned those Gypsies where 
settling occurred at an earlier date - often in the 
previous generation or the generation before that. 
Their way of life does not differ fundamentally from 
that of other inhabitants ... from whom they can be 
distinguished only by the colour of their skin and 
their physiognomy in which their Gypsy origin is evident. 
... They are in regular empl&yment and to all intents 
and purposes have ceased to lead a Gypsy life ... 
Semi-nomadic Gypsies 
As yet* most of our Gypsies must be assigned to this 
category which includes many inhabitants of the Gypsy 
settlements, noted for their backward way of life and 
low standards of accommodation. The employment of some 
semi-nomadic Gypsies is predominantly irregular, while 
some have no regular employment at all. 
The term 'semi-nomadic Gypsies' (sometimes 'semi- 
settled Gypsies' is also used in its place) derives - 
from the way of life they actually pursued until 1958 
and sometimes afterwards. As, a rule this group of 
Gypsies passed the winter months in their Gypsy 
settlements-which they left. in the spring to wander 
around in search of casual work until they returned 
once more"to., their settlements at the onset of winter. 
They usually moved from place to place by means of 
public transport and only exceptionally adopted the 
'classical' manner of nomadic Gypsies who travelled 
with typical Gypsy carts. 
Many semi-nomadic Gypsies travelled from Slovakia to 
seek work in the-Czech-lands and generally remained 
* In fact this quotation' comes-from a book published by the main Party 
academy in December 1968. However this fuller version of the distinction 
first°made'in 1958 is entirely compatible with earlier formulations. (See Chapter Four, for the main 1958 formulation). 
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only until they were paid, whereupon they 
returned home again. When their resources 
were exhausted they set off once more for 
the Czech lands in search of casual work. 
(Noväcek : 32,33)" 
By categorising most migrant Gypsies as 'semi-nomadic' in this way, 
official documents lumped together, for all practical purposes, settle- 
went Gypsies with the quite different and truly nomadic Vlachs and 
proceeded to brand both groups alike as social parasites: 
The sad reality is that the 25,000 adult nomadic 
and semi-nomadic gypsies live largely to the 
detriment of our society, gaining their livelihood 
mainly by thefts, swindles and 
[illegal] dealing. 
(Manual : 3). 
This blanket condemnation was made in support of the demand to 
"eliminate from our socialist society an intolerable relic of the past - 
the nomadic way of life of a certain number of'our gypsies, ... a form 
unworthy' of our society". (ibid. ). - 
Given the specific historical development of Gypsies on 
Czechoslovakian territory it is absurd that 'nomadism' should have 
been invoked to explain the post-war migratioh without further analysis. 
Yet, in spite of a terminological 
shift in 1965, this interpretation 
was to remain dominant and as recently as 1971 a ministry report 




A leading American sociologist of migration wrote: 
A social-group at-rest, -or a social group in motion, 
(e. g. nomads) tends to remain so unless impelled to 
change; for with any-viable pattern of life a value 
system is developed to support that pattern. To 
analyse the migration of gypsies, for example, in 
terms of push and pull is entirely inadequate - no 
better, in fact, than to explain modern western 
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migration, as Herbert Spencer did, in terms of 
'the restlessness inherited from ancestral nomads'. 
(Petersen : 52). 
Accepting Petersen's point, if it can be shown that certain 
Gypsies have been settled for a long period, the positions are 
reversed and itisasinadequate to explain their subsequent movement 
as 'ancestral nomadism' as it is to explain anyone else's. 
The Gypsies were regarded as a growing problem throughout the 
1950s add although the far more important tasks of socialising industry 
and agriculture pre-empted party and government attention, it would be 
a mistake to assume that there was no official response to Gypsies 
before 1958. * 1 
As early as 1950 a government decree drew attention to the Gypsies' 
inferior living conditions and some local action was taken, especially 
in the Gypsy settlements of Slovakia, to improve amenities such as 
approach roads and public lighting. In 1952 a national conference of 
school teachers and local authority cultural workers was held to discuss 
the education of Gypsies (Manual : 31) and in the same year the Home 
Office issued a nation-wide directive to all local authorities urging 
them "to apply the same principles of socialist legality to Gypsies as 
to other citizens '. .. 'to draw 
[them more "effectively into the-con- 
structive strength of our People's Democratic Republic". ` (quoted Kara 53)" 
Ulc characterised the period -between 1946 'and 19,58 as" the ?! Silent Decade : No Policy'. '(Ulc_: 422). 
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To implement this directive local authority co-ordinating committees were 
formed although they were disbanded the following year as an indirect 
result of a reorganisation of the state and local government apparatus. 
(1958 Decree). 
Another educational conference was held in 1954 - this time of 
Slovakian teachers of Gypsy children - but 1954 was more significant as 
the first year in which the highest policy-making body of the Communist 
Party became actively involved in finding a rapid solution to the 
'gypsy question'. In October the secretariat of the Cehtral Committee 
discussed shortcomings and issued a decree, urging local authorities 
to greater involvement. The subsequent 1958 decree complained that the 
1954 instructions had been misunderstood as advocating short-term 
rather than continuing action but it is evident that the Central 
Committee had not yet fully appreciated the complexity of the problem 
in 1954 (Kara : 54). However it is also apparent that local authority 
'misunderstanding' also, involved disinclination to take action for the 
later report of aCentral Committee investigator was opposed by the 
Commission for the Control of Local Authorities - indicative of the 
conflict of interests between central' and local government which was 
eventually to frustrate the 1958 policy. ° 
This special report was based on the investigator's experience 
in Plzen and Ostrava, two major centres of heavy industry which proved 
natural magnets for,. the incoming migrants to the-Czech lands. Mean- 
while some research had been undertaken in the Kosice and Presov regions 
, of eastern 
Slovakia, two of the areas most heavily populated by Gypsies. 
(1958 Decree, Kara: 54).., Althougb insubstantial, these probes marked 
, 
theýstartof systematic study of the whole problem. 
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Rather than being a decade of inactivity the 1948-1958 period is 
better characterised as one of growing official involvement. Local 
authorities made sporadic attempts to cope with the unchecked migratory 
flow and the spreading population concentrations and eventually 
appealed directly to central government for guidance and help. In 
September 1957 a meeting of regional Party and local authority workers 
from all over the Republic called for a directive imposing a unified 
nation-wide policy to bring about a speedy solution to the 'gypsy 
question'. (1958 Decree). Meanwhile the leadership, too, had come 
to the conclusion that something more substantial was required than 
the previous piecemeal directives. 
Eventually, in April 1958, the Politburo of the Communist Party 
Central Committee issued a decree described as "the first systematic 
Marxist analysis ... and, it can_be said, the first ever scientific 
sociological document on the gypsy question". (Sus : 76). 
Although brief this important decree contained: 
i) An account of the nature of the 'gypsy question'. 
ii)-An analysis of its historical origin and continuing 
presence in socialist society. 
iii) A dismissal of. the alternative approaches of class 
society and a warning of their dangers to the 
policy of socialist assimilation. 
iv) A rationale justifying the adoption of the assimilation 
policy. -. 11 1S 
Seven months later haw 74/1958 "on the permanent settlement of 
nomads" was enacted and shortly' afterwards aregister of 'nomads' was 
compiled. At"the same time a manual was issued to all local authorities 
which elaborated the arguments of the Central Committee and provided 
comprehensive instructions on implementing the policy and the law which 
was its chief instrument. 
130 
Law 74 marked the start of a massive, decade-long national 
campaign to raise the socio-economic level of Gypsies to that of other 
citizens by assimilating them into wider society. To accelerate this 
arduous process a strategy of maximum dispersal was adopted from the 
start but for this to be effective there had to be adequate means of 
regulating migration and for this reason the law itself and major 
measures thereafter were aimed at the direct control of Gypsy population 
movement. 
The timing of the campaign can be explained partly by the fact 
that in the late 1950s Czechoslovakia was preparing for the transition 
from a People's Democracy to a Socialist Republic (declared in 1960). 
The XIth Party Congress in 1958 outlined a two-year plan for building 
socialism which included, among other things, 
[a cultural revolution] whose content and goal is the 
creation of new socialist man- rid of all remnants 
of bourgeois ideology - conscious, -educated and able 
to fully utilise all the possibilities of socialism' 
in developing his capacities and'to employ-them for 
the benefit of a socialist society. 
(Manual : 5). 
The Gypsies struck a jarring note for: 
we would not be able to talk of achieving a cultural 
revolution here4 if we left the group of our gypsy 
citizens with low cultural and living standards. 
(ibid. ) 
Tomake the political embarrassment all the more acute, photographs 
of ragged and dirty Czechoslovakian Gypsies had been d: published in Life 
magazine, providing capitalist propaganda material, 'as the 1958 Party 
decree noted. 
Yet another factor in the timing may, have been the'fact that 'in 1956 
the Soviet Union issued a'similar decree to ban, Gypsy nomädism. q copy 
of this decree was attached as an appendix to the 1958 Czechoslovakian 
decree. 
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THE 1958 CENTRAL COMMITTEE DECREE. 
Some Problems of Documentation. 
The decree of the Central Committee was, as such, a secret internal 
document to be circulated only among a limited number of Party, govern- 
mental and ministry workers. A publication for local authority consumption, 
embodying the main decisions of the decree and paraphrasing certain key 
passages, was the subsequent manual 'for official use only'. 
Yet even this ample document was conspicuously reticent about the 
reasoning that lay behind the adoption of the policy, particularly as 
regards the rationale. Although the assimilation policy was unequivocally 
stated to be the only possible solution to the 'gypsy question' in 
accordance with Marxist-Leninist nationality theory, the underlying 
ideological rationale was not elaborated at length in any official 
document but appeared either in the form of terse, unsupported assertions 
or else remained implicit. For 'reasons discussed more fully in 
Appendix Two the decision makers wanted to present the 'policy "as a 
'fait accompli' rather than run the risk of controversy in the explosive 
area of the rights of national minorities. 
To amplify the blunt statements of the manual, therefore, they have 
been interspersed with more explicit quotations from an authoritative 
book published in Czechoslovakia three years after the initiation of the 
policy. The author, Jaroslav Sus, worked together with two principal 
co-authors of the manual* in preparing 'The Gypsy question in the 
Viz.,. preface where Otakar Zeman of the Central Committee secretariat 
and Eva Bacfkova, the Ministry of Education and Culture worker 
responsible for Gypsy affairs from the mid-1950s until 1968,. were 
, both mentioned. 
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Czechoslovakian Socialist Republic', which was later taken by Czechoslovak 
writers on nationality theory and on Gypsies (e. g. indelkajHübschmannovä 
etc. ), as the definitive exposition of the 1958 policy. However it 
should be pointed out that the pre-eminence of Sus in the Czechoslovakian 
literature on Gypsies is not entirely because his account is far more 
comprehensive and systematic than that given in official documents but 
also for the sound political reason that in attacking Sus opponents of 
" 
the 1958 policy were not openly challenging the Party. 
This book is not without its drawbacks, for, like official documents, 
it did not offer any quotations from Marxist-Leninist classics to 
support the policy's confident claim to doctrinal orthodoxy. In their 
place was the ubiquitous phrase: "Marxism-Leninism teaches ... ", 
introducing some unsubstantiated generalisation. 
One explanation for this puzzling omission lies in the fact that 
the chief proponent of the theory was Stalin. In the tense years 
following the 1956 denunciation by truschev, any quotation from his works 
or even mention of his name would have proved politically embarrassing 
to the leadership of the Czechoslovakian Party which remained Stalinist- 
dominated uhtil Novothy"s overthrow in 1968. " Possibly another reason 
is that any attempt to 'quote the scriptures' might have provoked 
opponents to follow suit, for damaging'ammunition was certainly not 
lacking, 'asf. 'appendix1demonstrates. 
The supreme example, of such embarrassment was the massive and costly 
stone statue of Stalin which the luckless Czechs had recently 
erected on a hillside to dominate Prague's 'Old Town' quarter. After 
a period of painful deliberation the monument was eventually demolished 
overnight. 
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The Nature of the 'Gypsy Question'. 
It might appear from the preceding section that policy makers in 
Czechoslovakia saw the 'gypsy question' as a troublesome complex of 
various types of anti-social behaviour that included absenteeism, 
alcoholism, petty-theft and maltreatment of children. While this is 
true, it is only partially so for these elements were perceived as the 
outward manifestations of a much deeper problem - the fundamental socio- 
economic gulf separating Gypsies from other citizens. 
"What is the gypsy question then? " asked Sus rhetorically, and 
answered: 
Its basis is the discrepancy between, on the one hand, 
the production methods and associated high cultural 
level of a socialist society and, on the other, the 
exceptionally low level of social life of the gypsy 
population. ... This discrepancy can be solved only 
by a consciously-undertaken, planned policy of 
assimilation; this means enabling gypsies to pass 
into a higher social and cultural environment, 
merging with its social structure and cultural standards. 
(Sus : 11). 
Origins and Persistence. 
The 1958 Party decree characterised 'the gypsy way of life' as a 
mixture of undesirable remnants. of previous social orders, including 
such elements as nomadism, _tribalism, ýanimism and 
blood-feuds. In 
similar vein the-1959 handbook: for_local authorities declared: 
over the majority of our gypsy citizens yet stretches 
as a bl. ack'cloudrthe burdensome"heritage of the past, 
(Manual : 6) 
or more prosaically: 
0 
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As a result of oppression and persecution by the 
ruling classes, [gypsies J were stamped with 
characteristic features of a way of life and 
psychological nature which are nowadays an anachronism 
and must be removed by a process of socialist education. 
(ibid., 26,27). 
The argument was that the 'gypsy way of life' (embodying traditions, 
value-systems and attitudes), which had been formed - or rather deformed. 
by the bitter historical experience of centuries of oppression under 
feudalism and capitalism, had been carried over into a period and form 
of society in which it no longer had any relevance. Resistance to change 
was perpetuated merely by the fact that Gypsies usually lived with other 
Gypsies in 'undesirable concentrations'. The 'gypsy way of life', 
therefore, was akin to a dangerous, contagious disease for which the 
only effective remedy was isolation from other sufferers and a hefty 
dose of socialist re-education. 
Looking at Gypsies in this way, the policy makers naturally saw 
little point in preserving a separate identity for these people. This 
was to be eliminated as rapidly as possible by dispersing Gypsies, thus 
destroying their previous social life and bringing them into contact 
with new, progressive patterns. Assimilation was felt to be in their 
own best interests--, for: 
experience shows that'`all forms, 'which revive gypsy 
national [sic: ] consciousness, their, own special 
organisation and autonomy, preserve the present 
isolation and separation of gypsies from the remainder 
-=of the population, prevent' the penetration of every- 
thing progressive from our environment to the life of 
gypsies and help conserve the old primitive gypsy way 




The intention to dissolve the Gypsies' separate identity was 
reflected in terminological changes in official usage, just as it had 
been in the time of Maria Theresa. Although official documents did not 
go to the lengths of renaming Gypsies 'new workers' or 'new Slovaks', 
they gradually came to adopt the standard formulation 'citizen of gypsy 
origin', which had the advantage of unambiguously denoting Gypsies yet 
at the same time suggesting that this was really a previous identity. 
This formulation also incorporated the essential contradiction in the 
official attitude towards them for while 'Gypsy' was no longer to exist 
as a valid identity, a whole series of measures were introduced directed 
specifically at Gypsies. 
Both in the description of the manifestations of the 'gypsy question' 
and in the explanation of its origin and perpetuation, the 1958 Czecho- 
slovakian analysis turned out to be an Eastern European variant of the 
'culture of poverty' approach to disadvantaged strata and minorities. 
For example, Michael Harrington's account of the poor in the United 
States could well have been an official report on. Gypsies in Czechoslovakia. 
Taken as a whole, poverty is a culture. Taken on the 
family level, it has the same quality. These are 
people who lack education and skill, who have bad 
health, poor housing, low levels of aspiration, and 
high levels of mental distress. They are, in the 
language of sociology, 'multi-problem' families. 
. __ .,,.... (Farrington : 158). 
Likewise the analysis of the 'gypsy way of life' as a pathological 
heritage, perpetuated in 'undesirable ' concentration' and-'which prevented 
their adaptation to the new opportunities' of socialist society, echoed 
the view that: 
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the poor constitute a distinctive culture or 
community within society; ... the experiences, 
attitudes, and values generated in poor communities 
are passed on from one generation to the next in a 
never-ending cycle ... by means of their 
3 effect 
on the children. By the time slum-children are age 
six or seven they have usually absorbed the basic 
attitudes and values of their subculture, and are 
not psychologically geared to take full advantage 
of changing conditions or increased opportunities 
which may occur in their lifetime'. 
(Lewis, quoted Coates and Silburn : 138,9)" 
Such similarity of views should not be entirely unexpected, for the 
development of a 'culture of poverty' by the poor in the Americas and 
by the Gypsies in Czechoslovakia alike was a defensive reaction "to their 
marginal position in a class-stratified, highly individuat4d, capitalistic 
society". (ibid. ). The difference lay in the fact that, following its 
socialist transformation, Czechoslovakia was both able and determined to 
remedy the situation by drastic action, unlike western capitalist 
societies where "there has been a great deal of emphasis on the social 
and personal pathologies that accompany poverty, ... shifting the 
focus of attention from the cause of the situation - low income - to 
its effects, ... to neutralise society's anxiety and discomfort". 
(Rainwater : 516). 
Alternative Approaches and-their Dangers. 
The situation of'the. Gypsies had- I already been transformed formally 
by the 
. 
1945. declaration against ethnic-discrimination, cancelling 
restrictions on'their movement and employment, and-also in., practice by-, 
the, post-Jar industrial expansion that gave them their opportunity, to 
participate, for,, the first time, -on a mass scale in the economic main-. 
stream.,. However it was,: judged, insufficient _to rely, wholly, onthe. impetus 
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from such fundamental changes in society to bring about a successful 
resolution of the 'gypsy question' for 
although such optimism demonstrates unlimited faith 
in the healthy developnent of our system, it cannot 
be in itself the substitute for a-planned, scientific 
solution of major problems in our society. 
(Sus : cover). 
In any case the Gypsies were thought to be incapable of making 
proper use of their new opportunities without the help of special 
measures - such as dispersal - to bring them into close contact with 
new patterns. 
, Although, gypsies 
have a considerable capacity for 
passive assimilation and acculturation, they are 
incapable of attaining a higher level by their own 
efforts without the assistance of higher cultural 
surroundings. 
(Sus : 53) 
Apart from the alternative of taking no specific action and relying 
on the socialist revolution to solve everything, three other approaches 
to the 'gypsy question' were mentioned - forcible assimilation, racism 
and autonomy. Since all were characterised as unsuccessfully attempted 
solutions in previous class society they were hardly considered as viable 
options for a socialist state. Nevertheless they had to be taken into 
consideration for it was recognised that predilection for these approaches 
might linger in popular attitudes and in-this-way jeopardize the 
effectiveness of - the assimilation policy., -' 
The general argument ran that previous efforts at forcible 
assimilation had been self-defeating due to the internal contradictions 
of such a policy; in essence they had been attempts by class society 
to resolve a 'problem constantly regenerated by=the fundamental inequalities 
inherent in such a society. Ultimate success only became a possibility, 
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therefore, once there had emerged a forrof society with a basis other 
than structured inequality. 
More specifically, even a humanitarian assimilation attempt was 
doomed to failure by the irrevocably antagonistic nature of class 
society. The allocation of the considerable resources required to carry 
out such a policy would inevitably arouse the hostility of other class 
elements struggling to improve their own position. In the face of such 
opposition the assimilation attempt would either lapse or else would be 
renewed by increasingly extreme measures in a vain endeavour to overcome 
the resistance of those elements frustrating its success. However this 
escalation would only have the effect of provoking the Gypsies, so that 
even the ultimate beneficiaries of the policy joined the ranks of its 
opponents. * 
The systematic policy of Maria Theresa and the weak attempts made 
during the bourgeois First Republic were cited as variants of such 
predetermined failure: 
If we consider the policy of Maria Theresa, at first 
sight it appears that some of the measures were not at 
all bad requirements in themselves(e. g. settling, 
employment etc. ). However, the whole administrative 
approach involving forcible means to, attain swift 
assimilation could not have ended in success. 
n 3, 
ikewise' "the 'educat: ionalist''ässimilatory solution 
[of the. 1930s3,, aimed only. at cultural re-education 
7 and totally neglecting the aspect of work, could not 
, 
have achieved the 
. 
desired result.. 
The effect of such attempts was to intensify the Gypsies' 
mistrust of all measures taken by institutes, official 
This whole process is an instance of Stalin's first dialectic. See i first appendix for a'full discussion of Marxist-Leninist nationality theory. 
- 
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bodies and society in general and so to reinforce 
still further their total isolation. Thus assimil- 
atory efforts in pre-socialist forms of society 
led to consequences that were completely contrary 
to the policy-makers' intentions ... 
Class society has been unable to find a positive 
and fundamental solution to the gypsy question in 
a single instance, either in practice or theoretically. 
... Nor is it capable of this, for it cannot 
ensure the basic material conditions for the Gypsies' 
systematic re-education and assimilation. Its 
assimilation policy, therefore, necessarily reverts 
to a bureaucratic and forcible approach. * 
These are the main features and aspects in which the 
assimilation policies of previous social orders differ 
from the Marxist approach to gypsy assimilation. 
(Sus : 95,96). 
It is a pity that forcible assimilation was not examined in greater 
detail, especially in view of the apparent resemblance of Maria Theresa's 
attempt to its 1958 successor. For, in spite of the claim that assimil- 
ation attempts in class society were totally unlike 'the Marxist approach 
to gypsy assimilation' both in conception and in application, it is 
still not clear to what extent the pre-socialist assimilationists' 
belief in the cultural and racial inferiority of the Gypsies differed 
from the later pessimistic 'culture of poverty' view that the Gypsies' 
culture and social structure had been so deformed by their experience of 
oppression that the only remedy was a wholesale transplaht of culture 
and identity. Even less obvious is the dividing line between the 
'bureaucratic and forcible approach ... of previous social orders' 
and certain dubious measures of the 1958 policy, especially Law 74 
itself. 
*. 
Emphasis in the original. 
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However an adequate answer to these important questions cannot be 
given until the operation of the policy has been examined in later 
chapters. At this stage it must suffice to register the doubts and 
moreover to record that the policy-makers explicitly denied that their 
measures were discriminatory. 
We must bear in mind that the whole re-education 
process necessitates special measures during the 
transition period. In such cases we should not 
regret the time spent in explaining, both to gypsies 
and to other members of the public, that these 
measures do not have a discriminatory character, 
for their consequences lead only to a speeding-up 
of re-education - and thereby benefit our gypsy 
fellow-citizens. 
(Manual : 20) 
Indeed an outright pledge was given that there would be no discrimination: 
Our socialist society rules out any kind of dis- 
crimination whatsoever and ensures the political, 
material and social environment that provides 
favourable preconditions for the gradual removal 
of all the injustices and relics of exploitative 
social orders from the life of our gypsy fellow- 
citizens. 
(ibid. : 23) 
Sus was equally outspoken: "Marxism-Leninism condemns and rejects 
a forcible and bureaucratic way of undertaking a policy of assimilation". 
(Sus : 98). 
Evidently there can have been few fears that a mistakenly 'forcible 
and bureaucratic' approach would be employed, either on a national or a 
local level, for the 1959 handbook did not contain any specific warnings 
on the danger or case histories illustrating over-zealous action, unless 
criticism of; local. authorities who_foolishly, rehoused nomadic Gypsies in 
luxury flats., is, interpreted_, in, this. way. -, A far. greater practical threat 
was anticipated from advocates, ofathe two other approaches of racialism 
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and autonomy, both of which were "harmful, for the one like thg6ther 
drives gypsies into isolation and revives undesirable gypsy separatism". 
(ibid. : 111). 
Although racism was quite out of the question as a policy option, 
its danger lay in the fact that its sympathisers were numerous. In some 
cases they occupied official posts and were thereby in a position to 
frustrate the smooth implementation of the assimilation policy by their 
opposition. 
Sus frankly drew attention to racism, particularly in Slovakia. 
Most frequently we meet with these [relics of racialist- 
'thinking 
3 in Slovakia, particularly in those regions 
which were in the past bastions of the former fascist 
Hlinka regime and where also gypsies were persecuted in 
the most brutal manner ... Many previous ... Hlinka 
guards sometimes even today ... have an ideological 
influence on citizens and incite them against gypsies. 
(ibid. ) 
There was also a mildQr form of-discrimination against Gypsies. 
Frequently entire local government-councils or else 
their individual members refuse to solve the gypsy 
housing problem. They resist resettling gypsy 
families amongst other people and, try to-prevent 
them from moving into empty'flats-among*non-gypsies. 
By means, of bureaucratic methods they make it difficult 
for gypsies to build a family house outside the-gypsy 
settlement among other people, and often make it 
impossible for them to obtain a puilding plot and 
the like. 
(ibid. ) 
Nor was this' discrimination confined. to, the area of-desegregating 
housing, ` but=extended=also to . the. workplace.,, ;,. 
The management-of many works-either resists employing 
gypsies or ... after accepting them pays no attention 
= , 'to their further training. There are cases, of dis-, 
crimination against gypsies by giving them heavy, 
- °" 
tiring work, that no-oiLe -else wants to do or, inferior 
jobs where no'qualifications are required. 
(ibid. ) 
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The amount of racist opposition to the policy and the extent 
to which it was successfully countered can be properly evaluated 
only after a discussion of the policy in action, but it is important 
to emphasize at this stage that the danger had been recognised at 
the outset. 
While racism provided the greatest practical threat to the 
1958 policy, its major theoretical challenge came from advocates 
of autonomy, for this approach alone could offer at least a 'prima 
facie' claim to consideration as a socialist alternative to 
assimilation. 
It was simple enough to ridicule fanciful pre-war schemes for 
a Gypsy republic of Romanistan somewhere. in Africa or benevolent 
state support for nomadism by. employing, nomadic-Gypsies as itinerant 
road-menders and to argue convincingly that, 'Romantic4demands for 
autonomy and preservation of, 'the Gypsy way of, lifel, were-usually 
"fundamentally rooted in a racialist outlook_concealed, beneath an 
apparently hu Tanist, exterior". (Sus-: '91). 
However, 'new demands were made in-post-war socialist society, 
which were "especially dangerous ' because ' of' their deceptively 
humanist and democratic character'l. "(Sus ': 86). The escalating 
official activity , on' all levels 'stimulated debate about the 
ideological basis for action and led some' to" argue; that the Gypsies 
constituted a nationality question rather than a social. problem. 
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During the earlier 1950s ... there was frequent 
discussion of the proposal by some [official 
workers in the field and members of the Gypsy 
intelligentsia I that the so-called Gypsy question 
should be treated as a nationality problem and 
the case of the Soviet Union was cited as a 
precedent. There, the Gypsy question was handled 
in this way from 1926 until 1935 as part of the 
general policy towards lesser nationalities of 
the USSR. 
(Kära : 385). 
This broadening and disturbing debate was not entirely silenced 
by the 1958 Party decree, even though to persist with such suggestions 
implicitly questioned the decision to adopt a policy of assimilation. 
Sometimes an overt appeal was made to Marxist-Leninist nationality 
theory in support of nationalist demands, thus offering a direct 
challenge to the legitimacy of the Party's conclusion that this 
theory was not relevant to the case, of the Gypsies. 
Despite the fact-that in the decree of the Central 
Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party the 
correct Marxist-Leninist conclusion has been reached 
that the gypsy population does not form a nationality, 
several individuals, mainly from the ranks of the 
intelligentsia (sometimes gypsy too), approach work 
among the gypsies by making a nationality problem of 
it, with demands for special gypsy education with 
teaching given in the gypsy language, for the 
publication of newspapers and literature in the gypsy 
language and for the formation of a separate gypsy,.. 
association. In this matter it is also necessary to 
condemn incorrect opinions printedin some of our 
magazines. 
The decree of the Czechoslovak C. P. Central I Committee 
emphatically opposes these efforts with the words 
'Experience to date shows that if attempts such as 
these were put into. practice it would. retard the re- 
education process of gypsies, it would strengthen 
the undesirable isolation of gypsies from the life 
of other workers and it would help to conserve still 
further the old, primitive way of gypsy life'. 
(Manual : 21,22) 
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The pre-war spokesmen had generally been non-Gypsies, speculating 
on what would be in the Gypsies' best interests, but now not only were 
individual Gypsies expressing their own demands but they were making 
use of democratic procedures to rally wider Gypsy support for their 
views. The 1959 manual mentioned that: 
at meetings of Gypsies from Bardejov 
[E. Slovakia 
last year and also from the Bratislava region and 
elsewhere we encountered ... opinions of several 
individuals which afterwards were expressed as 
resolutions and accepted by gypsy meetings. They 
called, for example, for school teaching in the 
gypsy language and the like. 
(ibid. : 26). 
Something had to be done to prevent the assimilation policy being 
undermined by such activity. It was a simple matter to prevent the 
propogation of such views in newspapers, books and magazines by an 
administrative instruction but, as Sus noted, "while it is true that 
such opinions as suggesting-a revival of Gypsy culture 
] are not 
openly published since the C. P.... decree of April'1958, this does not 
mean, however, that they do not exist in the minds of many people". 
(Sus : 37). 1 
The most persistent opponents of the assimilation policy were 
discouraged from voicing their criticisms by more informal means, as 
a leading Gypsiologist later recalled when political developments 
allowed freer expression: 
When, ten years ago, I called attention to the 
problem, my views were regarded as either . Gypsy 
bourgeois nationalism' or 'discrimination against 
Gypsies'. 
(Hubschnannova 11 v quoted Ulc : 422). 
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A leading member of the Gypsy intelligentsia in Slovakia was 
more explicit: 
Already in 1957 we wanted a Gypsy folk-group and 
magazine. However I requested this by myself for 
the organisation of any group was still banned then. 
If I had collected signatures they could have 
imprisoned me as a matter of course. ... 
E An 
official] from the C. P. Central Committee with 
responsibility for censorship and the so-called 
Gypsy question ... began to say that I was a 
Gypsy bourgeois nationalist who wanted to separate 
the Gypsies. The party and Government line was 
assimilation. ... Gypsies themselves want to 
assimilate and even if they didn't, assimilation 
would be better for them. I said to him: 'Look 
here, I'll bring you a thousand signatures that 
we want our magazine and folk-group'. 'You had 
better not', he said. 'That sort of thing is 
against the law'. In short he threatened me with 
the police. 
(Hübschtiannovä : 37). 
This was no idle warning at a time when several leading Communists 
had recently been imprisoned for Slovak 'bourgeois nationalism', among 




While oppoiients were successfully intimidated into silence, the 
argument was re-iterated in official documents and to a lesser degree 
in the mass media that the assimilation policy w,.. s the only authentically 
Marxist-Leninist approach to the 'gypsy question'. 
How the Gypsies should be characterised has been a basic problem 
facing all administrators and researchers concerned with them. As has 
been argued above administrators in western Europe have tended to define 
them as a social rather than an ethnic group, since this not only 
envisages their ultimate assimilation into the proletariat but allows 
local authorities a freer hand with their harassment to achieve this 
end, since there is less danger of being indicted for discrimination. 
(This modern western variant of 'forcible assimilation' has been under- 
taken primarily for the negative reason of eliminating Gypsies as a 
troublesoL.; e yet relatively minor social problem, as op;, osed to the 
positive motive underlying its more systematic eastern counterpart where 
the much larger Gypsy populations of eastern Europe have always been 
seen as potentially productive labour power). 
In their practice western administrators have been aided by the 
theoretical confusion within the field of social anthropology. Theorists 
have pursued a fruitless search for definitive objective criteria of an 
ethnic group and by their inconclusive findings have given the impression 
that the common classification of Gypsies as an eth: lic group by recent 
empirical researchers (e. g. Barth : 31; Adams ) rests on no sound 
theoretical basis and can safely be ignored by legislators. * 
* The similarity of the problems encountered by social anthropologists 
and Marxist-Leninist theorists seeking necessary criteria is discussed 
at greater length in appendix three. 
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Czechoslovakian Gypsies had been defines: for census-taking purposes 
in 1921 and again in 1930 as a national minority but in the meantime 
legislators saw this as no hindrance in defining, them in terms of a 
way of life( i. e. as a social group) in the 1927 law to allow maximum 
flexibility in controlling Gypsies and also non-Gypsy itinerants. This 
procedure was fully compatible with the 'modern' Austrian approach of 
the 1880s on which thenew law was based. 
Socialist policy-makers confronted what was basically the same 
problem in the late 1950s. However in this instance the matter was 
transformed from the remote and academic question of western Europe, 
where only an empty formal status was at stake, for, according to 
i"; arxist-Leninist nationality theory, the reco, nition of the Gypsies as 
a national minority would entail the concession to them of certain 
guaranteed group rights. 
Accordingly the forthright denial of the Gypsies' eligibility for 
national mir: ority status was of prime importance since it served as a 
theoretical rationale underpinning the whole assimilation policy. 
p 
The main argument was straightforward enough. Marxist-Leninist 
nationality theory was only applicable to nations and national minorities. 
Since the Gypsies lacked at least one and possibly all four of Stalin's 
necessary characteristics of a nation, they were neither nation nor 
national minority and were not then entitled to any recognition or 
rights as a group, but only individually as ordinary citizens. Nor was 
there any prospect of them ever becoming a nation or national minority. 
Gypsies are not a nation nor a nationality and with 
regard to the objective conditions of their existence (lack of homogeneity, dispersion, low cultural level 
etc. ), neither can they become a nationality nor even 
a national minority in the future. 
(Sus : 11). 
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Of the four characteristics - territory, language, economic life 
and culture - it was the lack of territory that was most often cited. 
However their prima facie more plausible claim to the6ther characteristics 
was also attacked. 
From the Marxist-Leninist standpoint gypsies lack 
the basic characteristic social features by which 
we could re6ard them as a nation. Nowhere in the 
world do gypsies form a nation - they live consider- 
ably dispersed and, for the most part, they have 
adapted themselves linguistically and culturally 
to the nation in whose land they live. 
(Manual : 22) 
Subsidiary arguments were also advanced which conceded that the 
assimilation policy might have the effect of eliminatingren nts of 
national characteristics among the Gypsies. However the state of decay 
of Gypsies' own social patterns and culture was judged to be so extreme 
that it precluded any attempt at revival and consequently the social 
aspects of the problem were paramount. Sus expressed this view: 
The main aim is therefore social and cultural changes 
of which a by-product is changes in some ethnic 
features which nowadays are only feebly manifested 
and in the process of withering away. With regard 
to the existence of these ethnic features and to the 
objective solution of the gypsy question it is not 
possible to deny that in several respects this process 
also involves nationality problems. In the gypsy 
question however this aspect is secondary and 
incidental; it is subordinated to the qu6stion of 
social and cultural education. 
(Sus : 11) 
Although some of these characteristics might have beep more 
pronounced in the past, they were fast diminishing in importance because 
Gypsies were, in any case, apparently undergoing a gradual process of 
assimilating with the Czech and Slovak nations. This was not an unexpected 
development for, 
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there is no necessity for all ethnic communities 
to develop independently and this is equally true 
under Socialism. In the process of historical 
development some of these groups merge witn the 
compact community of other nations. 
In this way gypsies are naturally merging with the 
surrounding population in the i: rocess of historical 
evolution. This is proved by the fact that some of 
our gypsies no longer know the gypsy language and 
in no way acknowledge their gypsy origin. 
(Manual : 27) 
Sus went even further, claiming that: 
The entire historical development of the gypsies ... 
and above all our own intense and very fruitful 
activities, convince us that the process of assimil- 
ating the gypsy population is an objectively 
unavoidable natural law. 
(süs : 108). 
Since the assimilatory trend was approved as 'progressive', the 
policy could be presented as a means to assist a beneficial and naturally 
occurring tendency, while conversely any opposition could be condemned 
not merely as dissent from a Party decree but as vain resistance 
to the 
course of history. 
To work against the objectively continuing dis- 
integration of the gypsy ethnic group would be 
incorrect and in the last analysis reactionary. 
To the contrary it is necessary to speed up and 
accelerate this process and pursue it to its 
end. 
(Sus : 100). 
Other more extreme arguments had ominous implications for all minority 
groups in Czechoslovakia, for they flatly stated that even had the Gypsies 
formally constituted a nationality problem, any separate development 
would have probably conflicted with the interests of socialism and there- 
fore would have been subordinated to this higher goal. 
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In the short term the main concern in Czechoslovakia of the late 
1950s was socialist construction in preparation for the planned transition 
to a socialist republic in 1960 and this took precedence over all 
national interests. 
The nationality question, like every other phenomenon, 
goes not exist entirely on its own. With every nation- 
alist movement it is necessary to distinguish whether 
it serves socialism, for not every nationalist movement 
is a progressive movement. History knows not a few 
reactionary nationalist movements which were a brake 
to the progressive development of society preventing 
the growth of consciousness in the masses. Under 
socialism the national question is subordinated to 
the tasks of socialist construction. For this reason 
tie national question and also the gypsy question in 
Czechoslovakia are subordinated to the tasks of 
building socialism in our state. 
(: Manual : 27,28). 
There was also the general question about the long term development 
of ethnic communities within a socialist society, In particular the 
continued existence of national minorities and ethnic groups was in 
considerable doubt for it was argued that the transition to Communism 
involved their rapid disappearance. 
Marxism-Leninism admits considerable importance to 
assimilation and integration. The assimilation of 
ethnic communities is one of the preconditions which 
hastens the elimination of class society and the 
transition to communism. Marxism still recognises 
for the present the necessary existence of the most 
developed ethnic units - nations, however, even their 
continuance and permanence is regarded as historically 
relative. Their isolation is at present gradually 
being overcome. Assimilation is a generally valid 
evolutionary law affecting all ethnic groups alike, 
it depends only on the concrete historical, economic 
and political conditions, in what way and with what 
intensity this or that ethnic group will adapt itself. 
... Marxism-Leninism recognises as correct those 
actions which consciously accelerate the naturally 
continuing assimilation process, presupposing however 
that they are in accordance with the demands of 
progressive development. 
(Sus : 98). 
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The evaluation of the involved rationale is of crucial importance 
for on its validity depends the ultimate legitimacy of the assimilation 
policy as an application of Marxist-Leninist nationality theory. 
However, having given an account of the stated rationale, the next step 
cannot be a direct comparison with some acknowledged, organised body of 
doctrine for Marxist-Leninist nationality theory does not exist in a 
compact and codified form. 
Marx and Engels never developed a co. -iprehensive nationality theory 
as such and Lenin's thoughts on the subject are mostly extant as 
fragments of published speeches. The core of Marxist-Leninist nationality 
theory is located in Stalin's 'Marxism and the National q`uestion', 
written in 1913 on Lenin's instructions, and Stalin's attempt to define 
the essence of nationality is still the starting-point for contemporary 
Soviet debate. However there are problems of interpretation and any 
adequate account of Marxist-Leninist nationality theory must supplement 
this basic work by later speeches as well as by polemics since Stalin's 
fall. 
To maintain the flow of the r arrafive it is advisable to postpone 
a fuller consideration of the complexities of the theory until the first 
appendix, but at this point it can be stated that the manner in which 
the rationale was presented was extremely misleading. 
By their assertion that the assimilation policy was the only 
ideologically acceptable option available to them, the Czechoslovakian 
policy-makers deliberately implied that Marxist-Leninist nationality 
theory was a straightforward doctrine which, when applied to the case of 
the Gypsies, gave a simple, unequivocal answer. Nothing could be further 
from the truth, for, rather than consisting of a single unified body of 
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doctrine on which all leading theorists are in agreement, Marxist- 
Leninist nationality theory contains two alternative and conflicting 
interpretations wich have been opposed in Marxist debate from the time 
of Marx and Engels until the present-day polemics of Soviet academicians. 
These rival approaches to ethnic community development point to dia- 
metrically opposed policies to be pursued by a socialist state. 
THE ASSIMILATIOLIST APPROACH sees nationalism as little more than a 
temporary by-product of class formation and, as such, having no value 
other than as a possible means to hasten the socialist revolution. 
Nationality and other forms of ethnicity consequently have no positive 
significance when the socialist era is reached and will disappear rapidly 
before the co#munist phase. 
The Policy for a Socialist State should therefore be to encourage the 
assimilation ('merging') of national and ethnic minorities, interpreting 
any resistance by them as due to reactionary elements, guilty of 
bourgeois nationalism. 
THE PLURALIST APPROACH acknowledges a greater continuity of ethnic 
identity under pre- and post-capitalist conditions. Capitalism created 
great inequalities between nations and between nationalities and con- 
sequently interests and accompanying loyalties often followed ethnic 
rather than class lines. The socialist revolution, in itself, does not 
eradicate these inequalities automatically and further deterioration of 
relations can only be avoided by a conscious and determihed programme 
to redress. the balance. Any assimilation during the socialist period will 
only take place if entirely voluntary and probably Only after a virtual 
renaissance of ethnic communities. 
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The Policy for a Socialist State should therefore be to encourage the 
development ('flourishing') of national and ethnic minorities, inter- 
preting any resistance by majority groups as uue to reactionary elements, 
guilty of "great power chauvinism decked by a mask of internationalism". 
(Stalin). 
The general argument of appendixinot only reveals the deceptive 
simplification and distortion embodied in the 1958 rationale but in 
addition, although not specifically concerned with Gyrsies, provides 
substantial support for the charge that while the policy to assimilate 
Gypsies in Czechoslovakia resembles more closely the 'assimilationist' 
interpretation of the theory, it is the rival 'pluralist' version that 
has the stronger claim to Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy. 
Although the theoretical legitimation of the policy is of undeniable 
importance, it would be a mistake to over-estimate its significance as 
a deciding factor in the adoption of the policy. Indeed many officials 
had little patience for elaborate justifications and the journal 
'Demografie' stated their position succinctly: 
Under socialism it is totally unthinkable to build some 
'socialist and national' gypsy culture on the basis of 
something which is very primitive, backward, essentially 
often even negative and lacking in advanced tradition. 
... The question is not whether the Gypsies are a 
nation but how to assimilate them. 
(quoted U1 : 440) 
It would be particularly naive to assume that the decision to 
assimilate the Gypsies was simply a matter of accepting a deduction, 
albeit tortuous, from rules prescribed in Marxist-Leninist texts. Perhaps 
such a rigorous analysis was made, though there is little enough evidence 
of it in official documents, but given the widely diveröent interpretations 
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of the nationality theory it is highly probable that in any case the 
choice of policy was influenced more by current political requirements 
in Czechoslovakia than by theoretical considerations. In particular 
any assessment of the reasons for the adoption, in 1956, of a policy 
of Gypsy assimilation must take into account the broader context of 
ethnic relations in Czechoslovakia as a whole. 
At the time the treatment of other ethnic communities, especially 
of Slovaks, was aimed at containing any separate national development 
and in view of this overall policy it was very unlikely that an 
exception would have been made for the Gypsies, even had their 
credentials for national minority status been stronger. Indeed the 
1958 Gypsy policy was far from the unique and isolated phenomenon 
it appeared; to the contrary it represented the most extreme case 
of a general assimilatory trend. 
However., a philosophy of assiüuilationism had been equally dominant 
during the period of the First Republic and in order to understand 
this continuing approach, common to bourgeois and communist adminis- 
trations alike, it is necessary at this point to make a brief survey 
of the development of inter-ethnic rivalry in Czechoslovakia. Likewise, 
to appreciate the strength of ethnic tensions beneath the surface of 
post-Second World War Czechoslovakian society, an excursion must be 
made beyond the 1958 watershed reached by the general narrative to 
the political liberalisation of 1968, in which such pressures were a 
major causal factor. Only in that year could accumulated grievances 
be expressed openly and this led to a formal revision of the status of 
the Slovak nation and of other national minorities within the public 
as well as to a reconsideration of the Gypsies' position. 
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A much fuller treatment of this complex subject, which supports 
the generalisations of the following section, is given in Appendix 
Two. 
Ethnic Tensions in post-War Czechoslovakia. 
The inevitable socio-economic imbalances resulting from the uneven 
development of pre-socialist society had not necessarily exacerbated 
ethnic tensions for while the rise of capitalism in western Europe led 
to fierce competition between the metropolitan powers for colonies and 
foreign markets, this process was generally accompanied by the con- 
solidation of ethnic communities within these states into relatively 
homogeneous 'national' populations. 
In eastern Europe, however, where multi-national states had been 
formed in face of the Turkish threat and where absolutist feudal 
regimes survived well into the nineteenth century, the impact of 
capitalist development had signalled an era of national awakening for 
hitherto 'non-historical' peoples. Rather than consolidating, the 
populations of these states split along ethnic lines and relations 
between them became increasingly embittered as rival communities 
jockeyed for political and economic dominance. Nor did the eventual 
fragmentation of such states at the end of the First World War resolve 
these conflicts for the supposedly 'national' successor states were as 
mixed in ethnic composition as their predecessors. 
The movement which dismembered Austria-Hungary and 
created Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia was bound to 
be succeeded by movements for the dismemberment of 
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Given the premises 
of nationalism the process was natural and legitimate 
and no end could be set to it. 
(Carr : 24). 
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In the newly-formed state of Czechoslovakia the inter-war centrist 
governments attempted to contain the centrifugal national minority 
parties of the Right by a policy of calculated concessions to their 
demands for increased autonomy. Ultimately this strategy failed and 
in 1938 the Republic fragmented under pressure from the dissatisfied 
German, Slovak, Hungarian, Polish and Ruthenian minorities. 
During the First Republic (1918-1938) the Social Democrats and 
Communists on the Left had, on the whole, argued the precedence of 
class before nationality and had consequently advocated a unitary and 
centralised socialist state. The pre-conditions for realising this aim 
were eventually provided by the post-war election victory of the 
Communist party. 
The new government first of all took swift action to bring about 
a drastic reduction in the size and proportion of ethnic minorities 
in the reconstituted Republic. Then centralist pressures against 
'bourgeois nationalists' in the late 1940s were intensified during the 
1950s in preparation for the transition to a socialist republic in 1960. 
The long-term goal of an ethnically and socially homogeneous population 
was seen as the sole certain guarantee against any future repetition 
of the nightmarish disintebration of 1938. 
To remove the basis of nationalist grievances which had destroyed 
the First Republic the Communist regime pursued a vigorous policy of 
economic equalisation, notably the industrialisation'of Slovakia, * and 
r 
A leading Czech economist stated that in 1937 "Slovakia was 70 
years behind Bohemia-Moravia in economic developments". (Selucky) 
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assumed the problem to have been solved. However no concessions were 
made to the subtler aspects of nationalist feeling and although the 
Slovaks were formally recognised as a separate nation in the constitution, 
their distinct identity found little expression in political and 
administrative institutions. 
Barely aware of nationality problems and of the 
need to respect the national liberty of the Slovak 
people, the pre-1964 Communist party line to the 
contrary often exacerbated the contradictions. 
(Jicinsky : 3,4) 
This inability to comprehend the full dimensions of the national 
problem and the insistence on the adequacy of a narrowly deterministic 
analysis in terms of economic factors alone had its precedent in the 
inter-War period when the Party failed to appreciate the complex 
motives behind Slovak Communists' demands for Slovakian autonomy. 
Evidently the [Czechoslovakian Communist party] 
failed to appreciate the delicacies and dangers of 
Slovak nationalism.... The solution of the national 
problem was for them secondary; the social problem 
was the dominant one. In analysing nationalism 
with the assistance of the Marxist vocabulary of 
base and superstructure, the Communists were unable 
to sense the irrational and emotional drivers of 
the recently awakened Slovaks. There is little 
doubt that the radicalism of the Slovak Communists 
originated in a variety of objective causes, such 
as increased exploitation, rising unemployment, 
extreme poverty in some parts of the country, and 
the mistakes and failures of Prague..... Yet the 
subjective elements should be remembered as well - 
the thirst for self-expression and self-rule, 
national pride, and the hatred of all capitalist 
systems. 
(Jelinek : 80). 
, 
Yet not all non-Slovak Party members were so inserjitive and the 
supporters of the 1924 Comintern line* included Bacilek (later to head 
* In 1924 the Fifth Coggress of the Communist International advocated 'a Leninist line in national problems' and emphasised the 'right of 
gelf-determination to the point of separation' in the case of Slovakia. This line closely re sembled the Pluralist approach out- lined above. 
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the Slovakian branch of the Party under Novotny) and Gottwald (first 
Communist president of Czechoslovakia from 1948 to 1953), who even at 
one point advocated Slovakian secession from the First Republic. (ibid: 
77,78). When such former champions of Slovakian autonomy eventually 
assumed power, these same men presided over renewed Slovakian political 
subordination. 
The centralism of the late 1940s and 1950s failed to eliminate 
nationalist pressures but instead drove them underground; when they 
surfaced they were a major factor in toppling the Stalinist Novotny 
regime. Nationality problems re-emerged, in 1968, in disturbingly 
familiar forms as the Slovaks pressed for federal status for Slovakia, 
whilst the largest national minority, the Hungarians, voiced renewed 
demands for border revisions irr favour of Hungary. 
In rejecting autocratic centralism not only as a violation of 
democracy in general but also of the rights of nationalities the post- 
Novotny leadership acknowledged the injustice of the previous party 
line on the national question. Federalisation of the Republic, after 
fifty years of sustained Slovak efforts, and the enactment of a new 
national minorities law represented, therefore, a return to the 
'Leninist' line advocated by the Comintern in 1924. Instead of 
enforcing unity within the Republic with the simplistic justification 
that the sole basis of separate ethnic identity - economic inequality - 
was being eliminated, the alternative approach was adopted of recognising 
the independent existence of ethnic communities and seeking their 
voluntary co-operation on a basis of mutual trust. This was the 
intention, at least, in the liberalising days of 1968 but the broader 
political democratisation* which alone could foster such developments, 
was soon to be destroyed in the aftermath of the Warsaw Pact invasion 
of August 1968. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE A. SHI; %ILATION POLICY IN ACTION (1958-1965). 
Before plunging into the detailed operation of the asiimilation 
policy it is best to pause briefly: 
(i) to outline the national and local government structure - the 
basic mechanism by which the plan was to be realised - and to 
locate it within the wider network of state and voluntary 
organisations. In. addition to indicate the means by which 
the Communist Party exercises effective control over all 
manner of organised activity in the Republic. 
(ii) to give a table dividing the post-Jar years into separate 
periods as regards the development of official policy towards 
Gypsies both to help analysis of policy shifts and to serve 
as a useful reference aid. 
(iii) to discuss the kinds and quality of sources on which the 
following chapters are based, their inevitable drawbacks 
and the criteria used to choose specific areas for closer 
study. 
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CZ HOS1 TAKLýN GOV. 2i'N NT CRG: ºir'IäATION 
The structure of national and local government in 
Czechoslovakia is not formally dissimilar to that in Britain.; as 
is evident from the following chart. 
The president is elected for a five-year term by parliament 
(the National Assembly), the supreme organ of state power and the 
legislative body, whose members are elected by universal adult 
suffrage every four years. Although appointed and recalled by the 
president, the government is responsible to parliament and consists, 
in the main, of the heads of various ministries. 
Before federalisation in 1968 there was a roughly parallel 
yet subordinate governmental structure in Slovakia where an elected 
parliament (Slovakian National Council) in turn elected its executive 
body (Praesidium) whose members (Commissioners) headed what amounted 
to Slovakian ministries (Commissions). However, since the writ of 
the National Assembly extended throughout the Republic, the position 
of the Slovakian National Council was somewhat analagous to that of 
Stormont in the United Kingdom and likewise its role in practice 
tended to be consultative and participatory rather than independent. 
Local government is the task of National Committees at 
regional, district and local level. These committees have relatively 
broad powers for they are responsible for organising economic, 
cultural, health and social affairs as a whole within their respective 
areas as well as running a number of small firms themselves (such as 
small production plants, building enterprises, local transport etc). 
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The organs of government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic 
(Handbook : 32,62). 
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Their finances are provided in part from the national budget (24.1% 
of the national budget in 1964), but also in part from their own 
economic activities. 
The supreme authority of a National Committee is its plenary 
meeting of all members, who have been elected in secret ballot by 
the public for a four-year term, but day-to-day management is the 
task of the Council which is elected by the plenary meeting and is 
responsible to it. The Council directs the work of a number of 
specialised committees (e. g. housing, health, etc. ) composed partly 
of elected members and partly of co-opted experts. 
Although primarily responsible to its plenary meeting, each 
Council "is guided by the principle of democratic centralism, which 
means that the Local National Committee is subordinated to the 
resolutions and decisions of the District National Committee, and 
this in turn, to the Regional National Committee". (Straka : 107). 
Likewise national committees are subject to governmental and ministerial 
control in the form of laws, decrees and policy directives which they 
must obey and furnish evidence of their compliance in periodic reports. 
In addition to this direct check on their work, the activities 
of local authorities are subject to the scrutiny of a national net- 
work of Control Commissions. Central Commissions of Control and 
Statistics are elected bi-annually by the National Assembly and by 
the Slovakian National Council; regional, district and municipal 
commissions by delegate conference and local and suburban commissions 
by public meeting. 
166 
These commissions are concerned with putting 
right shortcomin, s in public life. They keep a 
check on statistical and other economic data, 
publicly criticise the deficiencies they meet 
with, pay attention to suggestions and criticisms 
from the public. Where regulations have been 
infringed they are authorised to use suitable 
educational ; jeans - advice, persuasion., public 
criticism - or to suggest that the appropriate 
authorities take action. 
(Handbook : 62). 
While the formally democratic structure of government in Western 
capitalist states might be said to mask the real economic and 
consequently political power wielded by business interests, the 
control of the machinery of government in Czechoslovakia and in 
other socialist-bloc countries by forces other than the mass of 
electors is stated quite ppenly in the principle of 'the leading 
role of the Party'. Although the 1948 Constitution made no mention 
of the Communist Party, article four of the 1960 Constitution stated: 
The guiding force in society and in the State is 
the vanguard of the working class, the Communist 
Party of Czechoslovakia .... 
(Handbook : 25). 
The Constitution did not make fully explicit the means by which 
the Party could exercise this role, although the inter-dependence 
of all organisations in Czechoslovakia and their subordination to 
the Party was affirmed in article six: 
The National Front of Czechs and Slovaks, in which 
the people's organisations are associated, is the 
political expression of the alliance of the working 
people of town and country, led by the Communist 
Party of Czechoslovakia. 
(ibid. ) 
The National Front - an umbrella organisation comprising all 
political parties and all voluntary organisations such as the nation- 
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wide trade union movement, the youth movement, the Red Cross and 
also national minority cultural associations etc. - is intended to 
provide an overall framework during the transitory socialist phase 
when the state gradually withers away as full communism is approached. 
Its chief aim is to complete the construction of 
socialism in Czechoslovakia (and as this process 
continues) some of the duties of state organs shall 
gradually be transferred to ... 
Cmember a organisations. 
(Handbook : 35,25). 
All National Assembly and rational Committee members are elected 
as National Front candidates but the Front itself has no executive 
powers of its own; its function is to co-ordinate. The Front has an 
organisational structure of central, regional, district and local 
committees and this structure is common to all Front members, including 
the Communist Party for which it was originally devised. Equally 
applicable to all members is the principle of 'democratic centralism': 
... a ter # intended to denote that double process 
by which authority flowed upwards from party cells 
in town or factory or village through intermediate 
local or regional committees till it reached its 
apex in the central committee which was the organ 
of the sovereign congress, and discipline flowed 
downwards through the same channels, every party 
organ being subordinated to the organ above it and 
ultimately to the central committee. 
(Carr : 197). 
The rigidly hierarchical structure and the principle of democratic 
centralism have the effect that each separate level of a rational 
Front member organisation faces in two directions for it is accountable 
both to its direct electors yet also to the level above it in the 
hierarchy. These features, together with the requirement that all 
organisations be full members or at least affiliated to the Front, 
give the Communist Party leadership its means of control for ultimately 
ßv8 
every level of every organisation in the country is subordinated to 
the Party's Central Committee. 
PERIODILATIGN 
There is little disagreement among commentators on Gypsy 
policy in Czechoslovakia as to how the post-War years should be 
divided into separate periods - divisions being marked by major 
national legislation or decrees initiating new policy lines - but 
this does not imply similar characterisation of periods. 
The periodisation of the following table is based on that of 
the 1975 study by the Czechoslovakian Academy of Sciences (Kära : 47), 
which, in turn, is an improved version of a table in an earlier draft 
of this thesis, supplied to the research team in 1973. Naturally 
there is a close correspondance between the table below and ita 
Czechoslovakian equivalent which gives no hint of a serious difference 
in interpretation of the interrelationship of 1958 policy aims. 
However discussion of these is best postponed until a later stage - 
at the end of Chapter Six. 
DOCUMENTATION AND SAMPLE AREAS. 
Any nistorical study such as this, concentrating on the 
implementation of a nation-wide policy during more than a decade, 
must be heavily dependent on contemporary documents. Problems 
immediately arise about the reliability of such evidence, for the 
researcher is separated from the events he writes about, often by 
space and inevitably by time. The usual safeguard against error is 
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to take evidence from a numuer of different but apparently reliable 
sources in order to cross-check details from them against each other 
for consistency and plausibility. When the events in question are 
rot too remote in time he may even seek out eye-witnesses to 
corroborate the accounts in documents. 
In the case of this study two main sources of data are utilised - 
government and local government reports and documents as well as 
notes on field-work carried out in the areas examined in more detail. 
Unfortunately the official documents do not constitute as much of a 
variety of sources as could be desired and bearing in mind that their 
authors usually were officials responsible for the situations and 
events they described, it could be reasonably suspected that the 
accounts often intentionally distorted the real state of affairs. 
Also it could be argued, with some justification, that officials 
were often ignorant of the real state of affairs, being unwilling 
to leave the safety and comfort of their offices for the mud, disease 
and hostility of Gypsy settlements unless absolutely forced. In 
either case, official documents are 'prima facie' suspect. 
To such objections the only answer is that these are the only 
documents which exist on the subject. Because this is virtually 
virgin territory very few studies have been made and even these draw 
on the same official scurces (as Sus does for example). Ulc is 
forced to rely entirely on newspaper articles, but these in turn are 
largely based on official press releases. Official documents do 
give statistics, however, and it is possible to compare figures for 
different periods, accepting some as plausible and rejecting others 
as inconsistent with preceding or succeeding data. As for evaluations 
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it is often easy to detect a biased attitude and, knowing this, the 
direction in which the evaluation must be weighted is also known. 
But on close- inspection official documents by no means display 
a solid unanimity of approach but rather a wide range of often 
strongly conflicting attitudes and interests at every level. There 
is the well-intentioned central government expounding the national 
interest, which differs considerably from what local authorities 
usually see as their particular interests. Consequently there is a 
sharp interchange of opinion about the value of specific laws and 
administrative measures, or even outbursts against the entire policy 
aims. There is the local government official, caught between the 
millstones of grass-roots prejudice and administrative pressure to 
get results, who must explain to his superiors why the plan has not 
been fulfilled. There is the local authority complaining to another 
for 'unloading' their Gypsies on his district. There is the 
enthusiastic secretary of the Committee for Gypsy Affairs who in 
his reports gives vent to his frustration in not being able to change 
anything because he is consistently blocked by his more powerful 
colleagues, content to preserve the 'status quo'. There is the 
shocked medical authority angrily reporting the cohtaminated water 
and ordure-polluted surroundings of Gypsy settlements, while the 
local authority does nothing to improve basic amenities. 
In general the bluntness and frankness of official reports are 
surprising and because of inherent conflicts of interest, these 
documents can almost in effect be claimed as a variety of independent 
sources. 
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As for the accuracy of knowledge of document authors, this 
naturally varies a great deal. However, many local authorities, 
especially in Slovakia, appear to be extremely well informed as 
numerous case-histories testify. While it would be presumptuous 
to claim that a few months field-work justify an overall judgement 
of local government documents, nevertheless i did tend to encounter 
the sort of problems described in official reports and even if I 
did not always evaluate situations in the same way, the reports 
usually gave valuable insight rather than appearing the irrelevant 
imaginings of some remote official. 
It should also be mentioned that some of the officials who 
helped draft the 1958 policy and contributed to the 1959 handbook 
had considerable personal experience of Gypsy settlements. 
Another question entirely is availability of data. "While major 
national documents were obtainable from a number of sources, this 
was not the case with regional and district level documents. Tracking 
down the right office was sometimes a major task and then., apart 
from difficulties of access, documents more than a few years old 
were not arranged in neat ordered folios with contents chronologically 
listed but instead, crammed into boxes and drawers and cupboards - 
an incredible jumble of papers, some important, some trivial. Many 
documents had undoubtedly been destroyed, although for no more 
sinister reason than that they occupied limited cupboard space. 
So, in the limited time available, it was possible only to sift 
through the mass, hoping that nothing important escaped attention. 
There is an additional difficulty that copprehensive national 
reports and statistics were not compiled before the administrative 
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reorganisation of 1965 and therefore any picture of overall develop- 
ment during this initial period had to be constructed from sporadic 
regional and district reports, mainly from Slovakia. Such a 
limitation in official evidence placed added importance on the 
choice of areas to be studied in more detail. On what criteria 
should they have been chosen? 
Apart from the above-mentioned availability and accessibility 
of data, two further criteria suggested themselves - migration rate 
and population concentration. The principal feature of post-War 
Gypsy development was the heavy migratory flow between the Gypsy 
settlements in under-developed Slovakia and the industrial regions 
of the Czech lands, whilst the aims of the 1958 policy were to check 
this voluntary movement and replace it by the planned dispersal 
of all Gypsies from their population concentrations, whether recently 
or long established. Consequently it was natural to choose a 
predominantly rural part of Slovakia and complement this with an 
urban centre in the Czech lands, both areas having a relatively 
large number and proportion of Gypsies as well as a high migration 
rate. 
On this basis a choice was made in Slovakia of the East Slovakia 
Region and within this the Spisskä Novä Ves district, including a 
pair of adjacent villages with sizeable Gypsy settlements for field 
study. The Czech area chosen was the North Moravia Region and within 
this the coal and steel town of Ostrava, especially the decayed 
urban core. 
The attached map shows the 1967 Czechoslovakian Gypsy population 
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Most striking is the fact that a massive 
kO% of all Czechoslovakian 
Gypsies live in the East Slovakia Region, over double the number 
hing in any other region. Within the region eachcf the nine districts 
has several thousand Gypsy inhabitants, Spisskä Nova Ves being 
fourth both in absolute numbers and relative density. Unfortunately 
statistics for the region as a whole are lacking between 1968 and 
1971 when, for a brief period, regions were abolished as an 
administrative unit throughout Slovakia. 
Although the North Moravia Region is second in absolute 
Gypsy population and third relatively among the Czech regions, 
the city of Ostrava has the second largest Gypsy population of all 
districts in the Czech lands. Regrettably, however, official 
documentation was slighter, less reliable and less accessible than 
had been hoped at the start of the study. Ostrava in particular 
occasionally failed to reply to central government requests for 
information, apparently in protest against the whole policy. 
Since virtually all Gypsies in the Czech lands are either post- 
war migrants from Slovakia or children of such migrants, any area 
with a significant Gypsy copulation must have experienced heavy 
in-migration. Out-migration data from Slovakia was hard to obtain 
but a 1970 study (Davidovä : 154,157) showed that of Gypsies resident 
in Ostrava in 1969,40% were born in the East Slovakia Region and 
of these East Slovakia Gypsies in Ostrava, 3516 came from the district 
of Spisskä Nova Ves. In the main village studied in this district 
there was scarcely an adult Gypsy who had not Oigrated, at some time 
or another, to the Czech lands. 
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The areas chosen are not typical, for what areas could be, 
but they are important in that they have large numbers of Gypsies 
and are closely linked by migration to and fro between Slovakia 
and the Czech lands. 
THE 1958 ME URES. 
Policy Aims (1958-1968). 
In 1958 the 'gypsy question' was seen essentially as a problem 
of the socio-economic inequality of Gypsies with other citizens 
to be solved by means of the Gypsies' total assimilation. This was 
to be achieved by integrating them into the labour force while at 
the same time dispersing their population concentrations. * In the 
policy makers' view this course alone offered hope of a final 
solution to the perennial problem of Gypsies, was in harmony with 
Marxist-Leninist principles and - on a more practical level - 
suited the political requirements for an ethnically homogeneous 
population. 
It might seem unnecessary to repeat these basic points, already 
stated in the previous chapter, but some commentators - such as U1 - 
failed to recognise the central role of employment and dispersal in 
* This is why most emphasis is given here to themes such as 
employment, accommodation, population movement, dispersal and 
administrative control at the expense of health, education and 
crime. However another reason for the relatively sketchy treatment 
of these last three themes, apart from lack of space, is that local 
data tends to be limited and, in any case, effectively summarised 
by national surveys. As regards crime statistics little can be 
concluded except that the crime rate for Gypsies was considerably 
higher than for non-Gypsies - both for crimes of violence and 
property offences. 
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the 1958 measures and consequently regarded these policy aims as 
innovations of the 1965 measures. * Likewise the deceptive formulation 
of Law 74 might lead to a mistaien belief that the 1958 measures were 
directed at only a small part of the Gypsy population - the 'nomads' - 
rather than at the minority in its entirety. 
The 1959 local authority manual gave first priority to the 
task of ensuring that every adult Gypsy worked on a regular basis, 
whether classified as a nomad or not. 
Above all the problem of drawing gypsy citizens 
into permanent employment must be solved. This 
is not just a matter of providing for the nomadic 
or semi-nomadic gypsies covered by law [74J, but 
in fadt means all gypsies - and therefore settled 
gypsies too - who are as yet unemployed. 
(manual (5) ; 9**, emphasis in original). 
Apart from considerations that employed Gypsies' new income 
would be the basis of a higher standard of living and that regular 
work would play an important educative role, the wider issue was 
stressed by the manual that the economy was suffering as a result 
of such wasted productive potential. 
Heavy losses to the national economy, amounting to 
tens of millions of crown annually. are caused by 
this labour reserve of tens of thousands of pre- 
dominantly young gypsies who either do not work at 
all, or else whose work output is very low. This is 
proved b the case of the Kosice region [in East 
Slovakia] where a survey of six districts revealed 
v 
" U1's error is discussed more fully at the beginning of the 
next chapter. 
** National and local government documents are identified by 
numbers in the text and listed in full in Appendix 'B' at the end of Chapter Six. 
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that of 13,205 adult gypsies, only 2,917 are in 
regular work. Of these, 55o are employed as 
auxiliary building workers, a further significant 
proportion in agriculture and of them all 
probably a maximum of 10ö possess some work 
qualification. 
(ibid. : 7,8) 
Likewise the crucial : Laportance of maximum dispersal was re- 
iterated throughout the manual. In allocating accommodation local 
authorities were instructed that they: 
must observe the principle of dispersii: g.... 
[gypsies} as much as possible amon6st other 
inhabitants. As a matter of principle it is 
necessary to end the further concentration of 
gypsies in separate houses occupied by gypsies 
alone, in gypsy streets, town quarters or rural 
sCttlements. This way of living together causes 
backward, uncultural anu unhygenic forms of life 
to be preserved and considerably hinders the 
penetration of the re-educating influence of the 
other inhabitants.... Re-education will be possible 
above all in circumstances where nomadic persons 
or their families will not live in larger groups 
but dispersed among other citizens. 
(5: 12). (Emphasis in original). 
However the concept of dispersal was not limited to the breaking- 
up of Gypsy population concentrations; it extended to every aspect 
of daily lifework, leisure and political activity. 
At work: 
the best results in re-educating gypsies have been 
achieved in precisely those workplaces where they 
have never been employed in whole groups but 
individually among other workers.... Naturally the 
rule is that they should be dispersed as much as 
possible. 
(5: 9,10) 
Also in leisure, musical 'groups composed entirely of Gypsies 
were found: 
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lacking in education, or, anisational and methodical 
leadership... [and in] discipline.... The best results 
so far are where young gypsies are included in a 
group with other young people. In such groups young 
gypsies very quickly adapt and become effective 
members. 
(5: 19). 
In future it will be more suitable not to form 
separate gypsy groups but to include talented 
gypsies in our musical, dance or choral groups. 
(5: 43)" 
After criticising the practice in the pre-war republic where 
local government officers dealt with Gypsy spokesmen, since these 
leaders were unrepresentative of the broad mass of Gypsies, the 
handbook remarked that in political organisation contemporary 
"meetinus composed entirely of gypsies were unsatisfactory for 
similar reasons. Only such meetings where we discuss and work 
together are successful". (5: 37). The fate of a proposed all-Gypsy 
petition for their own magazine and folk group was mentioned in the 
previous chapter; indeed any attempts by young Gypsies to organise 
themselves were to be suppressed. 
There have developed completely incorrect tendencies 
among Gypsies to form independent groups and organis- 
ations in the settlements.... These tendencies must 
be resisted and... an opposite [tendency] strengthened 
for young gypsies to establish... friandly relations 
with other young people in youth organisations. 
(?: 19). 
Dispersal, then, was a general principle to be applied where- 
ever possible. "In all work among gypsies it is necessary to 
observe the principle that every form of concentrating gypsies hinders 
the process of their re-education" (5: 43)" To ask Gypsies their 
opinion of this principle was considered inappropriate, for any 
reluctance to be dispersed presumably would have been considered 
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as one of those features of 'the backward way of life' which the 
1958 measures were intended to eliminate. It was stated authoritatively 
on behalf of most Gypsies that; 
they want to live like other people and are grateful 
if we help them to achieve this. This is demonstrated 
by the fact that the dispersal of gypsies and patient 
work amonE them bring positive results. 
(5: 12) 
The third i: ýain policy aim of 1958 was to prevent voluntary 
population movement: 'natural migration' as it came to be termed. 
This was seen as an aim not only in its own right but as a pre- 
condition for the success ohe others, for if large numbers of 
Gypsies continued to migrate back and forth between their home 
settlements and the new urban concentrations there could be little 
hope of integrating them into the work force on any permanent basis 
or dispersing them amongst other citizens. 
But there was another important difference; while the first 
two aims could have been achieved within the existing legislative 
framework, this third required new legislation to limit the freedom 
of movement of a specific section of Czechoslovakian society - albeit 
in their best interests. 
Law 74/1958, the Ministry Directives and the Nomads' Register. 
Ostensibly the aim of law 74 was to bring to an end at last 
the immemorial nomadism with horse and cart that had persisted 
amongst Gypsies since the time of their first arrival on Slovakian 
territory in the early fourteenth century. More importantly it was 
also directed against the post-war migratory flow of Gypsies between 
their settlements in Slovakia and the Czech lands that had been 
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officially characterised as a disturbing modern recrudescence of the 
more traditional nomadism. As such the law was intended to give 
total control over voluntary Gypsy population movement and it still 
remains in force today. 
Law 74 itself simply stated the responsibility of local 
authorities to provide nomads with permanent accommodation and 
regular employment, while threatening unbrateful recipients of such 
generosity with ui to three years imprisonment. 
Law 74/1958 Sb. on the permanent settlement of nomads. 
(3) 
1. Local authorities shall provide comprehensive 
assistance to persons who lead a nomadic way of 
life to enable them to adopt a settled way of 
life; in particular they are obliged to help 
such persons in finding suitable employment and 
accommodation and by educational means to aim at 
making them orderly working citizens. 
2. A nomadic life is led by someone who, whether in 
a group or individually, wanders from place to 
place and avoids honest work or makes his living 
in some disreputable way, even though he might 
be registered as a permanent resident in some 
place. 
3. Whoever should continue in a nomadic way of life, 
in spite of having been offered help to settle 
permanently, will be punished for the offence by 
six months to three years deprivation of freedom. 
Although the law was the nucleus of the 1958 measures, their 
full extent can better be gauged from the associated ministry 
directives that were published together with the law in the manual 
for local authorities: 
The directive of the Ministry of the Interior listed the 
additional but key task of making the register of nomads. On a day 
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chosen by the Ministry, officials of Local National Committees 
(LNCs), assisted by the police, were to "acquaint nomadic persons 
with the content of the law and explain to them that the measures 
adopted were aimed at improving their standard of living? '. * (5: 67). 
Then a detailed register was to be made of all nomads. A separate 
'register document' was to be prepared for each family, containing 
photographs of all members over fifteen years old and details 
copied from documents such as identity cards, birth certificates, 
certificates of state citizenship, military service records etc. 
In the identity cards of nomads was to be stamped: "Included in the 
register at... LNC in... district on the date... " ($: 67). Should 
nomads over fifteen years old not possess identity cards they were 
to be given a document confirming their presence in the register 
and identified with their fingerprints. 
0 
Some difficulty was anticipated in establishing the identity 
of nomads and in a remarkable slip the E. Slovakia RNC warned that 
"during the registration it must be expected that persons will supply 
false information and gypsy... " (15). ('To gypsy' is the normal 
colloquial verb in Slovak for 'to tell lies'). Presumably as a 
deterrent to evasion, nomads were forbidden to move during the period 
of investigation meanwhile paying their own living expenses. 
" In a parallel directive to its subordinate 1,. Cs the East Slovakia 
RNC thoughtfully added: 
It must be expected that people will be reluctant 
[to register; consequently it is] not recommended 
that the campaign be 'popularised' too much by 
local radio or the town-crier. (15). 
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An overall plan of settlement was to be drawn up by local 
authorities, based on available opportunities for employment and 
accommodation and observing the principle of maximum dispersal. In 
principle the place where nomads were included in the register was 
to be their permanent residence (15), but this could be arranged in 
negotiations between local authorities. Apparently the nomads them- 
selves were to have some say in the matter for "where they refuse the 
proposed place of permanent residence or employment" (5: 66), a 
solution was to be sought at district or even regional level. Transfer 
of nomads between regions was even entisaged, although only "in 
exceptional cases'. In general the local authorities "do not expect 
the 'export' or 'import' of nomadic persons" (15). 
The register documents were to be held by the appropriate LNC 
mainly to assist in following the nomads' work, educational and 
health progress but rather than using sanctions against nomads, 
officials were advised to "patiently explain to them occasional 
shortcomings and their consequences". (5: 69). 
Because of the overall importance given to accommodation and 
employment in the assimilation programme, special attention was 
paid to these aspects. Should homads cancel their permanent residence 
(deregister) with an LNC, their register documents were to be forwarded 
to the LP, IC of their declared destination. Should they later fail to 
register for permanent residence there, these documents could then 
be used in tracing them. 
Although there was no outright prevention of nomads' movement 
by means of local government residential registration procedures, 
effective control was attempted in another way. When applying for 
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a job in Czechoslovakia, a prospective employee must first have 
been released from his previous employment. Formerly firms would 
only agree to release someone when a replacement had been found. 
Until he had his previous employer's stamp in his identity card 
together with a confirmation of his release, an applicant could not 
officially be re-employed. 
Local authorities were to checri that nomads were not re- 
employed without such a confirmation but more importantly to control 
that employers should release nomads "only after the previous 
agreement of the authority's departments of employment, health and 
social welfare". (5: 70). In effect this meant that if nomads tried 
to move without the permission of the L14C where they were registered 
as permanently resident, they would not receive the certificate of 
release and therefore, in theory, could not be employed elsewhere. 
This would make them liable to accusations of 'making their living 
in some dishonest way' and thereby the sanctions of Law 74. 
Unlike the directive of the Ministry of the Interior and indeed 
the law itself which spoke only of nomads, the directive of the 
Ministry of Education and Culture referred specifically to Gypsy 
children. The problem in this area was then, as now, a vicious 
spiral. When starting school at the age of six, Gypsy children 
were often partially or totally ignorant of the teaching language 
(Czech, Slovak or Eun3arian) and this was an important factor in 
their poor school performance, as was their erratic attendance. In 
their compulsory nine years of education they rarely reached the 
highest grade and equally rarely achieved full literacy. Therefore 
they were ineligible for apprenticeships and either remained 
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unemployed or else took unskilled jobs with no opportunity or 
incentive to improve their work qualifications. . r. arly marriage 
in mid- or late teens led to the birth of new children who 
repeated the same depressing cycle as their parents. 
The directive attempted to break into this circle at several 
places starting with pre-school age children, who were to be 
enrolled in nursery schools wherever possible, and similarly school- 
age gypsy children were to attend the supervised groups after school 
hours, created to help working mothers. As there was a shortage 
of places in these institutions the waiving of the usual requirement 
that the mothers should be employed, was preferential treatment 
for Gypsies. Attendance was voluntary and Gypsy parents were 
expected to pay for meals provided at the usual rate of up to 4 
crowns daily, although low-income families pay nothing. 
An effort was also to be made to improve school attendance 
but the statutory enforcement system of warnings followed by fines, 
with the ultimate sanction of putting children under the protection 
of the court, was not amended for Gypsies. Where Gypsy children 
over eight years old had not sufficient knowledge and skills to be 
included in their age-appropriate class, they were to be put in 
special classes or even schools. These special measures were only 
a means of giving concentrated instruction for a temporary period 
and the children were-to be re-integrated into normal schools and 
classes as soon as possible. The practice of some local authorities 
of putting educationally backward Gypsy children into schools for 
the mentally sub-normal was strongly criticised. 
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In placing Gypsy school-_eavers, local authorities were asked 
to bear in mind "the need to raise the cultural and economic level 
of gypsy families" (5: 73), which meant enrolling Gypsies for 
apprenticeships even where they fell short of the entrance require- 
ments. 
No extra funds were to be available however. "The establishment 
of these schools or classes may not lead to demands for an increased 
work-plan and bud,,, -et in 1958". (5: 74). 
Problems of adult illiteracy and poor work qualifications were 
to be dealt with either by courses run by employers during working 
hours or by voluntary courses in communities. 
The health situation was also grave and the Ministry of Health 
directive stressed the importance of initially gaining and keeping 
accurate medical records of individual families and also evidence 
of the conditions where they lived - houses, streets and settlements. 
All former nomads were to have a medical check-up with special 
attention paid to infectious diseases such as trachoma and tuberculosis, 
parasitic, skin and sexual diseases. In addition all legally 
required innoculation was to be carried out. Acute TB cases were to 
be hospitalised and where persuasion failed, legal sanctions were to 
be used. Similarly young children were to be hospitalised for a 
time where necessary. 
It was also to be determined whether the planned accommodation 
for nomads was hygenically adequate, particularly in respect of 
toilets and drinking water. An inspection was to be made of existing 
Gypsy settlements and where necessary new wells were to be dug. 
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Unless special equipment was needed, this was to be financed from 
"Campaign Z", a fund to assist citizens' self-help campaigns to 
beautify town and countryside. 
Lectures, film-shows and personal visits were planned to 
persuade Gypsies of the importance of hyElene and how it could 
be 
achieved. 
Throughout, great care was to be taken "to guard against every- 
thing, which could arouse among ... 
[nomads J the impression of 
discrimination. Particularly mass` campaigns may not be undertaken 
which are only directed at the gypsy population and announced as 
such", (5: 77)" Likewise "the delousing of adults must be done as 
a rule in such a way that their typical customs are not 
infringed 
upon (for example it is not permitted to demand gypsies to crop 
their hair" (5: 78). Doctors were recommended to commence the series 
of compulsory innoculations with those "which do not hurt and which 
do not cause a reaction". (5: 79)" 
The Administrative Apparatus. 
The basic administrative apparatus to administer the 'gypsy 
question' had already been outlined in the 1958 party decree (2). 
Permanent committees were established at regional, district and 
local NCs, usually attached to the education department, and were 
manned by local authority employees plus volunteers from social 
organisations such as lawyers, doctors, teachers, trade unionists, 
youth leaders and "aware gypsy citizens". (5: 21). 
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Their purpose was to co-ordinate the settling process, including 
eaucational courses, but in particular to follow carefully the 
progress of persons included on the nomads' register. Where there 
were large numbers of Gypsies a local government worker wý. s to be 
appointed to work full-time on Gypsy questions. 
No central government funds were to be made available and 
local authorities were advised that the major expense of providing 
accommodation was their own responsibility. 
As for supplying accommodation, on occasions even 
by new building, it is necessary to bear in mind 
that this is not just a matter of financial resources 
but of planning and the question will have to be 
solved within the general solution of the housing 
problem. (5: 62). 
An attempt was made to establish a national co-ordinating body 
the 'Central Committee for Mork wits Citizens of Gypsy Origin' - 
at the Ministry of Education and Culture, but in spite of its 
impressive title this committee exercised little effective control 
and was eventually dissolved in 1962 following a CP Central Committee 
suggestion that it should be replaced by a government committee. 
Such a body was eventually appointed - but not until October 1965. 
Identifying the Nomads. 
The term 'gypsy' did not appear in the wording of Law 74 nor 
throughout the directive of the Ministry of the Interior. Other 
ministries were less discreet however. The Ministry of Education 
and Culture headed its directive - "Re: The education and instruction 
of gypsy children", (5: 73) while the Ministry of Health frankly 
admitted the identity of nomads and Gypsies in the first paragraph 
of its directive. 
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At present it is a matter of persons living 
until now a nomadic or semi-nomadic life and 
of persons who, although they are settled, 
have a low standard of living. This concerns 
mainly gypsies. (5: 76). 
This caution in formulation had the immediate aim of fore- 
stalling charges of ethnic discrimination for the measures were 
nominally directed abainst a social group, 'nomads', which included 
others as well as Gypsies. Later, in 1965, when there was a need 
to tighten up central control of the policy the new measures, 
aimed specifically at Gypsies, were enacted not by law as in 1958 
but by the less public method of governmental and ministerial decree 
for the same reason. 
The fact that to this day not a single law in Czechoslovakia 
refers to Gypsies by name, so that in law they do not exist, is also 
a reflection of the official view of their collective future. Since 
complete absorption was to be their destiny, an important first 
step was the denial to them of any legally valid separate identity. 
Although such reticence avoided overt discrimination it had the 
concomitant disadvantage of imprecision for it was unclear from the 
law itself that Gypsies were its main object and in particular which 
Gypsies were to be regarded as nomads. It was to aid local authorities 
in their task of identifying nomads that the 1959 manual repeated 
the classification of Gypsies, first given in the 1958 Party decree. 
(See Chapter Three). There, Gypsies were divided into three 
categories - settled, semi-nomadic (or semi-settled), and nomadic - 
"according to their way of life at present" (5: 7). This classificatory 
system remained in force until the late 1960's. 
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According to the manual (5: 7) - 
settled gypsies are those with regular employment 
and a permanent residence who have attained the 
cultural level of other people.... They live 
dispersed among other inhabitants and will not 
require our care. 
But there was also an important sub-group of settled. Gypsies which 
gave cause for concern even though allegedly non-nomadic. 
It is necessary to distinguish this group from 
gypsies who, although settled, live tobether in 
separate settlements, urban quarters or streets 
and usually have a low cultural level. They 
require our concentrated attention to be devoted 
to them. 
The strongest group numerically... Cisl that of 
semi-settled gypsies, who often change their work- 
place and residence.... The majority are illiterate 
or semi-literate and live on a very low cultural 
level. 
fFinaliyJýnomadic (wandering) gypsies are a burning 
question. Most of these gypsies wander frotß place 
to place.... They live on the lowest cultural level 
and the majority are illiterate. Against them are 
made the most complaints! '. 
This classification was intended to clarify the concept of 
nomadism; its effect was to confuse it still further. The absurdity 
of regarding the post-war migration of 'semi-settled' Gypsies as a 
re-emergence of traditional nomadic patterns has already been established 
but at least 'a nomadic life', as defined by paragraph two of Law 74, 
necessarily involved physical movement by 'someone who... wanders from 
place to place'. According to the classification in the manual, however, 
the law was intended to apply not only to the 'nomadic' and 'semi- 
settled gypsies' but also to the sub-group of 'settled gypsies who... 
live together in separate settlements, urban quarters or streets and 
usually have a low cultural level'. In other words there were said to 
be large numbers of non-mobile 'nomads'. 
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In similar vein the directive of the i4iinistry of the Interior 
stated that "amongst nomadic and semi-nomadic persons cannot be 
included persons who, althou n formerly nomads, now do not differ 
significantly in their way of lire from other workers (5: 
65), 
implying that if settled, yet still differing in their way of life, 
former 'nomads' could be included in the register. A parallel 
directive issued by the aast Slovakia RC made this point quite 
explicit, instructing local authorities that: 
It is hecessa'y to judge individually - not by the 
length of settlement but by the results achieved... 
(at work, at home in the children's school 
attendance etc. ). If good results have been attained 
this means that these persons cannot have had the 
conceptual characteristic and puhishable offence of 
nomadism for some time... and should not be included 
in the register. (15). 
(My emphasis) 
Here the fact of whether physical movement had occurred or 
not was almost irrelevant, for the presence or absence of the almost 
metaphysical 'conceptual characteristic of nomadism' was to be 
inferred from the actual way of life at the time of inspection. 
Tortured ar6uments and apparent contradictions in terms 
stemmed from the legal use of 'nomad' as an unsatisfactory circum- 
location for 'gypsy'. For the real aim of the 1958 measures was 
not simply to restrict the movements of genuine nomads and migrants, 
it was to assimilate the entire Gypsy population and for this reason 
the only group excluded 'en masse' from the measures was that section 
of settled Gypsies who were regarded as almost assimilated. 
Yet the government shrank from directing local authorities to 
include in the register all the remaining Gypsies who either lived 
in Gypsy concentrations or whose way of life was unacceptable, 
193 
perhaps because of the massive costs and labour involved. Instead 
the measures were to serve as a framework which could be used 
selectively as each local authority thought fit. Likewise the 
directive of the East Slovakia RNC advised: 
It is impossible to give an automatic rule to 
determine who should or should not be included 
in the register. This must be the decision of 
local national committees (LNCs). (15) 
This particular regional directive, which was applicable to 
over a third of the Republic's Gypsies, exemplified the contradictions 
inherent in the formulation of the 1958 measures. After having 
instructed local authorities to detect 'the conceptual characteristic 
and punishable offence of nomadism' in Gypsy families by a general 
evaluation of their way of life, irrespective of whether they had 
ever migrated, it concluded with the enigmatic warning: "We are out 
to catch nomadism, not gypsies". (ibid). The consequent confusion 
among local authority officials can be imagined. 
A Comparison of the 1927 and 1958 Legislation 
Comparative evaluation of the two laws banning nomadism differed 
widely and predictably corresponded to the commentators' political 
positions. 
V 
Although Ulc did not refer specifically to the 1927 law, he 
attacked the policies of "the people's democratic era where the 
survival of ... 
[Gypsies' identity was put at stake", contrasting 
them with "the live-and-let-live policy of the pre-war capitalist 
v 
republic". (Ulc : 429). 
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Sus, on the other iand, argued that "between the 1927 law and 
law 74/1958... there is a basic difference. The 1927 law is aimed 
in a hostile and racist way against all gypsies and in fact legalises 
their persecution, while in contrast the 1958 law arises from help 
to all nomadic persons" (Sus : 101). 
Formally both laws had striking similarities. For example, 
neither law covered all Gypsies and neither applied to Gypsies alone. 
Paragraph one of Law 117/1927 specified that "by wandering gypsies, 
for the purposes of this law, is understood gypsies wandering from 
place to place and other work-shy wanderers who live in gypsy style... 
even if they should have a permanent residence for part of the year". (l). 
Both laws have an equal claim to be regarded as against nomadism 
rather than against Gypsies as such. 
In both cases a register of nomads was compiled and those so 
listed were required to carry identity cards showing this fact. 
There was not, however, an outright ban on future movement for this 
could occasionally be authorised by local authorities. 
Following 1958 this was only likely to be when there was a 
specific approved job and accommodation available elsewhere for the 
nomad but paragraph five of Law 117 mentioned a 'nomads' pass' to 
enable certain Gypsy families to continue travelling as before with 
their horses and carts. Although apparently more tolerant, Law 117 
was deceptive in this for although no registered nomad could travel 
without such a pass, possession in no way guaranteed his right to 
travel. In addition to a. list of persons, vehicles and animals for 
which the pass was valid, local authorities could also "specify in 
the intdrest of public safety the direction and type of journey". (1: 
55(3))" The pass was issued at the discretion of local authorities 
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("no-one has a claim to it") and they could "withdraw or alter it 
at any time" (1: §5(4)), without any possibility of appeal by the 
nomad. 
But if issue of the nomads' pass conferred no real right to 
travel, nor did it give any clear right to remain anywhere, for 
this too was a matter for the discretion of local authorities. 
These even had the power of "specifying territory and communities, 
to which the entry of nomadic gypsies is completely forbidden if 
they do not belong there". This ban was displayed "on roadside 
signs at the boundaries of such a territory or community". (1: f10). 
Infringements of the law were to be punished by a month's 
imprisonment, except in the case of carrying arms for which the 
penalty was three months, and in addition nomads travelling without 
a pacs were to have their vehicles and animals sold by public auction. 
Although the proceeds were to be returned to the nomads, most 
probably the sale price would be insufficient to provide alternative 
accommodation. Yet this problem and that of finding a new livelihood 
was left to the nomad to solve by himself. 
It was in this point that the laws were fundamentally different 
V 
and although both Ulc's and Sus' assessments were somewhat overstated, 
it is the latter who came nearer the truth. For although both laws, 
in certain hands, could be repressive, Law 74/1958 at least guaranteed 
the nomad and his family the right to be registered as resident in 
some place and imposed the duty on local authorities to find them 
regular work and adequate accommodation. law 117/1927 gave nomads 
no rights whatsoever and likewise specified no duties of local 
authorities. 
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As -L-ias already 
been shown in Chapter Two, the 1927 legislation 
was quite typical of the discriminatory measures of late nineteenth 
and twentieth century governments in capitalist western ! trope, where 
the long-term aim was to eradicate nomadic Gypsies by harrassing 
them from the roads. Far from 'live-and-let-live' such a policy had 
usually involved the toleration and even the encouragement of racialist 
attacks on Gypsies, especially in times of economic depression when 
they served as a convenient scapegoat. 
It is true that the 1958 measures shared with their 1927 
predecessor the hope of ridding society of an irritatingly visible 
social problem by the eventual assimilation of the Gypsies and with 
this end in view 'Gypsy' was defined in both periods as a social 
rather than an ethnic category. However, among the various motives 
prompting the 1958 policy was a genuine desire to benefit Gypsies 
by promoting their socio-economic equalisation which had no counter- 
part in the cynical disregard of the 1927 legislators. Ahd, in spite 
of the shortcomings of the 1958 measures, it is inconceivable that 
any Gypsies should have preferred to return to their desperate 
plight in 1927 when, in the pogroms and legalised persecution, the 
spectre of their impending mass extermination was already plainly 
visible. 
The real problem was not to choose between 1927 and 1958, but 
to determine which of the alternative socialist policies - assimilationist 
or pluralist - would be more just and effective in furthering the 
best interests of the Gypsies themselves and of the -Republic. 'It 
was this debate which had been cut short so abruptly in 1958 and 
-which was to revive once more in 1968. Understandably no Gypsy 
opponent of the 1958 measures or any of their supporters ever 
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advocated a return tu the days of 'live-and-let-live', for this was 
a myth founded on the ignorance of bourgeois apologists; instead 
they challenged the assimilationist denial of the Gypsies' 'right 
to their ethnicity, branding it as a Stalinist distortion of socialism, 
and condemned the special measures to control Gypsies' movement and 
ensure their dispersal as illegal. Whilst condemning the 1958 
measures as a travesty of a socialist solution, these critics never- 
theless agreed in principle with the Czechoslovakian government's 
claim that: 
Whereas capitalist states solved and still solve 
the gypsy question by the sharpest racial discrimin- 
ation and isolation, in countries of the socialist 
camp we approach the solution of this problem from 
principles of socialist humanism. In this way it is 
demonstrated in practice that the gypsy question can 
be completely solved only by a socialist society, based 
on the absolute equality of rights of all people, on 
the mutual respect of human being for human being. 
Moreover in the solution of these problems can be 
seen the clear superiority of the socialist system 
over the capitalist. 
(5: 6). 
THE POLICY IN ACTION 
Settling the Nomadic Vlachs 
In altruistic phrases the government manual had called for "the 
mutual rapprochement of gypsies and other people" (5: 32), emphasising 
" that "the basic and key condition in solving the gypsy question will 
be the formation of a correct new attitude of the while population 
towards gypsies". (5: 59). In contrast, official reports of local 
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authorities - so much closer to their political grass-roots - often 
expressed the narrow, self-interested view that the main benefit of 
the 1958 measures was that they provided new and more effective 
means of forcing recalcitrant Gypsies to behave. An Lust Slovakia 
RISC report of 1958 gave some idea of the strength of such local 
feeling. 
This contemporary situation is intolerable not only 
for nomadic and semi-nomadic persons themselves but 
also with retard to other people who, alarmed and 
threatened by nomadic and semi-nomadic groups, as 
honest citizens of our republic have complained and 
demanded that this state of affairs be set right. 
Administrative measures up till now, aimed at re- 
educating nomadic and semi-nomadic persons, have 
not led to a significant change and for this reason 
it was necessary to introduce a specific law to ban 
the nomadic way of life. This will create the 
necessary preconditions for employing nomadic and 
semi-nomadic persons and for exercising the required 
educating and coercive influence, mainly by local 
authorities. (16). 
It was the sub-ethnic group of nomadic Vlachs that probably 
aroused greatest hostility amongst the non-Gypsy population. They 
still made a living in the manner of their forefathers - horse-dealing, 
knife-grinding, fortune-telling and petty theft - and the most 
instantly successful part of the 1958 campaign was in preventing this 
small yet emotively significant group of true nomads from continuing 
their travels, bringing to an end in five brief days a traditional 
way of life that had survived in Czechoslovakia for as many centuries. 
To immobilise the nomads was simple enough; the wheels were ripped 
from their carts and wagons and their horses confiscated. Sometimes 
they were given money for their draught animals but in many cases these 
were slaughtered without compensation. 
I 
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Local accounts did not record the nomads' misery at what must 
have been a sudden and catastrophic loss but they did give occasional 
glimpses of the resilience of a people, long accustomed to harsh and 
arbitrary castiäation. With a final flourish some nomads managed to 
pull off yet another trick, nimbly outwitting the plodding officials 
in charge of settling them. One such cautionary tale was printed as 
a lesson to other local authorities. 
"What do the comrades from Nitra 
[in West Slovakia] have to 
report? " asked the manual. (5). Nitra reported as follows: 
In trying to settle nomads we came up against the 
problem of horses. Horses enable gypsies to move 
easily from place to place, so we bought their 
horses. 
Soon afterwards, nowever, the Gypsies used this money 
to buy new horses from agricultural co-operatives. 
As a result of increased mechanisation these co-ops 
had a surplus of horses and were selling them off 
cheaply. 
We learnt'a lesson from this. 
(5: 11,12). 
Provision of accommodation for these newly immobilised Vlachs 
varied enormously. For some it was nothing more than their now 
wheel-less wagons; others were moved by well-intentioned officials 
into modern flats. The results were predictable for the Vlachs, 
having been forced to abandon their wanderings naturally did their 
best to re-create an approximation of their former communal life 
around the camp-fire to draw some comfort from their new and unfamiliar 
surroundinzs. Such scenes did little to improve relations with their 
already unenthusiastic neighbours, who probably had waited years for 
a similar flat themselves. A report testified: 
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There are numerous complaints that gypsies remove 
the stove from the Kitchen to in front of the house 
where they later cook using as fuel the flooring, 
door-and window-frames and sometimes even rafters 
and ceiling, so that the i. ouse is soon uninhabitable. 
(5: 13). 
Ideally, however, the nomads were rehoused in "unoccupied, 
suitably-repaired older houses" (5: 13) with the intention that once 
having reached a "certain standard of living it would be possible 
to give them progressively better flats. This means that national 
cojmittees must put them on the housing list like other applicants". 
(5: 13). 
The Nomads' Register and Control of Population Movement 
V 
Ulc sug ested that following the enactment of Law 74 t'a few 
nomads were incarcerated but almost all nomads were put on the run.... 
The net result of the 1958 Act... was that the wandering Gypsy turned 
into one who 'was wandered"" (Ulc : 426,427), supporting this evaluation 
by his personal experience. " 
Cases of this sort were freely admitted in official documents, 
The 1959 manual complained that "several national committees had the 
practice of sometimes not even trying to place gypsies, preferring 
to pay their travel and subsistence expenses while sending them home, 
V 
" At this time Ulc was a member of the Czechoslovakian 
judiciary "and in 1959... [a] Deputy District Chairman 
in charge of 'The Final Solution of the Gypsy Questiont. tt 
(Ulc : 422 footnote). 
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mainly to Slovakia. This new form of nomadism at the state's 
expense cost us in 1957 alone. .. roughly twenty raillion crowns". * 
(5: 9). 
Although such practices were widespread enough to call for 
official rebuke, there is insufficient data to justify Ulc's bold 
claim that this was the general rule. Probably the majority of 
nomadic and 'semi-nomadic' Gypsies were simply registered where they 
were found at the time of registral. ion. ** 
It is not at all clear how many people were initially included 
on the 1959 nomads' register since official figures vary widely. 
The important 1967 assessment by the co-ordinating government 
committee of the results of the 1965 measures gave the number as 
There are considerable problems in expressing Czechoslovakian 
values in terms of sterling equivalents for although it is 
possible to quote the rates of exchange current during the 196Cs 
(per1 around 18 crowns 'official rate', 36 crowns 'tourist 
rate'), a direct translation would be often very misleading. 
Perhaps an adequate guide for budgetary sums is provided by 
dividing an amount in crowns by 20 (e. g. 2U million crowns is 
something less than £1 million). For smaller sums, however, it 
is more helpful to see an am: unt as a proportion of an average 
monthly wage of 1,500 crowns - bearing in mind that in Czechoslovakia 
there is a much narrower range of incomes than in Western Eitrope 
or even in other socialist-bloc states, often husbands and wives 
both work-, rents and public transport are exceptionally cheap, 
whilst consumer durables and clothing are liable to be relatively 
expensive. 
In the village chosen for intensive study in the Spisska Nova' 
Ves district, there seems to have been a large-scale return of 
migrants from the Czech lands around 1958. ' However, this seems 
to have been as much voluntary remigration motivated by the Gypsies' 
apprehension at rumoured new measures against them as direct 
expulsion of Gypsies by Czech local authorities. (See Chapter 
Seven). 
Pl? A 611 
20,000 (94), a 1970 Slovakian government report gave the somewhat 
higher figure of 27,000 (147), while the 1975 study doubled these 
with a total of 46,500 (Eiära : 56). 
Unfortunately none of the three documents in question gave any 
further information to substantiate its claim but although it cannot 
be establish: d with certainty which figure is neardst the truth, the 
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evidence tends to support a lower total. The 1975 figure 
is 
suspiciously close to the 1958 anticipation of "probably 
46,000 
nomads and sem4-nomads" (5: 8), and this suggests that, rather than 
deriving from any statistics compiled from the nomads' register, 
the source of the 1975 figure was really this prior estimate which 
at the time was admitted by the manual to be "a very 
imprecise 
figure" (ibid). Furthermore the 1958 estimate represented roughly 
30 per cent of the 150,000 Gypsies in the Republic, yet even 
in those 
areas with the heaviest migration rates the proportion of 
the Gypsy 
population included on the nomads' register in 1959 fell appreciably 
below this percentage and elsewhere must have been even lower. For 
example, of the 8,000-strong Gypsy population of 
the North Moravia 
Region only 2,000 were listed as nomads (25 per cent) 
(14), whilst 
of 6,914 Gypsies in the Spisskä Novä Ves district of East Slovakia, 
the corresponding figure was 1,671 'persons of gypsy origin' 
(24 
per cent). (27). 
Undoubtedly most-of the registered nomads were Gypsies, but not 
all. In the North Moravia Region 2,323 persons were initially 
listed 
of which about 300 were not Gypsies (i. e. 13 per cent). * (14). 
Whether this pattern was repeated nationally is not known. 
Equally difficult to determine is the proportion of nomadic 
Vlachs on the register, but it cannot have been large. The 45 Vlachs 
registered in North Moravia represented less than 2 per cent of the 
region's registered nomads and well under 1 per cent of the total Gypsy 
population. (Davidovä : 60). 
Davidovä gives the slightly different figure of 2,399, deriving her 
data from the regional NC and police records. (Davidovä: 59,60). Since 
there was no legal distinction between different kinds of 'nomad', 
non-Gypsies, Vlachs and migrant Gypsies could only be distinguished 
in documents by means of their surnames. 
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As a policy instrument the register soon proved to have serious 
shortcomings. Firstly the imprecise criteria for identifying nomads 
meant that selection of those to be registered was necessarily a 
more or less arbitrary affair but on occasions local authorities 
were so confused that they even included Gypsies who were clearly 
ineligible. 
In some cases LPNCs misunderstood Law 74 or 
proposed the inclusion of persons not possessing 
the characteristics of nomadic persons. For 
example... some LNCs included several pensioners. 
(28) 
Further confusion stemmed from the manual's deliberate blurring 
of the important differences between the two quite distinct sorts of 
mobile Gypsies - wandering Vlachs and migrant workers - in order 
that 
both might be lumped together as 'nomads' for legal purposes. In 
Spisskä Novä Vea careful watch was kept in case the district's 
(non-Vlach) Gypsies might try to leave the district using horses or 
else make a living as horse-dealers. A 1960 document disappointedly 
reported: 
rbnly 
a single case where a person of gypsy origin.. * 
earns money with a horse. From time to time there are 
cases where some citizens of gypsy origin buy horses 
which they use for transporting building materials 
for family houses. But when their own work is 
finished they sell them or eat them. (27) 
More fundamental a failure was the evident apathy of many local 
authorities towards the register and, indeed, towards the campaign as 
a whole. 
[Some LNCsa made serious errors while making the 
register in that they did not ascertain the real 
state of affairs... or else contented themselves 
with merely making records while the registered 
persons wandered around from village to village. 
(28) 
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This unwillingness or inability by NCs to make effective use 
of the register was apparently widespread. A 1962 report of the 
N. Moravia RVC had the same story to tell. 
If, after an interval of three years, we have to 
evaluate the results of the register it must be 
said that the register did not do the job it was 
meant to mainly because U%Cs did not update the 
registration cards and because these people [ Gypsies 
continued to move around. So, for example, in the 
Karvina district 400 adults were placed on the 
register in 1959, but on 1.1.62 there are 241 
registered persons. [ Some were de-registered 
but, 117 left the district and their place of 
residence is unknown. The situation is similar 
in other districts. 
(14) 
Almost a third or registered persons had simply vanished with- 
out trace. 
Similarly Law 74 was used very rarely, for example only once in 
the N. Moravia Region in the period up to 5.4.62 (14) and only three 
times during 1961 inthe Spisska Novä Ves district (28). Where cases 
of nomadism were thought to have occurred, the authorities generally 
preferred to use existing laws against parasitism. 
Although the law and directives directly controlled only 
registered nomads (less than a quarter of Spisskä Novä Ves district's 
Gypsies), the register had not been intended as a static record and 
could have been used to control indirectly all of the district's 
seven thousand Gypsies. For anyone thought to be 'nomadic' could 
have been subsequently added to the register. But a 1964 report noted 
that "from the time of drawing up the original register no further 
persons in the district were included". (47). 
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If no new persons were added to the register, many were removed 
from it. In the Spisskä Novä Ves district fifty seven had already 
been removed by late 1962 (37) and a 1964 report showed a reduction 
in the total number of registered persons of 23iä over the three year 
period from mid-1961 to mid-1964. (52). * 
Removals from the register, however, appeared quite as arbitrary 
as the original entries. One LNC was cited as an example of this 
for removing a person from the register who was not even permanently 
employed. (47). 
To combat this freedom of interpretation practised by many LNCs 
new regulations for removing persons from the register were issued 
by the DNC in 1961 (evidently without sufficient effect) and again 
in 1964. These 1964 regulations showed so clearly that the real 
criteria involved were more an evaluation of general way of life than 
of 'nomadism' as such, they deserve to oe quoted at length. 
The applicant must present a confirmation that 
he has worked regularly from the time of registration 
in one firm, a testimony from his employers about his 
attitude to work and that they are willing to continue 
employing him. The LNC committee [for gypsy affairs, ] 
must evaluate his family life, how he brings up his 
children, whether he has committed any offence and 
his whole behaviour in public and in general. 
In the applicant fulfuls the above conditions he 
may be... 
[removed 
from the register] ... and issued 
with a new identity card without the stamp that 
he is includdd on the register. 
This ... is conditional for should the applicant 
avoid work or chan3e his job more frequently in 
the future, his identity card will be stamped once 
more that he is on the register. (51) 
* 158 persons still remained on the register at the end of 1967 (130). 
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Yet it is unlikely that these new instructions were any more 
effective for the simple reason that L1Cs were unwilling to use the 
register and Law 74 to control Gypsy population movement because 
this made them responsible for accommodation, employment and sub- 
sequent supervision. It was less trouble to use other methods of 
coercing Gypsies when necessary - such as the regulations for 
residence registration or else the existing law against parasitism - 
and otherwise to ignore them. 
Migration and the Labour Market 
As has been shown, the nomads' register proved quite inadequate 
as a means of checking Gypsy migration for apart from the fact that 
a smaller proportion of Gypsies than anticipated had been initially 
registered as nomads, even these numbers were progressively reduced 
as local authorities eagerly shed their burdensome, responsibilities. 
Moreover it was soon apparent that many local authorities had little 
interest in supervising those still remaining on the register. Not 
only did registered nomäds frequently disappear without authorisation 
from thdr legal place of residence but attempts to prevent or trace 
such movement were generally ineffectual. I4eanwhile Law 74 itself 
was enforced. so sparingly that its usefulness as an instrument of 
control was negligible. 
Although this is how frustrated policy-makers saw the situation, 
it is necessary to realise that to the Gypsies the nomads' register 
in particular must have appeared quite differently, for scarcely 
more than a dozen years earlier the compilation of another register 
of Gypsies had been the first stage in a plan to annihilate them. 
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To them, therefore, the 1958 measures were full of hidden menace. 
In spite of o-'ficial declarations of good intent the Gypsies'new 
trust in the Communist Party was undermined by ingrained fears of 
renewed persecution, deepened no doubt by insinuations by malicious 
Slovak villagers of a grim fate in store. 
The fact that so many Gypsies dared to defy the arbitrary 
restrictions on their previous freedom of movement, although 
dreading the unpredictable outcome of their actions, testifies not 
to their blithe disregard of all laws - as many officials believed - 
but rather to the strength of their motivation. In short, they 
believed the potential rewards to be worth the risk. 
Although it was acknowledged in the manual that some Gypsies 
had migrated for better work opportunities, the mobility of the 
majority was regarded as an integral part of their 'backward way 
of life'. This view found expression in the phrasing of Law 74, 
where a 'nomad' 'wanders from place to place and avoids honest work 
of makes his living in some disreputable way', and in innumerable 
local authority reports. Representative was the tart comment by 
an Ostrava NC official that: 
Gypsies came to our city for the sole reason that 
here they could better pursue their criminal careers 
concealed by the anonymity of urban life. * 
(Survey) 
The corrective 'process of socialist education' Was to employ 
'nomads' on a regular basis in the place where they were registered 
+ This was the same argument that Western European officials had 
used to protest against twentieth century urbanisation of nomadic Gypsies. (See Chapter Two). 
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and to keep them there until re-education had been completed. 
Unfortunately this policy had been decided without any prior matching 
of Gypsy opulation concentrations with labour requirements and 
although some allowance had been made for re-adjustments, these were 
expected to be relatively minor. 
In spite of this important omission there seemed good grounds 
for optimism since the economy's heavy demand for unskilled labour 
which had tri, gered off the initial Gypsy migration and maintained 
it during the 1950s, continued into the 1960s as the planners clung 
to their familiar recipe of extensive economic growth. Rather than 
making more efficient use of already existing plant (intensive 
growth), this meant increasing productive capacity by the construction 
of new factories - especially in the sector of heavy industry, ririth 
the inevitable requirement for unskilled workers to build and man 
them. In spite of serious economic stagnation from 1961 to 1964 the 
planned increase in the labour force estimated in the Third Five-Year 
Plan (1961-65) was actually exceeded. 
The Plan postulated an increase of 440,000 workers - 
and by the end of 1965 more than 650,000 workers 
had actually been added to the work force. Of these 
some 436,000 were women.... This extensive development 
of the labour supply brought with it... serious problems 
of work morale, general qualifications of the recruits, 
and the resulting effect on productivity of labour.... 
On the part of the men, such a high level of employment 
also had adverse effects, as can be seen in the case 
of construction.... There the fact that if a worker 
was fired he could go around the corner and get another 
job, reduced work morale; absences increased; and 
the volume of idle time mounted.... The index of 
productivity in construction dropped from 220 in 1961 
(1948=100) to only 182 in 1963. Such a decline is 
closely related to the recruitment of an additional 
268,000 construction workers from 1948 to 1961, or 
more than double the original number. 
(Wheeler : 63,62). 
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Whatever the detrimental effects to the economy of drawing on 
the country's entire labour reserves to sustain the rate of extensive 
development, the insatiable demand for unskilled labour clearly put 
the labour potential of male Gypsies at a premium. However this 
demand was not uniform and in spite of major projects such as the 
V East Slovakia Steelworks near Kosice (completed in 1966), the 
industrialisation of Slovakia had still not reached the stage where 
employment opportunities were equal in both halves of the Republic. 
In consequence many areas in Slovakia suffered a glut of labour 
power at a time of acute national shortage. Naturally it was the 
Gypsies, as the least trained and desirable section of the labour 
force, that were most directly affected by this situation. For 
them the practical choice was still between seeking work locally 
in relatively low-paid a6ricultural jobs or else migrating for the 
higher wages of industry - the classic dilemma of the migrant worker. 
Slovakian local authorities were sometimes reluctant to admit 
the position. A 1962 report of the Spisska Novä Ves DNC insisted 
that "job opportunities in the district are sufficient"* (34) and 
blamed the departure of Gypsies on the fact that It Gypsies do not 
take their work seriously and their work-morale is unstable so, as 
a result, local firms do not want to employ them in greater numbers". 
(ibid). 
* This claim was also disproved by a 1970 survey of employment in the district. (See the-following Chapter). 
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Later it was conceded that the district's basic employment 
situation was otherwise; there were not enough jobs 
to go round. 
Other reports recorded the Gypsies' response to their predicament 
and, very exceptionally, even showed a degree of sympathetic approval. 
Some citizens included in the register for bad work 
morale were not immediately found employment and went 
off secretly to work in the Czech lands, in this way 
breaking the law. (27) 
It is necessary to bear in mind critically the cir- 
cumstance that in our district the opportunity to 
work was not offered to all registered persons, 
therefore they were right to seek job opportunities 
in other districts, most often in the Czech lands. (28) 
(My emphasis). 
Yet even if there had been sufficient appropriate jobs in the 
district, this would still not have compared to the urgent labour 
needs of the Czech industrial areas. It was this basic difference 
in labour markets which explained why "the managers of 
[local] firms 
[did] not respect the... decree that citizens of gypsy origin may not 
be released from employment without the prior consent of the DNC 
labour department". (41). It also explained the complementary fact 
that: 
... several works, mainly 
in the Czech lands, offer 
jobs to registered persons without the agreement 
of the labour department of the DNC where they are 
permanent residents.... In such cases these people 
are registered as tempdrary residents, but without 
the consent of the NC where they are permanent 
residents. (32) 
This 1962 report mentioned thirty-one such cases, 
The importance of the Czech labour market for Spisskä Nova Ves 
Gypsies can be seen from statistics which show that in 1961 and 1962 
around half o£-the newly employed Gypsies were absorbed there. It was 
this migration to which the D14C labour department objected so strongly. 
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Proportion of newly employed Gypsies finding work 
in the Czech lands. 
Period Newly employed 
Gypsy workers 
Of which finding wor 
in the Czech lands 
', o of newly 
employed Gypsies 
finding work in 
total men women total men women the Czech lands. 
1961 439 408 31 206 178 28 46.8; 
1.1.62 
to 
1.9.62 333 318 15 196 182 14 58.9% 
(34) 
(37) 
A 1962 survey of 481 'Gypsy houses in need of improvement' confirmed 
this, showing that over a quarter of Gypsy houseowners in the Spisska 
Novä Ves district were employed in the Czech lands. Although the 
quality of sample is not clear, its size is large being of the 
total 116 Gypsy houses in the district. (3; ), 
Workplace of 481 Gypsy houseowners. 
Workplace In home In district Elsewhere Elsewhere In Czech 
of Gypsy village outside in E. Slovak in Slovakia lands. 
'ouseowner village Region 
of house- 
wners 22 41 8 2 27 
(38) 
This migration was not only to Czech industrial areas however for 
the combination of a labour shortage in the Czech lands and higher 
wages paid by industry left Czech agriculture under-manned, especially 
at harvest time. Many Gypsies therefore went to work as seasonal 
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labourers. "in the summer gypsy citizens leave to work in the 
Czech lands without their families and in winter return home and do 
not work... at all". (41). As well as a_riculture the other great 
seasonal employer was, of course, the building industry. 
Gypsy population movement was not all out-migration from Slovakia 
for there was a constant stream returning from the Czech lands, 
altho74gh numbers are difficult to estimate. Whether registered as 
nomads or not, such Gypsies were generally grudgingly admitted to 
have a human ri6ht to resume living in their home settlement - 
although nowhere else as a rule - but in a few cases NCs resisted 
the return of Gypsies who had not retained a nominal permanent 
residence at home during their spell in the Czech lands. 
Four [Gypsies3, permanent residents of Karvina 
[IN. Moravia Region] moved... [back to Spisfskä Nova 
Ves ] without any permission for permanent residence. 
When they were told to go back [to Karvina 7 where 
they had come from... they refused saying they would 
not move, even if an attempt were made to remove 
them forcibly. (17). 
Ironically this failure to control Gypsy migration played an 
important part in the major success of the policy - the improvement 
in the Gypsy employment rate. The figures for Spisskä Nova Ves show 
steady progress year by year although the proportion of women in 
regularly employment remained low. This was partly because Gypsy 
women of productive age were also of reproductive age and generally 
had small children to care for, but it was more due to the lack of 
job opportunities for women -a general problem in Slovakia. Many 
Gypsy women did in. fact work locally as seasonal farm or forestry 
workers but since this was not regarded as regular employment for 
statistical purposes, it did not appear in official tables. 
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Date Gypsies of Regularly employed not regularly working 
productive 
age* No. Total men women 
1961 3,251 1,402 43 1,849 467 1,382 
8.11.63 3,651 1,686 46 1,965 213 1,752 
3.11.64 3,851 2,186 57 1,665 - - 
* Men 15 - 60 years, women 15 - 55 years. 
Also remarkable was the similarity in distribution of employment 
type for Gypsies and non-Gypsies, although the nearly doubled proportion 
of Gypsies in the building industry was notable. 
rmnployment type : Comparison of Gypsies and 
non-Gypsies. (1962) 
Percentage National Average Percentage of 
d l of workers 





e Gypsy samp 
workers 
Industry 1,477 43.0 46.5 
Agriculture 1,178 23.8 21.2 
Building 1,532 9.3 16.8 
Transport 1,572 6.9 3-0 
Other - 17.0 12,5 
TAL - 100.0 100.0 
(Handbook : 116) (Facts : 90) (38) 
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The sample of Gypsy workers was the same 481 house-owners and 
therefore the relatively high percentage of Gypsies shown as employed 
in industry was probably a distortion for a worker in industry or 
the building industry was more likely to be a house-owner because 
of the higher wades. On the other hand, this was counter-balanced 
by the fact that the sample was of 'houses in need of improvement'. 
The same 1902 survey also gave data about the income of 519 
Gypsy families living in the 481 houses sampled. The figures are 
extremely difficult to compare with national statistics since family 
and work patterns are so dissimilar. 'Whereas in a typical Czechoslovak 
family there will be one child and both parents will work, in a 
typical Gypsy family there will be four or five children and the 
wife will not work. However, since the generous family allowance 
on five children (maximum 950 crowns/month (Facts : 109) can be 
roughly equated with a working Czechoslovak wife's monthly wages, a 
very crude comparison can be made. 











Below 1,000 21 Below 833 38 
1,000-2,000 68 833-1,666 46 
2,000-3,000 10 1,666-2,500 13 
over 3,000 1 over 2,500 3 
(Facts : 99) (38) 
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This table shows that although over a third of Gypsies were 
still undoubtedly poor, almost two thirds had already achieved by 
1962 an income witýlin the range of the national average. 
There was little progress in increasing the proportion of 
qualified workers among Gypsies (in 1963 the national average of 
qualified workers was one in six (Facts)) but on the whole progress 
in employment came closer to 1958 expectations than any other aspect 
of the 'Gypsy question'. Gradually Gypsies were attaining at least 
the basic economic means which were regarded as the key to the whole 
complex process of socio-economic equalisation. 
Accommodation and the Dispersal of Population Concentrations 
If employment showed the most progress, accommodation probably 
showed the least. The failure of local authorities to disperse 
Gypsy population concentrations was more complete even than their 
inability to control migration, for at least they had managed to 
settle the Vlachs. 
As might have been expected the situation was most critical in 
the region with most Gypsies - rural East Slovakia. 
The greater part of the gypsy population live in 
settlements lying between five hundred metres and 
four kilometers from [Slovak] villages, in places 
which are inaccessible and without roads. Most 
[settlements] are in places in which no-one had 
any interest - neither town, village nor individuals. 
The humble, temporary huts were built in various 
valleys,... ravines, at the edge of the forest, on 
the slopes behind villages where they were not 
easily visible. 
Bost were built during the period of the so-called 
Slovak state [during the Second World War]. The 
oldest settlements which still exist were built 
near roads, at cross-roads or beneath castle walls. 
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Gypsy settlements even sprang up in our district 
during the Austro-Hungarian era when individual 
groups settled when permitted by the social order 
of that day.... During the period of the first 
republic [1918-38] .... further settlements grew 
up. 
(63)" 
This account of Gypsy settlements in the Spisskä Novä Ves 
district referred, not to the pre-1958 situation, but to that of 
1965. For all its inaccuracy in characteristically underestimating 
the age of the district's settlements, * this report is nevertheless 
remarkable among official documents for its graphic description of 
the physical isolation of Gypsy settlements - and its implication of 
the corresponding social isolation of their inhabitants. host reports 
contented themselves with dry statistics. 
Living conditions in the settlements were as primitive as their 
remoteness suggested. Statistics from different years were often 
incompatible, chiefly because what would be called a settlement in 
one report would be regarded as an integrated part of a Slovak village 
in the next. Similarly some officials would regard a wooden douse as 
a hut, while to others it would be a house. Bearing these inconsistencies 
in mind, a 1962 report (37) listed 67 Gypsy settlements in the Spisskar 
Nova" Ves district containing 988 of the total 1303 Gypsy families. 
The remaining 315 families were 'dispersed' in Slovak villages but 
" See the previous chapter for a discussion of the motivation. 
This particular report included the two settlements studied 
in detail among those allegedly founded between the wars, yet 
a study of parish records and local testimony confirmed their 
presence at least as far back as the early nineteenth century. 
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it is highly probable that this figure also included families 
living together in Gypsy quarters on the outskirts of a village. 
These 988 families lived in 996 dwellings of which 250 were said to 
be huts; the empty dwellings probably belonged to migrants to the 
Czech lands. 
There were severe deficiencies in basic amenities - drinking 
water and toilets. Of the 67 settlements, 22 were completely with- 
out a well or pump of their own and in 13 settlements drinking 
water could only be obtained from a nearby stream. (37). To rectify 
this critical situation in the 22 settlements, wells were planned 
in 8 settlements for 1962 and in 14for 1963 to be financed from 
'Campaign 'Z'' '' funds at a cost of 10,000 Crowns per well. As for 
toilets, there was a grand total of 196-even in 1964 - of which none 
were hygenically adequate (55). This meant that 80% of all Gypsy 
dwellings in settlements were without toilets and their occupants 
were forced to use the surroundings of the settlements with a 
resulting increase in the danger of contaminating the already unsafe 
drinking water supplies. 
A more detailed idea of living conditions was given by the 
1962 survey. 
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Survey of 481 Gypsy houses in need of improvement (38). 
Location of houses t In 
[Slovak] 
village 119 
In [Gypsy] settlement 362 
Type of dwelling T House 168 
Hut 313 




State of repair : Very good 1 
Moderate 46 
Ramshackle 221 
(Immediate action necessary) Disintegrating 213 
Living rooms per house : 1 room 266 
(including bedroom and 2 rooms 187 
living room but not 3 rooms 23 kitchen). 
4 rooms or more 5 
Living space per house : up to 10m2 30 
ºº u 30m2 254 
if it 60m2 170 
ºt it 100m2 22 
more than 100m2 5 
Density of occupation per house: Empty 50 
1 family 330 
2 families 80 
3-4 families 27 
5 or more families 0 
Family size : up to 5 members 256 
(for 519 families in 481 ºý 'ý 10 tº 220 
houses) ºº ,º 15 39 
more than 15 c&embers 4 
Toilets : Flush 0 




Access to water : In house 3 
Cwn well in yard 11 
Well distant up to 50m. 163 
it ºr ºi n loom. 91 
it it uu 300tß. 120 
It more than 300m. 24 
Without water (from stream) 69 
Adequacy of water supply: Suitable 166 
from health reasons Unsuitable 246 
Without water 69 
Electricity supply: Connected 193 
Not connected but possible 105 
No possibility of connection 183 
In dispersing Gypsies from the deteriorating conditions of the 
overcrowded settlements, local authorities had a choice of accommodation 








(ii) STATE (iii) CO-OP (iv) PRIVATE 








PUBLIC Z TOR -R YNTED ACCOMMODATION 
(Iiot roquirir ; Gypsy savings 




needing: a) building plot 
b) planning permission 
c) building materials 
PRIVATE SECTOR - PURCHASED ACCOtHMOD- 
ATION. 
(Requiring Gypsy savings or 
a loan). 
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i) Given the relatively un-avourable employment situation for 
Gypsies in much of rural Slovakia it seemed unlikely that employers 
would enthusiastically provide them with works flats. Attempts were 
made to require enterprises to reserve a fixed quota of their 
accommodation for Gypsy employees but had little effect, as a 1963 
report showed. 
The principle of allocating 5w 
fof 
works flats1 
for employees of gypsy origin is not respected 
by the works. 
(45) 
ii) State housing was a better bet, especially using older renovated 
houses as the manual had suggested, but suitable buildings were in 
short supply. For example only five were purchased by the DIIC in 
1964. (29,55). The number of ordinary state flats allocated to 
Gypsies was also disappointingly low* and even if the planned quotas 
had been fulfilled, only 0.18 per cent of the district's Gypsy 
population would have been rehoused in this way, which was even less 
than the proportion of all Slovakian inhabitants who actually received 
a state flat during the same period (0.2 per cent). 
iii) In the on-inal 1958 plans there had been little expectation 
that Gypsies would seek co-operative flats since this was not only 
better quality housing as a rule but required a substantial cash 
deposit from each member of the co-operative before a state loan was 
granted to cover the remainder of the building expenses. 
' In this respect the performance of the district was exceptionally 
poor, its rate being well below that for Gypsies in the East 
Slovakia Region and in Slovakia as a whole. (See below). 
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Aievertheless some Gypsies tried to use their savins to join 
a housing co-operative but usually encountered much hostility. 
In many cases a citizen of gypsy origin is subjected 
to many pressures and manoeuvres aimed at depriving 
him of his membership as soon as he becomes a housing 
co-op member. A case in point occurred in 
[the town 
of ] Spisskä i ova Ves where for unknown reasons 
[a gypsy 
woman] was expelled from a co-op and her deposit 
returned to her. She was a citizen who lived in a 
decent and civilised way.... 
Other members of a co-op 
[often] 
refuse to accept a 
gypsy family [and]... in some cases a threat is made 
to dissolve the co-op. 
(22) 
Although incomplete, the following table gives some idea of the 
small number of Gypsies rehoused in state, works and co-op flats in 








Rehousing Gypsies by State, Works and Co-op flats. 
Period State flats Co-op flats Works flats 
Plan Reality Plan Reality Plan Reality 
1959-X-6o 19 
1961 12 9 0 2 
1962 15 ? . 6 
1963 18 10 6 5 11 
1964 20 6 9f 6 3 
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iv) In Slovakian towns and villages the characteristic type of 
accommodation was not the more recent block of works, state or co-op 
flats but the privately-owned detached family house, often built by 
the owner and his family in their spare time. This preference was 
shared by the Gypsies too and many of them had amassed considerable 
savings to build such a house. The most effective means of dispersing 
Gypsies in Slovakia, therefore, was for local authorities to assist 
them to build or buy their own houses outside the Gypsy settlements 
by enabling then to obtain plots of land, scarce building materials 
and, in deserving cases, by providing them with interest-free loans 
as well. 
However the 1959 manual had recognised that the resistance of 
Slovak villagers and their NCs had frequently been so strong that 
Gypsies had been forced to build their new hohles in their segregated 
settlements or not at all. Some Gypsies, of course, were quite 
content to build alongside their parents and brothers but others 
would have preferred the village in spite of the hostility - for 
the superior status of living among the "whites" or perhaps to escape 
prying relatives. But there were more concrete reasons too: settlements 
usually lacked basic amenities such as water, electricity, public 
lighting, roads and convenient shops. The same house, built as part 
of the village proper was worth much more and also was resaleable to 
someone other than a local settlement Gypsy. * 
* Attempts by Gypsies to build in the village were no new 
phenomenon: 
In 1927 a group of 13 Gypsies requested building plots 
outside their settlement in a village [near Kezmarok 
(E. Slovakia) but... ] the council refused because 'to 
spread Gypsies in this way is against the interest of the entire community'. (Kara : 384). 
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Recently there have been many cases where Gypsies 
build normal houses by themselves, but as a rule 
in some gypsy settlement. This is mainly in 
Slovakia where other people often to not want to 
permit gypsies in the town or village. They use 
various means to achieve this like raising the 
price of plots of land or, where gypsies already 
have obtained plots, even by demolishing already 
completed buildings. Gypsies are in this way 
sent back to the old gypsy settlements which they 
would be glad to leave. Such cases must be condemned 
as strongly as possible especially where this is 
done with the silent agreement or even active help 
of NC members. 
(5 : 48). 
In spite of this clear warning NCs in the Spisska Nova Ves 
district cnntinued to carry out the will of their local electors 
rather than that of central government. The most common means of 
preventing Gypsies from breaking out of their settlements, "attested 




did not want to 
allocate plots for private building 
[to 
gypsies]" (45), or where, 
"as in Spisskä Novä files in several cases, the 1-II4C did not agree to 
the purchase of houses 
{by 
gypsies)". (45). Local authorities also 
"made it hard for them ... to ensure building materials and difficulties 
were experienced in obtaining loans". (10). In 1963 only three loans 
were made to Gypsies in the district and in 1964 a further four 
(totalling 56,000 Crowns). * 
This widespread opposition was regarded so seriously that in 
1963 the secretary of the DNC Gypsy Affairs Committee recommended: 
* What is remarkable is that even without such loans so many 
Gypsies were able to build substantial brick houses, albeit in 
their settlements. A 1963 estimate (39) costed the Construction 
of a typical family house at 78,381 crowns although most Gypsies, 
using their own labour and second-hand building materials, 
would Generally have paid sighificantly less for such a house. 
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"This will have to be regarded as a breach of state discipline by 
LNC officials" (45) and two years later the DIiC instructed that 
"where LNCs refuse to provide building plots, the names of the 
villages and the number of applicants should be reported". (62). 
Yet there is no evidence that any action was taken against offenders. 
Only occasionally dich the DNC manage to overcome LNC resistance, as 
in 1962 when 'the DNC Gypsy Affairs Committee succeeded in resolving 
six cases by buying plots for private building by Gypsies in the 
village proper in spite of opposition by LC officials". (37). 
Statistics on the subject are both incomplete and unreliable 
but the share of building permits issued to Gypsies appears to be 
more than their proportion of the whole population. Their need was 
incomparably greater, of course, and the figures give no indication 
of the number of applications that were refused or otherwise frustrated. 








Period Total building Of which to Gypsies Proportion 
d it i perm ssue s of permits 
Plan Reality to Gypsies 
1959. X. 60 330 29 8.8% 
1961 45 18 
1962 50 14 
1963 61 14 
1964 70 11 15.? w 
TOTAL 
1959-64 - - 86 
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It is probable that the number of rouses actually built by 
Gypsies was roughly equivalent to the number of permits issued (e. g. 
18 houses were built in 1961 and 11 in 1963). Indeed some of the 
permits simply legalised the existence of houses already constructed, 
for in the face of such opposition it was not surprising the " gypsy 
citizens in many cases... build houses without planning permission". (45). 
It is unlikely that any significant reduction in the size of 
Gypsy settlements in the district was achieved in the period from 
1958 to 1965 for the population losses caused by out-migration and 
rehousing were more than compensated by the continuing high birth- 
rate. This lack of impact is evident from the almost static ratd 
of demolition. Only five huts were demolished in 1963 and four in 
1964 (55), while not a single settlement was eliminated. 
Yet it would be wrong to see the development of the Gypsy 
accommodation problem during the period 1958 to 1965 entirely as 
DNC impotence in the face of united INC opposition for attitudes of 
LNCs varied enormously. In some places (e. g. Spissky Stvrtok, 
Smizany etc. ) there had not been isolat6d Gypsy settlements as such 
for many years and although Gypsy houses tended to be built together 
as a quarter, there were occasional Gypsy houses among those of non- 
Gypsies. Apparently little outright opposition was offered by such 
LNCs and of them, (including the better of the settlements studied 
in detail), the D1C wrote: 
... it must be noted that despite many shortcomings 
and lack of attention paid by NCs, the hyEene and living conditions are gradually improving and there 
are cases where citizens of gypsy origin live in 
normal dwellings where the living conditions are 
reasonably good. (45) 
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A fairer overall assessment would be that 1958 had not 
basically changed the situation; those LNCs where ethnic relations 
had been relatively good continued to integrate their Gypsies, while 
others found that in spite of DNC directives and protests they could 
continue in their previous practice of seöregation with impunity. 
Regrettably there is not enough data to make a similar survey 
of contemporary developments in the Czech industrial areas but it is 
clear that in the urban districts - where home-building was 
impracticable - Gypsies fell victim to the rapidly worsening general 
housing shortage. One Czech NC admitted the problem frankly: 
We badly neglected the question of accommodation 
for Gypsies but it is not easy. Our NC has 5,200 
applications on the waiting list for flats. 
(5) 
The Absence of Administrative Control 
In the initially confused situation following the 1959 directives, 
it was impossible to evaluate the performance of national committees. 
The Spisskä Novä Ves DNC was apparently active in planning measures to 
hasten the assimilation of Gypsies, even to the extent of mounting a 
1959 campaign to ur6e Gypsies to change their characteristic surnames 
for Slovak ones. 
This campaign was not sufficiently understood by 
these citizens for even those who changed their 
surnames continue to use their old shameful names. 
It will be necessary for LPNCs.... to urge citizens 
of gypsy origin to change their old and, in their 
language, ridiculous surnames. (46) 
Yet by 1963 the widespread apathy and resistance to the 1958 
policy had already aroused serious official concern. In an extremely 
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critical report from this year the secretary of the DNC committee 
for Gypsy affairs concluded that "the situation is such that NCs 
think the Gypsy Affairs Committees make the decisions and do not 
bear in mind that these are only advisory committees to the DNCr 
orINCs". (45) 
Inactivity was apparently typical at both DNC and LNC levels, 
although this took different forms. Another 1963 report commented 
that althouga the DNC committee sat monthly, "a relatively serious 
shortcoming in the work of the committee is the poor attendance at 
its meetings on the part of social organisations and certain DNC 
departments - chiefly finance and planning". 
(40). The same report 
stated that a "control commission had found the fulfilment by LNCs 
of the Central Committee decree to be inadequate", naming several 
LIvCs including those studied in the field-work. Based on findings 
such as these the report continued: t'LNCs and their advisory committees 
... concern themselves with the 
[gypsy] 
question only rarely or not 
at all" and concluded with the general condemnation that "it is a 
fact that very little attention is paid to fulfilling the Party and 
government decrees.... In most cases they have not been fulfilled to 
the slightest degree". (40). 
As has been shown the major failures resulting from this general 
apathy were in preventing migration and conversely in promiting 
dispersal. In the more elusive area of migration control the DNC 
apparently limited its role to the provision of jobs. 
Even trough, according to the law, the department 
[of labour] cannot completely prevent the departure 
of these [gypsy] workers from the district, every 
possibility was used to employ the majority... in our 




When this passive approach proved insufficient, the DNC 
resigned itself to the inevitable - contenting itself with occasional 
querulous complaints that employers ignored the regulations but making 
no attempt to enforce them. Probably the real purpose of such 
complaints was only to excuse DNC inactivity to higher authorities. 
If the principle were respected that agreement to 
moving would not be given until a document were 
produced, attesting that adequate accommodation 
and work were available at the new workplace, then 
Law 74/1958 and the Ministry of the Interior directive 
would not be infringed and this law would become a 
real aid in eliminating the social differences of 
gypsy citizens. 
(28). 
The inability of local authorities to stamp out migration had 
been unexpected by the 1958 policy-makers but as early as 1959 
widespread popular resistance to dispersal had been detected and 
condemned. The Slovak version of the government manual gave a critical 
analysis of the situation. 
It is necessary to state quite openly that the 
delay in solving these questions and the often 
Eompletel negative attitude to the decisive step 
of 1958 3 is due to individual NCs whose members 
and officials were not able to overcome their own 
prejudices against citizens of gypsy origin.... 
To counteract this damaging opposition] it is 
necessary to intervene wherever an NC works either 
formally or sluggishly and even more so when it 
does not obey or even goes against the directives. 
(7 11,12,18). 
As has been shown the DNC occasionally suggested that the most 
intransigent LNCs should be reported for a 'breach of state discipline' 
but in spite of the detailed evidence of obstruction, provided by 
control commissions' reports which named specific offending villages, 
no effective punitive action appears to have been taken. 
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Yet UC hostility was not entirely to blame for the slow 
progress for apart from those Gypsies with savings the DNC was 
expected to finance virtually all of the dispersal from its own 
budget. For a district such as Spisska Nova Ves, with over six 
thousand Gypsies living in settlements, this was no small burden. 
A 1963 report stated 'oluntly: 
We have already informed the finance department 
of the RNC of our financial requirements. How- 
ever, up till now we have only planned for we 
have no funds.... The elimination of gypsy settle- 
ments can only be undertaken effectively if money 
is provided. LNC members say the same. 
(39). 
THE OVERALL SITUATION IN THE EAST SLOVAKIA REGION AND 
SLOVAKIA FOLIIDWING THE 1958 MEASURES. 
J// 
What is remarkable about the experience of the Spisska Nova 
Ves district is not its uniqueness but to the contrary its apparent 
similarity to the overall situation in the East Slovakia Region in 
particular and to a certain extent in Slovakia as a whole. This 
was revealed by two key reports which had great influence in the 
subsequent reformulation of national measures in 1965. These were 
general assessments of the situation by the East Slovakia RNC 
Committee for Gypsy Affairs in December 1963 (21) and by the S; ovale 
Planning Commission a year lat4r in November 1964. (10). 
The latter report was the basis of Slovak National Council 
Decree Pio. 58/1965 which urged the need for re-thinking the current 
programme and eventually led to the meeting of the Praesidia of the 
Central Committees of the Slovak and Czechoslovak Us on the 15th June 
1965. A few months later in October 1965, the new overall measures were 
published in Government Decree No. 502/1965. (147). 
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The East Slovakia RPNC and Slovak Planning Commission reports 
concluded, as had the Spissxa Nova Ves reports, that the situation 
was critical in all of its aspects and was continuing to worsen as 
a result of the undiminished high birth-rate of Gypsies. Since 
increased innoculation and generally iºproved medical treatment was 
reducing the mortality rate among Gypsies more swiftly than they 
could be persuaded to adopt contraceptive measures, the success of 
some post-1958 measures was, to some extent, paradoxically aggravating 
this problem. 
Comparative population increase in the East Slovakia 
Region -_Gypsies and non-Gypsies. 
(30.12.63). (21) 
Total Gypsy Annual population increase Annual % pop. increase 
ll E f Sl kR population. or a ova . eg. 
No. ö 
9,799 3,300 to 3,500 4.69% 2.260/6' 
Both overall statistics and assessments told the same tale as 
the more detailed documents of the Spisska Nova Ves district. 
Most encouraging once more was the work situation where a dramatic 
improvement in employment level was claimed, although the 1958 figure 
was probably too low and the 1963 figure suspiciously high. 
Improvement in Gypsy employment level - E. Slovak Region. 
Date Gypsies of Of which employed 
productive age 
No. 
12.11.58 22,800 4,54o 226 (16) 
30.12.63 29,049 10,500 ? 1; n (21) 
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Accommodation remained a major problem for the vast majority 
of Gypsies in Slovakia still lived in isolated and segregated 
settlements and there seemed little prospect of any significant 
change. By the end of 1965 a total of 45 settlements and 2,500 
huts had been eliminated but "although probably 3,000 families 
moved out of settlements during the period 
(1959-65], 
the number 
of Gypsies living in settlements and huts rose as a result of the 
high birth-rate by almost 3,000 persons so that the average number 
of persons living in one hut rose from 6.1 in 1958 to 7.4 in 1965". (147). 
In the E. Slovak Region's 435 settlements still lived 55,656 
Gypsies (i. e. 79.7% of the region's 69,799 Gypsies) for only twelve 
settlements had been eliminated by 1965, of which nine in 1963 and 
1964 (20,21,22). The level of living conditions in these settlements 
was indicated by the official category-names' given in the following 
table. 






"hygenically revolting" "dangerous to life" 
No. % No. % 
8,094 6,636 82.3% 4,578 56.2% 
These conditions partly consisted of severe overcrowding. Rather 
surprisingly there were fewer households per house for Gypsies than 
for the_ country as a whole, but because Gypsy houses were generally 
smaller (30m2 as opposed to 40m2) and more importantly because their 
families were larger (averaging six members compared to a national 
average of 3.2) an E. Slovak settlement Gypsy had well under half the 
living space of the average Czechoslovak. 
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Relative overcrowding of settlement Gypsies (E. Slovak Reg. ) 
Total No. of No. of Households Persons Av. area- 
pop* households houses/ per per per 
flats house house person 2 (m ) 
Czechoslovakia 14,240,000 4,400,000 3,800,000 1.16 3.7 10.8 
Gypsies in E. 
Slovak 
settlements 55,656 9,27661 8,094 1.15 6.9 4.2 
+ (Facts : 8,113). 
9 (21,1967 Census : 1119) 
Probably even more serious than the overcrowding was the lack of 
the basic amenities - reliable drinking water and toilets. In the East 
Slovakia Region for example there was one adequate well for 291 Gypsies 
and one adequate toilet for 251 Gypsies. 
Yet despite the national housing shortage and in particular the 
shortage of building materials, in Slovakia Gypsies were rehoused at 
a slightly higher rate than non-Gypsies both in state flats and family 
houses. Figures for the East Slovakia Region show a much lower rate 
for family houses perhaps because of LNC opposition but care is needed 
in interpretation for these figures are for a much earlier period. 
The generally poorer health of Gypsies, revealed by figures from 
the Spisskä Novä Ves district, * was equally true of Gypsies in Slovakia 
and the East Slovakia Region. Whereas the infant mortality rate for 
the total population of Slovakia was 0.35,, for Gypsies in Slovakia it 
" Detailed statistics at district level on health and education 
have been omitted in this and the following chapter for the sake 
of brevity since they indicate similar differentials between the 
Gypsy and non-Gypsy populations as do the more general regional 
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was double at C. 71w (10) and while Gypsies in the Fast Slovakia 
Region only accounted for 12.4zý, of live births, their proportion 
of infant mortality was 61.4; ö. (21). 
äirnilar1j althoubh 3. ö%% of the total population of Slovakia 
drew invalid pensions, the percentage for Gypsies in Slovakia was 
5.45"E and of Gy,, sies of productive age 11.2%. (10). 
The incidence of TB was also much higher for Gypsies and was not 
limited to adults, although the high figure for Gypsy children in 
all Slovakia was very dubious. Particularly interesting was the 
much higheriate (1%) for the Fast Slovak Region as a whole, indicating 
the relative backwardness of this area of Slovakia. 
Comparison of TB incidence - Gypsies and non-Gypsies. (21). 














No. % All TB TB cases 
cases under 15 
years. 
Slovakia 0.15w 2.4% 3550 1500? 42.8 
E. Slov. Reg. 1.0% 2.5% 1796 400 22.2 16iß 20/^ö 
Finally the education situation was comparable. Very few 
Gypsy children were left in nurseries or attended nursery schools 
compared with non-Gypsies. 
236 









128 ) All CSSR 3,560,000® 65,000 1.8 345,000 9.7 
(21) Gypsies in 
E. Slov. Reg. 28,990 19 0.06 409 1.4 
© estimate from 1964 pop. figure (Facts). 
Attendance at ENS* gradually improved and corresponded to the 
Spisskä Novä Ves district's experience. 
Improvement in BNS school attendance (East Slovak Region). 
Date Total No. 
Gypsy 
Of which of 
school age 
Regularly attend Attend rarely 
or not at all 
children 
No. qö No. 
(16) 12.11.58 - - - 50-60% - 40-50% 
(21) 1964 28,990 17,967 11,328 63% 2,775 37: 6 
Attainment was disappointing and despite the preferentially low 
entrance requirements, Gypsies in the 15 to 17 year age group accounted 
for only 2% of all East Slovakia Region apprenticeships although forming 
5.3% of this age group. Cnly 30% to 50% of Gypsies enrolled as 
apprentices completed their training. (21). 
* Basic Nine-Year School - the standard school in Czechoslovakia 
providing compulsory primary and secondary education to children between the ages'of six and fifteen. 
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A total of 10,224 Gypsy illiterates and semi-literates was claimed 
for the East Slovakia Region in 1964 (i. e. 25 of adult Gypsies) but 
it is difficult to evaluate this. 
In assessing the various reasons for the slow rate of progress 
both the Slovak Planning Commission and the East Slovakia RNC came 
to similar general conclusions to those of the Spisskä Novä Ves DNC, 
explaining the stagnation by NC apathy and opposition but also by 
lack of resources. 
The East Slovakia RNC sharply condemned NC shortcomings, occasionally 
attributing them to misunderstandings about the non-executive role of 
the advisory committees for Gypsy affairs. 
General apathy appeared widespread and: - 
until now practically not a single task of the 
advisory committees attached to the RNC or DNCs 
has been completed. Committees met only from 
time to time and members.... from various depart- 
ments did not take... [them] sufficiently 
seriously. (20) 
But also important was blatant and fully-conscious administrative 
sabotage especially in the field of accommodation. 
Not only individuals, who as owners of building 
plots refuse to sell them to NCs as soon as they 
learn that they are for Gypsies, but also officials 
.... hinder this work. We have very few cases in 
the region where LPNCs have managed to obtain 
building plots for citizens of gypsy origin. We 
have dozens of villages in the region where the 
officials have no interest in solving this problem 
or only solve it under pressure from DNCs and the 
East Slovakia RNC... [14 villages named]. One 
LNC president... resigned his position and refused 
to solve this problem on principle.... 
As the LNC refuses to allocate him a building plot 
or deliberately drags out the procedure, the 
citizen of gypsy origin is then forced to build 
in the settlement. This is also proved by the 
fact that even though we have demolished 600 huts 
in the region since 1962, the number of unsuitable 
huts has not basically decreased with the exception 
of completely demolished settlements. (22) 
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As had the Spisskä Nova Ves DNC, the East Slovakia RNC 
suggested "considering it a breach of state discipline when LNC 
officials do not want to allocate building plots to gypsies", but 
likewise no action was apparently taken. 
There was an important difference of stress however in assessing 
the importance of the other main factor - lack of resources. 
The East Slovakia PMC sometimes tended to see the limited 
resources employed in solving the problem as yet another instance 
of tNC opposition. 
Even DhICs do not consider... work among the population 
of gypsy origin as an indivisible part of NCs' 
[responsibilities] and this is shown. . . by their 
repeated demands for extra funds, as if the solution 
of these questions were not a part of the work and 
budget of the whole district. (20) 
This was of course the same approach as in the 1959 government manual 
but it is a little strange to find it fully endorsed by the region 
with 40ö of the country's Gypsies. 
The Slovak Planning Commission, on the other hand, saw the lack 
of resources as an independent factor which both limited the 
possibility of NCs to act and undermined their morale. In solving 
the problem "the initial elan soon weakened however, especially when 
there were no funds for solving the problems'. (10). The Commission 
warned that "if these funds are not provided and the solution of the 
problem is postponed, this will mean not only a further increase in 
the problem in the very near future but much higher costs". (10). 
But perhaps a more fundamental lack, recognised by all levels 
of local authority in Slovakia, was the basic disparity between 
labour supply and demand. The basis of the solution had always been 
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to employ Gypsies, in this way diving them the means to help them- 
selves. Local authorities could then provide additional assistance, 
especially with accommodation, and gradually the whole complex of 
cultural - educational problems would presumably dissolve. 
Many [ gypsy, families do not have the financial 
preconditions to solve their backwardness. For 
this reason employment and by this the raising 
of incomes of gypsy families, must be understood 
as the basic precondition for solving their 
accommodation, social and hygene problems. (20) 
Yet often the areas with the largest numbers of Gypsies had 
quite inadequate employment opportunities for them. A 1963 East 
Slovakia Region report stated: 
Following... calculations, as a result of the lack 
of jobs in our region, it will be necessary to 
find employment outside our region for 3,823 
persons, [ i. e. 13.2,0 of Gypsies of productive age 
which means transferring 14,000 persons from the 
region. (19). 
A PROPOSED SOWTION : POPUL, LTION TRANSFERS 
This strategy of spreading the burden was to become the basis 
of official policy for its subsequent phase. 
In fact the agreed transfer of Gypsies from one district or 
region to another when there were insufficient jobs was envisaged 
in the 1959 directives and had been practised on a small scale 
throughout the early 1960s, especially from the East Slovakia Region 
to the Czech lands. For example the Spisskä Nova Ves Di1C had 
eventually abandoned its earlier resistance, reporting in 1964 that 
"the DI1C... arranges the transfer of five to seven gypsy families 
annually to the Czech regions'. (43). 
240 
Although complete families were sometimes transferred, in most 
cases only heaas of families were involved and on a temporary basis. 
Now increased efforts were to be made to ensure that whole families 
were transferred permanently. 
With regard to the limited jobs.... 
[ in 6 named 
districts including Spisskä Nova Ves J in relation 
to the number of fellow citizens of gypsy origin, 
it is necessary to make transfers within districts 
of the region and outside the region by agreement 
with the Central Office of NCs to the West and 
Central Bohemia and the North and South Moravia 
Regions so that these regions and their firms do 
not accept only workers, as they have done until 
now, but whole families and that they... provide 
them with accommodation and by this means realise 
the dispersal of citizens of gypsy origin and 
settlements. (20) 
In 1963 the Ferst Slovakia . RISC had also calculated 
the- long- 
term rehousing capacity for the next five-year plan until 1970 and 
increased the proportion of state flats to be allocated to Gypsies to 
9.9, although the improbability of this was conceded in the qualification 
"at least 5% for gypsies" (19). In contrast to this was the drop in 
planned private houses "possible without state aid". The Slovak 
Planning Commission's target of 6% was more cautious (or realistic), 
being only slightly above the rate already achieved. (10). 





Of which to 
be alloc. to 
% of Gypsy pop. 
to receive state 
Planned 
family 
% of Gypsy pop. 
to receive 
state Gypsies flat houses for family house 
fl t s a Gypsies 
No. % Total ö Annual % Total % Annual 
1965-70 20,018 2,000 9.9 2.65 0.53 650 0.98 0.19 
Yet even if these fairly optimistic plans could be realised the 
number of new houses and flats built by 1970 would still only be slightly 
more than half of the number of houses assessed as "dangerous to 
life" in the East Slovakia Region in 1964. Taking into consideration 
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the expected population growth during the planning period it could 
be seen that the planned rehousing rate would barely keep up with 
the emergence of new Gypsy families (as happened in the period 
January 1963 to September 1964 in Slovakia) or would even fall 
behind it in the East Slovakia Region and the accommodation problem 
would increase. 
The effect of Gypsy population growth on rehousing rates 
I 
Period Reality/plan Total houses Annual New Gypsy Net Gypsy 
area alloc. to rate families families 
Gypsies Q per year rehoused 
per year 
(10) an. 1963 Reality 2,139 1,284 1,000 to + 254 
to Sept. 1964 Slovakia 1,100 
(19j' 19 5 to 70. Plans 2,650 530 5451' - 15 E. Slov. Reg. 
* estimate based on proportion of total new Gypsy families for 
all Slovakia. 
2 Includes state flats and family houses. 
The problem appeared insoluble unless large-scale population 
transfers were resorted to. A 1963 Fast Slovakia RNC document showed 
the attractions of such a policy. This piece of optimistic arithmetic 
from 1963 was only one of several however and is given as an example 
to show how different the problem could appear. No account was 
taken of rehousing Gypsies in co-op or works flats or of returning 
migrants in this particular calculation. 
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Planned transfers as a solution to the Gypsy accommodation 
Problem (1965-70 East Slovak Region). (19) 
Gypsies nee. Involving Freeing Planned Tot. houses Houses 
to employ. transfer houses for alloc. of to be available 
outside o. f persons improvement houses to demolished for new 
E. Slov. Reg. Gypsies Gypsy fams. 
3,823 14,000 cca. 2,000 2,650 3,130 1,520 
On past experience it was clear that the accommodation problem 
could be eased in such a dramatic way only if there was a complete 
change of heart by many NC officials or alternatively far more 
efficient means of ensuring "state discipline". Neither seemed very 
likely. 
There were several proposals, however, to adopt fixed housing 
quotas for Gypsies, rather than leaving this to the discretion of 
LNCs and DNCs, which would at least make disobedience more easily 
detectable. '"It will be necessary to take strict measures that... 
in each block one or two flats will be compulsorily allocated to 
fellow citizens of gypsy origin and likewise.... compulsorily with 
works". (20). Similarly: "From experience.... it is evident that 
this problem of NCs refusing to allocate building plots to Gypsies] 
can only be solved by obtaining building plots in bulk for all 
applicants". (22). 
To what extent RNC officials thought they could transform the 
situation by transfers varied from report to report. In the 1964 
East Slovakia RNC report (21) such transfers were seen more as 
valuable help rather than a panacea and the plans for 1965 to 1970 
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were correspondingly less grandiose, with only 6,000 to 6,500 
persons to be transferred in contrast to the previous plan of around 
14,000. (19). This change of emphasis entailed a correspondingly 
treater pressure on the regions own rehousing programme. 
Apart from greatly increased transfers the accommodation 
problem was to be solved more or less as before with poorer Gypsies 
rehoused in state flats and regularly working, stabler Gypsies in 
co-op flats or family houses. To assist family house building it 
was proposed to exempt Gypsies from the costs of building plots, 
plans and documentation and to facilitate interest-free state loans. 
Proposed measures in other fields often had a familiar ring. 
Adequate drinking water and sanitation facilities were to be 
provided for settlements without them. There were to be regular 
injections and medical check-ups and to help spread health education, 
courses were to be organised and Gypsy girls were to be trained as 
auxiliary nurses. Four new childrens' hoOes were to be built with 
a capacity of 370 places. 
In the field of education a target of 50ö of all Gypsy children 
were to attend nursery school and at BNS special classes for Gypsies 
were to be continued. In addition four special research classes 
were to be established including one in the town of Spisskä Novä 
Ves. To encourage regular school attendance family allowances were 
to be withheld in cases of persistent non-attendance, although this 
was only made possible legally in 1966. 
At work educationally backward Gypsies were to have four hours 
of lessons daily during working hours on full pay, for which firms 
were to be compensated. In general campaigns were to be organised 
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with the help of the trade union and youth movements to increase 
Gypsies' work qualifications. 
In the field of crime it was recommended that officials "seek 
out criminal acts of sexual abuse and devote special care to the 
punishable activity of migrancy in the sense of Law 74/1958 Sb". (21) 
Budgetary plans for the 1965-70 period were impressive but 
difficult to evaluate since they often showed only that part 
specifically devoted to Gypsies, while not including such major 
items as state flat construction for Gypsies (which amounted to 
73 million crowns for the East Slovakia Region (21)), since this 
was an integral part of the general budget. The estimated 1965-70 
budget for solving the 'Gypsy question' in Slovakia was 200 million 
crowns of which nursery schools and child-minding facilities 
accounted for over half with 120 million, purchase of huts 52 
million, wells and toilets 7 million and bonuses for teachers 21 
million crowns. (10). 
For the year 1965 although the bulk of the funds still had to 
be drawn from DNC resources, the East Slovakia RNC provided help in 
a number of ways. It created a reserve fund of over two and a half 
million crowns for improving amenities in settlements (such as 
toilets, wells, roads and lighting) to be utilised when DNC funds 
. were exhausted and covered 
DNC purchases of huts (over two million 
crowns) as well as making available over one and a half million 
crowns within Campaign 'Z' for 'beautifying the surroundings'. In 
addition the East Slovak Steelworks at Kosice provided almost half 
a million crowns for the elimination of the nearby Bukovec settlement, 
which was feared to be endangering the health of workers, (22). 
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AN ASSESSMENT OF PROGRESS SINCE 1958 
It is all too easy to become so immersed in the detail of 
official reports, preoccupied with specific aspects of local 
authority performance, that the wider aspects are forgotten. 
For example the ultimate goal of assimilation was rarely mentioned 
in NC documents which instead listed the minutiae of hut demolitions, 
building permits and so on, i. e. the mechanism by which dispersal 
and hence assimilation was to be achieved. For this reason it 
would be helpful to restate the central features of the 1958 policy 
and, without launching into a fuller analysis at this intermediate 
stage, to summarise the reasons for the policy's limited progress. 
For the assimilation policy to be a success three main aims 
had to be achieved: 
i) Gypsies had to be integrated into the labour 
force as this would provide both an economic 
base for a hi6her standard of living and the 
most effective re-educative influence. 
ii) Gypsy population concentrations had to be 
dispersed to prevent 'the perpetuation of the 
previous backward way of life' and to allow 
Gypsies to come into contact with new, progressive 
living patterns. 
iii) In order that re-education by work should be 
completed successfully and that the dispersal 
of Gypsies should not be thwarted, control had 
to be established over natural migration. 
Six years later the Slovakian reports confirmed what was 
already evident - significant progress had been made towards the 
first aim alone; elsewhere the results had been negligible. 
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&ne major reason why the attempt failed to control Gypsy 
migration by mans of iaw 74 and the nomads'register was that it 
conflicted with the labour requirements of the economy ; witii the 
interests of Slovakian rural employers, easer to restrict or shed 
their Gypsy workforce; of Czech industrial employers, desperate 
for any additional labour dower and, not least, of Gypsies in search 
of high wages. 
Local authorities possessed sufficient powers to make deep 
inroads into the migratory flow, if not to halt it entirely, for 
they could have insisted that employers complied with the regulations 
.. r---ý 
and simply intimidated the Gypsies into obedience. Instead they 
preferred to include _-only 
a relatively small proportion of Gypsies 
on the nomads' register initially and thereafter to reduce their 
numbers, turning a blind eye to continued migration in the meantime. 
This was not entirely straightforward defiance of central 
government policy because local authorities were, in fact, receiving 
contradictory instructions. On the one hand new regulations required 
them to eradicate 'nomadism' but at the same time there were familiar, 
incessant demands for higher production levels which could only be 
met by allowing the remaining untapped labour reserves to gravitate 
to the industrial centres where they were most needed. 
Paradoxically, therefore, the greatest success of the 1958 
policy in this initial period - the dramatically improving proportion 
of Gypsies in regular work - was largely due to local authority 
unwillingness to make use of their powers to control natural 
miGration, thus allowing fundamental economic requirements to over- 
ride the ill-considered and unrealistic plan to provide local employment 
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for the overwhelming numbers of Gypsies still living in Slovakia. 
This is to cut a charitable interpretation on the action of 
local authorities and some, as their reports make clear, did reason 
in this way. These were almost certainly in the minority; the 
majority did as little as possible to implement a policy in which 
they had no real interest. This is especially true of local dispersal 
of Gypsy concentrations. Apart from occasional mutterings about 
sanctions, which never seemed to materialise, they took the line 
of least resistance after the early discovery that their short- 
comings went undetected - or at least unpunished. 
Given the rigidly hierarchical administrative structure in 
Czechoslovakia, it is puzzling that local authorities were so 
immune from discipline. As was shown in the section on government 
organisation local authorities faced in two directions for although 
they represented local interests - including those of local 
employers - they were ultimately subordinate to central government 
by the principle of democratic centralism. Any conflict of interests 
should have been swiftly resolved in favour of central policy, 
especially so after the Stalinist leadership had tightened its grip, 
treating government and local authorities alike as 'levers of a 
transmission system' (Selucky) and not as decision-Taking bodies in 
their own right. But at the same time that rigid 'dirigisme' 
reached its height, there occurred the greatest collapse of central 
planning and control yet experienced in Czechoslovakia. 
The Third Five-Year Plan, which was to run from 
1961 through 1965, had to be abandoned in 1962.... 
It was the most elaborate plan yet drawn up... yet, 
within a comparatively short time, ... it became 
evident that it could never be carried to completion. 
%ýýý 
In a way it was, to put it bluntly, a vast 
exercise in bureaucratic self-deception. 
(Wheeler : 58,59). 
Compared to this traumatic blow to the prestige and confidence 
of the Novotnyite lea? ership, which seriously weakened it politically 
and eventually led to its downfall six years later, the contemporaneous 
failure of its Gypsy policy was a drop in the ocean; it was perhaps 
remarkable that it was noticed at all. 
Meanwhile the painful lesson that was being learnt at this time 
by planners in the broader sphere of the economy - that the breakdown 
of grandiose and unworkable plans necessitated a radical rethinking 
of fundamentals - had not yet permeated to the peripheral area of 
Gypsy policy by 1965. There, the response to failure was still the 
instinctive dirigiste reaction; to intensify the policy that had 
foundered by redoubling the detail of the plans and compounding the 
bureaucracy to administer them. If the economic planners were 
tentatively approaching the renaissance of 1968, those in charge 
of Gypsy policy were still immersed in the Dark Ages of the late 
1950s. Instead of re-examining the assumptions of 1958, the policy- 
makers simply reaffirmed the previous aims and added a fourth: 
iv) Effective central control over local authorities 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE Bl? i 04. o OF THE ASSIMILATION POLICY (1965-11968)_ 
THE 1965 MEASURES - 'i)ISPERSAL AvD TRANSFER' 
Government Decree I'o. 502/1965 
In a 'justifying report' attached to Decree 502, there was a 
brief review of the national situation which recognised that many 
of the problems discussed in the previous chapter, mainly in 
relation to Slovakia, were indeed widespread throughout the Republic. 
The problem of employment showed the most improvement but "the 
required elimination of gypsy concentrations - streets and town 
quarters in the Czech regions and settlements in Slovakia-proceeded 
very slowly". (82). Health and school attendance remained serious 
problems and the alleged indifference of officials to Gypsy crime - 
("mainly parasitism, dealing and fighting" (82)) - was said to be 
the cause of growing public hostility towards Gypsies. Meanwhile 
the population explosion continued unchecked and the Gypsies' 
numbers were expected to increase from the 1965 estimate of between 
180,000 and 200,000 to around 300,000 by 1970. 
The pre-condition of effective dispersal - control over 
spontaneous population movement - had been only a partial success 
for while nomadism with horses and carts had been eliminated, the 
migration rate remained high. The report moved towards a clearer 
differentiation between the two quite distinct types of movement 
and in some ways the scheme to transfer Gypsies from Slovakia to 
the Czech lands was an acknowledgement of the inadequacy of previous 
assumptions that the majority of unemployed Gypsies in Slovakia could 
be absorbed locally. 
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Some Czech regions will have to help Slovak 
regions where there is the greatest concentration 
of the gypsy population, above all in providing 
permanent employment and accommodation for a 
number of gypsy citizens. (82). 
However the imbalances in the labour market were regarded as 
less important a factor than administrative deficiency. For instance 
the sparing use of Law 74 was blamed on "several provisions of Jaw 
74... which do not suit present-day conditions (e. g. a pre-condition 
for prosecution is proof that NCs helped to provide suitable 
employment, accommodation and systematic education"). (82). In 
other words the law was inoperable because local authorities had 
defaulted on their statutory responsibilities to give help. Here 
the implication was not that there shoäld have been funds available 
and firmer supervision of NCs but that the law should have been 
designed for use against migration, irrespective of whether NCs 
had been either capable or willing to play their part in the bargain 
by providing suitable jobs and housing. 
Overall, the' disappointing progress in assimilating Gypsies 
was attributed chiefly to an inadequate administrative structure, 
especially in the Czech lands where the practice had been to set 
up advisory committees in DNC and R1C departments of education, 
loosely co-ordinated by the Ministry of Education and Culture. 
"Their recommendations were not observed by other NC departments, 
especially planning and finance". (82). In consequence the 
Ministry's "Central Committee for Work with Citizens of Gypsy Origin" 
had ceased to function in 1962, following a recoMmendation in a 
CP Central Committee report that a government committee should be 
set up for overall co-ordination. 
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Likewise the improved results in Slovakia during 1964 and 1965 
were believed to be the result of administrative caanges and con- 
seque. Litly Czech _JCs were directed to "make use of the experience 
of Slovakia in setting up committees with sufficient authority and 
overall control". (82) Instead of including their advisory committees 
in WC education departments, the Slovaks had attached them directly 
to RNC and DNC councils and had styled the full-time secretaries of 
such committees 'plenipotentiaries for work among the gypsy 
population'. 
This form of administrative solution was seen as particularly 
urgent for the North Bohemia Region "where there is the greatest 
concentration of gypsy citizens in the Czech regions yet in practice 
no-one is concerned with the problem" (82). 
The Government Decree No. 502/1965 (80) was important not so 
much for any detailed new measures contained in it but because it 
transformed the whole administrative organisation to solve the 
'gypsy problem' by bringing it for the first time on the 13th of 
October, 1965 under one overall national co-ordinating body - the 
'Government Committee for questions of the Gypsy Population'. 
The Government Committee was to be "an advisory, initiating 
and co-ordinating body" concentrating "above all on questions of 
the regular employment of gypsy citizens and raising their living 
and cultural standards" (84) and its main activities were: 
(a) to co-ordinate and monitor the overall solution of 
questions of the gypsy population, 
- giving proposals where required on their solution 
to central bodies, social organisations and RNCs. 
- warning about shortcomings that had been discovered... 
- controlling how basic directives were being followed..., 
- keeping the government informed and recommending to 
it measures when required...., 
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(b) to work out basic party and government decrees 
and directives; 
(c) to co-ordinate important campaigns... particularly 
the organised transfer and dispersal of part of 
the gypsy population from Slovakia to the Czech 
regions; 
(d) to wor: c out the principles and a national time- 
table for eliminating undesirable gypsy suburbs 
and concentrations, including the financial and 
material requirements, and ensuring its implementation; 
(e) to discuss plans and proposals of central offices, 
bodies and social organisations, BNC councils.... 
and to present its own proposals for improving... 
their plans; 
(f) to control the effective use made of financial 
and material resources provided in the state plan 
and budget..., 
(g) to evaluate proposals for laws and directives 
amending the solution of questions of the gypsy 
population. (84) 
To enable it to perform such wide-ranging tasks, the Government 
Committee was to be chaired by a vice-chairman of the Slovak National 
Council and was to include among its nineteen members important 
officials from such bodies as the State Planning Committee, the 
Ministries of Finance, Education and Culture, Health, the Interior 
and Justice, from the Public Prosecutor's office, the trade Unions, 
the Youth movement and various NCs. To perform the administrative 
tasks of the Government Committee a special section was to be 
created as part of the Government Praesidium's department for NCs. 
Shortly afterwards (on 3.1.66), a parallel advisory committee 
was created by Slovak National Council Decree No. 5 to co-ordinate 
the administrative system in Slovakia. 
In addition to specifying the composition, status and activities 
of the Government Co. mnittee, Government Decree 502 also set a number 
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of tasks for other bodies. Some of these were more or less 
instructions to continue along previous lines as in the field of 
employment and education, but others were related to new measures, 
in particular to the 'dispersal and transfer' policy. 
The procedure was to be that RICs add DNCs were to prepare 
both long-terry, and annual timetables, for eliminating Gypsy 
concentrations together with the associated financial and material 
requirements. These proposals were then to be discussed and agreed 
with the Government Committee and presented to the State Planning 
Committee and I-iinistry of Finance in the form of a plan, so that 
the necessary resources would be provided by the state plan and 
budget. 
To find a legal means of stopping Gypsy migration, the 
Ministries of Justice and the Interior were to analyse the operation 
of Law 74 and prepare quickly a proposal for amending it, "so that 
its effectiveness would be ensured in contemporary conditions". (80). 
In addition the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences was directed 
to undertake sociological research presenting its conclusions to 
the government by the end of 1968. 
! Main Directions in Solving Questions of the Gypsy 
Population' (85) 
Government Decree 502 had set up the new administrative 
organisation for solving the 'Gypsy q'uestion' in October 3965 but 
it was the 'Main Directions' document on the 18th December 1965 
which reaffirmed that despite administrative changes the complete 
assimilation of the Gypsy minority, as.. declared in 1958, was still 
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the fundamental policy aim. This document was an extract from the 
first report of the new Government Committee. 
Much of the document's opening review of the development of 
the 'gypsy problem' since 1958 was more a re-discovery of old truths 
rather than a display of fresh insight. 
Although some successes were claimed - (nomadism and employment) - 
"the gypsy question is deteriorating and the dispersal, which is 
one of the fundamental preconditions of the assimilation of the 
gypsy population, is left to natural development. Virtually no 
progress is being made in the elimination of gypsy settlements, 
quarters and streets". (85). The main reasons given for this 
failure - lack of funds and administrative faults - were those 
given by the East Slovakia R4C and the Slovak Planning Commission 
a year or two before, although their formulation by the Government 
Committee was more sophisticated. 
The problem had been initially analysed as of socio-economic 
origin and it was failure to observe the implications that had led 
to such disappointing results, for "when the plans of regions and 
districts for solving the gypsy question were not backed up by 
financial and material resources they became 
[nothing 
more than] 
declarations of intent". (85). 
Similarly the allocation of the co-ordinating role to the 
Ministry of Education and Culture was due to this misunderstanding: 
The centre of gravity of work passed to the NC 
advisory committees, which... concentrated mainly 
on tasks of cultural education. One of the 
causes was that the solution of the gypsy question 
was not tackled by inter-department co-operation 
at NCs or . Et central bodies ... and the solution of 
the entire problem remained with the committee at the Ministry of Education and Culture. (85) 
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Even the slow rate of improvement in Gypsy school attendance 
and performance was attributed to this same basic misunderstanding. 
Experience "confirms that school attendance and performance cannot 
be separated from the surroundings in which the children live. 
Insufficient regard for this relationship is the Cause of why the 
results achieved in education at school and in eliminating illiteracy 
do not correspond to the efforts made". (85) 
It is important that this failure in understanding was admitted 
to have occurred at governmental level and had resulted in the 
establishment of an inadequate administrative structure. Even had 
the main executive agents, the NCs, been determined to follow the 
1959 directives to the best of their ability, they would have been 
severely handicapped by the lack of special funds and possibly even 
more so by the inevitable inter-departmental rivalry arising from a 
situation where, acting on the advice of its advisory committee for 
Gypsy affairs, the department of education would try to direct its 
fellow and equal NC departments. This last difficulty had already 
been avoided by many TICs in Slovakia however. 
Another structural weakness, partially stemming from the same 
cause, was the inability of central government or even RNCs to 
control their subordinate ICs. 
Some NCs appeared to be strongly in favour of assimilation. 
RNC and DNC officials fully understand the need 
for a planned and differentiated dispersal of the 
gypsy population but also justifiably demand that 
in performing this task, they should have the 
help of all central bodies and firms, so that in 
so far as these are able, they will create the 




But even if these declarations are accepted at face-value, 
such NCs were vastly outnumbered by those outri6htly hostile, 
especially at UC level. 
The negative aspects of the gypsy way of life had 
led some officials to believe that gypsies will 
never be assimilated and that they should be 
dealt with by purely punitive administrative 
measures such as expixIsion from towns, forced 
labour, removal of children, imprisonment, etc. 
(85) 
This NC opposition was often fully shared by constituents. 
The attitude of other people towards Gypsies is 
a serious problem. In many places prejudice is 
shown towards gypsies which often borders on 
racial discrimination. It is manifested in the 
exclusion [of gypsies from public and social 
life in town and village [and] in the isolation 
of young people from young gypsies.... (85) 
Yet realisation of this relatively serious situation was not 
to lead to an abandonment of the policy of assimilation by dispersal 
at this stage, but, on the contrary, to redoubled efforts utilising 
an. improved administrative structure and increased resources. * The 
* Ulc drew a sharp distinction between the 1958-1965 period (which 
he characterised as "wrong policy") and the 1965-1968 period 
("some policy"), mistakenly believing that the 1965 measures 
reversed those of 1958. 
It was conceded 
fin 196.5] that the previous policies 
had failed 'in toto' .... Finally, after 20 yeaks, the 
malady was recognised as a socio-economic one, to be 
coped with primarily by economic measures, and supple- 
mented, but not substituted, by public enlightenment. 
The new program put stress on two tasks : full employment 
of able-bodied Gypsies as the pre-condition of a decent 
living standard; and liquidation of Gypsy hamlets and 
dispersal (rozptyl) of these people throughout Czechoslovakia. 
(Ulc : 431) 
Although it is true that the 1958 policy was eventually reversed, this occurred only in 1968 and not in 1965. None of the 1958 policy 
aims were in any way questioned in 1965 and indeed the innovatory 
measures of that year (the planned dispersal programme, the 




conceptual structure of 1958 remained intact and even the value of 
classifying Gyrsies into Groups was re-iterated as the basis for 
deciding eligibility for dispersal. 
At first sight these groups appear rather different from those 
described in 1958 as 'settled, semi-nomadic and nomadic gypsies' 
for the 1965 groups were declared to have no connection with the 
origin of the gypsies. 
It is not a matter therefore of categorising by 
origin or on the basis of whether the gypsies in 
question are settled or non-settled but according 
to their connection to the production process, 
the level of their education and culture in the 
widest sense of the word. (85) 
The difference between 1958 and 1965 is less striking when it 
is remembered that the awkward 1958 categorisation by degrees of 
'nomadism' was ambiguous and, as was shown in the previous chapter, 
depended in practice more on an assessment of general living 
standards than evidence of actual movement. Likewise it is 
difficult to evaluate to what extent the terminological shift in 
1965 from 'nomadism' to 'migration' represented a clearer under- 
standing of the nature of Gypsy population movement. 
In 1958 the concept of 'nomadism' was stretched to cover what 
was identified as 'traditional' nomadism as well as the very 
different patterns of movement of settlement Gypsies. No doubt this 
was partly for legal convenience but it was also the expression of a 
Cont/.. 
from the central exchequer and the overall co-ordination of the policy by a permanent government committee) were all designed to achieve the 1958 policy aims in a more systematic fashion. 
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strongly-held belief that the newer movement was really a resurgence 
of the Gypsies' legendary nomadic urge. The ending of 'traditional' 
nomadism in 1959 led policy-makers to concentrate their whole attention 
on the less controllable movement of settlement Gypsies and in 1965 
this was almost acknowledged as a case of rural-to-urban mi ration* - 
albeit with qualifications. 
The departure of the population to industrial 
centres is an objective process. With the gypsy 
population however it is necessary to take into 
consideration the special conditions of their 
former life; a different way of living to other 
people, uncivilised living conditions, large 
families, illness and illiteracy. These realities 
are often forgotten and firms, I; Cs and the inhabitants 
of the Czech regions are not adequately prepared 
for them. (85) 
Yet the systematic replacement of the term 'nomadism' by 'migration' 
after 1965 did not signify any renunciation of the previous belief 
that this movement was nevertheless motivated in a similar and 
uniquely Gypsy way. Official reports, particularly in 1967,1971 
and 1975, persisted in trying to explain continued Gypsy movement as 
'inherent nomadism'. That no lasting improvement in comprehension 
had occurred is especially evident from the important 1967 Government 
Committee report which reviewed progress to date. 
As the result of applying the original law 74 
the typical forms of nomadism with horse and cart 
have been virtually eliminated... however, only a 
minority of [these nomads J were successfully 
" Occasionally this concept had been expressed before but always 
in a subordinate capacity rather than as a central explanation, (eig. in the 1959 manual and also in a 1965 Spisskä Novä Ves 
report which ccnceded that the "semi-nomadic life... and 
relatively great movement of gypsy citizens has its roots in the 
years 1945 to 1950 when many... went to work in the Czech lands1t. 
(63) 
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settled permanently and the remainder changed 
their form of nomadism. Basically this 
Enowl 
consists of frequent changes of residence by 
means of public transport. 
The majority of these 
[nomads] try (or at least 
pretend to try) to find work. They work with the 
mini. 'um of effort and are content with low wages 
and family allowances, which are high as the 
result of a large number of children. 
These forms of nomadism are typical today not 
only of a signiTicant number of registered nomads 
but also of a wide circle of other gypsies, yet 
they cannot be prevented by law 74. (94). 
On the whole, therefore, the terminological changes were less 
significant than they appeared. The 1965 formulations were able to 
clarify the implicit criteria of 1958 since they openly dealt with 
Gypsies alone and focussed on the main problem of migration instead 
of having to straddle uneasily the two distinct types of Gypsy movement. 
But, like their predecessors, they also embodied the same fundamental 
confusion about nomadism. 
Whereas the 1958 categorisation had the difficult task of facing 
both ways for legalistic reasons - backwards to origins and forwards 
to aspirations - its 1965 counterpart could concentrate entirely on 
attained standard of living as a measure of Gypsy aspirations. It 
had been noticed long before 1958 that the: 
way of life of our 
[socialist] society has an 
objective effect and accelerates the differentiation 
process amongst Gypsies themselves. However, it 
must be said that this objectively operating factor 
has not been sufficiently utilised and ... so this 
differentiation process continued more or less un- 
controlled. It is necessary to catch hold of this 
process at a definite moment, to abstract and express 
it by dividing gypsies into groups according to their 
stage of development and specify for each group the 
most effective form of solution. .. . The division and 
manner of solution should be made binding for all 
bodies and institutions and should become the basis 
for working out the plans of central bodies and NCs 
for solving the gypsy question. (85). 
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Although it was freely admitted that individual Gypsies could be 
reclassified from one group to another, this approach revealed a 
new firmness which was characteristic of the 1965 measures. 
In the same way that the differentiation process was regarded 
as objective, so was its meaning objectively and unequivocally 
stated in terms of Gypsy aspirations to assimilation. 
The first Group in fact were of no official concern since they 
had "completely extricated themselves from gypsy surroundings 
[and] 
live the life of other citizens". They were only mentioned to snow 
"the consummation of the differentiation process from the lowest 
level of development to the achievement of full assimilation". (85) 
[My 
emphasis]. 
To the second group belong those who no longer 
live in a gypsy concentration and who have 
already attained certain work qualifications, 
are settled among other 
[non-Gypsy people and 
have bought or built their own family house... 
or obtained a state or co-op flat. Further they 
observe basic principles of by ne, send their 
children more or less regularly to school and 
try to adapt to their surroundings in clothing, 
housekeeping etc.. However, they still need to 
strengthen these basic habits and principles and 
often need to learn to read and write, to acquire 
aesthetic principles of dress and furnishing, 
modern ways of living and nourishment. 
It must be said that in this phase of development 
gypsies are very adaptive, often unintentionally 
adopting very swiftly some models, unfortunately 
not always good, that they see around them. It 
is this group which is separated by only the final 
step from full assimilation. 85 by emphasis). 
In the third group should be included those 
families or gypsies who already work although 
as yet have no work qualifications, who try to 
acquire a basic working r6utine, who try to gain 
regular employment% who try to acquire basic 
principles of hygiene and whose children are sent 
11 
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more or less regularly to school. i"iany of these 
want to build or buy a house or try to obtain by 
means of their job a state or co-op flat. They 
are on the best road to °et out of a gypsy 
environment. [My emphasis] (b5). 
In the fourth group shoald be included the most 
backward and most wretched part of the gypsy 
population. They live at idal gypsy life in 
a gypsy concentration (my emphasis and as yet 
hove no interest in leaving this concentration. 
If they work at all, they work irregularly; they 
do not send their children to school nor do they 
take much care of them and it cannot be said of 
them that they have attained any cultural level 
for they live in filth and from their numbers 
are recruited parasites and criminals. Among 
them are included many chronically ill or feeble 
people and pensioners who do not even want to be 
cured because their illness brings them an income 
without work. The solution of problems in 
assimilating gypsies from this group will be 
very demanding. (85) 
Eligible for transfer were Gypsies of the second and third 
groups although since a condition of being classified in the second 
group was residence outside a 'gypsy concentration', the case of 
these Gypsies was not so urgent. The basic difference between the 
second and third groups was that members of the former had already 
achieved some of their basic aspirations while members of the latter 
were still striving. * 
Most promising of all for transfer and dispersal were Gypsies 
of the third group. "Families of this group are 'ripe' for planned 
dispersal and not only in Slovakia but to the Czech lands". NCs were 
* In fact the first group was not counted later and what are here the second, third and fourth groups became the first, 
second and third groups. 
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to keep careful watch "so that we recognise in time whether that 
particular family has 'ripened' yet for dispersal and afterwards 
perform everything necessary so that the move can be made as soon 
as possible". 
Criteria for selection for transfer and dispersal were that 
Gypsies should 'have the basic preconditions 
(i. 
e. a certain 
standard of living] and should have already expressed their own 
interest in moving". In all "they must feel equally responsible 
for the successful progress of the assimilation process". 
The recommended form of co-operation between Czech and Slovak 
PACs was not specified in detail in the 'Main Directions' document 
but the case of Poprad, a DNC of the East Slovakia Region, was 
cited as an example. Poprad had made working agreements with two 
Czech DNCs and had already successfully transferred some Gypsies 
of the third category. The Government Committee warned that once 
similar agreements had been concluded for "other districts in 
Slovakia to be considered for transfers to the Czech lands, any 
other transfers would have to be regarded as wandering and prosecuted 
as such". (85). The possibility was conceded that 
in individual cases it will be necessary to take 
into consideration the possible wishes of a 
gypsy family which might want to settle for 
important reasons in some other place [than that 
with which their district has an agreementj, but 
this must always be... with the agreement of both 
districts. (85) 
The document 'Principles for Organising the Dispersal and Transfer 
of the Gypsy Population' (83) was to spell out such procedures in 
greater detail. 
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As for Gypsies of the fourth group, they were not to be 
transferred but left in their 'concentrations' for the time being. 
"At present it must be expected that individual settlements will 
not be eliminated immediately but gradually according to the 
possibilities of transferring or placing Gypsies and this in turn 
dependent on the resources which can be freed by the national 
economy for such matters" (85). Therefore measures would have to 
be taken to improve the fundamental amenities of such remaining 
settlements. 
Gypsies of the fourth group were to be offered work but it was 
believed "necessary to proceed against them far more systematically 
and firmly than formerly" by acting against parasitism, theft and 
breaches of public order by severer judgements in the courts. The 
legal aparatus already existed for solving some major problems (e. g. 
to remove children to institutions when they are not cared for, to 
take chronically ill people into sanatoria or hospitals and to place 
pensioners in old people's homes) but the capacity of such institutlont 
was insufficient. 
Nevertheless it was hoped that "the gypsy problem could be 
finally solved in a historically short period or at least the 
perpetuation of the gypsy way of life stopped, especially... of 
gypsies 
[of 
the fourth] group". (85) 
'Principles for Organising the Dispersal and Transfer 
of the Gypsy Population'. (83) 
This document was intended particularly for NC use to specify 
in detail three of the key tasks set in Government Decree 502 - the 
k 
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transfer of Gypsies from Slovakia to the Czech lands, the dispersal 
of Gypsies within their own district or region and the "adoption of 
effective measures to prevent un-organised, natural migration of 
gypsies to the Czech regions and back again". (83) 
Some basic pre-conditions for undertaking any dispersal or 
transfer of Gypsies were initially stated: 
a) the dispersal and transfer of part of the gypsy 
population can only be organised on the basis of 
the voluntary agreement of the gypsy population; 
b) it cannot be undertaken without previously ensuring 
accommodation and employment for gypsy families and 
persons; 
c) gypsy huts and unhy¬jenic dwellings can only be 
eliminated on the pre-condition that other more 
suitable accommodation is available for their 
occupants; 
d) a precise survey must be made of gypsy families 
(persons) to be dispersed or transferred from 
Slovakia to the Czech regions and further care must 
be ensured for them in their new surroundings so 
that it is possible to follow their process of re- 
education. 
e) NCs and social orEanisations must together create 
conditions so that other people [i. e. non-Gypsies) 
understand the dispersal and transfer; 
f) DNCs, MNCs and LTNCs in the Czech regions and in 
Slovakia must enure all conditions in a fully 
responsible way for transferring and dispersing 
part of the gypsy population. 
(83) 
(i) In carrying out transfers the Slovak RNCs and DNCs had the 
responsibility of selecting and preparing Gypsies from the second 
group (i. e. the third group of the 'Main Directions' document. See 
footnote above), while their Czech counterparts had the demanding 
task of finding suitable accommodation and employment as well as co- 
operating with the trade unions and social organisations in ensuring 
2G6 
the further education of transferred Gypsies. The previous practice 
of employin; many Gypsies for seasonal work was discouraged and was 
only to be permitted in exceptional cases under DNC supervision to 
ensure both that school attendance was not interrupted and that the 
Gypsies returned to their original place of residence at the end of 
the contract period. 
i'umbers to be transferred were to be agreed between Slovak and 
Czech DNCs each year and included in the annual budget, but there 
were to be no transfers outside of these NC agreements for: 
every unplanned, unorganised, unconfirmed transfer 
of a gypsy person or family should be considered 
by both districts as undesirable migration of gypsy 
persons and refused on principle. The person or 
district which arranged the transfer should be 
charged the costs of returning the gypsy person 
or family to the original place of residence. (83) 
The Government Committee had recommended that transfers be 
organised between regions in the following way: 
From (Slovakia) To (Czech lands) 
East Slovak Region North Moravia Region and 
Fast Bohemia Region 
West Slovak Region Central Bohemia Region and 
South Czech Region 
Central Slovak Region South Moravia Region 
All but three Czech regions were to receive transferred Gypsies 
for "with regard to the considerable concentration of gypsy 
inhabitants in the West and North Bohemia Regions at present, the 
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transfer of gypsies from Slovakia to these regions is not recommended". 
Similarly the capital city, Prague, was not chosen as a transfer 
destination. 
To6ether with their recommended regional partners, RNCs were 
to specify individual districts which would co-operate in organising 
transfers. aowever, it was recognised that some inter-district 
agreements had already been made (e. g. Poprad and its Czech partners) 
which might not correspond to the new overall plan, but to interrupt 
these would be administrative foriialism and their continuance was 
recommended. 
(ii) As for dispersal within region or district, "the sale principles 
apply as in making transfers" but special priority was given to 
"eliminating gypsy settlements in areas frequented by foreign 
tourists (the high Tatras [Mountains national park]) and also to... 
Velkä Ida in the health interests of workers at the Fast Slovak 
Steelworks". (83). 
For both transfers and dispersal within region and district, 
DNCs were responsible for checking for TB, germ-harrying and 
trachoma and for disinfecting any furniture to be moved. 
From 1967 onwards the main financial and material resources 
were to be provided as part of the state plan and budget but until 
then (and afterwards as well) the necessary funds were to be found 
in a number of ways. 
Basically DNCs where Gypsies were originally resident were 
responsible for all expenses involved in sending Gypsies to their 
new place of residence (i. e. removal allowances, travel etc. ), while 
2G8 
DNNCs at the destination had to provide accommodation and any 
additional moving-in expenses. However, DNC funds could 
be 
supplemented by works and social organisation funds as well as 
by 
Gypsies' own savin6s or payments received on the purchase or 
demolition of their previous dwelling. In addition for "unexpected 
exceptional costs... an appropriate part of 
the government budget 




Law 117 "on some consequences of neglecting care of children'? 
(93) was enacted on 15th December 1966 and was not strictly part of 
the 1965 measures to solve the Gypsy question. It also differed from 
those measures in being a general law of the republic, not mentioning 
Gypsies at all by name. 
However, it can be justifiably considered with the 1965 measures 
for, like law 74/1958, it was intended primarily as a weapon for the 
use of NCs in controlling their Gypsy citizens. 
Paragraphs two and three empowered ICs to withhold payment of 
family allowances in cases where the money was not being used for 
the intended purposes, particularly where "basic care of the children 
is neglected" (93) or where the children "do not attend school at all 
or are regularly absent" (93) without sufficient reason. The task of 
ensuring that the children still received the benefit of the allowances 
in such cases passed to NCs who were to spend the money on "school 
dinners, other nourishment, clothing, footwear" etc. (93). 
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Freedom of Movement and the Gypsies 
Until 1965 Gypsies, as such, could move as freely around the 
country as any other citizens. This was true with the exception of 
those listed in the nomads' register who could move only with the 
prior agreement of both source and destination ICs. After the initial 
compilation of the register in 1959, additions could be made if local 
authorities decided that the imprecise criteria for 'nomadism' were 
satisfied and in this way all Gypsy population movement could be 
controlled - at least in theory. 
In practice NNCs proved unwilling to shoulder extra responsibilities 
and only amended the register by deletions. During this period even 
registered persons were probably able to move fairly freely since 
local authorities and employers alike frequently ignored the 1958 
directives. Law 74 was rarely used since NCs were reluctant to bring 
their own performance under legal scrutiny. 
At the same time as the recidivist, the state body 
(i. e. NO was judged too, for it had to be established 
whether help had been offered to settle ermanently 




To counteract this state of paralysis, the 1965 measures in 
effect extended the restrictions of 1958 from about 25 per cent of 
Gypsies ('registered nomads') to all Gypsies - whether they could 
be identified as 'nomads' or not - for the 'Principles for... Dispersal 
and Transfer' instructed NCs to resist all Gypsy movement on principle, 




Leaving aside for the moment the problematic case of those said 
to be 'fully assimilated', all Gypsies were to be classified by NCs 
into three groups b:.! sed on their way of life (level of assimilation). 
Those to be dispersed and transferred were to be chosen mainly from 
the second group, the plan being to cream off the most adaptive 
Gypsies and spread them as thinly as possible throughout the Republic, 
while the most intractable in the third group were to be left until 
later. As a Gypsy ppokesman laconically commented a few years afterwards: 
"They plan how many there should be in each village : horses, cows and 
Gypsies". (quoted Hübschmannovä). 
A 1967 report emphasised that statistics based on such a 
categorisation of Gypsies were inherently unreliable. 
Although... the differentiation process [among Gypsies] 
takes place objectively and... these groups really 
exist, it must be recognised that the assignment of 
specific Gypsy families into groups involves sub- 
jective jud; ement. For this reason it is necessary 
to take the statistical results only as a rough 
guide. (94). 
Yet while readers of statistics were cautioned, no similar 
warning was given to the NC officials who were to make the assignment 
into categories. To the contrary the 'Main Directions' guide-lines 
urged NCs that, 
... the division 
[of Gypsies into groups 
land [the 
appropriate J manner of solution [e. g. transfer etc. ] 
should be made binding for all bodies and institutions. 
(85) 
The classification, therefore, rested entirely on the arbitrary attempts 
of NC officials to match Gypsies against what were little more than 
crude stereotypes of life-styles. Against these decisions the Gypsies 
had no right of appeal; indeed they did not even have the right to be 
informed of their classification. 
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Only one group of Gypsies appeared to escape the restrictions; 
those regarded as 'fully assimilated' who did not count ofl`icially as 
Gypsies at all. But although this Group existed in theory, any 
particular Gypsy - no matter how assimilated in life-style - could 
be prevented from moving since NCs were not required to keep records 
of the classification of individuals or families, only to provide 
statistics of group totals for occasional reports. Should they attempt 
to move, such Gypsies were liable to be returned home at their own 
expense, like any others, even if they had managed to buy or rent 
accommodation and find employment on their own initiative. They 
might even be prosecuted for nomadism under Law 74. 
These sweeping measures to curtail Gypsies' freedom of movement 
had no legal basis as yet, although it was hoped that a revision of 
Law 71+ would make good this deficiency in the near. -future. A number 
of possible modifications were considered at the Government Committee 
meeting of June 1966. A major problem was whether the amended law 
should refer to Gypsies by name like the 1965 measures, in this way 
risking the charge of discrimination, or whether it should be cast 
in a more general form like the original law, with the consequent 
danger of ambiguity, i. e. failing to indicate sufficiently clearly 
that the law concerned only Gypsies. There were also misgivings that 
any legal attempt to determine the place of residence and work of 
Gypsies would be in conflict with the Constitution and perhaps even 
with international law. 
Eventually an 'ends justify the means' argument was put forward, 
reminiscent of the 1959 manual's position that the original "measures 
, 
do not have a discriminatory character, for their consequences lead 
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only to a speeding-up of re-education - and thereby benefit our 
gypsy fellow-citizens". (5: 20). 
The duty to work, perhaps in a specified place, 
under the new law would not be in conflict with 
the Constitution or international covenants 
because the aim of the measure would be to raise 
these people to a higher standard of living. (90) 
In support of this view appeal was made to article five of 
International Covenant Plo. 111/1958 on 'Discrimination (r' ployment 
and Occu, )ation)'"which states essentially that such measures would 
not be regarded as discrimination where the aim was to meet the 
specific needs of people who must be afforded special help". (90). 
This justification was accepted by the chairman, who did not see 
"such a problem 
[with 
possible infringements of the Constitution 
and international covenants] if the law will be motivated by the 
special needs of gypsies" (90) and the Government Committee agreed 
that the amended Law 74 be placed before the National Assembly 
(Parliament) by the 15th of September. 
However the Government Committee's belief that the modified 
law represented positive discrimination to help Gypsies was not 
shared by the National Assembly's Constitutional Law Committee nor 
by its Committee for Local Government. 
CThese1 did not recommend amending 
flaw 741 for the 
general opinion was that the proposed solution of 
limiting the movement of the gypsy population in 
practice limits their freedom of residence and there- 
fore is not in harmony with article 31 of the 
Constitution. (90) 
This was a severe setback with far-reaching implications. It not 
only prevented the amendment of law 74, leaving P; cs with no strictly 
legal means of preventing Gypsy population movement, but suggested 
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that a major policy document - the 'Principles for CrE; anisin6 the 
Dispersal and Transfer of the Gypsy Population' (83) - was in 
conflict with the constitution. In directing NCs to resist all 
unplanned Gypsy population movement, returning such migrants to 
their homes at their own expense, the Government Committee was 
probably instructing 1, Os to break the law. 
Even worse, the National Assembly decision cast serious doubts 
on the legality of the Ministry of the Interior's 1959 directive 
for law 74 about the Register of Nomads, for this too restricted 
freedom of movement and residence. Indeed, inclusion on the register 
was the result of an administrative NC decision, not any judgement 
in a court of law based on evidence which the accused had the right 
to challenge. Similarly removal from the register was left entirely 
to the discretion of NCs and could not be achieved by legal appeal. 
Stated bluntly, it appeared that the entire attempt from 1958 
onwards to control Gypsy population movement was illegal yet, having 
been made aware of these disturbing anomalies, the Government 
Committee made no further attempt to investigate them or to rectify 
them. Government Decree 502/1965 and its associated directives 
remained technically in force until 1970 in the Czech lands and 
until 1972 in Slovakia, while law 74 has still not been repealed. 
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THE COLLAPSE OF THE DISPEý-ZAL AND TRANSFER Pi-OGR ME AND 
Tmc tl ATT. 'c 
The Plan 
Government Decree 11O. 159/15.5.67 approved a national time- 
table for a 'Dispersal and Transfer' program. -je until 1970 drawn 
up by the Government Com, iittee. As well as specifying targets of 
families and persons to be rehoused, the plan also included targets 
for the elimination of 'undesirable concentrations' (including 
settlements), unhygjenic flats and huts as well as for basic 
amenities to be constructed in those concentrations not to be 
eliminated before the end of 1970. Budgetary requirements were 
also given. 
Plan for dispersal of Gypsy families within the region. 
(1967 - 1970). (97) 
Region Gypsy families to be dispersed 
Czech regions Slovak regions 
Prague - 
Central Bohemia 72 
South Bohemia 49 
';: est Bohemia 74 
'; orth Bohemia 120 
East Bohemia 65 
outh I: oravia - 
North Moravia - 
, dest Slovakia 2,208 
entral Slovakia 1,230 
st Slovakia 2,510 
otaltCSIR/SSR 380 5,948 
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Plans for transfer of Gypsy families from Slovakia to 
the Czech regions (1967 - 1970). (97) 
From : Slovak region To : Czech region Gypsy families 




d. Slovakia - total - 371 
Central Slovakia : South Moravia 600 
East Slovakia : West Bohemia 
North Moravia 




E. Slovakia - total - 1206 
Total families to be transferred 2177* 
* Comprising about 14,000 persons. 
Plan for construction of basic amenities (1967-70). (97) 







284 537 119.5 70 43 26 55 
To finance this massive and ambitious programme a budget of 
571,661,000 crowns (about 230 million) was approved, of which the 
1967 budget was 119,108,000 crowns (about C6 million). (97). 
Details of this budget are not given in this study, since little of 
the available funds were used. 
277 
Gypsy Population Movement - Planned and Unplanned 
Although the completed national timetable for dispersal and 
transfer of Gypsies was finally approved only in may 1967, local 
authorities had already set to work as instructed early in 1966, 
preparing their own preliminary plans for the current and sub- 
sequent years. As well as passing these draft timetables to higher 
bodies for modification and eventual inclusion in the national plan, 
some local authorities took immediate action to begin the transfers. 
However resistance was reported on the part of some Czech NCs from 
the very start. As early as June 1966 a Slovak member of the Government 
Committee complained that: 
Up till now the South Bohemia RTC has not 
answered the letter of the West Slovakia RNC 
chairman about transfers and the Central 
Bohemia RNC refused to carry out any transfers 
this year [1966 ] even though 60 gypsy families 
are prepared for transfer in the West Slovakia 
Region. (90) 
The first task of NCs was to determine the size of their 
problem i. e. to recl&ssify systematically their Gipsies into three 
categories. The second category would then be the initial group for 
dispersal and transfer while the third would require firm educational 
and supervisory measures. There is no evidence that ICs were alarmed 
by the inadequacy of the criteria but the inevitably arbitrary nature 
of their decisions and consequent meaninglessness of the results 
is demonstrated by the erratically fluctuating totals by category 
each time a new assessment was made. Although no data is available 
for 1966, this is well illustrated by subsequent figures from the 





a Nova 'des district 
by category : (1967,1968). 
Gypsies by Category 
Date of I II III 
(130) classification "outside '! adaptable" "most TOTAL 
concentration" backward" 
(128) 1.2.67 1,655 3,347 5,579 10,200* 
(130) 31.12.67 3,017 4,839 2,393 10,249 
(160) 31.12.68 1,663 5,729 3,241 10,633 
* The mistake in the totals for this year is probably for category III. 
In Spisska Iyovä Ves, at least, the programme started in chaos as 
Gypsies - eager to move to the Czech lands - besieged the NC official 
in charge. 
During the period January to March 1966 the 
situation was utterly confused. Whole crowds of 
gypsies (40 to 50 people daily) came to see the 
secretary of the co:,,, ryittee [for gypsy affairs with 
the result that] ... he did not fulfil the tasks 
allocated to him, pleading that he was fully 
occupied with the purchase of family houses and 
with arranging the necessary financial resources 
for the continued purchase of gypsy huts.... 
On 28.4.66 the documents for 
. 
P8 hut purchases were 
presented , for authorisation]. (129) 
Shortly afterwards, following a check by the control department, 
the "secretary of the committee 
[was found to have] connitted a 
punishable offence of an extent as yet unknown" (124) and was later 
convicted of misappropriation of funds-for hut purchases". " 
*y This appears a sudden lapse in an official who, from documents at least, was for several years a vigorous and often outspoken 
secretary. 
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In spite of such difficulties the DNC drew up a timetable for 
transferring 156 families, comprising 1,247 persons, in 1966-1970 
and pressed on wit_. the first transfers after : gree: ºents had been 
concluded with two districts in the Korth i: oravia Region - Vsetin, 
"a mainly wooded and aöricultural district" (106) and Prerov, a 
town with 35,000 inhabitants and engineering, textile and chemical 
industries. 
In July 1; 66 for example, agreement was reached with Vsetin 
on the transfer of nine (named) Gypsy families from the village of 
Bystrany. This evidently aroused hopes of further imminent transfers 
from Bystrany for Spissk Nova Ves DNC had to write to the L[: C 
askinö them "to prevent any further visits of your gypsy citizens 
to Vsetin DEC or this DISC and not to give them any confirmations 
because this on! y complicates the work of state bodies unnecessarily". 
(120). 
In a late 1967 report by the North Moravia RIN, Spisskä Iova 
Ves and its partner DNCs are singled out for especial praise. 
As for Vsetin DNC and its partner Spisskjý Novä 
Ves, no serious difficulties were encountered. 
The choice of families for transfer was made 
very responsibly and likewise houses.... and 
employment were ensured with the maximum consider- 
ation paid to the wishes of the moving Gypsies. 
This responsible approach on both sides and the 
close co-operation no doubt helped in the 
successful completion of the whole task for the 
years 1966-1967. Here it was possible to discern 
a contrary trend to that in the majority of other 
districts - for during the implementation of the 
transfer, the mistrust and resistance of local 
officials lessened.... and a similar tendency 
could be seen in the reactions of citizens. For 
objectivity we add that..... at the start of the 
transfer a relatively low number of gypsy families 
was involved. (106). 
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V 
Spissriä Nova Ves' other partner, Prerov (also a partner of 
Bardejov DNC in E. Slovakia), was also cucarended for its procedure. 
Apparently Prerov officials often visited Bardejov and chose families 
directly in gypsy settleu; ents. They visited the gypsy families, 
photographed them, obtained all the necessary information and 
, arranged the means and 
date of transfer.... Gypsies who showed 
interest were enabled to acquaint themselves witz their new residence 
in advance.... Immediately after transfer they were provided with 
beds, mattresses, bedclothes and clothes and shoes for the children - 
also old furniture. Private citizens often contributed such materials. 
After resettlement Gypsy families were given 500 crowns for coal, 
wood and potatoes. (106). 
This almost idyllic account of successful transfers between 
Spisskä Novä Jes and its Czech partners was exceptional. At the same 
time it was highly unreliable for more detailed documents revealed 
urgent and recurring problems - often related to difficulties in 
obtaining and purchasing new accommodation. Probably this account 
represented an attempt by the North Moravia RNC to show progress to 
the Government Committee rather than a realistic assessment of the 
situation. 
According to the plan Gypsies to be transferred were to sell 
their previous hut or house (for demolition or renovation) to their 
own DNC which could then augment the sale price by a discretionary 
grant. This sum, with the possible addition of personal savings or 
a state loan, was expected to cover the purchase price of a new home 
in the Czech lands. 
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Most transfers were planned to rural areas where state flats 
were in particularly sLort supply, but in any case older family 
houses were thought to be the most suitable for incoming Gypsies. 
However the generally higher house prices in the Czech lands meant 
that the total funds available to prospective Gypsy purchasers were 
insufficient to buy houses that were adequate for their large 
families and so, in practice, they were usually restricted to the 
bottom end of the iiousing market. 
The North Moravia- RNC reported that: 
even in those cases where the sale price 
[of a 
house in Slovakia j (including the permitted 
grant) is sufficient to buy a house in our region, 
NCs are co:.. pelled to provide... a Grant or a loan 
for the purchase of a stove, wiring, paint etc. 
In a few cases these Gypsies obtained part of the 
money by a loan from the State Savings Bank. (106) 
There were also difficulties in the necessary purchase of old huts 
for sometimes: 
before the move is completed sons or daughters 
move into the huts [to be vacated ]and there- 
after the sale price, which could have been used 
in purchasing alternative accommodation in the 
Czech lands, cannot be paid. We have seven such 
cases. (129). 
These were difficulties with optimum cases where both source 
and destination NCs followed the guidelines laid down in the 'Principles... 
for Dispersal and Transfer' document. Other documents indicated that 
adequate NC co-ordination was often lacking and in particular trans- 
ferred Gypsies sometimes had to find their own new accommodation. 
From transfers to Czech districts we 
[ Spiýskä I, ova 
Ves DNCJ also have experience of gypsy citizens 
choosing accommodation planned for demolition.... 
but because of the low sale prices of their huts 
they cannot find [other] acct nodatior for a price 
they can afford, so we lust often chanEe the choice 
of families. (129). 
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This has the implication that sales of previous dwellings were 
sometimes completed before new accommodation had been found and 
without any guarantee that suitable accommodation was even available. 
The DNC reported three Gypsy families returning to Bystrany from 
the Czech lands to live with relatives "having spent the proceeds 
from the sale of their huts". (129). 
To avoid such occurrences the previous practice of payin6 the 
sale price directly to the Gypsy owners was changed on 14th July 
1966 to a system where the sale price could be used solely for the 
purchase of a new house. 
Sometimes lack of NC co-ordination resulted in Gypsies beine 
left homeless. In a letter to an Ostrava SNC, Spisskä iova Ves 
D: 1C explained that they had received official NC a&reement to the 
proposed sale of a family house in Ostrava by a pensioner to two 
Gypsy families for 72,000 crowns. "On the basis of documents about 
the sale, the [old] houses of the two Gypsy families were purchased 
and permission was given to demolish them. The families were paid 
for their houses and allowed a grant of up to 24,000 crowhs each 
for the purchase of an alternative family house". The DNC urged 
that the Ostrava SNC settle the matter as soon as possible "because 
these families now have nowhere to live". (122). 
In other cases Gypsies, whose old homes had already been bought 
by the DISC, were refused the discretionary grant, even when, on 
their own initiative, they had found alternative accommodation where 
the NC was willing; to agree to the sale and to their registration 
as permanent residents. 
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An Ostrava house-owner wrote to the Spisskä Nova Ves DX 
V 
requesting "a confirmation that M. Z. received 4,300 crowns in cash 
for the sale of her house and in addition has 40,000 crowns set 
aside in the bank which she can use for the purchase of alternative 
accommodation.... The LNC here has no objections to the sale of this 
house". She received in reply the following: 
For the iurchase of a family house we require a 
document containing... an official valuation of 
to house... and in addition a confirmation that 
the LNC has no objection to the sale and will 
register the purchaser , as a resident ..... 
In 
the case in question M. Z. was paid 4,800 crowns 
by the DNC for her property and indeed in addition 
the DNC could make an exceltion of up to 40,000 
crowns for the purchase of a house. 
[However] 
we do not agree with the sale to the 
person named and the above-mentioned sum will not 
be paid. Under no circumstances do we recommend 
this sale. But wait a little and we will recommend 
to you a citizen of gypsy origin from our district 
to whom we would allow the financial means to buy 
a family house.... As far as you are able, let the 
above-named person know you have decided not to sell 
the house. (118) 
The practice of some Slovak DNCs who purchased huts before 
alternative accommodation had beea ensured, leaving this task to the 
Gypsies themselves, made life very difficult for Czech N Cs in industrial 
areas since such official breaches of the principles for dispersal and 
transfer greatly obscured the difference between planned and unplanned 
movement. More importantly it threatened previously agreed plans and 
also left the migrant Gypsies without protection. All this was well 
illustrated in a letter fro4 Karvina'(an industrial town near Ostrava) 
D: YC to Vsetin and Prerov DNCs nearly. 
The agreement 
C to transfer gypsies to Karvina from 
Kosice, E. Slovakia (its partner)] is Gravely 
jeopardised by the fact that gypsy families arrive 
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in our district from other Slovak districts, mainly 
from the Spisskä Novä Vey district, where their 
houses were allegedly demolished, in order to buy 
family mouses. 
This creates considerable problems for us, not to 
mention the fact that this unorGanised emigration 
is made use of speculatively by some of our citizens 
who offer for sale family houses standing on ground 
which is subsidi_ig due to mine workings. In many 
cases these are not even proper family houses. This 
occurred in Grlovä where two gypsy couples from the 
äpisskä Nova Ves district... paid 83,016 crowns. In 
the interests of society the registration of this 
sale will not be permitted and tae contract will 
have no validity. 
In view of the fact that transfers of gypsy 
families from LSpisss Novä Ves 7 are to be made 
to the Vsetin and Prerov districts, we ask you... 
if you are willing to accept these two gypsy 
families an*ossibly enable them to buy a suitable 
family 'louse. If not we will be forced to return 
these families to the Spisskä Nova Ves district. 
(126). 
Eventually Czech NC$ decided to treat such semi-planned movement 
as if it were unplanned, since it did not have their prior approval, 
and migrant Gypsies were often returned on arrival. 
There have been cases, although fewer, where 
gypsies from Slovakia try individually to buy 
a house or otherwise obtain a flat in our 
[North Koravial region on their own initiative, 
although sometimes with the support of Slovak 
LIXs, which is evident from various confirmations 
and recommendations with which they are provided. 
(106). 
The practice of actively encouraging Gypsies to migrate to the 
Czech lands without any guarantee of accommodation on arrival appears 
to have been widespread among Slovakian ICs. A 1967 Government 
Committee report argued that the resistance and mistrust of Czech 
NCs was: 
285 
strengtI. ened by frequent cases where... the free 
movement of a considerable part of the gypsy 
population is sometimes... supported by some NCs, 
mainly in Slovakia, who... encoura ;e gypsies to 
seek a place by their own efforts anywhere in 
the Czech lands. Usually this occurs with 
gypsies where there is not the slightest guarantee 
that they take their moving seriously. (94). 
However, in a confused situation with no adequate mechanism of 
control, it was difficult to establish to what extent NCs were 
implicated in failures. The accusation was made that "Slovak NCs 
give I gypsies 1a confirmation that their souses are to be demolished 
in order that they can find new accommodation themselves - which in 
practice encouraGes nomadism around the country" (90), but Slovak 
NCs in their defence explained that "gypsies who found out about the 
transfer principle, demolished their own huts by themselves, presenting 
DNCs with the fact that they had nowhere to live". (90). 
During the period 1966-1968 unplanned nigration to the North 
Moravia Region gradually diminished, but by no means to the extent 
claimed by the RPrC in a decidedly over-optimistic report to the 
Government Committee where the decrease was attributed to the 
deterrent effect of the RNC's policy of returning such migrants. 
It can generally be said that recently there has 
been a marked drop in the rate of natural migration 
.... In 1967 there were about four to six cases in 
each district. In most cases these migrating 
families (the majority of which moved into derelict 
houses) were sent back to their former residence but 
in a few cases they were allowed to stay and given 
the possibility of buying a house. Most cases were 
of migration from Slovakia but some were of migration 
within the North Moravia Region.... 
It is very likely that a definite contribution to 
the lessening in migration has been made by the 
General knowledge among -gypsies that the reaction 
of the majority'of D; +Cs VCs, and CRCs to these 
attempts is to resist them firmly. (106). 
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In fact, later and more complete statistics for 1967 show a 
figure of 113 unplanned arrivals of Gypsy families in the region 
(i. e. about 11 per district). Of these only 25 families (or 22 per 
cent) were returned to their former residence. (See below). 
On the whole, however, the statistics that are available tend 
to bear out most of the evaluations of the preceding pages. The 
figures for the Spisska Novä Ves district are incomplete but are 
complemented by the fuller survey of the North Moravia Region. 
Planned transfers from Spisska Nova Ves. Plan and Reality. 
(1966 - 1970). 
(123) 
Transferred 
persons 1966 1967 1968 I9G9 1970 
Plan (1.9.66) 440 271 200 112 224 
Reality 83 7 61 20 - 
(124) (147)I-IX 065)I-VIII 
only only 
The discrepancy between plan and reality is plain, as is the 
drop in actual numbers transferred. 
Comparison of organised transfers and natural migration from 
Spisska Nova Ves (1966). 
Organised Natural migration 
transfers To Czech lands From Czech lands Total 
No. of Families 12 45 3 43 
migrants Persons 83 113 20 133 
(124) (124) (129) (124) 
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In 1966 Gypsies migrating by organised transfers (all to Vsetin) 
were greatly outnumoered by those migrating on their own initiative, 
although it is impossible to determine what proportion of natural 
migration was 'semi-planned' in the sense discussed above. The 
much smaller average family size for natural mi6raiits can be simply 
explained by the fact that many of these migrants were probably 
younger people without families or married men, who left their families 
in Spisskä Nova Ves while seeking work in the Czech lands. 
vff 
Gypsy Outmigration and InmiGration* - Spisska Nova Ves (1966-68). 
(units are Gypsy persons). 
OUT, 4IGRATION INMIGRATION MIGRATION BALANCE 
Year To To Total From From Total Czech Slovakia Total 
Czech Czech lands 
lands Slovakia lands Slovakia 
(124)1966 - - 196 20 9f 20 - - -176 
(130)1967 117 3 120 21 10 31 -96 +7 - 89 
(160)1968 87 22 109 100 54 154 +13 +32 + 45 
ot. 66-68 - - 425** 141 64 205 - - -220 
* Cutc1igration includes both planned and unplanned migration. 
Inznigration is 'a priori' unplanned, even though some cases 
are the result of Czech NC expulsions. 
*" As a footnote it is perhaps worth noting that the total out- 
miGration of Gypsies in the three years 1966-68 (both planned 
and unplanned, both to the Czech lands and Slovakia) was still less than the target for planned transfers to the Czech lands 
in 1966 alone (i. e. 440. See table on previous page). 
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The general pattern revealed by these figures is that of a 
gradual reversal of the migratory flow. During the period 1966-1968 
total outmigration dropped by almost a half while there was an 
accompanying increase in inmigration, which in 1968 was roughly 50 per 
cent more than outmigration. * 
Whereas outmigration to the Czech lands fell and inmigration 
rose, both outmigration to and inmigration from other districts in 
Slovakia increased. Yet movement within Slovakia remained relatively 
less important and in 1968 the rates of outmigration to and inmigration 
from the Czech lands were respectively four times and twice their 
counterparts to and from other districts in Slovakia. 
Statistics on transfers compiled by the North l: oravia Region are 
more comprehensive, although marred by the regrettable omission of any 
details from Ostrava - by far the largest district, which either could 
not or would not supply the required information to the RNC. The 
original R NC tables gave figures for each district in the region 
except Ostrava. Those tables given below are simplified by including 
only three districts - Bruntal, Karvina and Vsetin. The first is 
included as a district criticised by the RNC as the worst DNC in this 
matter (106), while Karvina DNC was the most conscientious practitioner 
and enthusiastic supporter of the 1965 measures, almost alone in still 
advocating their retention in 1970. Apart from being praised by the 
FuyC, Vsetin was of course a partner of Spisska Novä Ves DNC. 
" The causes of this reversal are discussed later but at this point 
it should be mentioned that the sudden 1968 jump in inmiCration from 
the Czech lands was at least partly a reflection of the flieht of 
frightened Gypsies from the Czech lands to their home settlements 
in Slovakia after the invasion of the Warsaw Pact armies in ru st 1968. 
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A growing discrepancy between plan and reality is clearly seen, 
especially in the regional totals. By. 1968 tI0 transfer system had more 
or less collapsed in most districts with persistent Karvina alone 
accounting for 40% of the region's transfers. Figures given are 
for families but assuming seven per family, then roughly 1600 persons 
were transferred from 1966 to 1968. The relatively 
low number of 
families moving away after transfer would seem to indicate at 
least 
a fair degree of satisfaction with the new conditions on 
the part of 
the Gypsy migrants, although it must be remembered that many of 
their previous homes would have been demolished. 
Parallel to the decrease in transfers is a corresponding overall 
decrease in natural unplanned migration to the North Moravia Region. 
The 1968 total of inmigrating families was only half that of 1966. 
Karvina was an exception where inmigration actually slightly increased 
until in 1968 half of the migrants chose this district as their 
destination. 
It is remarkable, however, bearing in mind the strict principles 
for dispersal and transfer, that overall only 20'% and in any year 
of the period less than a quarter of natural migrants failed to 
find accomodation. As the number of migrants dropped the chances 
of those who did migrate improved, although they found accommodation 
more often without NC help than with it. Bruntal is perhaps unique 
for not a single inmigrating family failed to find accommodation 
and without any help from the DNC. Many districts, including Vsetin, 
reported no natural inmigration but this is dubious. No proportions 
are given for migrants from Slovakia and from the Czech lands but 



























4) . c1 . L: 






(d 4-) Pj 
C 0 r-q 0 Id 0 0) 
. O\ N co 4-3 T- M 








H 4-i 0 
4-1 4J cd 
P4 
r-i G. ' N 
r1 1010 " 4. ) CA O-N . _* 
.d 
O 

















A as x z 
291 













U\ c- IA 
c- c- N -: t 
Lr\ r" M 







































If these figures are accurate however, they do not substantiate 
the R14C claim, quoted above, that failure to find accommodation due 
to IBC firmness was a principal factor in the decreases of natural 
ihmigration. 
Unfortunately no figures were given for outmigration, apart 
from those unfortunate immigrants who had to leave at once, but 
the 1968 'Census of the Gypsy Population' (151) for Ostrava showed 
i v Nova Ves. In 1968 the a complementary trend to that in Spisskai 
migratory tide had changed and for the first time the number of 
Gypsies migrating home to Slovakia from the Czech lands exceeded 
those going the other way. (See following table for comparison). 
In reports to the North Moravia RNC in 1969, individual DNCs 
often attributed the breakdown of the transfer system to the Gypsies 
themselves. Vsetin claimed that after federalisation in late 1968 
"gypsies themselves refused to be transferred and.... Spisskä Novä 
Ves and Vsetin DNCs agreed that the transfers would be discontinued". 
i (152). Equally strange was the account of Frydek-'i1stek D:. C which 
reported the return of Gypsies to Slovakia after federalisation which 
"cannot be prevented for they are generally born in Slovakia dnd have 
therefore become citizens of the SSR 
[Slovak Socialist Republic 
from 1st January 1969", (152). 
Predictably a more subtle and honest analysis came from Karvina, 
where the root of the problem was seen in unrealistic transfer quotas 
" Around this time several Gypsies in the Czech lands expressed 
fears to me that their new SSR citizenship could become an 
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with no regard for accommodation available but equally in incon- 
sistencies within the system. In contrast to the problem of Vsetin, 
where potential miörabts refused the warm offer of transfers, and 
of Frydek, which found itself sadly powerless to prevent the exodus 
of its Gypsy :. opulation, riarvina reported in mid-1969 that "unplanned 
migration is the absolute problem number one in our district. The 
cause of this we see in the contradictions between individual regulations 
or in the irrelevance of a whole group of laws and regulations". (152). 
Nevertheless Karvina soldiered on in the face of increasing difficulties. 
"however we do not refuse organised transfers and in 1969 we have 
transferred five families and have houses prepared for a further two 
more.... We will continue as circumstances allow. It is the only way". 
(152). But Karvina's stand was an isolated one and by thieime the 
majority of other DNCs had followed Vset3. 
n in discontinuing their 
planned transfers. 
Local statistics from Spisskä Novä 'ties on the dispersal of 
Gypsy population concentrations are much sparser but show a corresponding 
lack of progress. A 1971 report by the district medical authority 
gave a depressing summary of developments since the start of the 
assimilation campaign over a decade earlier. 
The plan to eliminate Gypsy settlements Gradually, 
which was agreed over ten years ago, has still not 
been realised.... There was little progress in the 
construction of public wells and hygienically 
adequate toilets in the settlements... and those 
which were built either do not serve their purpose 
nowadays or else have been destroyed in the mean- 
time. (174) 
Although the only figures available are too fragmentary to give 
in tabular form, they* confirmed this assessment. After a promising start 
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by the end of 1970 only 154 huts in all had been eliminated during 
the five-year period - an average of 30 a year. (124,130,150,1064,148). 
Likewise toilet, well and road construction and electrification 
proceeded extremely slowly. (116,124,148). 
Meanwhile the rate of rehousing Gypsies outside their settle- 
ments showed a corresponding decline. In 1966 a total of 83 dwellings 
were allocated to Gypsies (of which 76 were of the limited stock of 
older houses) but in the first eight months of 1969 this figure had 
fallen to 5. (124,130,164). raren private house-building by Gysies 
themselves was disappointing. In 1966 18 new houses were built by 
Gypsies (124) - the majority in settlements no doubt - whilst in 
1967 the Gypsies' share of new building plots was only 13 of the 
total of 482 (164) (i. e. 2.7 per cent although they formed 8.3 per 
cent of the district's population). 
In view of the lack of detailed statistics from Spisskä Novä 
Yes a more reliable idea of the stagnation is given by a rough 
comparison of living conditions in the settlements at the end of 
the 1960s with those before the 1965 measures. This shows that 
although there was some improvement in basic amenities the dispersal 
and transfer pro ramme had failed to keep pace with the birth rate 
and consequehtly overcrowding in Gypsy settlements had actually 
increased during the period. 
Figures for dispersals within the North Moravia Region are 
somewhat fuller, although Ostrava again declined to supply information 
to the RNC. The importance of the contribution of the untypically 
zealous Karvina DNC is evident from the table below and if this district's 
















. r4 Irl 
4 "r( ) 





0 4.3 r 
$ "ri "r i 
"r4 










0 CX) ON 






























































dispersed each Ye--r shows the same declining trend as for planned 
transfers - ten in 1)66, four in 1967 and 
finally zero in 1; x68. 
'Whereas the fibures for transfers to the north Moravia Re6ion are 
probably fairly accurate, those for dispersals are strangely low 
and it is likely that most DNCs simply did not bother to keep a 
special record of Gypsy families rehoused by them. r+evertheless 
on the whole country districts had few Gypsies to disperse while 
urban districts . Wade little effort 
to carry out a thorough dispersal. 
The Housing Shortage and its Effects. 
This account of the collapse of the transfer and dispersal 
programme ii. the Spisska Novä Ves district and North NN: oravia region 
suggests that all the factors which had previously hindered the 
implementation of the 1358 measures were still in operation and 
that against them the re-organised administrative structure could 
make little headway. While this was true the old problems of housing 
shortages, employment imbalances, uncontrolled natural migration and 
local authority apathy and outright resistance did not remain entirely 
as before; they were all modified by the movement of the economy and 
Czechoslovakian society in general in the direction of 'market 
socialism' following the traumatic economic crisis of the early 1960s. 
she 'New Economic Policy' (usually associated with the name of 
v 
economist Ota Sik) proposed a drastic reduction of central planning 
and control functions and a consequent increase of local works autonomy. 
Productivity and efficiency were to be increased by cutting subsidies 
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to inefficient firms, by reducing over-staffing in works and by 
generally increasi. i. g; the elei: nent of competition. This Gradual 
replacement of bureaucratic dirigisme by more decentralised forms - 
was widely hailed, both within and outside Czechoslovakia, as a 
significant democratic reform of what remained the most rigid 
Stalinist regime in the socialist bloc. As regards the planned 
solution of the 'gypsy question' however, this development only 
intensified the difficulties since it undermined the whole basis of 
the 1965 measures : increased central control of the assimilation 
policy to enforce what were recognised as unpopular measures. 
It is difficult to measure the extent of the continuing; national 
housing shortage that had resulted from the diversion of construction 
resources into heavy industry in the 1950s but wait_ng lists were 
long and it was common for young married couples to share with their 
parents. 
The housing situation among newlyweds was reported in 
1966 to be as follows : 59.1 per cent lived with parents, 
20.5 per cent had separate living quarters, and 4.1 per 
cent lived with other families. 
(quoted Ulc (2): 50) 
While the total of completed new houses increased steadily in 
an attempt to meet demand, the general movement towards an economy 
in which market forces played some role led to important chances in 
emphasis in new housing construction, favouring those better able to 
pay. The same development occurred a little later in Hungary. 
The accent is to be shifted from new State housing- 
towards'co-operative building for which people save 
for a deposit, then borrow the rest and pay off the 
loan by instalments. 
The ideal is not exactly a property-owning democracy. 
But the trend in F. ungary is now more and more towards 
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a consumer society in which responsible citizens 
are those who have savings accounts. 
('Guardian' 14.6.72). 
Czechoslovakian house construction statistics clearly show this 
dramatic switch from state to co-operative housing. In 1955 the 
proportion of all new housing constituted by state flats had been 
69 per cent but ten years later in 1965 it was only 21 per cent as 
compared with a 53 per cent share of co-operative housing. In 1965 
the proportion for state flats was even lower than that for houses 
which citizens had built with their own resources and by their own 
labour (26 per cent). 
Housing Construction by Type (1955-65) (Czechoslovakia). 
Dwellings constructed 1955 1960 1965 
total 48,800 73,800 75,000 
by public authorities 33,800 42,100 15,800 
by co-operatives - 8,800 39,800 
1privately 15,000 18,000 19,400 
(Facts : 113) 
This objective trend had ominous implications for co-operative 
housing was not generally considered in rehousing Gypsies. Grave 
doubts about the continuing supply of suitable accommodation were 
expressed in a long debate recorded in the minutes of a Government 
Committee meeting only eight months after Government Decree 502. 
In response to the information that new houses for Gypsies could 
not be a supplecent to existing plans but must form part of the 
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national planned target of 460,000 houses for the period 1966-1970, 
one critical committee ic. ember: 
recommended that the CP Central Committee and 
government should be informed that the possibilities 
at present do not allow the gypsy problem to be 
solved and that measures should be adopted to 
enable RI`; Cs... to work out their own proposals... 
from which a more realistic solution could be 
prepared. (90). 
As previously the ideal was to rehouse Gypsies in older houses 
and flats but "houses which can be adapted are already scarce... and 
these reserve possibilities will not be sufficient for dispersal 
requirements". (90). Although the supply of such accommodation was 
dwindling it was stated that it would be enough for 1966 and 1967 
needs but would then be virtually exhausted. 
Accepting that new lousing for Gypsies had to be included in 
the state plan, the same critic suggested that within the overall 
total of 460,000 housing units at least it would be possible to 
change the proportions of state flats and co-op flats in favour of 
the former, pointing out that since Gypsies to be dispersed would 
be taken from the second group, they would be unlikely to be able 
to raise the necessary deposit for a co-op flat. 
Another solution discussed was to develop a simpler and cheaper 
housing unit for Gypsies costing 45,000 crowns per unit instead of 
the normal 60,000 crowns. 
The chairman of the Committee put members, minds at rest by 
pointing out that they "maust expect to encounter problems but this 
must not lead to pessimism and reminded them that the intention of 
the government in setting up the Government CoxMittee was to obtain 
help in solving the gypsy question". (90). 
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The pessimism Was justified, however, and in April 1967 in its 
important 'Report on fulfilling government directive 502' (94) the 
Government Committee warned that the whole dispersal and transfer 
programme was jeopardised by the housing shortage. 
Accommodation in new places has been solved up 
till now mainly by adapting and repairing empty 
older family hhuses or flats with the aim of 
combining the financial resources of individual 
gypsies, NOs and firms. It is evident, however, 
that these possibilities will be gradually 
exhausted and with regard to the limited means of 
individual gypsies [it will be possible to rehouse 
them] ... only by placing them 
in state flats, 
vacated on the departure of citizens to new flats 
and in individual cases placing them in new 
flats. The extent of the dispersal and transfer 
will be determined by these possibilities. (94). 
The same report saw little prospect of easing the situation by 
means of works flats. 
Many firms, although employing gypsies for some 
time and satisfied with their work, do not try to 
help them to improve their accommodation conditions 
.... There are frequent cases where a 
firm has 
employed a gypsy for many years and he still lives 
in some temporary accommodation (bachelor flat, 
caravan or works flat in a poor state of repair 
etc. ). These problems are most marked with 
seasonally employed gypsies. (94). 
A little later, in mid-1967, the North Moravia RIIC predicted 
that they would be unable to rehouse 80 of the families planned for 
transfer from Slovakia that year - almost half the planned total - 
because of accocl, odation problems. 
The outlook for succeeding years is similarly 
pessimistic.... Apart from the lack of suitable 
buildinGs there are difficulties with building 
capacity and 
[in obtaining sufficient] building 
materials for the adaptation of older flats. 
(103) 
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While there was an undoubtedly serious housiag shortage through- 
out the 1960s it is necessary to put the potential impact of the 1965 
measures in perspective for even had the 1967-1970 plan to rehouse 
10,000 Gypsy families been completely fulfilled - using nothing but 
new housing - this still would have represented only 
2.7 per cent of 
all new -. ousin6 for the period. This share for the most deprived 
section of society appears modest 
(in 1967 Gypsies formed 1.6 per 
cent of the nepublic's population), but in a time of severe shortage 
perhaps any rehousing plan would have been opposed. Such popular 
resistance was noted in an important 1969 report by the Czech Ministry 
of labour and Social Affairs (which by then had assumed overall 
responsibility for the 'gypsy question' in the Czech lands from the 
defunct Government Committee). 
With reference to the general housing crisis, corisnents 
are made ... about the preferential eligibility of 
Gypsies. (140) 
In a 1969 report to the same ministry, the North Moravia RNC 
gave a similar explanation for its poor progress over the years 1966 
to 1968 stating that transfers from Slovakia "were often opposed by 
NCs1 the general public and by Gypsies already settled in the region". 
(152). This opposition was mainly attributed to the lack of 
accommodation but also to "bad experience with Gypsies as well as to 
groundless prejudice against settling Gypsies in town or village". (152). 
Federalisation and "exceptional 
[political] circumstances" were also 
listed as negative factors. In the same report the RNC confessed that 
dispersal had been attempted in only two of its ten districts. 
. 4, 
t' 04 
In this hostile climate it is surprisin that so many unplanned 
migrants to the Czech lands managed to remain there but Czech Cs had 
no effective means of preventing the influx; technically at least the 
failure to amend Law 74 on nomadism meant that they could only "note 
and record this movement because there are no legal means by which 
this can be restricted". (94). In practice, however, Czech NCs tried 
to discourage the newcomers by refusing to register them as permanent 
residents. 
Ii: places where they are temporarily employed and 
[temporarily registered as] residents, gypsies occupy 
flats which are in a state of disrepair or intended 
for demolition and their numbers are often increased 
by relatives and friends who move in with them. In 
this they cannot be prevented even by the housing 
regulations.... In these cases ICs defend themselves 
by refusing to register these citizens as permanent' 
residents. (94) 
By this means NCs hoped to avoid responsibility for rehousing the 
migrants for although 
registration as a permanent resident is not a claim 
for the immediate allocation of a flat,... it does 
mean that the NC in question has a responsibility to 
solve the situation that has arisen.... As a rule 
this occurs in places of greater industrial and 
population concentration where the housing problem 
is difficult to solve and in addition where there 
are greater concentrations of gypsies. (94) 
The Government Committee criticised this practice as illegal, 
pointing out that: 
the Ministry of the Interior directive on law 52/1949 Sb. 
about population registration specifically states that 
registration as a permanent resident may not be made 
dependent on any other conditions, especially accommod- 
ation, economic, financial, etc. (94) 
205 
Yet these Czech local authorities were only following Government 
Committee instructions in refusing unplanned migrants; the Committee 
seemed unaware that it was its own- 'Principles for Organising 
Dispersal and Transfer' which were in conflict with the directive 
of the Ministry of the I:: terior! The Government Committee's 
successor in the Czech lands, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 
had no such scruples and in its survey at the end of 1969, gave its 
approval to NC refusal to register unplanned Gypsy migrants as 
residents - either permanent or temporary. 
Xs justifiably resist the influx of Gypsy families 
who have no possibility of suitable accommodation 
and employment in the district. They do not 
register the majority as residents and send them 
back from where they came, paying; the fares (from 
funds intended for solving the Gypsy question). 
(140) 
As a result of Czech NC refusal to register them as resident, 
migrant Gypsies often found themselves in the anomalous position of 
not being registered anywhere, for in many cases they had already 
been de-registered by Slovak NCs. Their position was very similar to 
that of registered nomads who, if they moved without NC agreement, 
found themselves to be unregistered residents, technically unable to 
be employed or even rent or buy accommodation. As previously, however, 
employers frequently ignored the regulations and the Gypsies remained, 
often as squatters. A 1967 estimate put the number of such non- 
registered Gypsy residents in ISärvina (North º4oravia Region) as high 
as 17; -o` of the district's Gypsy population. (105). 
As part of its 1969 report to the Ministry, the North Moravia 
RNC attacked the progress reports of individual DIcCsl including their 
recommendations for future administrative measures. These reports make 
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dismal reading, being; full of accounts of NC attempts to turn away 
'undesired miLrants' and consequently the commonest suggestion was 
that residence registration regulations should be made more strict. 
Although they did not state this openly, almost all DidCs in 
the region were evidently opposed to c3ntinuing the transfers from 
Slovakia, the sole exception being Karvina which saw "no other way". 
Karvina's proposal was to make law the principles for dispersal 
and transfer and: 
to fix Edensity] limits of permitted dispersal 
for individual districts (in the interest of 
gypsy citizens themselves), which should be made 
binding for all districts. We recommend 1% of 
the total population. * 
... ', Je are aware that at first sight this proposal 
appears 'to limit personal freedom' but is it more 
humane to allow people to live in conditions 
unworthy of human beings? . eeping silent in this 
matter of hiding the truth is definitely unsocial. 
(152). 
As usual Karvina's contribution is important for this DNC carne 
closest to the 'ideal type', envisaged in the 1965 and indeed 1958 
measures. Had they come from any other NC, such suggestions could 
be justifiably suspected of aiming to strengthen the hand of D;; Cs in 
resisting natural migration, whilst at the same time leaving them free 
to continue their resistance to planned transfers. But Karvina's past 
record guaranteed that this was a genuine proposal to achieve the 
* In Hubschmannovä (op. cit. ) DNCs are reported as operating a 5, 
maximum permitted density of Gypsies. While D,, 'C officials may 
well have used this explanation verbally in attempting to turn 
away migrants, I have seen no documentary evidence for such a limit and certainly no national level document mentioned it. 
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overall policy goal of complete and harmonious assimilation of 
Gypsies throughout Czechoslova ia. 
The moral and political dilemma posed was a major and recurring 
one. If it was accepted that assimilation was the inevitable but 
also beneficial fate of the Gypsy minority, to what extent was it 
permissible to assist the painful assimilation process by coercive 
administrative and legal measures which, if they were to be effective, 
would almost certainly contravene the laws and indeed the constitution? 
From the 1969 handbook onwards the general answer had been that in 
this particular case the desirable ends justified unpleasant short- 
term means. In an important sense, therefore, the proposal of 
Karvina to impose a rigid 1% maximum density of Gypsies per district 
was taking the 1958 policy to its logical administrative conclusions. 
X03 
In Slovakia tae housing shortage was less critical on the whole 
but there popular resistance was probably more important a factor in 
delaying Gy sy dispersal than in the Czech lands. A late 1968 report 
attributed slow probress in Slovakia not entirely 
to the absolute drop in reserves of houses [but 
also].... to the increasing unwillingness of local 
people to accept gypsy families among themselves - 
not only in the case of gypsies from other villages 
but even from their own gypsy settlement. (146) 
House-owners preferred to sell privately to other non-Gypsies rather 
than to NCs for rehousing Gypsies. (140). 
Gypsies wishing to build their own houses during this period were 
hampered by familiar difficulties - lack of financial and material 
resources. "It is difficult to persuade individual State Savings 
Banks to make loans to gypsies", the Government Committee complained. (90). 
fore serious was the general shortage of building materials which was 
blamed for "the relatively large number of unfinished family houses of 
gypsies 
[and 
also for deterring 
J 
other gypsy families from the intention 
of startinG to build even a simple one-or two-room family house". 
Yet even if they had acquired sufficient money and caterials to 
build a family house, some Gypsies were frustrated by NCs who were 
unwilling to issue them with plots and permits to build either in a 
Slovakian village or in a Gypsy settlement. The former needs no 
explanation but in the case of the latter these ICs feared that to 
allow new building in settlements would contravene the principle of 
dispersal. After all the settlements were to vanish in a few years 
time. 
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Changing Employment Patterns and Migration 
That decentralisation of ministerial authority to individual 
enterprises should have adversely affected the transfer programme 
seems paradoxical. Indeed the continuing high demand for unskilled 
workers in the Czech lands during the late 1950s and early 1960s had 
been a major factor in frustrating control of Gypsy migration from 
Slovakia during the : arlier phase of the assimilation policy and the 
1965 plan to transfer Gypsies 'en masse' to the Czech lands might be 
regarded as a rationalisation of the already existing rural-to-urban 
migration of under-employed settlement Gypsies. 
This was not really the case however, for in addition to the 
principle that Gypsies should be transferred to places where there 
was work for them - whicr, by itself might have resulted in their 
transfer to industrial centres - there were also the requirements 
that there should be adequate accommodation available and that they 
should be dispersed as much as possible. Application of these two 
last principles meant a rural rather than an industrial destination 
for not only was the housing shortage more critical in the Czech 
towns and cities but these urban areas had been the destination of 
the overwhelming c-: ajority of previous Gypsy migrants. A rural 
destination was ideal for there was farm work in abundance. 
Agriculture had been suffering for some time from an increasing 
manpower shortage and in 1966 "the average age 
[of 
the workforce was 
J 
... roughly 10 years higher than in industry or the building industry". 
(Yearbook : 87). This situation had arisen because of the continuing 
priority given to heavy industry and official reports conceded that 
in agriculture the "working environment still leaves much to be 
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desired from the cultural point of view"- (Facts : 78) and wages 
were significantly lower. * 
Gypsies, therefore, were expected to Lake up the jobs and houses 
of Czechs who had left the farms for the factories but understandably 
the Gypsies, too, preferred the better pay of urban areas -a fact 
which central government and local authorities alike appeared unable 
to appreciate. The Ministry of labour complained: 
There are numerous cases where Gypsy families have 
refused the chance of living in a family house in 
the country even though they live in thoroughly 
unsuitable a., d inadequate flats in town. (140). 
In similar vein Vsetin - the partner of Spisska Nova Ves - 
accused transferred Gypsies of ingratitude. (This rural district, 
which lay near Ostrava yet beyond convenient commuting distance, had 
suffered population loss of its own inhabitants to the city). 
Despite the fact that gypsies lived in Slovakia in 
very poor conditions with low wages... after reaching 
ä certain level they suddenly become more demanding 
and dissatisfied. Some of them change their jobs 
in an attempt to earn more money .... Many request 
accommodation in the town despite the fact that in 
Slovakia they lived in a village and often far from 
the grillage - without light and sometimes without 
water. (106). 
Although employment was probably the most important factor 
determining their choice, Gypsies often preferred towns because they 
had relatives there and resisted transfer or dispersal to renot© 
* In 1955 the national average wage in agriculture (excluding; 
co-op farmers) was 70 per cent of that in industry, althouGh 
this proportion rose to 84 per cent by 19b5. However, in 
comparison with the most popular employment sector for Gypsies - 
construction - the corresponding proportions were 66 and 76 per 
cent. (Statistical Abstract : 35). 
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rural districts for this reason. An urban authority in i4orth Bohemia 
gave a grarj, ic illustration of the waste of resources and personal 
grief involved in trying to disperse Gypsies to country districts 
against their will. * 
It must be retorted that five gypsy families who 
were moved 
[from our Forth Bohemia industrial 
area] to a country district do all they can to 
gain registration again as permanent residents 
in our town and at the same time try to find 
work here. There was a meeting between these 
families and the department of the interior and 
under no circumstances will registration as 
permanent residents be Given them again. * 
It was also necessary to take further measures, 
chiefly to contact their former employers to 
ensure that they did not re-employ members of 
these families. The DNC rwhere they are at 
present] was warned of their efforts.... and 
we received an assurance that under no circum- 
stances would it allow these families to de- 
register from permanent residence there. Two 
families however do not make use of the flats 
allocated to them and are staying elsewhere 
tempdrarily. 
All the families give the same reasons that they 
have got used to our town, their relatives are 
here and that firms here pay higher wages. 
It must be added that all the families moved 
into very nice flats but that half of the 
families have already destroyed their flats, 
so the DNC has no interest in further families. 
(143)" 
In 1967, when the transfer system was already faltering and 
natural migration to Czech urban areas was becoming even harder because 
* The 'Principles fo/organisinE; the dispersal and transfer of the 
gypsy population' (83)-required the "voluntary agreement" of the 
Gypsies involved, but this was often_regarded as a technicality. 
Incidentally this particular case occurred in Iiay 1970, six 
months after the policy of dispersal had been for, ally abandoned in the Czech lands. 
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of the housing shortage, a development occurred which, alti,:. uth it 
did not solve the would-be migrant's dilemma, at least offered him 
an alternative. As part of the general reforms a new economic 
mana&e.: ient syste. ii w is introduced in Czechoslovakian abriculture on 
January 1st 1967 weich gave greater freedom to co-operatives from 
central _lanning and which was hoped would "create conditions for an 
influx of labour into agriculture". (Yearbook : 87, Vydra : 8). In 
this and successive measures constraints on co-operatives were removed 
which had previously restricted their activities to rural areas and 
to the field in which they had been originally established (i. e. 
agriculture) as well as limiting the free movement of their labour 
force. (Selucky : 101,102). 
In response a lar; e number of co-operative farms set up in 
business as sub-contractors for construction worin, recruiting gangs 
of labourers to travel on contract work all over the republic. Since 
co-operatives were able to pay their members on a profit-sharing 
basis, the long hours, arduous tasks and discomfort in often working 
far from home could be compensated by extremely high piece-work rates 
and bonuses. This form of economic organisation had a significant 
effect on the 'gypsy question' for not only did many Gypsies join 
co-op units but one of the concessions made to the newly-formed 
Gypsy associations in 1968 was that they, too, could operate a 
similar scheme. (See the following chapter). 
As regards the 1965 measures the greater freedom of the co- 
operatives was a disaster since it attracted many Gypsies away from 
fixed, regalar employment and enabled them to travel the country as 
latter-day seasonal workers. From the very start of the assimilation 
campaign in 1953 the government had insisted that such mobility 
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could : 'lot 1, roviüe the necessary re-educative 
influence and foster a 
stable way of life, yet a raid-1967 esticiaýe put the number of Gypsies 
from Slovakia temporarily employed in the Czech lands at 10,000 
(i. e. 10 per cent of the republic's 101,700 Gypsies of productive 
age). (94+). 
From the considerably more limited perspective of urban Czech 
local authorities and employers the innovation of co-op labouring 
ganZs appeared quite differently for it supplied much needed extra 
labour without the usual requirement of accompanying social costs. 
In place of expensive housing and education and health services for 
the workers' families it was sufficient to provide minimal barracks - 
or dormitory-type accommodation for the incoming 'temporary' workers - 
although such workers often remained for several years at a stretch. 
Yet even before the introduction of co-op production units Czech 
employers had recruited Gypsy workers without the prior agreement of 
IJCz, sometimes accommodating them in the most rudimentary conditions. 
In June 1966 the Government Committee reported: 
Firms [are often] ignorant of the principles for 
solving the gypsy questions and numerous cases 
occur of concrete acts against their spirit, 
e. g. the recent example of the Central Bohemia 
Power Authority which employed gypsies and housed 
them in caravans in Prague itself. (90). 
For the Gypsies of Slovakia the innovation of co-op production 
units provided a means of earning, the higher wages of Czech industrial 
or construction workers* without needing to find scarce family 
Although progress continued to be made in improving conditions in 
Slovakia to the level of those in the Czech lands, a 1968 survey 
revealed persistent inequalities. In a table of income by nationality the best-paid group were the Poles, concentrated in their heavy 
industrial enclave near Ostrava, second equal were the Czechs and - surprisingly - the Gypsies (largely due, no doubt, to their participation in co-op units) and-in fourth-place, the Slovaks. In terms of every other indicator (living standards, life style, education and complexity 
of work) the Gypsies came uniformly last. (t"iachonin 3 557). 
ý ýý 
accommodation in town or city. True, it meant long periods of gainful 
separation of as e-earners from their families - left behind in their 
Slovakian settlements - but at least these were not subjected to the 
hazards of squatting in derelict buildings, which was often the out- 
code when whole families attempted to migrate together as formerly. 
In many ways the changing situation had Modified the predicament 
of settlement Gypsies so that it ressembled that of migrant workers 
to capitalist western Europe. Whilst it might seem absurd to compare 
Gypsies in Slovakia with chronically under-employed natives of 
Eorocco, Turkey or Yugoslavia it remains true, nevertheless, that to 
many the difference between local employment possibilities and jobs 
in the Czech lands appeared great enough to make worth*hile the 
considerable hardship and suffering involved in migrating without 
their families. When living conditions in the Gypsy settlements are 
recalled, a comparison with the underdeveloped Mediterranean countries 
appears less ridiculous. 
The formation of the co-op production units had a variable but 
often dramatic effect on Gypsy employment in Slovakia, as in the case 
V 11 of Spisska Novä Ves where there was a sharp fall in the number of 
Gypsies in regular employment by as much as a quarter during 1967. 






Date Total Gypsies of Regularly Temporarily 
Gypsy pop. productive employed employed 
age 
21.1.66 10,060 - 1,968 
1.2.67 10,200 4,448* 2,040 
31.12.67 10,249 4,087. 1,547 215 
31.12.68 10,633 4,320 1,728 
- 4.70 - - 1,759 358 
* Almost certainly a mistake for the proportion in relation to total popul- ation is too large. In general these statistics are unreliable and difficult to interpret e. g. the figure for regularly employed Gyr. siea in November 1964 was 193 higher than the corresponding fi January 1966. (55,116). ire for 
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A 1968 report had no hesitation in attributing this fall in 
numbers to the appearance of co-op units. 
The cause of the drop to the present state 
[of 
Qypsy euployyrnent figures] ... can be attributed 
to the fact that many [Gypsies] voluntarily left 
their work and were re-employed by 'co-op 
production units' of the co-operative farms in 
the district. It has been ascertained that... 
a total of 523 [Gypsies] work there of which 
176 in construction units in our district and 
347 in construction units in the Czech lands. 
(134). 
However other factors were operating as well, such as the 
increasing lack of local employment possibilities. A 1970 survey 
commissioned by the Spisskä Novä Ves DNC from the Advisory Institute 
of the Czech Commission for Scientific Control on the proposed 
economic development of the district noted that: 
Despite an absolute rise in employed persons... 
the growth of job opportunities does not match 
the populatian growth in the district.... Contrary 
to the national situation, reserves of labour 
exist. This raises specially acute problems in 
suitably employing Gypsies. [Sonne of the labour 
surplus must be absorbed locally and] ... it will 
always be necessary to create @ew jobs... but a 
certain part of the population growth undoubtedly 
will be solved effectively by migration. (167) 
The report showed that this situation had been worsening during 
the 1960s for in 1961 the migratory balance in favour of outmigration 
had been 317 but by 1967 had exceeded a thousand annually. "In recent 
years more than half of the natural population growth is absorbed by 
outmigration". (167). 
In unfavourable employment situations such as this local authorities 
had previously been able to intervene sometimes on the Gypsies' behalf, 
insisting that firms employ a certain quota of Gypsy workers, but the 
new economic system removed this power. In 1967 the Government Committee 
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anticipated how some firms would make use of their increased 
autonomy as regards 3-psy workers. 
There are, even now, many cases of outright refusal 
[by firms to employ gypsies] and there are justifiable 
fears that this situation will worsen when the new 
economic system is put into practice.... 
[At present] under Law 70/1958 DNCs can recommend 
that firms employ workers and in certain cases can 
decide on the responsibility of firms to employ them. 
However, in the case of Gypsies, firms generally 
give reasons which... [legally] permit them to refuse 
workers (such as their lack of physical or mental 
capacity or qualifications for the jobs they are 
intended to do). 
The unwillingness of firms to accept gypsies and 
the limited possibilities of 1-; Cs to act against 
this are serious obstacles to carrying out dispersal 
and transfer. (94) 
The proposals for amending Law 74 on nomadism had included a 
recommendation that I\Cs be given increased power to control firms for 
well before the introduction of the new economic system there had 
evidently been widespread resistance by employers. A survey of eleven 
Slovakian firms showed that while the total work force had risen from 
41,000 to 52,000 in the two years from October 1964 until September 1966, 
during the same period the number of Gypsy employees had fallen from 
1,970 to 1,788. (94). 
As might have been expected the combination of a more competitive 
economy and greater autonomy of individual firms had a marked effect 
on the least desirable - and consequently most vulnerable - sections 
of the Gypsy labour force : women, the young and the disabled. 
At a time when the total number of women in employment was steadily 
V 
growing, both in the Spisska Nova Ves district and in Slovakia as a 
whole (167), the number of Gypsy women"with a rebular job - in Spisska 
Novä `des at least - fell dramatically during 196? and 1968. 
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Gypsy women regularly employed - Spisskä Novä Ves 
(1967-68). 
Date 21.1.66 1.2.67 31.12.67 31.12.68 
Women regularly 
employed 118 121 80 38 
(116) (128) (130) (160) 
The same was true of young Gypsies, although some youths probably 




Employment of Young Gypsies - Spisskä Novä Ves (1967-68). 
Regularly working Not regularly 
working 
Age Date Total youths girls Total youths Girls 
group 
15-18 1.2.67 89 73 16 495 74 421 
15-17 31.12.67 77 62 15 598 281 317 
15-17 31.12.68 18 18 p1 729 355 374 
In the same way that local authorities had sometimes been able 
to require that employers accept Gypsy workers, they had also been 
empowered to make them waive minimum qualifications for apprenticeships. 
However this was no longer to be the case. 
The Ministry of Education and Culture issued an 
internal directive in 1962... to enable young 
gypsies to be accepted as apprentices even when 
they lacked the basic entrance requirements. 
Firms however do not observe this directive.... 
Under the new economic system... the placing of 
young gypsies will be even more difficult. (94) 
C) ýU 
In 1965 as much as 50 percent of all Gypsy school leavers in the 
Spisska Nova Ves district had been placed in apprenticeships (59) but 
from 1965 until 1969 this proportion never exceeded 20 per cent (113, 
146,164). Yet the previous policy of preferential apprenticeships 
for young Gypsies had often met with resistance from Gypsies them- 
selves, for whom: 
... the simple possibility of earnin, 
has the greatest 
influence. [Compared with the relatively low wages of 
an apprentice]... research in Ostrava 
[district 13 
showed that an auxiliary worker of 16 to 18 years 
earns on average 1,100 crowns per month 
Land as a 
consequence] it appears more advantageous to 
[Gypsy] 
parents if their children start paid work immediately, 
rather than enter apprenticeships. (92). 
Bleakest of all were the employment prospects of the partially- 
disabled Gypsy invalid pensioners(2,360 in 1967 (94)) whose situation 
appeared liable to deteriorate further as the proposed changes to the 
national economy were introduced. 
The Failure of the New Administrative Structure 
The growing divergence, during the period 1966-1969, of NC 
performance from the ambitious earlier plans has already been described 
in the key areas of population transfer, accommodation and employment, 
but perhaps the simplest single indicator of local authority 
inactivity is the failure by I; Cs to make use of the funds already 
allocated to them for the purpose of solving the 'gypsy question'. 
The figures for the Spisska Nova Vey district are regrettably 
inconplete but nevertheless the difference is stri1; inZ between the 
performance of 1966, when expenditure actually exceeded the budget, 
and 1969, when during the first six months less than 6 per cent of the 
annual budget was utilised. 
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DAIC Budget and Expenditure for Gypsy Affairs 
- Spisska :: ova Ves (1966-1969) 
(in thousands of crowns) 











* Expenditure for hut purchases only. However in 1966 this item 
had accounted for 78% of all expenditure. 
enditure for I-IX. 68 only. 
*** It 11 I-VII. 69 only. 
RP; C Budget and Expenditure for Gypsy affairs 
- North iloravia Region (1968-1969) 
(in thousands of crowns) 
Year 1968 1969* 
Bruntal Budget 395 290 
DNC Expenditure 15 - 
Karvina B. 117 116 
DNC E. 90 50 
Vsetin B. 450 105 
DNC E. 157 105 
Ostrava B. 44,5 310 
DNC E. 110 13 
DNNCs B. 3,109 29283 
total** E. 758 120 
N. Mor. Reg. B. 4,700 3,438 
TCTAL B. 758 122 
* Expenditure for I=JI.. 69 only. 
"w Separate figures are given above for only four of the regions ten 
DNCs. In 1968 the expenditure of these four accounted for 49; x, of 
that of all DNCs. 
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The 'Nort_. 7 , oravia Region statistics 
tell the same story. In 
1968 only 16 per cent of the budget was utilised, while in the first 
half of tie following year this proportion of the annual budget was 
a miniscule 3- per cent. To put this in proportion, the region's 
total outlay on Gypsy affairs from January to June 1969 was roughly 
equivalent to the price of a new car. 
The extent to which the poor performance of NCs in carrying 
out the 1965 measures is due to broader political developments during 
this period is not easy to assess : certainly they had the direct 
effect of encouraging local authority resistance to central government. 
During the mid-1960s the prospects of success for the Gypsy 
policy of assimilation by dispersal were already deteriorating as a 
direct result of contemporary economic developments. The balance of 
new house-building was altering in favour of the more expensive 
privately-owned co-operative fl-is whilst central controls over 
employers were progressively removed allowing, on the one hand, same 
firms to refuse the Gypsy workers and apprentices they did not want, 
but, on the other, the new co-op production units to recruit Gypsies 
as casual labourers to travel the country in mobile gangs. 
But reforms in the economic sphere did not, and could not, fail 
to extend into the political sphere and finally they led, in early 
1968, to the overthrow of the Novotny regime that had ruled the 
Republic since 1957. The process of undermining and eventually ousting 
the entrenched dirigiste leadership was a prolonged campaign of 
attrition, extending from the first economic reforms of 1964 that 
were introduced after the collapse of the five-year plan. The nucleus 
of central government acquiesced uneasily to the new economic measures 
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which necessarily involved considerable devolution of its powers - 
for it could see no alternative - yet continued to act outwardly as 
if nothing ß. aä c: ian ed. A leading Czech economist graphically 
described this rez. arkable situ tioa as it was in 1967: 
The power centre tried to manage the national economy 
by directive methods, but its orders were being 
fulfilled only by the ministries; the command system 
was, by then, already so eroded that it failed to 
affect tue economic units. It was a paradoxical 
situation: the old system had already ceased to 
function. The political command system also began 
to disintegrate as quickly. Most of the decisions 
of the top power bodies were being fulfilled only 
formally because the enforcing apparatus was in 
part decomposed and in part divided into two opinion 
groups. Because the system was no longer able to 
enforce compliance with its orders by power-political 
means, its mechanism began to falter. 
(Selucky : 89. Emphasis in oriCinal). 
This almost total collapse of the command system was bound to 
affect the impleLentation of the Gypsy policy. In Slovakia the 
weakening of central control and the consequently greater involvement 
of the electorate in political life made elected NC officials acutely 
sensitive to grass-roots pressure, particularly in the turbulent year 
of 1968. A report in November of that year exllained the poor 
performance of Slovakian NCs in dispersing Gypsies locally by: 
... the greater respect paid to the wishes of the [non-Gypsy] people - especially in smaller villages. 
As in the past these people, for the most part, 
refuse to accept Gypsy families among themselves 
in the village. 
The same report continued: 
In the first three cr four months of this year [1968] 
NC officials did not pay attention to the question [of the gypsy population] for tactical reasons. Some 
did not want to lose popularity with their electors 
by solving this un opular question... in the pre- 
election period. [Zae elections were originally to 
be in May and were later postponed until August]. 
Others - who were not standing for election - did 
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not fulfil the tasks shown in the work timetable 
in the belief that no-one would criticise them 
for not having; undertaken these tasks. (145) 
But Czech i: Cs were no better, for: 
From May [19681... Czech DIVC partners 
(of Slovak 
DTv"s ]refused... to accept the gypsy families 
prepared for transfer from Slovaý: ia and to the 
contrary in places pressed for the return to 
Slovakia of tose already settled. This had even 
occurred during the previous year 
x19673. (146) 
This was the harsh verdict of the Slovak central authorities but 
their Czech counterparts' view was not dissimilar, although not so 
outrightly critical. 
Political and constitutional changes during 1968 
affected the completion of the tasks in solving 
the gypsy question both centrally and locally... 
[and] the Government Committee did not meet even 
once during 1968. (140). 
Somewhat later, in April 1970, another :: ajor Slovakian report 
seemed to lay the entire blame for the collapse of the dispersal and 
transfer programme on the malevolent intent of local authoritie3 who 
were able to ignore the 1965 measures because of the deteriorating 
political situation. 
Local officials wanted nothing more than to aet rid 
of their own Gypsies with the help of Government 
Decree 502/1965... 
The failure to fulfil the planned tasks cannot be 
attributed, in any way, to [this ] decree. " . but 
solely to those [entrusted ': with carrying 
theca out]... 
The desire, the will and the involvement of elected 
officials, likewise of responsible administrators 
on every level of state bodies or social orCanisations, 
can be evaluated positively only in exceptional cases 
as regards the Gypsy question. (147) 
It is impossible to absolve the 1965 measures in this way for 
the principal shortcoming before 1965 had been the lack of control over 
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local authorities. fhe main purpose, therefore, of the administrative 
re-orr; anisation of 1965 was to improve this on a local and national 
level, by attachin;, advisory committees directly to i)NC and RNC 
councils and by creating, an overall co-ordinating body, the Government 
Committee, which was to report directly to the Government Praesidium. 
The Government Committee itself was initially very active and 
although it only raet four times in the fifteen months between December 
1965 and April 1967, it issued a number of major documents and discussed 
plans of the Ministries of Education and : iealth, the Social Security 
Office and the trade union movement. The dispersal and transfer plans 
and budgets up to 1970 were also prepared and a--reed. Law 117, weich 
enabled family allowances to be withheld when the children in question 
did not attend school regularly, was recommended to and passed by the 
L-ational Asse. nbly in December 1966, althougn the proposal to amend law 
74 was less successful. 
In practice, however, Law 117 was as ineffective as Law 74 had 
been and for the similar reason that its use entailed additional 
responsibilities for NCs. For example Law 117 was used in the North 
Bohemia Region only 94 times in the period 1966-1963. 
The reason [for the infrequent use of Law 1171 is 
the work involved for NCs in applying it. Usually 
child welfare departments have responsibility but 
these are still understaffed. Also [its use provokes) 
... unpleasantness or even aggressive behaviour from [Gypsy] parents. (140). 
Meanwhile the Government Committee's counterpart in Slovakia, 
the Slovakian National Council Committee, met several times and, 
amonc other things, issued a directive on the compulsory purchase of 
Gypsy huts. (94). 
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For the first time a concerted effort as made to ý, ain new 
factual knowledge , aboat 
tie dimensions of the Gypsy problem by the 
compilation of st tistics and by sociological research. The Government 
Com. -rittee admitted: "'; le do not know in what the gypsy way of life 
and its perretuation are rooted for that has to be established by 
sociological research; we only see they are undesirable". (90). 
. However, since "for tue present neither 
rthe Czechoslovak nor Slovaic 
Academy of Sciences) shows any interest in cürryinZ out research" (90), 
it was proposed to set up a small team as part of the Government 
Committee section, to do immediate, if limited, sccioloZical research. 
Before this could be arranged, however, statistics were required on 
Gypsy apprentices "but the Central Committee for the People's Controls 
and Statistics refused the survey". (92). 
In 1; 67 both major scientific academies were still unwilling 
tor undertake research and so it was proposed to set up an eight or 
nine-member research team as part of the Slovak idational Council's 
Advisory Committee section. 
If the Government Committee was unfortunate in obtaininG outside 
research co-operation, it did manaze to Gather data from NCs. Slovak 
J, Cs had already made a survey in 1964 but Czech NCs compiled fresh 
statistics from their residence registration cards and, taken together, 
these gave the first national statistical picture of the 'Gypsy 
problem'. The use of registration cards as source documents 
undoubtedly led to errors for they were often out of data and in 
particular showed where Gypsies were registered rather than where they 
were actually resident, but nevertheless it was a considerable achievement. 
C) r- 
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A year later, in Decem'. er 1967, and again in December 1; 68, the 
State Statistical -'ffice rroduced its own detailed census of Gypsies 
in Czechoslovakia. 
After a proraisi -iz start, the activity of the Government Committee 
declined sharply in 1,67 and the committee did not meet once in 1963. 
The production of the April 1967 report (94) was its last major act. 
To the last the Government Committee remained convinced that "experience 
to date confirms the correctness of the measures taken by the govern- 
ment to solve the gypsy question" (94), yet only a year after making 
this assessment the Committee had effectively ceased to function and 
the dispersal and transfer programme was almost at a standstill. 
This collapse was due not only to external causes - the 
contemporaneous political crisis - but was also the result of structural 
weaknesses which would have gravely jeopardised the success of the 1965 
measures, even had there been no general breakdown of the command 
system. These weaknesses were analogous to the inherent faults of 
the administrative structure in the time of Maria Theresa, indeed the 
parallel was remarkable. 
The seemingly powerful Imperial Governor's Council had sought to 
impose assimilation of the Gypsies by numerous decrees and assiduous 
report-gathering but had been ultimately frustrated by the local 
Diets' unwillingness to carry out measures contrary to their own 
interests. Not only had the Council been unable to enforce effective 
dispersal of Gypsies among the serfs but it was unaware of the decree 
of failure of its policies, for, without th56ans of independently 
evaluating the reports it received, it could not penetrate the Diets' 
mask of compliant activity. Meanwhile the Gypsies were alienated by 
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the harshness of the measures intended to acrnieve the policy aims, 
even tiioubh their own ambitions were not always far removed from 
some of those main aims (such as settling and employment). So, in 
a different way, the Gypsies added their resistance to that cf the 
Diets. 
Two centuries later the corr:. spondinö co-ordinating body, the 
Government Committee, whicr. had been established in order to extend 
firm central control ovei the local authority network, was likewise 
unable to enforce its instructions and its authority proved illusory. * 
The Government Committee could not "control how basic directives were 
being followed", as instructed in Decree 502/1965, for - in spite of 
the appearance of dual control - the regional and district committees 
for Gypsy affairs were airectly responsible only to their own NCs. 
Even the full-tine secretaries of these committees - the impressive- 
sounding 'plenipotentiaries for questions of the gypsy population' - 
were nominated by their own NCs, paid by them and not by central 
government, and eventually h:; ped to be rewarded by a less frustrating 
post within their NC-s. 
Equally, the Government Com ittee was unable "to monitor the 
overall solution" (84) with any reliability, for, although equipped 
with its own small secretariat, it did not have the staff (nor 
probably the authority) to make its own investigations into NC 
performance, but had to rely entirely on reports submitted by the veby 
bodies it was meant to be controlling. It is doubtful what use the 
The same wý, s true of the Slovakian National Council COr-mittee. 
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Government Committee coý. ld have made of independent data in any case 
because, like committees fir Gypsy affairs, its status was advisory 
and not executive. , it most, it could only report periodically on 
general developments to the over-worked Government Praesidium winch, 
in turn, sporadically res, onded with broad policy pronouncements. 
The impotence o- the Government Committee was typified by its 
feeble response to flagrant administrative sabotage of the 1965 
measures by i. Cs. , d:. e ^eas on occasions Slovakian 2: ýCs had previously 
aräued that deliberate opposition by ICs to the assimilation policy 
should be treated as a 'breach of state discipline', all the 
Government Committee could suggest was to improve propaganda! 
Lie significance and importance of further 
intensifying and improving propaganda... is 
confirmed by the fact that to a considerable 
degree the public, NC officials and employees, 
firms and social orhanisations still retain 
their old, incorrect opinions about gypsies 
and solving the gypsy question. An expression 
of these incorrect opinions is the lack of 
interest... and sometimes even resistance to 
solving the problem. (94). 
Day-to-day control of actual performance rested wit# IiCs them- 
selves while the Government Committee could only attempt a monitoring 
operation on the lasis of whatever information 2NCs chose to give it. 
Success of the 1965 measures depended, as before, on the attitude of 
individual NCs and the resources available to them, not on any firm 
control from central government as the 1965 measures had seemed to 
promise. 
On a local level pre-1965 Slovakian experience had already shown 
that the direct attachment of advisory cor. 1ittees to NC councils did 
not, by itself, solve the problem of NO inactivity. Althout; hi the 
administrative reor&anisation'undoubtedly increased the potential 
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influence of these coamittees, they were largely composed of NC 
officials - often apathetic or actively hostile 
to the 1965 measures. 
Even if such committees d. d attempt to be active, they were 
thwarted 
by their advisory status for they . =ad no executive powers of their 
own. They were powerless if iC councils chose to i6no re their 
advice - as they frequently did. 
In theory RiX councils were empowered to control their sub- 
ordinate D,. Cs (and likewise DiNCs their subordinate X1; Cs and 1141.0s) 
but instances of such intervention were rare and even then most 
commonly took the form of an ineffectual reprimand. 
As had been the case in Habsburg times the very autnorities 
designated as the main agents of the assimilation policy were 
probable is most effective opponents and, as then, their opposition 
most probably stemmed from the fact that implementation of the planned 
measures would have placed new and severe strains on their finances - 
in other words it would have cost ther. 
/noney. 
Even after 1965, when funds were made available from the central 
exchequer, to have rehoused Gypsies on the scale proposed, for example, 
would have been to diminish the already scarce resources available for 
those whom NC officials retarded as their own people, for the general 
shortage of housing and building materials continued to be critical. 
However this general explanation is not entirely adequate and the 
influence of outright racialism cannot be discounted, particularly in 
Slovakia where numerous local authorities steadfastly refused to allow 
Gypsies to live in the village proper on any term. There, many officials 
had grown up in an atmosphere where Gypsies had been reSarded as sub- 
human and rigorously segregated wherever possible. The same attitudes 
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often persisted in spite of socialism, as is evident from reading 
between the lines of local authority reports. 
Unable tý admit openly to their prejudices or, in some cases, 
fearful to confess their reluctance to take unpopular action, the 
local autaorities played the same game with the Government Committee 
as had the Diets with the Imperial Governor's Council. 
initially awed by the formidable appearance of Government Decree 
no. 502/1965 and the new Government Committee, many NCs greatly 
increased their activity in 1966, utilising a good deal of the funds 
allocated to them. They soon discovered that in practice the effective 
control over their performance was no better than before and during 
the following year abandoned their caution, lapsinn once more into 
token compliance with a policy in which they had no faith. 
In this they were undoubtedly aided by political developments 
at the time but these wider changes were more a convenient tool than 
the principal cause of the policy's failure. Local Authorities had 
successfully frustrated the 1958 measures; there was no real reason 
why they could not do the same with those of 1965. 
Cnce again the Gypsies were the losers in the tussle between 
central and local government and although blamed by both sides as the 
main cause of the breakdown of the policy, this was not true. The 
Gypsies cherished ambitions which were not dissimilar to some of the 
main policy aims; they desperately wanted socio-economic equalisation 
which meant for them in concrete terms such thins as new houses, 
better jobs and, above all, respect. To ache these more rapidly 
many Gypsies had already moved to the Czech lands, yet they did not 
want to be directed to remote rural areas far from well-paid industrial 
ý3ý 
jobs and . in, or to be tied indefinitely to one employer or one 
flat for circumstances chan;; ed. 
In the event the Government Committee plans had little relevance 
for the majority of Gypsies who, instead, were confronted with a 
strengthened armoury of bureaucratic restrictions in the hands of 
their customary adversaries, the local authorities. These the 
Gypsies combated in the only way open to them, by taking matters 
into t.. eir own hands where p&ssible and presenting the authorities 
with a 'fait accompli'. 
The structural defects in the 1965 reorganisation, the skiff ful 
manipulation of the: by NCs and the continued evasion of regulations 
by Gypsies all suggest that, rather than being a well-conceived 
policy hopelessly overwhelmed by external events, the 1965 measures 
already ccrried within them the seeds of their own destruction. 
The Results 
The dispersal and transfer programme did not come to any sudden 
or ddfinite end; it simply petered out at varying rates in different 
areas during 1968 and 1969. The problem of selecting even a nominal 
date for the end of the programme is further increased by the federalis- 
ation of the Republic which took effect from January 1st 1969 and 
had the practical consequence of a slower run-docm of the 1965 
programme in Slovakia than in the Czech lands. At the same time it 
can be said that in some places, in spite of dutiful form-fillinG 
by the appropriate local authority officials, the program.. e never 
even started. 
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Anotýier and -, ore serious rroblem is that of compa-'ative data. 
A number of , -ov., ririent reports in 1)68 and later give nation-wide 
statistics, w. iic . are su., rlernented 
by the special Gypsy censuses of 
December 1,37 and 1'963 and also - to some extent - by the national 
census of 1;; 70, but there exists no data of comparable range or 
reliability for the pre-1965 period. 
As regards certain post-1968 statistics - budget utilisation, 
completed transfers and dispersals, unplanned migration, rehousinn and 
provision of amenities in settlements - these can at least be compared 
with the corresponding planned figures in the national ti: j'ietable for 
the programme approved by Government Decree 159/1967. (98). The 
comparisons made in this section are more or less specific to a 
limited evaluation of the effectiveness of the 1965 measures; the 
euch broader and more important question of chanties in the overall 
living standards of Gypsies during this period - involving statistics 
on population levels, emp)oyme. nt, health, education and crime - is 
put aside until the following chapter. 
i) Bud,; et Utilisation 
The experience of Spisskä Nova Veo and the Tvorth Moravia Region 
was evidently quite typical of the national trend. The pattern was 
initial promise in 1966, followed by rapidly deteriorating results 
in 1967 and 1968. The proportion of the overall 1967-1970 budget for 
the 33 months from January 1967 until October 1969 was 393,017,000 
crowns but by the end of this period only 25.6 per cent of the 
allocated funds had been used. 
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Gypsy affairs - IG Budget and expenditure (1967-70). (137) 
(in thousands of crowns). 













The Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs report, 
which gave these figures, added: 
The sharply falling trend shows not only the gradually 
contracting possibility of realising the measures 
originally planned, but the cad results of these forms 
of solution. Districts which were to accept transferred 
Gypsies defended themselves, the supply of houses 
suitable for rehousing Gypsies shrank, and Edistricts] 
made no attempt to keep those Gypsies already transferred, 
who moved home acain or on to other places to other 
clansmen. (137). 
ii) Transfers 
In a 1969 report (140), the Czech Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs claimed a 45 per cent overall success rate in transferring 
Gypsies during the three years from 1966 to 1968. This optimistic 
assessment also showed the sharp decline in performance year by year. 
(See the following table). 
Although all of these statistics are to some extent unreliable - 
in that they frequently fail to tally with each other - this purported 
success rate is almost certainly too high because the base figure 
from which it was calculated is suspiciously low. The 1969 Czech 
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report gave a total of 1,091 Gypsy families planned for transfer 
from Slovakia to the Czech lands during the 1966-1968 period at the 
rate of roughly 350 families a year but thq'original plan for the four- 
year period 1967-1970 showed 2,177 families to be transferred at the 
considerably higher rate of over 500 families a year. (97). Likewise 
a Slovakian report for the comparable but slightly earlier four-year 
period 1966-1969 gave a figure of 1,975 families - also around 500 
families a year (147). Using these figures the overall fulfillment 
of the transfer plan for the 1966-1968 period should not be the 45 per 
cent given in the Czech report but only 33 per cent (on the basis of 
1,500 planned transfers). 
iii) Dispersals and Unplanned Migration 
The figures for dispersals are much harder to evaluate. The 
impressive 81 per cent success rate claimed for Slovakia should be 
revised to 67 per cent on the basis of a calculation similar to that 
made for transfers. According to the original 1967-70 plan a total 
of 5,91+8 families were to be dispersed during the four-year period, 
giving 1+, 461 families during three years instead of 3,700, as stated 
in the 1969 report. Apart from discrepancies in the planned total, 
doubt is cast on the numbers actually dispersed for a Slovakian 
report noted that during the first nine months of 1968 only 35 Gypsy 
families were dispersed in Slovakia. (146). 
Again, what Slovakian authorities actually meant by a dispersal 
is highly problematic; perhaps those, who went with the proceeds of 
their hut sales as unplanned migrants to the Czech lands figured as 
successful 'dispersals' in Slovakian statistics. 
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Figures for dispersals in the Czech lands are no less confusing 
but discrepancies nere are of little importance since the planned 
dispersal of a few hundred Gypsy families was dwarfed by the perpetual 
problem of unplanned migration, both within the Czech lands and from 
Slovakia. Local authorities proved as incapable of controlling 
Gypsy population movement after tie 1965 measures as they had before 
them and during the three years from 1966 to 1968 there were over 
three times as many recorded unplanned moves by Gypsies into and 
within the Czech lands as there were planned moves. 
(140). 
The scale of population movement involved is difficult to grasp 
at first but the 1969 report tried to put this in perspective. 
In comparison with [planned] transfers, wAch... 
dropped s.: arply from 1966 to 1968, unplanned 
migration remained at roughly the same level 
each year.... if we add together the number of 
families who changed their residence..., whether 
by planned transfer and dispersal or unplanned 
migration, we reach a surprising high figure. 
It is roughly 3,000 families (i. e. probably 
16,800 Gypsies which, for comparison, is probably 
a third of all Gypsies in the Czech lands in 
1965). in most cases NCs had to deal with their 
accommodation and other problems during the past 
three years [1966-19681. (140). 
Additional light was thrown on Gypsy migratory patterns by the 
special censuses of Gypsies in December 1967 and December 1968, which 
gave statistics of Gypsy movement for the current year. On the whole 
these confirmed expectations - that the rate of internal Gypsy 
migration was much higher within the Czech lands than within Slovakia 
and that more unplanned Gypsy migrants moved from Slovakia to the 
Czech lands than in the opposite direction, although less so in 1968. * 
This did not amount to a reversal of migratory flow as in the 
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Gypsy A ration (1967). (1967 Census : Table 36). 
(persons) 
iýiigrating Gypsies (persons) % of total 
ulation o G 
C/ 
of total 
ratin o mi Area 
Total Within Between 
p .p 
migrating 
p. g p a 
within country 
couztry* countries within country 
Czechoslovaxia 6,668x 2,440 4,221 2.99 1.59 
Czech lands 4,708 1,530 3,178+ 2.64 1.63 
Slovakia 1,953 910 1,043+ 0.55 0.89 
Notes: * Mi6rations within the district are not included in this 
table and since the majority of planned dispersals were 
within the district, these are not shown here. 
+ The second row shows inmigration to the Czech lands from 
Slovakia. 
The third row shows inmigration to Slovakia from the 
Czech lands. 
x This figure is compatible with the 16,800 quoted above 
for the three-year period 1966-1968 (140). However another 
1970 source (137) gave a much higher figure of 27,419 total 
Gypsy migrants for the same period, although proportions of 
migration types were similar. 
"" These percentages are for total migrants (i. e. within 
country plus between country but not including those 
who moved only within their district, of course). 
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These censuses also provided a useful comparison with non-Gypsies. 
The 1967 census revealed that although migration within Slovakia was 
less than within the Czech lands for Gypsies and tue total population 
aline, this difference was far more pronounced in the case of Gypsies. 
The proportion of Gypsies migrating within the same country was five 
times greater a'non; Gypsies in the Czech lands than among Gypsies in 
Slovakia, whilst amongst the total population the corresponding 
difference in proportions was only double. Indeed the rate of internal 
migration within Slovakia was lower for Gypsies than for the total 
population;. 
The figure of Gypsy migrants to the Czech lands from Slovakia 
included at most 1,000 Gypsies in planned transfers. Therefore this 
census su&, ested that in 1967 there were at least twice as many 
Gypsies migrating to the Czech lands from Slovakia without authorisation 
as there were returning to Slovakia from the Czech lands. 
iv) Eliminating sub-standard Gypsy dwellings and 
rehousing Gypsy families. 
This problem mainly concerned the Gypsy settlements of Slovakia 
and yet again a downward revision of the targets in the original 1; 67-1970 
plan (97) allowed relatively high success rates to be claimed in sub- 
sequent reports. If the initial targets are resubstituted, the rate for 
eliminating sub-standard dwellings drops from 67.1 per cent to 52.5 per 
cent for the four-year 1960-1969 period and likewise the rate for 
rehousing Gypsy f4ilies from 59.6 per cent to 52.2 per cent. The followinG 
table shows the officially claimed rates however. 
C) C) 
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Eliminating Gypsy dwellings and rehousing Gypsy families - 
clan and ieality (1966-1969). 
1966-1969 1966 - 1968 
Slovakia Czech lands Czechoslovakia* 
(147) (140) (140) 
nhyjezic Total (ßi7) 12,500 1,748 14,248 
ypsy Plan. elim. 5,314 919 4,919 
wellin&s Reality 3,568 689+ - 
fulfilled 67.1% - - 
ypsy Total (97) 16,500 2,119 18,619 
families Flan. reaoused 7,183 436 5,236 
to be Raality 4,280 235 3,729 
ehoused fulfilled 59.6% 54% 71.2% 
* The totals for Czechoslovakia are compiled using 1966-68 
figures for Slovakia from (140). 
+ Figure for 1967 and 1968 only. 
Of the ambitious plan to eliminate by 1970 over six hundred of the 
1027 'undesirable gypsy concentrations' in Slovakia (i. e. 60 per cent) 
there was little mention and certainly no table of detailed results. 
The 1969 Slovakian report (147) listed 927 such concentrations which 
meant that by December 1969 less than IQ per cent had been eliminated. 
f) u 
v) The Construction of Amenities in Gypsy Settlements 
Once ro e, initial targets were lowered to produce more flattering 
results. If the 1967 targets of 284 wells and 537 , QCs for the four-year 
period 1967-1970 are substituted for their counterparts for the 1966- 
10,69 period, the extent to which the plans weg: e fulfilled drops to 
58.8 and 48 per cent respectively. Another rather more graphic way 
of measuring performaice is to catch the amenities constructed 
against the to-Gal of 'undesirable gypsy concentrations' listed in 
1969: for example one ; yew well was provided for every fifth such 
concentration, one new toilet for every third. 
Other targets given by the 1969 Slovakian report - for road 
building, electrical connections, public lighting and stream 
regulation - remained the same as in the 1967 plan. (97). This lends 
support to the practice of comparinZ directly the fipurea for the two 
overlapping four-year periods. 
Construction of basic amenities in Gypsy settlements 
in Slovakia - (1966-1969). (147). 
Wells WCs Roads(Km) Elect. Public Regulation 
connections lighting of streams 
lan 227 387 120 70 43 26 
Realised 167 258 63 14 21 4 
' fulfilled 73.5 66.7 52.5 20.0 48.9 15.4 
.. 
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An Assessment of the Effectiveness of the 1965 i; easures. 
Judged at their most basic level - as an attempt to scatter 
physically large numbers of Gypsies by means of a planned 
programme of population transfer and dispersal, funded by the 
central exchequer and co-ordinated and enforced by an improved 
administrative structure - the 1965 measures were as ineffectual 
as their 195ä predecessors had been. 
The most dramatic element of the plan - to lighten Slovakia's 
load by the transfer of some 500 Gypsy families a year to the Czech 
lands - was an almost total failure. Yet even had the plan worked 
in its entirety it could hot have kept pace with the natural population 
growth in Slovakia; the reservoir of G; psy settlements was filling 
at a faster raue than it could be emptied, as the Government Committee 
realised in its April 1967 report. 
The transfer of part of the gypsy population to the 
Czech regions, as envisaged in the planned timetable, 
provides only ligited assistance to the overall 
solution for fulfi3,, ment of the programme does not 
cover even the expected natural growth of the gypsy 
population of Slovakia in the years 1966-1970. (94) 
In the event the number of families transferred during the whole 
period amounted to less than 500 in all and of these almost a quarter 
failed to remain at their new destination. 
Local dispersals appeared more successful but, leaving aside 
arguments about the extent to which various planned targets had been 
approached, the direct impact of the transfer and dispersal proGramiae 
on the Gypsy population as a whole was strictly limited. Even if the 
questionable Slovakian statistics for dispersals are taten at their 
face value the number of Gypsies involved in transfers and dispersals 
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was at most 22,500 (i. e. 4,500 families). This was less than 10 per 
cent of the Republic's Gypsy population (1968 Census) and only half 
the proportion that was intended to benefit from these measures. (97). 
Meanwhile ti-: is restricted level of planned population movement was 
dwarfed in significance by natural migration, which appeared to 
continue more or less unchecked as before. 
The re-organised administrative structure, on which the success 
of the 1965 measures depended, proved wholly inadequate to the task. 
The impotence of the co-ordinating Government Committee was evident 
in the declining rate of transfer and dispersal and even more so in 
the low level of budget utilisation by local authorities. This 
meant, among other things, the deterioration of conditions in the 
settlements as the 6rowin population steadily increased preisure 
on already scarce amenities. 
Had the Government Committee not lapsed into inaction well 
before its formal dissolution in December 1968, all it could have 
done after the initial agreement of the programme would have been to 
monitor the ruin of its plans. 
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AFTERMATH :: ; CONSIDERATION OF THE 1958 POLICY 
(1968- ) 
THE RE-EMERGENCE OF THE NATIONAL c UCESTiON 
If economic failure had demoralised and weakened the Novotny 
regime to the point that it could be overthrown, ever-present Slovak 
nationalism provided much of the impetus that allowed this opportunity 
for change to be seized. i4Fovotny's policy to repress all separatist 
aspirations whilst hopefully undermining them by purely ecohomic 
measures proved a failure and from 1963 onwards accumulated Slovak 
grievances played a major role in challenging and eventually ousting 
his leadership. Consequently a central aspect of the political 
reforms of 1968 was the correction of the centralist trend of the 
prexious twenty years or more. 
This re-emergence of the national question concerned not only 
the Slovaks but other minority nationalities and the Gypsies too. 
The Gypsy leaders and their sympathisers who had formerly campaigned 
for Gypsy cultural associations and recognition of the Gypsy language 
renewed their demands. An important 1968 article by a leading Czech 
Gypsiologist recalled their past Efforts. 
In April 1960 a group of the Bratislava Gypsy 
intelligentsia (a doctor, a philosopher, a 
builder, a musician, an artistic craftsman and 
an official) sent a letter to the government of 
Czechoslovakia in which they requested that Gypsies 
be recognised as a nationality, that they be 
permitted to form a cultural association of 
Czechoslovak Gypsies so that the might have their 
own artistic [musical and dance 
Y 
group and night 
publish their own journal (like-Gypsies in the 
USSR, Bulgaria, Hungary, France etc. ) 
(Hibschniannovä : 33) 
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According to the criteria in operation from 1958 onwards these 
people were not rebarded technically as Gypsies since their level of 
education and employment indicated that they were 'successfully 
assimilated'. Evidently this was not how they regarded themselves 
for their letter was bitterly critical of the development of policy 
towards Gypsies since the war and in particular of the repressive 
nature of the 1956) policy. * 
After 1; 45 things i; aproved [for Gypsies] in 
Czechoslovakia but as time went on various 
party and government measures did not achieve 
the expected [results].... Tinis was mainly 
because Gypsies did not have their own organis- 
ation, which would have helped in a responsible 
way in solving the so-called gypsy questions. 
Administrative measures like forcible resettling, 
planning how many Gypsies there should be and where, 
only increased the difficulties of co-existance in 
our society. Up till now the measures to solve the 
problems have been more[ a display of] power than 
they should have been. Very often the so-called 
gypsy questions have been solved without the 
participation of Gypsy-Roms. For this reason we 
have proposed the formation of a cultural educational 
organisation in Czechoslovakia - the Association of 
Czechoslovak Gypsy-Roms. 
(quoted hübsch. -n=ova : 33) 
The letter went on to challenge the long-terra goal of 'assimilation' 
as understood in 1958, and in its place suggested a more humane and 
also realistic policy of pluralist development which could replace 
conflict by co-existence between Gypsies and non-Gypsies. 
The Gypsiologist was even more outspoken in her condemnation: 
Who divides Gypsies into groups? Who stamps and 
sorts them? Who decides if they live a 'typically 
gypsy life' or if they are 'suitable enough' to 
move? (Hubschmannovä : 39) 
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What do we [Gypsies] really want? And what do 
the [non-Gypsy 7 official representatives want? 
Do we want tj avoid conflict and that we-non- 
Gypsies and Gypsies alike - should participate in 
our common society? Or do we want Gypsies to 
'assimilate' which - as it has been understood up 
till now and is still un:: erstood - presupposes 
that they must surrender their own values, their 
own language, their own folk-lore and their own 
interests? 
Is such an assimilation as this necessary? 
(ibid. ) 
Polemics such as this struck a chord in the popular press where 
feature-writers began to probe the question of the appalling conditions 
in the Gypsy settlements of Slovakia. The previous tones of indignant 
self-righteousness or, alternatively, of smug optimism were replaced 
by unease and even guilt that such thins were possible. Some 
journalists even tried to image what it must feel like to be Gypsies 
living under such conditions with little apparent hope of escape. 
I have already walked through many settlements. 
Everywhere I met Gypsies either sad or wild with 
grief. Even when they sometimes attacked me with 
an axe or cooking knife it was a despairing torment 
which gave them courage. And always enough people 
could be found who were concerned that nothing 
should happen to me. So I came among true Gypsies 
and in their anger and their grief they were proud. 
(Sidon). 
And so, if the slackening of political control during 1968 allowed 
'racist" NCs to neglect their tasks of transferring, dispersing and 
rehousing Gypsies, at least there was the compensation that 'liberal 
uncritical pseudohumanists " could at last express their views in print. 
* Sus' terminology for these two kinds of opponent of the 
assimilation policy. (Sus : 111). 
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'l he government had found little difficulty in silencing the 
critics of its 3ypsy policy after 1958 but a decade later all the 
Government Committee could do was utter feeble protests. 
The national press has started to write about the 
1; roblems of gyps; - questions. The activity of this 
section of the press must be judged inadequate 
and in some examples considerably subjective. Some 
articles (e. g. in Literarni Listy, Tvorba, Slovenka) 
judged the situation in Slovakia one-sidedly, only 
paying attention to the negative aspects. 
(94). 
The eventual autcome of nationalist pressures throughout 1968 
was a substantive strengthening of the legal position of major 
national minorities in the Republic. The extent of redress was 
directly related to the strength of the minority in question; the 
formal status of the Slovak nation was revised by federalising the 
Republic, the more important national minorities were given additional 
protection by a new law which expressly forbade "all forms of pressure 
aiming at denationalisation", whilst the large yet organisationally 
weakest Gypsy community was considered for national minority status 
but rejected as 'an uncrystallised ethnic group'. 
The appropriate experts decided, after some deliberation, that 
Gypsies could not be regarded as on the same level as other national 
minorities (Price : 9.10.68) and in this way the minority which had 
suffered the most direct and explicit assimilatory pressures was 
given no official acknowledgement of the fact, nor any legal safeguard 
that the previous policy would not be resumed. 
Nevertheless there was considerable official disquiet about the 
anomalous Gypsy, -community which so closely resembled a national 
minority in many important respects. Eventually a peculiar compromise 
was adopted; in place of formal recognition as a national minority 
348 
Gypsies were granted the privileges of a national minority, but with 
no guarantee that these would continue. In : dovember 1968-the same 
month in which the Government Committee was dissolved - permission 
was granted by the Ministry of the Interior for the formation of 
Gypsy associations in the Czech lands and in Slovakia, which were 
to be affiliated to the National Front. (147). 
The new policy-line on Gypsies was not firm and clear, as 
had been the case in 1958; it was tentative and uncertain of its 
theoretical justification. In addition it was not comprehensive 
either, for although the decision to recognise the validity of 
Gypsy identity effectively negated the current policy of assimilation, 
little attempt was made to spell out the full implications to the 
various official bodies which administered Gypsy affairs, although 
in any case the mechanism for a co-ordinated approach ceased to 
exist as federalisation took effect. As a result contradictory 
policy-lines were sometimes pursued at the same time andinthe same 
area. Whereas in the Czech lands efforts were made to reappraise 
the previous policy and even to integrate the Gypsy association into 
decision-making bodies, the Slovakian authorities remained aloof from 
the association of Slovakian Gypsies and persisted with a policy of 
assimilation - modified by little more than a few cosmetic changes 
such as the substitution of the term 'acculturation' wherever the 
term 'assimilation' -would formerly have been used. 
The key decision to permit the formation of Gypsy associations 
did not steci from any deep conviction on the part of central government 
that it had been fundamentally mistaken in the past* but derived more 
* Undoubtedly a few experts who advised the government at this 
time did hold this view with passion. 
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from the general current of liberalisation and democratisation that 
had happened to co-incide with the collapse of the dispersal and 
transfer programme. Confronted with the evident breakdown of its 
timetable the government seemed at a loss and appeared to take the 
decision opportunistically in a mood of despondent resignation. 
flatters could hardly deteriorate and perhaps the direct involvement 
of Gypsies in some organised fashion might actually prove beneficial. 
There was another, subsidiary reason why the associations were 
permitted - political expediency. At a time when popular feeling was 
violently anti-Soviet as a result of the Au&ust invasion, the govern- 
ment of 'normalisation' was in desperate need of public support. 
Among the drastic measures to re-establish control the National Front 
had been purged of all organisations containing 'anti-Soviet and anti- 
Socialist elements', that is of almost all the Front's previous 
members, and therefore new and ideologically uncontaminated recruits 
were urgently required. (TJlcM; 41). As entirely hew organisations, 
the proposed Gypsy associations were especially suitable and - more 
importantly while opposition to the post-1958 regime was still strong - 
they were willing to proclaim their loyalty to the regime and their 
approval of Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakian affairs. Like 
the Slovaks - and with far more justification - their immediate 
concern was to consolidate their newly-won advantages, but in any 
case their pro-Soviet stance derived from a deeper source than 
opportunistic scheming; while the Red Army had liberated the other 
nationalities of Czechoslovakia from Nazi rule, it had saved the Gypsies 
from physical extermination. 
It is evident that there was no real official cocmnitt ment to 
the principle of Gypsy associations for the motives that lay behind 
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permission for their formation were largely negative. In some ways 
the short-lived rise of the associations was a sad repetition of the 
Gypsies' accustomed historical role as tools in the service of 
reactionary and unpopular rulers. 
For a time the Gypsy associations' strategy paid off handsomely 
and they succeeded in gaining numerous short-term benefits, but once 
'normalisation' had been achieved such marginal support became an 
irrelevance which could be discarded after a decent interval had 
elapsed. When the assocations failed to matcn the high level of 
performance demanded of them, their inevitably erratic progress 
irritated the regime and even became a political embarrassment as 
other national minorities began to complain at the Gypsies' privileged 
treatment. Early in 1973 the Gypsy associations were simply ordered 
to disband for having 'failed to fulfil their integrative &nction'. ' 
The original bureaucratic decision went unrecorded and against it 
there was no possibility of appeal. 
THE IMPACT OF FEDERALISATION 
Federalisation of the Republic in late 1968 provided the 
opportunity to dismantle the already moribund administrative apparatus 
in charge of the Gypsy policy. It also proved a suitable moment to 
assess the extent of the failure of the Dispersal and Transfer 
programme which, in turn, led to a critical re-examination of the 
policy's basic aims. This was a period of general confusion for, 
apart from the numbing shock of the August invasion of Czechoslovakia 
The associations "were guilty of not fulfilling their main . 10 
ra : 386 note 31). taskst". (Ka 
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by the Warsaw Pact armies, there was no overall plan for the co- 
ordinated re-structuring of the administrative apparatus on a 
federated basis; instead, changes took place often out of phase 
and in piecemeal fashion resulting in anomalies that sometimes took 
years to resolve. In no area was this more true than in that of 
Gypsy affairs. 
O November 7th 1968 Government Decree no. 384 finally dissolved 
the Government Committee for questions of the Gypsy Population. The 
Committee had not met once during 1968 and the programme it should 
have been supervising was at an almost complete standstill. Local 
authorities hostile to the 1958 policy new they had won and in the 
Czech lands "some NCs, acting against the Government Decree Ho. 502/65 , 
began to dissolve their NC council committees for Gypsy affairs... when 
the Government Committee was dissolved". (140). Meanwhile in Slovakia 
the demise of the Committee only "hastened the drop in interest shown 
by leading DNC officials". (146). 
Responsibility for Gypsy affairs passed to the Ministry of 
labour ahd Social Affairs which set to wor:; energetically and 
assembled all available materials about the 
Gypsy population including comments on previous 
practice, which showed the unreality of some 
conclusions of Government Decree No. 502/65. 
Before these conclusions could be more precisely 
formulated the state was federalised. (140). 
It was hardly surprising that the Ministry was unable to finalise 
its findinbs for on December 22nd, barely six weeks after it had 
assumed responsibility, the Ministry's staff and files were divided 
as a consequence of Constitutional Law 171/1968, which established a 
federal ministry. Shortly afterwards, on January 8th 1969, a subordinate 
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Czech national ministry w,;. s established by Czech National Council 
law 2/1969. Although Slovakia followed suit with its own ministry, 
it was ; iecided that Gypsy affairs could be best handled by a con- 
tinuation of the previous administrative structure, albeit limited 
to only half of the Republic. Accordingly a Slovakian Government 
Coriunittee for G psy affairs was established by SSR Government Decree 
No. 50/1969 on February 7th 1969. (137)" 
This asymmetric arrangement meant, in affect, that there was 
now no means of co-ordination between the Czech lands and Slovakia. 
While the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs h--d overall 
responsibility for the entire Republic, Gypsy affairs were not the 
concern of its subordinate national ministry in Slovakia but of a 
committee directly attached to the Slovakian government and this out- 
side and above federal ministry control. 
Althougri the Czechs eventually adopted the Slovakian structure 
two years later, during the intervening period they made good use 
of the new freedom -a predictable consequence of federalisation - to 
place their own particular interests before the general well-being 
of the Republic. At least that was how it appeared to the Slovaks 
who watched in dismay as the Czechs progressively dismantled the 
previous policy : first returning overall responsibility from the 
Government Committee to a separate ministry - as had been the situation 
before 1965, then rejecting the fundamental policy aim of dispersal 
and finally, in November 1970, revoking the 1965 measures by the 
unilateral cancellation of Government Decree No. 502/1965. 
The Slovaks protested impotently at the dissolution of the 
Government Committee and at subsequent developments in the Czech 
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lands, seeing in them the legitimisation at national level of the 
previously near-illegal resistance of Czech NCs to the transfer 
programme and also an ominous statement of intent by the Czech 
lands that henceforth they refused to accept an equal share of a 
problem of wh9le-state dimensions. 
LThe di::, solution of the Government CommitteeJ.... 
perhaps suits the Czeca regions, where there are 
about 40,000 Gypsies. In Slovakia, where we have 
today 170,000 (and of these perhaps 100,000 living 
under quite inhuman conditions), the latest 
administrative structure for solvin8 the gypsy 
question is utterly unsuitable. (146). 
If the 1968 dissolution of the Government Committee had been 
opposed in Slovakia, at least its formal legality was undisputed for 
one Czechoslovak government decree had rescinded another. However, 
Czech Government Decree No. 279/70, cancellin; the 1965 measures and 
the dispersal and transfer timetable, was another matter for here was 
a national government decree rescinding for its half of the Republic 
a decree issued by the government of the whole Republic without the 
agreement of its partner national government. It is true that in any 
case this timetable had lapsed at the end of 1970 but the legal 
anomaly remained. Only in Aucust 1972 did the Slovakian government 
finally agree to rescind the 1965 measures, at last ending the 
bizarre situation where, for two years, nominal Slovakian policy had 
been to continue transferring Gypsies to -the Czech lands even though 
the Czechs had cancelled their side of the bargain. Slovakian 
Government Decree No. 94/1972 was soon followed by Czechoslovakian 
Government Decree No. 231/1972 which replaced both Czech and Slovr ; ian 
decrees and finally restored equilibrium. ff(Cara : 61). 
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In the meantime no attempt was made to remove law 74 from the 
statute book. Unaltered since its appearance in 1958, this law 
remained in force throughout the Republic and with it the Nomads' 
Register. Although idCs had removed many Gypsies from the Register 
during the period from 1958 to 1965, the subsequent failure to 
update the law and its consequent inapplicability as a means of 
controlling natural migration had led to growing NC inactivity in 
this practice. In 1970 a Slovakian report noted: 
Cf the original total of more than 27,000 Gypsies 
[in 1959], 10,000 were gradually removed from the 
register according to their acculturation..... 
Today 17,000 Gypsies remain on the register of 
which more than half fulfil the conditions for 
removal from the register accordinä to the 
criteria specified by law. (147). 
The fact that law 74 had fallen into disuse as a direct control 
did not mean that it was quite immaterial to Gypsies whether they 
were still included in the Nomads' Register; this was far from the 
case. On occasions, either from misguided conscientiousness or more 
commonly when it suited them, employers and local authorities still 
pointed to the incriminating stamp in the Gypsies' identity catdo as 
a reason for refusing to employ them or register them as letal 
residents. 
THE SITUATION OF THE GYPSIES AFB A DECADE 
OF ASSIMILATIONISM. 
In trying to assess the contribution of the n33ini tion 
campaign to the undoubted overall improvement in Gypsies' conditions 
that occurred between 1958 and 1970, it is essential to recognise 
that these are not the same thing. Official reports made no such 
355 
distinction however and fror the inception of the 1958 policy they 
automatically claimed any advance as a success of the assimilation 
campaign - presumably on the assumption that since the policy was 
intended as comprehensive, absolutely every change that took place 
could be safely attributed to it. 
There are good grounds for doubting this assumption for in 
spite of the government's determination not to rely simply on the 
impetus of the socialist revolution to take care of the Gypsy 
question, it is probable that in the long run this groundswell 
contributed more to the Gypsies' well-being than any of the grandiose 
plans specifically designed for that purpose. It can even be argued 
that on the whole the Gypsies would have been better off without the 
Gypsy policy because some major improvements in their situation such 
as their growing employment rate and increasing incomes were 
achieved more in spite of the policy than because of it. For all 
practical purposes the 1958 and 1965 measures did more to put 
barriers in the path of would-be Gypsy migrant workers by restricting 
their freedom of movement than they did to provide them with new, 
well-paid employment opportunities. 
Probably there can be no final answer to these important 
questions; indeed it is hard enough to gauge with any accuracy the 
extent to which the situation of the Gypsies had improved during the 
decade of assimilationism. 
ýýý 
Nevertheless statistical information 
about Gypsies increased in frequency, scale and accuracy during 
this period and in site of unavoidable problems it is well worth 
making an attempt to sketch the situation of Gypsies in the late 
1960s. To this end a number of statistic tables are given in 
Appendix 'A' at the end of this chapter. 
When evaluating progress after 1958, the central authorities 
had relied tý a great extent on the experience of Slovakia and in 
particular of the East Slovakia Region which surpassed all other 
regions in detailed and reliable reporting. 
Following the collapse of the dispersal and transfer programme, 
however, new national statistics about Gypsies were available from 
the State Statistical Office's censuses of Gypsies in December 1967 
and December 1968. 
Eventually additional information was derived from the December 
1970 national census but figures from this source must be treated 
with some caution since many Gypsies were evidently not included as 
such. Despite widespread evidence of a continued high birth-rate 
among Gypsies in the years 1969 and 1970, the national census gave 
a figure of 202,285 Gypsies in Czechoslovakia, 24,182 less than the 
1968 figures of 226,467 (see Appendix 'A', Table 1). The 1966, 
1967 and 1968 figures had shown a population increase among Gypsies 
of roughly 2,500 per year and projecting this to 1970 would give a 
total population of about 231,500, which meant that over 10, E of 
Gypsies were not classified as Gypsies in the 1970 census. Since 
the 1966,1967 and 1968 figures only represented those requiring 
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official attention (and classified into the three categories of 
'cultural level', the real number of people who would have re&; ýrded 
themselves and would have normally been regarded by others as 
Gypsies was estimated in 1970 at between 250,000 and 300,000 by 
Dr. Srb, who had supervised the 1967 and 1968 censuses. 
(Srb : 
193)" Despite such difficulties, the 1967 and 1963 censuses of 
Gypsies contain what is probably the most extensive and reliable 
statistical information about Gypsies ever collected and published, 
not only in Czechoslovakia but throughout the world. * 
The most depressing figures were those compiled from NC reports 
showing the failure of the 'Dispersal and Transfer' policy from which 
so much had been expected. Yet other statistics were scarcely more 
comforting and, as was the case in the 1958-65 period, the 
experience of the local districts of Spisska Novä Ves and its Czech 
partners was evidently a reflection of national developments. 
The Gypsy population continued to grow at a far faster rate 
than the national average, which often led to a direct worsening of 
other problems, especially in areas of high concentration. (See 
Appendix 'A', table 2). This population increase was due to the 
continuing high birth rate (see Appendix 'A', table 3). This increazo 
was also reflected in an age structure where 50.7; of CSSR'o Gypsy 
population was under 16 years of age. (150: I/2). 
The most immediate negative effects of the rapidly-increasing 
population were apparent in accomodation statistics. 
+ With the possible exception of Sweden where the numbers of 
, Gypsies are minute in comparison. 
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Bearing in mind problems in operationally defining these terms, 
v 
80,029 Gypsies (ie. 35.7iß of the total CSSR Gypsy population) lived 
in Gypsy 'settlements' in Slovakia, of which 64,096 lived in 'huts'. 
(1967 Census : Tables 30,32). Of the total of 31,361 Gypsy dwellings 
12,232 (39%) were declared to be "hygenically and otherwise 
inadequate", although the inherent unreliability of such subjective 
evaluations was emphasised by the fact that more than half of the 
'huts' were declared to be 'adequate'. (1967 Census : Tables 29, 
33). If it were possible to give any clear meaning to these concepts, 
this would be a contradiction in terms. 
Of greater objectivity and significance were figures showing 
the overcrowding in Gypsy dwellings. In the East Slovakia Region 
in 1964 there had been an average 1.15 households and 6.9 persons 
per dwelling (21), but in Slovakia as a whole these figures had 
risen by 1967 to 1.3 households and 7.5 persons per dwelling. * 
Figures for Gypsies in the Czech lands were better but not greatly 
so (see Appendix 'A", Table 4). Incidentally, overcrowding in 
'settlements' and 'huts' was the same as for Gypsies in Slovakia 
generally. (1967 Census : Tables 29,30,32). 
This increase in overcrowding was a direct consequence of 
Gypsy population growth and administrative failure to provide 
sufficient additional accommodation in the 'dispersal and transfer' 
programme. 
Comparable figures are not yet available from the 1970 cen3u3 
but statistics were published on the average size of Gypsy dwellings. 
*A 1970 Slovak report (147) gave this 1965 figure as 7.4 persons 
per dwelling for all Gypsies in Slovakia but this seems too high. 
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These showed that for Gypsies in the Czech lands 50.656 of their 
dwellings consisted of a kitchen plus one living room, or less, 
while for Slovakia the figure was 59.3%. These cramped quarters 
housed 43.1ö and 55.45a respectively of the Gypsy population. 
(150 : Table V/1). 
Although no wide-scale statistics had been available previously, 
the 1970 figures on basic amenities within dwellings suggested a 
considerable increase in these among Gypsies, especially in possession 
of TV sets and washing machines (in 56.7% and 43.9%ä respectively of 
Gypsy dwellings in Czechoslovakia). The difference between Gypsies 
and non-Gypsies still remained but appeared to be diminishing. (See 
Appendix 'A', Table 5- which also showed the overall difference in 
amenities between the Czech lands and Slovakia). 
Unfortunately no data on two of the most basic amenities - 
drinking water and toilets - was published, indeed the 1970 census 
form did not even list the possibilities of a household obtaining 
water from a village pump or completely without water. It seems 
probable that, as with accommodation, the Gypsy population in 
Slovakia grew faster than these amenities were provided (a total 
of 222 wells and 279 toilets between 1966 and 1970 - (147,148)). 
Employment statistics however continued to show a steady 
improvement, both for Gypsy men and women until by 1970 in the Czech 
lands 87.67% of men and 51.55% of women of productive age (15 to 
59 years for men, 15 to 54 years for women) were employed. /See 
Appendix W, Table 6) . 
1970 was, in fact, a landmark for it was the first time any 
target of the 1958 measures had been achieved, although in a limited 
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way. For the employment level of Gypsy men, in the Czech lands at 
least, had at last reached the national average for men of productive 
age (86%% in 1967. (Yearbook : 102)). Although the majority of 
these Gypsies were employed as unskilled labourers in industry and 
construction, these were well-paid jobs that laid solid economic 
foundations for further consolidation. 
The figures for Gypsy women in the Czech lands still lagged 
behind the national average (74% in 1967 (Yearbook : 102)), as did 
those for Gypsy men and women in Slovakia (78.9yä and 27.1%ö respectively 
(see Appendix °A', table 6)), but there was regular progress. 
The problem of unemployed adolescents still remained, although 
mainly in Slovakia where of unemployed fifteen year-old school- 
leavers 33.1% were Gypsies. (1967 Census : Table 18). 
Also encouraging were health statistics. The rate of infant 
mortality among Gypsies in 1967 was 0.3494 in the Czech lands and 
0.55% in Slovakia (1967 Census : Table 23), a considerable improvement 
on the 1964 East Slovak Region rate of 0.71iä for Gypsies (10), but 
still well above the 1967 national average of 0.23% (167). 
The incidence of TB had diminished. In 1967 there were 0.58% 
of Gypsies with active TB in the Czech lands and 0.91% in Slovakia 
(1967 Census : Table 24) whereas the 1964 figure for Gypsies in 
Slovakia had been 2.4% (21). Also the percentage of child cases 
(under 15 years) among Gypsies with TB had dropped from 22% (for the 
E. Slovakia Region in 1964 (10)) to 13% (1967 Census : Table 24). 
A general improvement in health was also reflected in the 
decrease in invalid pensions. In Slovakia 5.4% of all Gypsies had 
drawn invalid pensions in 1964 (which represented 11.254 of Gypsies 
cC-161 . 46 
of productive age). (10). In 1967, however, the corresponding 
percentages had dropped to 2.8, and 5.7% respectively. (1967 Census : 
Table 26). Gypsies still received a higher proportion of social 
pensions than their share of the total population but this was 
explained by the fact that a relatively small proportion of Gypsies 
were eligible for old-age pensions, for these were tied to previous 
employment. (1967 Census : Table 26). 
Education statistics are difficult to interpret. Nursery school 
attendance appeared to show a slight improvement. In 1964 only 1.4% 
of Gypsy children (0.. 15 years) had attended nursery school in the 
East Slovakia Region (21), but in 1967 this percentage was 1.9% 
for Gypsy children in Slovakia and 6.6% in the Czech lands (1967 
Census : Table 11). The 1964 national average had been 9.7% (Facts : 
128). 
For BNS school attendance figures were only available for 
Slovakia but the percentage of Gypsy children with bad school 
attendance (i. e. miýised at least 30 hours of teaching or did not 
attend at all), rose from 360106 for the school year 1965/1966 to 
47.8% for 1969/1970. (150 : Table II/1). Performance, on the other 
hand, apparently improved. Although the overall percentage of 
Gypsy children that proceeded to the next grade remained between 55% 
and 60% (56.9% for the Czech lands and 59.8 for Slovakia (150 : 
Table II/4,63.3% of Gypsy school leavers had reached 6th grade or 
higher (150 : Table 11/5). 
The placing of school leavers still gave cause for concern, 
particularly in Slovakia where 1fOw of Gypsy school leavers remained 
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at home or were otherwise unplaced in 1969 and 
41.1; ö in 1970. In 
the Czech lands the corresponding figures were 22% and 17.3; % (see 
Appendix ''A', ', able 7). After promising years in 1967 and 1968 the 
number of Gypsy adolescents in secondary education and apprenticeships 
dropped sharply in 1969, although the 1970 figures suggested a 
possible recovery. (See Appendix 
AAS, Table 8). 
one important aspect of education not coversd by the 1970 
statistics was the high percentage of Gypsies in all residential 
institutions for children, especially in Slovakia. The 1967 Slovakia 
figures showed that of all children in infants homes (0-1 year) 
20.9% were Gypsies, in childrens' homes (1-3 years) 63.5%, in 
childrens' homes (3-15 years) 34.8% and in homes for young people 
(15-18 years) 38.7%. 
In all, 2.5% of the Gypsy children (0-15 years) in Slovakia in 
1967 were living in state institutions. (See Appendix 'A!, table 9). 
In addition further capacity was required, for example the number 
ofýGypsies in childrens' homes was only 54; ö of Gypsy children 
requiring a place. (1967 Census : Table 20). 
Literacy statistics were given only for the 15-39 years age- 
group. The 1967 census stated that at the very least 13% of all 
adult Gypsies in Czechoslovakia were illiterate but that this percentage 
was certain to be much higher in reality. (1967 Census : Table 5). In 
1970 a total of 63 literacy classes had been planned but only 5 
realised. (148). 
Other plans for educational courses for Slovakia in 1970 were 
more successful with 60 cooking classes, 36 sewing classes and 58 
other classes being realised. Also 19 summer camps were held. (148). 
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Censuses gave no details of criminality, but a 1969 report by 
the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs showed that Gypsies were 
four times more likely to be charged with an offence than the 
average citizen. (. ý20 per 1000 as opposed to 73 per 1000). 
(140). 
Of the 3,897 Gypsies charged in 1967 57E were recidivists and 28% 
were in the 15-19 year-old a 6e group. (140). 
39% of all Gypsy offences were committed under the influence 
of alcohol and most frequent offences were fighting and bodily 
injury (29%) and thefts (27%). (140). No separate statistics were 
given on drunkenness but the proportion of Gypsy offences committed 
under the influence of alcohol was probably more indicative of 
widespread Gypsy alcoholosm than anything else. A 1966 document 
reported that "Prague has 85 Gypsies attending its advisory centres 
for alcoholics which is roughly 10% of the adult gypsy population 
of Frague". (88). 
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Administrative Structure. 
From the critical viewpoint of Slovakia, Czech re-evaluation of 
the administrative structure for dealing with Gypsy affairs 
consisted of three or fcur years of ponderous deliberation in order 
to arrive eventually at a position fundamentally the same as that 
from which tt ' had started. The more cynical among the Slovak 
officials suspected that the real point of the exercise was to delay 
the re-introduction of a co-ordinated structure for the whole 
Republic until it was certain that there would be no revival of 
I 
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population transfers of Gypsies from Slovakia to the Czech lands. 
Whether tr: is belief is justified, the Czech gyrations between 1968 
and 1972 seemed a repetition of the sorts of argument that had 
preceded the 1y05 measures. 
The first step was to agree a division of labour whereby the 
federal ministry had responsibility for long-term planning, based 
on scientific researcr, (the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences had at 
last recruited researchers in September 1968, (140)), while the 
national ministry was to concentrate "only on questions of social 
care... in the narrower sense". (140). In practice, the work of the 
two ministries overlapped considerably. 
As well as reviewing the overall situation, the new Czech 
national ministry critically examined the current administrative 
system both at local and national level. Four alternative solutions 
were discussed, of which the only one to give NC committees for 
Gypsy affairs the power to act independently was rejected immediately. 
They cannot have the position of executive committees 
because they do not decide on the rights and duties 
either of citizens or of organisations. (140). 
The three remaining possibilities were all for advisory status but 
differed in respect of the potential influence that would follow 
from attaching these advisory committees to bodies at different 
levels in the NC hierarchy. 
1*0 As advisory bodies of the department of social 
welfare... their activities would be limited in 
practice to social problems in the narrower sense 
H 3G5 
only and they could only participate in the 
solution of other problems by advice to other NC bode 
il() As advisory bodies to NC councils 
[the post-1955 system] (therefore as advisory 
committees to elected NC bodies which direct 
the executive bodies) they could judge more 
effectively and more broadly all partial aspects, 
organise the activity of INC branches concerned 
and their policy advice could be put into 
practice quite flexibly by means of NC councils. 
As NC committees (elected by plena composed 
mainly of elected deputies) they could engage 
even more effectively in overall care in the 
widest sense and control the fulfilment of key 
measures by the position and means specified 
for such committees] in the law on NCs. (140). 
Either of the two last alternatives were recommended but the 
ministry expected that "these preliminary remarks on organisation 
will lead to a closer evaluation of all alternatives". (140). It 
was suggested that such NC committees be established at LNCs, MNCs 
and SNCs with more than 200 Gypsy inhabitants, at DNCs with more 
than 500 and at all RNCs and cities. 
The recommendations at national level followed similar reasoning, 
for the 1968 belief that the ministry could provide overall co- 
ordination was fallacious for the same reason that local committees 
for Gypsy affairs would be severely limited in their scope of 
activities if attached to social welfare departments. The Ministry 
of Labour and Social Affairs could no more direct its fellow 
ministries than could NC departments of social welfare direct their 
fellow departments. 
Further disadvantages were that if ministry recommendations on 
local administrative structure were adopted, then the ministry would 
be unable to direct the operations of the resulting local committees 
for Gypsy affairs since they would be outside its jurisdiction. For 
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similar reasons the ministry would be unable to co-operate properly 
with the Gypsy associations for in their status as social organisations 
affiliated to the National Front, their proper administrative partners 
would be other members of the Front, e. g. Government. 
Therefore the ministry recommended that a special committee 
be established as an advisory body of the Government 
(ie. the post- 
1965 Government Committee once more). This would also simplify co- 
operation with Slovakia, which had immediately adopted this system 
on the dissolution of the former Government Committee. (140). 
On the 25th November 1970 the Czech Government Decree No. 279/70 
was issued, replacing previous Government Decrees No. 502/65 (the 
1965 measures) and No. 159/67 (approving the dispersal and transfer 
timetable). 
A Czech Government Committee was established as overall national 
co-ordinator, with a very similar composition to the previous 1965 
Government Committee except that its members were from Czech not 
Czechoslovak bodies and included the president of the Czech Gypsy- 
Rom Association. (144). 
At local level the recommendations of the ministry had been 
accepted and committees for Gypsy affairs were attached to NC 
councils (the third alternative above) although a year later their 
importance was increased by attaching them to NC plena (the fourth 
alternative above). However, a 1971 federal report oomplained that 
in some districts (chiefly in Slovakia) the most important officials 
in these committees, the secretaries, were not released from other 
NC responsibilities and were thus only part-timers. (150). 
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The Fro, )lern of relatin6 and co-ordinating the Czech and 
Slovak 
Government Committees was not resolved. In theory a third committee 
attached t:. the federal government should have been established 
but 
in practice the only federal body to speak for the whole republic 
was the Federal :. inistry of labour and Social Affairs. however, 
for the admiaist=ative reasons given a'-ove, this body was in no 
positio: i to ., irect Government 
Committees. 
Policy Chances 
If the re-examination of administrative structures in the Czech 
lands consisted of little more than retreading old paths - including 
the crucial avoidance of giving; executive power to any level of 
special committee for Gypsy affairs - this was hardly true of policy 
re-evaluation. The permission granted for Gypsy associations to 
establish themselves already constituted a major policy reversal 
but this did not remain an exceptional and isolated fiat; it began 
an overall, if limited, change in direction. 
In the Czech lands the first official change of policy after 
the dissolution of the Government Committee was directive No. 21/69, 
issued by the Czech, Ministry of Education in August 1969. Tiis was 
the result of a national conference of teachers the previous November 
(140) and although some of its recommendations were familiar (such 
as special classes for Gypsy children - previously urged in 1959 and 
1963), others showed a different approach. For the first time Gypsy 
children were to have a special syllabus which emj ýasized the Czech 
or Slovak language and did not include Russian, usually compulsory 
in elementary schools. In general "methods, forms and organisation 
of education have to be adapted to the characteristics of Gypsy 
children". (137). 
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The first sum. nary of the decade of assimilationism, the December 
1969 report by the Czech Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (140), 
still fours,: it helpful to rttain the previous system of classifyin6 
Gypsies that üated from the original Central Committee Decree of 
1958. iowever, the substitution of 'integration' for 'assimilation' 
indicated the chanted times. (To compare with the 1965 version, 
see the '.. ain Directions' document (85)). 
In the fir, category (probably 2/5 of Gypsies... ) 
are included those who are nearest to full integration 
into our society, in the second (also probably 2/5) 
are Gyi)sies who make partial efforts to extricate 
themselves from their backwardness and in the third 
(probably 1/5) are Gypsies living; in the most wretched 
way which they are neither willing nor capable of 
changing. (140). 
In this report the policy Goal was stated to be "the gradual 
integration of Gypsies. To achieve this", the report cobtinued, "it 
is indispensable to aim at progressively equalising the socio-economic 
and cultural conditions of their life". (140). This emphasis on the 
new goal of integration in place of assimilation marked all subsequent 
official Czech documents, although what this change actually meant - 
in terms of official action - was not entirely clear. 
Of course socio-economic and cultural equalisation had been the 
fundamental aim of the 1958 policy too, but at that time this was 
believed to be attainable only by the total assimilation of the 
Gypsies by means of their maximum dispersal. Now, these formerly 
unquestionable tenets were relinquished as the ministry proposed 
"that NCs cease organising transfers of Gypsy families frog Slovakia 
to the Czech lands and similarly that they abandon plans for organising 
extensive dispersal of Gypsy families from places where they are 
concentrated". (140). Instead they were to "gradually improve 
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living conditions in present 3ypsy c-ncentrations". (144). Equalisation 
was to be promoted: 
... in places where 
EGypsies1... are permanent 
residents in such a way that leads to their 
social integration. 
In this a start should be made) from the specific 
qualities and differences of this ethnic group 
from our people. To this end 
CNCs should] co- 
operate completely wit', the... Gypsy Association. 
(144). 
Although old-style dispersal on principle was to be discontinued, 
NCs were recommended to make exceptions for particularly suitable 
families. NCs were advised to; 
help in moving to permanent residence in other 
places where conditions are better only those 
Gypsy families who, by themselves, express a 
real interest. In cases where the place of 
resettlement is outside the district, this move 
should be agreed with the appropriate NC. (144). 
The actual procedure for such dispersal appeared more or less 
unchanged for it remained the NC's prerogative to decide whether the 
expressed interest was 'real' and in the case of inter-district moves 
the prior agreement of the receiving NC had to be obtained. 
There still remained the perennial problem of natural migration 
but the Ministry promised to produce guide-lines for standatdised 
procedures. It was already preparing: 
with the co-operation of the Ministries of the 
Interior and Justice, of the Public Prosecutor 
and NCs,... principles for the effective applic- 
ation of legal regulations concerning accommodation, 
social affairs and residence registration to 
ensure a unified approach by NCs to Gypsy families 
who move to places where they have accommodation 
arranged. At the same time... [these principles 
should solve] the problem of r how to treat] Gypsy 
families without accommodation... which regularly 
change their place of residence. (144). 
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however these new procedures were unlikely to be more generous 
to Gypsies for only a year earlier the same ministry had approved 
the action of ; Cs irk efusing to register incoming Gypsy migrants 
as residents (140), even though the Government Committee had 
acknowledged such action to be illegal. (94). (See Chapter Five : 
The Housing Shorta6e and its Effects). 
In the 1958 policy, the aim of cultural equalisation was to be 
achieved by breaking up Gypsy concentrations in a dispersal programme, 
thus replacing the 'backward' influence of an 'undesirable Gypsy 
concentr. tion' by the more 'pro6ressive' surroundings of Czech or 
Slovak fellow-citizens. But since no more dispersals were to be 
made after 1968, there remained the problem of how to improve cultural 
conditions. Tile Ministry's answer was to call on social workers and 
the report envisaged the initial recruitment of 168 social workers 
(at a total annual salary of 3,685,000 crowns) who would be attached 
to social welfare departments of Ms. 
However, before making a long-term plan, the Ministry acknowledged 
the need of a deeper analysis of theoretical and practical aspects, 
drawing on the experience of other states. 
The Federal Ministry of labour and Social Affairs report (137) 
in April 1970 was less specific in its proposals yet more outspoken, 
especially in its assessment of the 1965 measures. It even questioned 
the fundamental tenet that the type of politico-economic system 
should be the starting point of any explanation of inter-community 
relations, a startling departure from Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy in 
a report of ministerial level. 
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From the sociological viewpoint the problem of 
the Gypsy population appears to be that of the 
co-existence of a dominant society with an 
ethnically different minority Croup .... It appears 
that as re&. rds social positioh, the situation 
of minority Eroups is very similar in different 
count, "ies despite differences of political and 
socio-economic systems in the dominant societies 
and despite di: ferences in socio-cultural level 
in dinority groups. The dominant societies define 
the relations between both groups in a way that 
usually no respect is paid to the specific interests 
of minority groups, often opinions not their own 
are forced on them and as a rule they are not 
consulted in decisions about their fate. (137)" 
The re. -ort also attacked the naive 'dispersal equals acculturation' 
formula, which had been presupposed by the 1958 and 1965 measures, 
in arguing th-t dispersal and transfers destroyed a social system 
without providing anything in its place. 
As a result of the insensitive procedures of NCs 
in the choice of families for transfer, which was 
to be undertaken on a voluntary basis, Gypsies came 
to the Czeca lands who were illiterate, on a low 
level, without basic hyjene customs or experience. 
Individual families were transferred that had hitherto 
lived in a clan society. The transfer destroyed this 
society and did not provide an alternative. The 
broken clan society and traditional way of life led 
to new migrations. (137). 
For all its bold and radical departure from the earlier neCative 
view of Gypsies, the Federal Ministry report still shared some of the 
fundamental misconceptions of the 1958 approach. In particular it 
saw Gypsy society as naturally static and traditional and consequently 
attributed the high migratory rates to "the historically-rooted 
proneness to nomadism in Gypsies" which had re-emerged on the 
disruption of clan society by the transfer system. (137). While the 
report sympathised with the loneliness of Gypsies separated from kins- 
folk by transfers, such an approach made little allowance for the 
c1 
72 
crucial facts that these settlement Gypsies had not been nomadic 
for centuries and that the previous degree of immobility had been 
artificially high - being due less to a 'traditional way of life' 
than to external constraints. When these had been removed the result 
was a most un-Gypsy-like mass migration to industrial centres which, 
although bringing in its wake theisual hardships and sorrows of 
migrants, was nevertheless in an important sense a natural process. 
Compared with this self-initiated ferment, the disruption to Gypsy 
life caused by a few hundred transfers was minimal; the frustrations 
caused by restrictions on the Gypsies' freedom of movement was another 
matter. 
The Federal Ministry, like the Czech Ministry, saw a solution 
to the proble: s of cultural equalisation in social workers and 
research, although there was an important difference of emphasis. 
Social work, as understood by the Czech ministry, seemed to be aimed 
simply at changing certain outward behaviour patterns so that they no 
longer offended non-Gypsies. In this conception of integration, as 
with assimilation previously, it was Gypsies who had to change in 
order to gain acceptance, while non-Gypsies were urged merely to 
refrain from discrimination. 
Integration is, above all, the business of the 
Gypsy population itself, but others E i. e. non- 
Gypsies J should help this process by treating 
Gypsies as fellow-citizens with equal rights. 
(150). 
The analysis of the Federal Ministry was more subtle* for it 
realised that such behaviour was the inevitable outcome of the 
* It was strongly influenced by one of the researchers of the 
Czechoslovakian Academy of Sciences. 
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Gypsies' disadvantaged position in wider society and oftex a direct 
expression of their alienation. 
The main problems which increase differences 
between Gypsies and non-Gypsies can be seen 
as above all the shortcomings in education and 
Qualifications, which lead to a limited choice 
of occupations, to low incomes, to social 
insecurity, to a loss of self-awareness and 
finally to a feeling of discrimination, whether 
this is the case or not. (137)" 
Rather than teaching Gypsies to behave, this Ministry saw social- 
work more as helping to develop new and viable types of social 
organisation among Gypsies in order to counter their growing discontent. 
Social work with groups of Gypsies, which would 
be part of social work on the development of 
Gypsy... settlements, has never been tried in 
-zechoslovakia. 
(137). 
The Federal Hinistry also recognised that adjustment had to be 
mutual and not one-sided if any real progress was. to be made towards 
integration; otherwise Gypsy alienation would continue to be 
regenerated. 
Yet in a sense the disagreement over the role of social workers 
was academic for there appeared little likelihood of recruiting 
sufficient social workers. Discussion on this point at a 1970 seminar 
of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs was depressingly similar 
to the minutes of a 1966 Government Committee meeting (90) where 
justified criticism was levelled at the disparity between ambitious 
plans and the limited resources actually available. 
At the seminar delegates from the North Moravia region were 
particularly outspoken. The Ostrava representative pointed out that 
this plan for a great increase in social workers was proposed at the 
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very time w:: en a national 10; ý cut in administrative staff was 
reducinE, the output of trained social worxers. He added 
that in 
his area there would not be enough ordinary social workers recruited 
by the end of 1y70 to fulfil the previous overall plan 
for 1969 - let 
alone extra social workers for üypsies! 
(142). 
Perhaps there was More than a Crain of truth in the sceptical 
Slovaks' suslicion that for all the liberal redefinition of 
the 
Gypsy question in the 'zech lands, the practical outcome was empty 
talk about sjcial workers instead of the provision of real houses. 
The Policy of Acculturation in Slovakia. 
Whereas the major Czech reports re-iterated the positive results 
that had been achieved during the decade of assimilationism but then 
recommended what amounted to a reversal of previous policy, their 
Slovakian counterparts did the opposite; they stressed the enormous 
problems that still remained and continued to grow, whilst urging 
more vi6orou3 implementation of the previous policy. 
Although the transfer pro6ramme had been of little practical 
assistance to Slovakia, its removal as even a theoretical panacea 
in 1968 made Slovak realisation of their problems even starker. A 
Iovember 1908 report expressed this mood. 
Although no-one thought the gypsy problem would 
be solved in a generation, when the Government 
Decree No. 502/65 was issued it was expected that 
during ten to fifteen years all gypsy settlements 
in the republic would be completely eliminated. 
As things stand at present however, there can be 
no expectations at all of eliminating existing 
settlements. On the contrary it is more to be 
expected that they will continue to grow. There 
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are about 400 new gypsy families annually but 
probably only 200 to 250 families can be moved 
from tae settlec,, ents each year, as in[ 19b61... 
oeradays it is clear that the elimination of 
Lypsy settlements cannot be accomplished without 
accommodation. manly on the basis of allocatin 
the necessary number of flats and houses from the 
normal quota for gypsy families will it be possible 
to continue satisfactorily with the elimination 
of huts. (146). 
As the discussion about causes of the collapse of the dispersal 
and transfer pro6ramme has shown, Slovakian central authorities 
laid the blame entirely on people within the administrative 
structure rather than on mistaken policy- aims or faults in the 
structure itself. Fundamentally the spirit of 1958 remained 
unchan;; ed. 
The main assessment of the period of assimilation (147) was 
given in the 1970 overall conception of a solution for the next 
decade (1971-1980). After a similar preamble to that in the 1958 
Iiandboo:: for local authorities - that Gypsies lacked the necessary 
requirements of a nationality and therefore constituted only an 
ethnic group - the report went on to attribute much of the poor 
progress to data to the Gypsies themselves. 
Gypsies achieved real equality of rights with other 
citizens... in 1945... [but] did not make use of the 
opportunity that was offered them. A large 
proportion continued to prefer their previous 
backward way of life. (147). 
The same mood was evident in discussions of the problems of 
"Gypsy acculturation" and "eliminating the Gypsy way of life". (147). 
Although Slovakia deferred to the 1968 developments to the 
extent of permitting the formation of a Gypsy association, sub- 
stitutin, 3 the term 'acculturation' for 'assimilation', writing 
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'Cigan' (Gypsy) with a capital 'C' and a6reeing the need for social 
workers, there is little doubt that there was no real change of 
heart. The Gyrsy association was seen in Slovakia more as a pressure 
group to enforce better behaviour than as a partner in finding a 
new approach, as iii the Czech lands. Meanwhile the wholesale dispersal 
of Gypsies was still regarded as the only solution to the problem 
of Gypsy settlements. 
As long as we do not swiftly resettle Gypsy families 
in proper flats and family houses amongst the other 
[non-Gy. j. syJ inhabitants, we shall not solve the 
Gypsy problem but increase it even more. (147). 
Yet, as a result of this basically unchanged approach, the 
Slovakian Government Committee began to press once more for the 
allocation of flats to Gypsies and to criticise inactive DNCs as 
soon as it had regained some measure of control after the muddle of 
federalisation. 
That this sometimes had effect can be seen in the case of the 
SpisV skä Nova Ves DNC which, like many other Slovakian local 
authorities, had taken the opportunity provided by the weakened 
command system to lapse into virtual inaction. The DNC justified 
its evident reluctance to cake use of the allocated budget in reports 
that were overtly racialist in tone and which advocated new repressive 
measures in place of better housing and amenities. A February 1969 
'Proposal for Solving the Gypsy Problem by Slovakian National Bodies' 
was particularly extreme. 
Apart from the familiar demands for stricter penalties for 
convicted Gypsies and tightening up the regulations for registration 
of residence, there was a proposal "to rescind law 74/58 and replace 
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it by other 1eoa1 reg'alations so that a record of Gypsy population 
movement co, 1d be maintained in order to prevent undesired movement 
and job cnanbinE by gypsies". (161). 
Amon; th. - prgposals for 'health' was one "to limit family 
allowances by legal weans to a maximum of five children so that a 
large family cannot be misused intentionally to gain financial 
reward without work" and - even more drastic - another "to make 
compulsory sterilisation legally possiOle not only on health grounds 
but for social reasons, especially where there is no guarantee that 
children will receive an adequate upbringing". Decisions about 
compulsory sterilisation were to be made in court, "based on the 
recommendations of relevant social, education, health and other 
bodies". (161). 
The section on education opened with the general remark that: 
up till now decrees and directives of the state 
educational authorities have been one-sided because 
of a Markedly excessive fear of racial discrimin- 
ation. They do not take into account... the mental 
backwardness of the majority of these children which 
stems from the social backwardness of their environment. 
(161). 
The DNC prorposed, therefore, to segregate Gypsy children in 
special boarding schools where they would not only receive a basic 
education but also learn "a suitable trade". The removal of children 
from their parents was to be enforced by law. 
Since at present the placinG of gypsy children in 
boarding school meets with nreat resistance on the 
part of their parents, this must be solved by 
relevant legal regulations which would support and 
in some cases ensure the success of these measures, 
(161). 
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With proposals such as these, the DNC moved back to the spirit 
of the Austro-. iun6z rian monarch, harialheresa, when Gypsy children 
were forcibly dra ed from their homes to be brought up 
by Christian 
families. 
In fairness it should be said that no other DNC document was 
so extreme and that in any case the proposed measures would 
have 
needed authorisation on a national level - of which there was no 
chance whatsoever. Yet even though these proposals should 
be seen 
as indicative of DNC desperation at its inability to contain 
the 
district's growing Gypsy population rather than as realistic 
suggestions, it is still chilling to find "compulsory sterilisation... 
for social reasons" advocated at DNC level for this gives some 
idea 
of the local authority's general attitude to the Gypsies that it 
was their responsibility to help. 
Not surprisingly statistics showed that during the half-year 
in which this report was produced (I-VII. 1969) less than 6 per cent 
was utilised of the annual budget for Gypsy affairs. (162). The 
situation was much the same the following year as regards investment 
in settlement amenity improvement, except that on this occasion the 
Slovakian Government Committee was already well established and 
reacted sharply to the news of Spisskä Nova Vespoor performance. 
In September 1970 a DNC report stated that for this type of investment* 
during the first half-year: 
* By this time the situation had already improved considerably as 
regards investmeht in flat and nursery school construction for, 
during the first half-year of 1970,2,266,000 crowns had already 
been used of the annual budget of 2,615,000 crowns (i. e. 87 
However no huts at all were purchased during this period. (166). 
1) 
... of a total annual 
budget of 1,170,000 crowns 
119,000 crowns were used (i. e. 10.1%). only'119,000" 
Lecause of this critical state the DIX president 
was warned by a[ Slovakian 
] government vice- 
president that our district does not pay sufficient 
attention to this socially important task and... 
effective correction of fulfilline the planned 
tasx s was :: e, nanded. (166) 
The Rise and Fall of the Gypsy Associations 
The Formation of the Assocatiors 
In late 1; 68 the same Gypsy spokesmen who had been warned a 
decade earlier to abandon the idea of their own cultural organisations 
were at last granted permission to form Gypsy associations. As a 
consequence of federalisation there were to be two associations - one 
for the Czech lands and the other for Slovakia - both affiliated to 
the Tlatioral Front umbrella organisation. This entitled them to 
political representation, to government funds and also to the right 
to engage in a certain amount of political activity - such as drumming 
up the Gypsy vote for elections to the National Assembly. The 
associations were to have the same organisational structure as every 
other Front member -a hierarchy of central, regional, district and 
local committees, each level being subordinate both to the level above 
it and also to the full congress of its members. (See Chapter Four). 
Although the main function of the associations was to be in the 
field of socio-cultural activities, unlike the equivalent organisation 
of any other national minority in Czechoslovakia each Gypsy association 
had an economic branch which consisted of a nation-wide network of 
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co-operative production units, supplying gangs of contract workers 
to hard-pressed indus'rial enterprises. The purpose of this 
innovation w;;, s to enable the associations to become self-sufficient 
eventually. Once the economic branches had successfully established 
themselves a portion of their profits was to replace the support of 
: rational Front funds. 
These associations grew swiftly in numbers, attracting not only 
poorer Gypsies but, as might have been expected from the pattern of 
other nationalist movements, the small but influential Gypsy 
intelligentsia which had been regarded officially as successfully 
assimilated. Within two years they were promoting festivals and 
competitions of Romani song and dance, publishing magazines - partly 
in the Rollani language - as well as arranging social functions such 
as childrens' and pensioners' outings. They provided a great stimulus 
for young musicians and soon Gypsy pop groups began to appear on TV 
singing in Romani and some even reached the hit parade. Gypsies were 
increasingly described in the mass media as 'Rom' - their own name 
for themselves - and this usage began to spread among ordinary people. 
Meanwhile the leadership broadened their contacts with Gypsy 
movements in other countries - within and outside the socialist bloc. 
The Gypsy-Rom Association of the Czech Lands sent delegations to the 
traditioral Gypsy festival of Saintes Maries de la Her in France and 
to the World Romani Congress in England, * whilst its Slovakian counter- 
part organised a successful international festival of Gypsy song and 
dance in Bratislava. 
+I assisted the Czech Gypsy delegation to this congress in 
April 1971 as an interpreter. 
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It is not the intention here to chronicle the many activities 
of the üypsy-Rom associations for this would need a detailed, 
separate study in itself, whereas the t: aii: focus of this thesis is 
national and local , overnment 
during the decade of assirailationism. 
I; evert-aeless it is important to point out that the associations' 
apparent stre. qth was lar6ely illusory and 
their weaknesses contributed, 
in different mea: iure, to their eventual downfall in 1973. 
Weaknesses. 
Althau, gh Gypsy spokesmen were delighted at their change in 
fortunes, they were also apprehensive about the precarious existence 
of the newly-formed associations. Undoubtedly the dubious legality 
of the associatio:. s had an inhibiting effect on every aspect of their 
activity - as probably was the intention. Awareness of this 
vulnerability helps to explain the extreme caution with which Gypsies 
criticised the questionable 1958 interpretation of harxist-Leninist 
nationality theory in their case and the assimilatory practice that 
followed, and indeed their general strategy of ingratiation. 
The Pro6ramne of the Czech 'Gypsy-Rom Association', distributed 
to delegates at the Association's First Congress in August 1969, 
clearly identified the real issue at stake in the debate over the 
legal status of the Gypsy minority: 
If the Gypsies have not been recognised as a 
nationality yet, the main reason has been fear of 
the consequences of conceding various rights to the 
Gypsies as a nationality. Arguments - like the lack 
of certain characteristics (territory etc. ) - ... s 
were only used as an excuse for refusing to recognise 
Gypsies as a nationality. However this position 
conflicts with actual practice, where many of the 
measures used to solve the Gypsy problem have the 
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ý. rorounced character of a nationality solution. 
Furtner. nore it does not agree with the fact that 
Cy]psies have survived througt: centuries of 
o.. pres3ion as an ethnic community. 
(pa 6e 13) 
But after having laid such promising foundations for an outribht 
attack on previous policy, the Programme veered deliberately away from 
cor_frontation, continuinb lamely: 
she question is whether we should concern ourselves 
today wit. l a matter of principle (to prove whether 
the Gypsies are., or are not, a nationality), or aim 
to solve the [Gypsy] question by putting our own 
programme into practice. At the present we are in 
fav., ur of attempting a solution... 
(ibid. ) 
T.. e dilemma was a false one for the very possibility of Gypsies 
'putting, their... own programme into practice' ultimately depended on 
a guarantee of the continued existence of their associations as of 
right, as subsequent experience was to show. In effect this meant 
protection as a national minority but on this crucial issue the 
Programme once more began an oblique criticism of previous practice 
only to shrink back again and finally hesitated to commit itself: 
As yet the characteristics of the Gypsies have not 
been theoretically elaborated. The question is 
very complicated. Nowadays, however, it is not 
possible to cling dogmatically to the precepts 
that were formerly valid. In order to resolve this 
question it will, be necessary to investigate the 
teaching of Marxist-Leninist nationality theory; 
Indeed the concepts 'nation' and 'nationality' are 
unclear nowadays and expJa nations of their meaning 
are not always consistent. 
(paces 12,13). 
In the following year the Fraesidium of the same association 
accompanied a similar discussion with the disclaimer: I'Most decidedly 
we do not want our memorandum to be understood as a political demand". 
(taera. ) 
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As well as the associations' fatal weakness vis-a-vis government, 
they also suffered from lack of support from their own minority 
populatic. n. This was to be expected for severe restrictions on 
political activity had prevented Gypsy leaders from trying to build 
a mass movement in support of their demands and consequently 
permission for the formation of the associations had not been a 
concession won by organised struggle but rather a dispensation 
Granted to what amounted to a tiny pressure-group. 
The formal co-option of the associations into the establishment 
greatly restricted their range of options without giving them any 
real measure of power in return. Alth;: ugh association officers were 
regularly invited to participate in meetings at ministerial level, 
the responsibility to cake vital day-to-day decisions about housing 
and jobs still rested with local authorities and employers who were 
able to disregard local branches of the associations with impunity. 
Meanwhile, since the associations owed their position and their funds 
entirely to government largesse, they forfeited the possibility of 
adopting the tactics of a western-style protest movement - denouncing 
institutionalised discrimination and pressing for ttructural change. 
Instead they had to remain mute or, at most, confine themselves to 
generalised complaints when local and national authorities criticised 
their lack of success in solving social problems that were, by their 
nature, beyond the powers of the associations to remedy. 
The associations were further handicapped by the fact that some 
of their leading officers - vetted and approved by the Communist 
party - were inevitably Party members or bureaucrats of long-standing, 
well schooled in the politics of pious resolutions and vacuous 
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generalisations. All too rarely were they the principled activists 
that were needed to combat the structural disadvantages of the 
difficult role in wnica the associations had been cast. 
All of theme limitations caused predictable problems for the 
associations in the task of recruiting a mass membership. City and 
settlement Gypsies alike were quick to detect the disparity between 
the trappings of power of association officers and their evident 
inability to provide practical assistance where it was needed and 
often believed that the main purpose of those accepting office was 
to enricn themselves with the government funds destined for their 
poorer fellow- Gypsies. However such suspicions would probably have 
arisen even had the Gypsies not been a community where in the past 
inescapable external pressures had resulted in dissension and feud 
rather than solidarity. For this mistrust was not unique to Gypsies; 
it was shared by ordinary Czechs and Slovaks who believed that Party 
officials found it easier to obtain cars, weekend cottages, trips 
abroad and precious vouchers for the hard-currency shops that stocked 
luxuries imported from the West. 
Regrettably, doubts about corruption in the associations were 
not without foundation. At regional and district offices, where 
cadres were often poorly trained or semi-literate and book-keeping 
techniques primitive, the presence of large cash sums proved too 
great a temptation for some officers to resist and several were 
convicted of embezzlement and imprisoned. 
The most troubling case was that of 'Nevodrom, the economic 
branch of the Czech Gypsy association. By 1972, when the time was 
fast approaching for the organisation to assume full responsibility 
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for tue economic requirements of its parent Gypsy association, 
nevodron's finances were in such confusion that a number of regional 
units had to be suspended and eventually the association decided to 
cease its economic operations entirely. * 
iyeverthe1ess the associations steadily increased their 
membership and the scale of their activities in spite of the dis- 
advarta es of their position and economic setbacks such as the failure 
of ;, evodrom. From the start they had been acutely sensitive about 
their unrepresentative nature and consequently loth to publish figures 
of brancri and individual membership but figures published in 1973 
showed that the association for the Czech lands had almost doubled 
its members between 1970 and 1972.1he figure of 8,500 given for 1972 
(Rocnäno tit 3/72) meant that over a third of the Gypsies over the age 
of fifteen in the Czech lands were members of the association and 
probably that a still greater proportion of Gypsy families had at 
least one member. 
This represented a significant broadening of the associations' 
base which not only strengthened their position vis-ä vis government 
but offered eventual hope of new and more militant leaders. The 
promise remained unfulfilled for early in 1973 the associations were 
disbanded. 
* In fact the co-op production units operated by the Gypsy associations 
were a complete anomaly by this time for at the end of 1971 all 
other co-op production units in the Republic had been disbanded 
compulsorily, accused of capitalistic business practices and 
exploitation of their labour force. Such charges were probably 
justified as the testimony of Gypsy employees of such non- 
association co-ops indicates. (See following chapter i). 
It is important to recognise, however, that the undoubted short- 
comings of the associations' co-ops were not unique but shared to 
a large degree by many other non-Gypsy co-ops in the Republic. 
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The Did of the Gypsy Association in the Czech Lands. 
The Gypsy-Rom association for the Caeca lands was bundled 
unceremoniously out of existence following a plenum of the 
association's central committee in Prague on April 25th 1973. The 
Praesidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party had 
previously decided to expel the Gypsy associations from the national 
Front and since this amounted to a death sentence, it only remained 
to carry out the execution in as convenient a manner possible to 
minimise unwelcome publicity. The device chosen was for the 
associations to disband voluntarily and accordingly the plenum of 
the Czech association was summoned to inform members of the decision 
that had been taken about their fate. In fact this way of ending the 
activities of the association was quite unconstitutional but, as 
discussion at the April plenum was to show, the Party had little 
concern for the legal niceties of the case. 
We owe this remarkable picture of bureaucratic dirigisme in 
action to the courageous publication of the minutes of the plenum* in 
the last issue of the association's newsletter. (Romano Mil 2/1973). 
Te plenum opened with a lengthy speech by a vice-chairman of 
the Central Committee of the National Front who argued that although 
the association had not compromised itself politically during the 
troubled year of 1969 and had done some useful wort in its early stages 
*A tape-recording of the proceedings, made by a representative of 
the National Front, was not available to the association. The 
minutes, therefore, were based on full notes taken during the 
course of the plenum. 
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- as during the sensitive elections of 1971, it was now failing in 
many ways. In particular he cast doubts on the impressive increase 
in membership by poii. ting to unpaid subscriptions, recalled the 
closure of \evodrom the year before and criticised the lack of 
association branches at local level in some areas. The whole 
strategy o., the vice-chairman's argument was to demonstrate that the 
association had effectively ceased to function for the association's 
statutes specified "inactivity of the organisation" as one of the 
two circumstances in which the association would be terminated. The 
other was if two-thirds of the delegates to the association's 
congress, its highest body, should vote for termination. (Article 
vi. 4 1). 
The vice-chairman concluded by informing his audience that 
following the Party decision to expel the association because it 
"lacked cadres", the Central Committee of the National Front was 
asking both associationsfto dissolve themselves. 
The association officer who chaired the meeting had been well 
prepared for his role in advance - and perhaps others too - but to 
almost all of the plenum members the news came as a bombshell. After 
the initial shock a number of delegates countered the vice-chairman's 
allegation of inactivity with concrete instances of recruiting drives, 
fund-raising and voluntary work but their protests had the tone of 
despairing resignation to the'fait accompli'. As had been the case 
of the leaders of Fvlitical reform in 1968, many delegates were 
disarmed by their deeply-instilled loyalty to the Communist Party; 
when put to the test they would always accept the Party's decision 
as final. 
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Not all were so compliant and voices were raised questioning 
the legality of t. ie procedure. One pointed out that the proposal 
was not on the at;, enda, which had to be circulated to plenum members 
fourteen days in advance. Others drew attention to the much more 
serious irreg"ularit; that by the statutes only the congress was 
eliipowered to dissolve the association; even if the plenum wanted 
to take the recommended course of action, it had not the legal right 
to do so. 
There was opposition to the proposal that the association should 
voluntarily pat its head into the noose, but a Communist Party official 
from the Central Coirnittee's section for social organisation put the 
position bluntly. 
Why disband voluntarily? We could have used an 
official directive but we chose the most convenient 
way. If you do not do it, we will take care of it! 
"perhaps thinZs will be different in ten years time, " 
he added cynically, 
"that is, if your intellect has improved in the 
meantime". 
The plenum delegates knew the situation was hopeless but some 
spoke out nevertheless. Their objections were brave and moving 
gestures, but futile. Demoralised by its long drawn-out difficulties 
and weakened by internal dissension. and divided loyalities, the 
association did not have the capacity to make a defiant stand against 
the inevitable. The association's president delivered a sad final 
speech - not from his presidential chair but from the body of the 
hall. In a stunned voice he thanked the delegates for their efforts 
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on behalf of the on movement and proclaimed his unsrjaken belief in 
further ro`ress and in socialism. The experiment of the associations 
was over and oily a few mechanical formalities were left to comjlete. 
The association official in the chair drew the discussion to a 
close with a bland recommendation: 
In my opinion we Gyxsies would be even better off 
if we were w'thout this burden of a Gypsy-Rom 
association. In my opinion we should agree with 
the recommendation - and now I shall hand over 
to the comrade from the National Front for the 
concludiiig speech. 
The vice-chairman was brief and to the point in his exposition 
of the technical possibilities open to the plenum members. 
According to the statutes of your organisation it 
can be dissolved either by a two-thirds majority 
of the congress delegates or else through inactivity 
of the orL; anisation. But who weld organise a 
congress? We see the second way as better - besides, 
there was no activity.... The Gypsy-Rom Association 
in Slovakia has already agreed to this procedure 
and so I recommend that we elect members of a 
liquidation committee. 
Members were proposed and spasmodic voting took place but the 
officer in the chair did not even bother to count the votes. The same 
thing happened with voting for termination of the association a few 
moments later. There were perhaps six or eight votes in favour of the 
recommendation, five against and four abstentions. 
When the voting had finally sealed the fate of the association 
one plenum member could contain his indignation no longer. 
From the very start of the association I have served 
as a district chairman. Cur branch was looking 
forward to this coming May Day and we prepared floats 
for the procession and promised to complete 3,000 
hours as voluntary brigade workers to raise funds 
We wanted to improve the lot of Roms. 
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Our as3ociation is accused of neglecting its tasks 
and misusing funds but I wonder how those comrades 
in local authorities made use of the funds at their 
disposal for solving the Gypsy question. When 
overnrent Decree vo. 502 ,,,., as iii force we were 
divided into categories but it was those comrades 
who categorised us that misused funds. I have six 
children yet I go among Gypsies and work unpaid. 
Did those comrades do the same?! 
All of us have bone through tenements but when shall 
we sit in the pub at last? 
Another menyer, almost in tears, could only bring himself to 
, ask, rhetorically: 
But whatare we to tell our Roms now? Why did the 
association disband? 
Anger and pathos alike left the professional bureaucrats unruffled 
and the Party official cooly thanked those present on behalf of the 
Party's Central Co:: iittee for their "success in achieving equality". 
Likewise the final words of the officer in the chair were an affront - 
cynically disregarding the enormity of what had been done. 
Let us conclude then with this slogan of the 
president of our association - 'Unite and work 
on! ' 
C. ) 
THE ASSESSMENT OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT BY THE CZECHOSLOVAK 
ACADDAY OF SCIENCES. 
early in 1975, two years after the Gypsy association had been 
dissolved, the research team of the Institute of Pnilosophy and 
Sociology of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences published its report 
entitled: 'On the Social Problem-Area of Gypsies in Czechoslovakia'. 
(Kara et al. ). As the introduction correctly claimed, this study 
was "the first relatively definitive sociological treatment of the 
Gypsy question" containing "the most recent sociological, efhno- 
sociological and demographic findings concerning this important 
social problem" and was "a theoretical foundation for a further stage 
of research". (ibid : 3)4). 
When the research was originally commissioned the intention was 
that it should also serve as a guide to government policy-making by 
including policy recommendations for future practice but for various 
reasons the research gradually assumed a more abstracted academic 
character as it progressed. The vast bulk of the report eventually 
concerned itself with the changing life-style of-Gypsies in 
Czechoslovakia, but it was impossible to write such a study in depth 
without at least a brief evaluation of the 195b assimilation campaign 
and a prognosis of future development. Since the theme of this thesis 
is government policy itself and its effects, only these short sections 
of the report are directly relevant here, although other material 
from the report has been incorporated in previous chapters. However, 
before going further, it is best to pause briefly to recall the changes 
in political climate during the production of the report. 
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The small research team included several leading Czech 
Gypsiologists 
who were initially influential as ministry advisors and who recommended 
the establishment of Gypsy associations and subsequently played an 
active part as members of the association in 
the Czech lands. Since 
1968 the Institute - like all other higher education 
institutions - 
had been purged drastically in retribution for the 
leading role of 
academics and intellectuals during the 
liberalisation process, 
'normalisation' had been completed and the short-lived experiment of 
the Gypsy associations had been abruptly terminated. It could 
be 
expected, therefore, that these events might have had a certain 
restraining influence on the formulation of the report and indeed 
this sombre backcloth helps to explain the heavy emphasis on 'ethno- 
sociological' material, the circumspect tone of the report and its 
muted criticisms, slipped in between the lines as dark afterthoughts 
to confident proclamations about a bright and assured future develop- 
ment. 
The report opened with a customary obeisance in the direction 
of Marxist-Leninist nationality theory, reasserting the 1958 position 
that "Gypsies in Czechoslovakia are neither a nation nor a nationality 
but form a special ethnic group". (ibid : 4). However, this claim 
was not supported, as formerly, by the familiar argument that the 
Gypsies lacked at least one of the formal characteristics of a 
nationality but defended on the more general grounds that to group 
Gypsies with other nationalities in Czechoslovakia: 
would reflect neither their current level of socio- 
economic development nor their prospects of future 
development in the concrete historical conditions 
of Czechoslovakian socialist-society. 
(ibid : 14,15). 
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While reminiscent of the 1959 government manual (5), this argument 
had a double meaning for although apparently a neutral and objective 
prediction about the probable natural development of ti1is community, 
the phrase "concrete historical conditions" could be interpreted as 
referring to the government's continuing view of Gypsies as a backward, 
tribal form of society whicii it had no intention of encouraging to 
consolidate into a nationality. Yet, having stated its orthodox 
position on the nationality question, the report then qualified this 
by a tentative acknowledgement, that the previous approach had been 
too extreme in its uncompromising opposition to all manifestations 
of Gypsy ethnicity. 
Research on the Gypsy question ... leads to the 
conclusion that perhaps the previous approach to 
the problem ... should have paid more attention 
to the Gypsies' specific ethnicity. 
(ibid : 14). 
In its assessment of the 1958 policy the report was at pains to 
avoid outright criticism whilst at the same time cautiously indicating 
some of the drawbacks of total assimilationism. The report sought to 
present the twists and turns of the Gypsy policy since 1958 as a 
relatively smooth progression in which new measures represented minor 
pragmatic modifications to a fundamentally sound initial analysis. 
This it attempted by means of identifying three main aims of the 1958 
campaign: 
- the elimination of nomadism 
- maximum dispersal 
- complete assimilation 
and arguing that the first two had been retained as policy aims 
throughout (ibid : 55); whilst only the third had been dropped 
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eventually after criticism that in practice it had been misinterpeted 
because of excessive yet comprehensible zeal to achieve quick results. 
The implication was that the policy-makers' real aim from the start 
had been 'integration' but that they had failed to make their 
intentions plain. 
From 1958 the solution of the so-called 'Gypsy 
question' was based on the principle that no 
change in the position and way of life of the 
Gypsies would be possible: 
a) without abolishing the so-called 'nomadic way 
of life' (for this reason this way of life was 
eliminated on the basis of law 74/1958 and the 
register of these people in February 1959). 
b) in densely-settled population concentrations of 
large numbers of Gypsy families. (From this 
principle was derived the conclusion that they 
must be dispersed as evenly as possible among [non-Gypsies]. 
.. because, in the way that 
the 'Gypsy question' was understood at that 
time, all the more conspicuous manifestations 
of Gypsy ethnicity were considered as a brake 
to their adaptation from a backward way of 
life and as a barrier to their inclusion in 
society ... 
c)[withoutJ assimilation (gradual, but total), 
which was emphasised both as a means and as 
an end. (However, the manner in which the 
concept 'assimilation' should have been under- 
stood was not elucidated sufficiently in a 
single important document of the period. In 
practice, it was interpreted to mean that the 
" necessary suppression of all their ethnic 
characteristics was urgently required in order 
to overcome the Gypsies' historico-social 
backwardness. In consequence every specific 
expression of a distinct way of life was regarded 
as undesirable and retarding). 
(Kära : 55,59). 
These aims were indeed pivotal but this manner of formulating 
them tended to minimise, deliberately, the logical interconnection of 
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the separate elements in the interests of demonstrating an overall 
continuity of approach since the beginni: g of the assimilation 
campaign. This atLemyt to conceal the important policy reversal in 
1968 must be rejected for whilst it is true that the fundamental 
goal of Gypsy policy remained, throughout, the socio-economic 
equalisation of Gypsies with other Czechoslovakian citizens, this 
concept does not serve to unify all policy lines from 1y5ä onwards 
for it is fundamentally ambiguous and in reality was interpreted 
quite differently at different times. Perhaps the best way to make 
this clear is to separate 'Gypsy policy' into three distinct logical 
parts: (see page 3%) 
L. 1956 total assimilation of all Gypsies was seen as the only 
means* of achieving socio-economic equalisation and it was claimed 
that this course of action stemmed from an analysis of Marxist- 
Leninist nationality theory. Assimilation was not an additional 
and quite separate aim, tacked onto the 1958 policy as an after- 
tnought and still less was it an extreme practice adopted by certain 
local administrators because key official documents had somehow 
neglected to explain its precise significance. There was no need 
to explain it; the Czechs and Slovaks were quite clear about its 
meaning from their own bitter historical experience. But in any 
case local administrative resistance thwarted any systematic 
implementation of assimilation and so it existed effectively only at 
the theoretical and policy levels and least of all at the level of 
practical application where the Academy report tried to locate it 
almost exclusively. 
M"r 
Here assimilation is not part of the meaning of equalisation but 
whether policy makers made this distinction is uncertain; this 
formulation gives them the benefit of the doubt. 
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The permission given to Gypsies to form their own socio-cultural 
associatio:. s in 1968 represented not a modification but a reversal 
of the previous assimilation policy. However the volte-face was not 
complete, nor was it undertaken with any conviction, as wws evident 
from the failure to guarantee the continued existence of the 
associations and to revoke previous legislation and government 
decrees. Fundamentally it was an opportunist move by a bewildered 
government and both policy makers and Gypsy associations alike shrank 
from probing the theoretical basis of the policy changes for this 
would have swiftly led to a rejection of the 1958 interpretation 
of Marxist-Leninist nationality theory in favour of the alternative, 
pluralist version where minority communities such as the Gypsies 
were to be encouraged to flourish in their own right. (See Appendix 
One). Meanwhile at the level of practical application there was 
little real change as councils continued to contain their local 
'Gypsy problem' as best they could be resisting the registration of 
newcomers. 
The charge made by the Academy report that ""the concept 
'assimilation'. .. was not elucidated sufficiently 
[in 19.58]11 is 
far more appropriately levelled at the terminology of the post-1968 
policy-makers for the new goals of 'acculturation' (adopted in 1969 
in Slovakia) and 'social integration' (adopted in 1970 in the Czech 
lands) were left more or less undefined and consequently permitted 
great flexibility of interpretation. At first - at least in the 
Czech lands - the new stance appeared a radical departure from the 
discredited assimilation policy but later, when official disenchant- 
ment with the Gypsy associations led to their enforced dissolution, 
the government was able to revert to a pre-1968-type position without 
any need to redefine policy objectives. 
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Therefore, rather than resembling a smooth and orderly 
progression, official policy towards Gypsies in Czechoslovakia 
swung violently and uncertainly from one extreme almost to the other 
in 1966 and was soon to veer back once more in the opposite direction. 
It comes as no surprise to realise that these dramatic policy 
reversals reflected wider political developments in the Republic 
during, these troubled years. 
To the Gypsies themselves the gradually stiffening resistance 
towards them on the part of local authorities which they experienced 
from the late 1950s onwards was of more direct importance than 
variations in official policy. Nevertheless they were far from 
immune from the repercussions of official policy and although the 
1958 campaign was motivated by genuine concern for what were 
regarded as their best interests, selective use of restrictive 
measures abainst them by local councils and in particular the 
chauvinistic denigration of their whole Gypsy identity as worthless, 
accompanied by constant exhortation to renounce their shameful 
origins, had a devastating effect on their already shaky self- 
esteem. The Academy report candidly acknowledged the damage they 
suffered: 
As the result of such a concept of assimilation 
and its incorrect application many Gypsies 
developed psychic syndromes; meanwhile incorrect 
prejudices and opinions about the Gypsy problem 
were strengthened amongst [non-Gypsies]. .. 
It cannot be ignored that some of the problems 
of Gypsies themselves] are consequences of the 
previous solution. .. which undervalued social 
and ethnic aspects. 
(ibid : 59,61) 
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The Gypsy associations had done something to redress the 
balance by giving Gypsies the chance to be proud of their identity 
for the first time but in the event this had been only a brief 
interlude. 
In spite of the admitted defects of the assimilation policy, 
the public voice of the report was still able to echo the bold 
claim put forward in the 1959 manual(s) that Czechoslovakia's 
solution of its Gypsy question provided a model for the world. 
however, no attempt was made to distinguish the undoubted improvements 
in Gypsy living standards and social integration that stemmed from 
the general socialist infrastructure (and in particular from the 
extensively expanding economy that gave Gypsies their opportunity 
to earn high wages) from the more dubious benefits directly 
attributable to the Gypsy policy itself. Indeed, like the government 
reports before it, the Academy report seemed unaware that there was 
a difference. 
In its critical evaluation of the results achieved 
and objective assessment of the degree of social 
integration of Gypsies. .. as well as in its 
theoretical/scientific approach, Czechoslovakia 
stands in the forefront. Its manner of solution 
has no equivalent among Western European countries 
and even to socialist societies it is a source of 
inspiration. 
The approach to the Gypsy problem and ... 
experience in its solution take on a wider sig- 
nificance. .. and can serve to heighten the 
prestige of socialism in the world. 
(ibid : 62). 
Given the current political climate perhaps such a pronouncement 
was inevitable but a few pages later the report lapsed into unprecedented 
pessimism about the future. Contrary to 1958 assupption of a relatively 
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speedy solution to the question, there was the warning that: 
The social integration of Gypsies is a long- 
term affair, a lengthy social process, which 
commenced with the establishment of a socialist 
social order and which will last, in all 
probability, throughout the entire period of 
socialist development. 
(ibid : 66) 
Not even a successful outcome was assured for the report 
pointed out that if sufficient respect was not paid to the specific 
ethnicity of Gypsies, the result would be to alienate them still 
further. 
A delicate approach to ethnic particularities 
is required - in the spirit of Leninist principles - 
... for lack of sensitivity. .. and disregard 
for ethnicity does not help the Gypsies' social 
integration but provokes the opposite reaction. 
This takes the form of separation and isolation 
from the remainder of society and in this way 
leads not to the eradication of their backwardness 
but to its perpetuation. 
(ibid : 66,67). 
This argument was straight from the pluralist version of 
Marxist-Leninist nationality theory* and although the report was 
unable to say as much, perhaps it envisaged a day when the improving 
living and educational standards of Gypsies might be expected, on 
past experience of other emergent ethnic communities, to lead to 
heightened self-awareness and even a revival of nationalism -a 
path of potential development the government was determined to block. 
See Stalin's third dialectic (Appendix One). 
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APFEIDIX 'A' - SOME TABLES OF POST-1967 STATISTICS. 
List of Tables. 
Source 
(Doc. no Table no. ) 
Table No. 1. Increase of Gypsy population (1921-1970) 
in Czechoslovakia. (150: I/1) 
2. Gypsy population by individual regions 
(1967,1968). (150: 1/4) 
3. Natural reproduction of Gypsy population 
in comparison with total population in 
Czechoslovakia (1967,1968). (150: 1/3) 
4. Accommodation of Gypsy families (1967) (1967 Census: 
29) 
5" Amenities of permanently occupied 
dwellings of the Gypsy population(1.12.1970) (150: V/5) 
6. Economic activity of the Gypsy population 
(1967-1970) (150: 111/1,2,3) 
7. Placing Gypsy adolescents (1969,1970) (150: IV/1) 
8. Gypsy adolescents in middle and high 
schools (including apprenticet)(1967-1970) (150: 1I/7) 
9" Gypsy children resident in state institutions 




Increase of Gypsy Population (1921-70) in Czechoslovakia 
(150 : Table I/1) 
Territory 
Gypsy population 
1921* 1930 1947 1966 1967 1968 197o** 
Czech lands 61 227 16,752 52,519 59,467 61,085 50,542 
Slovakia 7,967 31,188 84,438 161,006 164,526 165,382 151,743 
Czechoslovakia 8,028 31,415 101,190 221,525 223,993 226,467 202,285 
* By no means real state, but according to declarations of Gypsy 
nationality. 
From 1970 national census in which many Gypsies were evidently 
not classified as such. 
TABLE 2. Gypsy Population by Individual Regions (1967,1968). 
(150 : Table I/4). 
Region Absolute Gypsy pop. % of total pop. 
1967 1968 1967 1968 
ague 3,170 3,471 0.26 0.3 
entral Bohemia Region 5,925 3,690 0.41 0.5 
South º' it 2,581 2,613 0.39 0.4 
Jest it 11 8,647 9,014 1.01 1.0 
Borth It It 18,922 18,907 1.69 1.7 
st ti if 5,279 5,295 0.44 0.4 
South Moravia " 4,155 4,504 0.21 0.2 
North It if 10,788 11,591 0.61 0.6 
ratislava 1,027 1,032 0.36 0.4 
West Slovakia Region 40,478 40,329 2.22 2.5 
Central It " 339331 35,078 2.41 2.5 
East 89,697 88,943 7.38 7.2 
^zech lands (total) 59,467 61,085 0.57 0.6 
Slovakia (total) - 164,526 165 382 3.72 3.7 
Czechoslovakia (total) 223,993 226,467 1.55 1.6 
XO3 
TABLE 3. natural Reproduction of Gypsy Population in comparison 
with total population of Czechoslovakia (1967,1968). 
(150 : Table I/3). 
Territory Gypsy pop. (per 
1000 inhabs. ) 
Total pop. (per 
1000 inhabs. ) 











Czechoslovakia 28.6 26.2 5 4.2 
TABLE 4. Accommodation of Gypsy Families (1967) 
(1967 Census : Table 29). 
erritoi, y Number of Gypsy Per Gypsy 
dwelling occufs 
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TABLE 8. Gypsy Adolescents in Middle and High Schools 
(incl. apprentices) (1967-70)- 
(150 : Table 11/7) 
Territory 1967 1968 1969 1970 Total 
1967-1970 
Czech lands 310 525 187 233 1,255 
Slovakia 1,262 1,280 766 763 4,071 
Czechoslovakia 1,572 1,805 953 996 5,326 
TABLE 9. Gypsy children resident in state institutions (1967). 
(based on 1967 Census). 
Type of Institute 
creche infants' child. home child. home young pgr.. Total 
home (1-3 yrs. ) (3-15 yrs. ) home(15- 
18 yrs. ) 
% No. % No. 
I% 
No. % No. % NO- 
lovakia 478 0.7 892 12.5 804 23.3 2091 21.3 210 24.8 4475 
zech lands 353 0.7 440 8.8 440 15.3 1160 16.3 119 19.4 2512 
Slovakia 125 0.6 452 20.9 364 63.5 931 34.8 91 38.7 1963 
Table 10 Table 17 Table 19 
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APPENDIX . 
`8' - NATIONAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS. 
Note: The following list of documents is divided by periods (as 
given in ßk. 4- and subdivided by geograp. Acal area. It is not a 
complete list of all important documents but only of those available. 
Nevertheless most important national documents after 1958 are listed 
here and also what is hoped is a representative set of local 
government documents. Documents are not always dated or named and 
in these cases it has been necessary to estimate a date or to invent 
a name. Names are in Czech (or Slovak) and English. 
The numbers given in the left-hand column are sequence numbers 
used as references in the text of Chapters l- 
to (9. 
PERIODS: 1) to 3) (previous to 13.10.65). 
AREA : Czechoslovakia, Czech lands, Slovakia. 
No. Date Document Name 
1 14.7.27 Zakon c-117/27 g otulnych cikanech (Law 117 about 
nomadic gypsies). 
2 26.3.58 0' Usneseni UV KSC o praci mezi cikanskym obyvatelstuem 
V 
v CSSR. (CP Central Committee Decree about work among 
g. pop. in Czechoslovakia). 
3 17.10.58 Zakon c 74/58 Sb. o trvalem usidleni kocujicich osob. 
(Law 74 about the permanent settlement of nomads). 
4 1958/59 Smernice min. vnitra (6.12.58), skolstvi a kultury 
(30.10.58) a zdravotnictvi (10.1.59). (Directives 
of Ministries of the Interior, Education and Health). 
5 1959 Price mezi cikänskym obyvatelstvem (Work among the 
gypsy population). 
7 1959 10, Prä ca medzi cigänskym obyvatelstvom (Work among the 
gypsy population), Slovak version. 
O8 
No. Date Document Name 
8 11.7.60 Ustava CSSR - Ustavni zdkon 000/60 Sb. (1960 Constitution). 
9 1903 Zoznar - zakonov, uzneseni viady, vyhlasok a 
uprav 
(1958-63). (List of laws, government decrees, 
regulations and instructions). 
10. Oct? 64 Zprava o riesenie problemy obc. cig. pov. -Slov. planovacia 
komisia. (Report on solving problems of gypsies - 
Slovak Planning Commission). 
11.9.64 Zpräva o plneni usneseni 
I'LC 
z roku 1958-Predsed. 
UV KSC. (Report on fulfilling 1958 CP Central 
Committee Decree - CP Central Comb. Praesidium), 
PERIODS : 1) 
to 3). AREA : North Moravia Region. 
12 1956 Diplomova prace - Zdena Puckovä (Diploma study by 
ev 
Z. Puckova). 
14 5.4.62 Zprq/va KNV - Komise pro skolstvi a kultury (RNC 
report - education committee). 
PERIODS : 1) to 3). AREA : East Slovakia Region. 
15 1958/59 Priprava soupisu - KNV (Preparation for Nomads' 
Register - RNC). 
16 12.11.58 Zpräva KNV - (RNC report). 
18 1963? Zpräva kraj. komise pre riesenie otazky cig. obyv. - 
Rade KNV. (Report of RNC Council's Gypsy Affairs 
Committee). 
19 1963 Navrh opatreni na vyriesenie... (proposed measures 
for a solution... ) 
20 1963 Zprava o sücasnej situacii... a nävrh na opatrenia. 
(Report on the contemporary situation... and a proposal 
for measures). 
609 
PERIODS : 1) 
to 3) " AREA : East Slovakia Region 
(Cont'd..... ) 
No. Date Document Name. 
21 1964 Koncepcia riesenie otäzok obc. cig. pov... do roku 1970. 
(Plan for solving the gypsy question... up to 1970). 
22,15.5.65 Inf. zprava 0 postupe likvidaci cig. osad. 
(Report on the gradual elimination of gypsy settlements). 
PERIODS : ý) 
tO 3). AREA : Spisskä Novä Ves District. 
25 27.11.59 Zprava o cinnosti korn sie... od 4.10.58 do 31.12.58. 
(Report on activities of the committee for G. affairs 
4.10.58 - 31.12.58). 
26 1959 Soupis-pocty za obci (Register of nomads-numbers by 
V 
town and village). 
27 6.10.60 Zpräva z vykonanej previerk ;, lnenia uzneseni rady 
KPN a KV KSS. (Report on fulfilling decrees of RNC 
council and CP Regional Committee). 
28 2.6.61 Zprava o situäci na 
üseku 
cig. probl. -ONVodb. pre 
vnütr. veci. (Report on the gypsy situation - DNC 
Dept. of the Interior). 
29 1961 Zpräva komise ONV (DNC Committee report). 
A 30 1961 Evidencia ziak: ov cig. pov 1961 (Record of gypsy 
pupils 1961). 
31 13.3.61 Zpraiva o hygen. opatrenie (Report on hyne measures). 
18.7.61 Nävrh plänu vystavby studni v/6ig. osad. (Plan of well- 
building in g. settlements). 
32 21.12.61 Situäcia na üseku plnenia zäkona 
c 74-oab. pre vnütr. 
veci. (Situation on fulfilling Law 74 - Dept. of 
the Interior). 
d10 
No. Date Document name 
33 1902 Zprava o praci medzi obc. cig. pov - OV KSS 
(. aeport on work acnon,., gypsies - District committee of 
CP. ). 
34 1962 Prehl'ad o situacii na 
useku 
siesenie otazek oboe 
cig. pov. -usek prac. sil. (Survey of solving go 
question - Dept. of e), iployment). 
35 1962 Zoznam obc. c. p., ktori pracuju v jednotl. podnikoch 
u Cechach. (List of gypsies working in the Czech lands). 
36 17.5.62 Zpräva OHES 0 präci medzi obyv. c. p. (Report of 
medical authority). 
If V 
37 10.10.62 Zprava o plnenia uznesenie UV ISC z 8.4.58 (Report 
on fulfilling CP directive). 
38 30.10.62 Vy'sledky prieskumu cig. usadlosti (Results of 
research on gypsy settling). 
39 1963 Zprava o rieseni cig. otazky (Report on solving the 
gypsy question). 
40 1963 Zpräva o sic. stave plnenia stran a vläd. uznesenie z 
1958. (Report on fulfilling party ancovt. decrees 
of 1958). 
V 
41 1963 Zprava 0 pinenia uznesenie UV KSC... (Report on 
fulfilling CP decree). 
42 1963 Prehled negramotnosti awn likvidace negram. 
ýetech 
1963-65 (Survey of illiteracy and plan for eliminating 
it 1963-65). 
43 24.1.63 Celookresny prehiad niekterych 
udajov k otazke cig. 
spoluobc. - (District survey of data about gypsy 
fellow-citizens). 
Of Vv 44 3.63 Plan okr. komisie pre ries. otazek c. obc. (Plan of 
district committee). 




No. Date Document name. 
iiViV 46 late 63 Ulohy na useku riesenia otazok obc. c. p... 1964 
(Tasks for solving in 1964). 
bv 47 1964 Stay evidencie kocujuclch a polokocujuclch osoA 
zmysle zak. 
c 74. (State of records of nomads and 
semi-nomads as understood in law 74). 
48 1964 Opatrenia k zpräve 9'iesenie otäzok obc. c. p. 
(Measures resulting from the report on solving gypsy 
question). 
v 49 6.1.64 Vyhodnotenie celk. cinnosti... za roku 1963 
(Evaluation of 1963 activity). 
50 30.6.64 Hlaseni o vysledcich dosahnutych na 
üseku... 
otäzok 
c. oby"za Ipolrok. 64 (Results from first six months 
of 1964 in solving gypsy question). 
51 3.7.64 Evidencia kocujücich a polokoc. osob, spresnenie 
(Record of nomads and semi-nomads, improvement). 
, 11 52 1.8.64 Okresny prehlad kocujucich osob (District survey of 
nomads). 
53 18.10.64 Trestny cinnosti obc. c. p. od 1.1. do 1.10.64 
(Offences by gypsies 1.1. to 1.10.64). 
54 30.10.64 Naivrh na likvidaci osady - Letanovce (Proposal for 
eliminating Letanovce settlement). 
55 3.11.64 Prehlad kult. a ekon. v 
"oje 
obc. c. p. (Survey of 
cultural and economic development of gypsies). 
56 11.64 Prehl'ad zamestnanie obc. c. p. v okresu (Survey of 
Gypsy employment in the district). 
57 8.12.64 Plän 1965 - riesenie cig. problem. v okresu. 
(1965 Plan for solving the gypsy problem). 
58 1965 Pasportisace cig. osady v okresu - OHES. (Characterisation 
of gypsy settlements - District Health Authority). 
X12 
No. Date Document name. 
59 1965 Prehl'ad o pocte vyslanych obc. c. p. na dosidlenie 
yýoku 1963 a 1964... do 
siech (Numbers of gypsies 
sent to work in Bohemia 1963 and 
64). 
60 1965 Vykaz o cinnosti na useku rieseni otazek c. p. v 
roku 1964 (Survey of activities to solve gypsy 
problem in 1964). 
v 
61 20.1.65 Stat. prehl'ad oigcich c. p. v skol. roku 1964/5 
k. 15.1.65. (Statistical survey of gypsy pupils in 
school year 1964-5). 
VV/Y 
62 6.65 Hlasenie o vysledkoch riesenie otazek obc. c. p. k. 6.65 
(Results of first six months 1965 in gypsy question). 
63 6.8.65 Koncepcia riesenie otazek obc. c. p... do 1970. 
(Overall plan for solving g. problem till 1970). 
PERIOD : 4. 
)(13.10.65 
- 7.11.68). AREA : Czechoslovakia, Czech 
lands, Slovakia. 
80 13.10.65 Viadni usneseni c. 502/65 0 opatrenich 'eseni otazek 
cik. obyv. (Government directive 502/65 about measures 
to solve the gypsy questions). 
82 13.10.65 Duvodova zprava pro vladni usneseni c. 502/65 
(Justifying report for government directive No. 502/65). 
83 1965 Zäsady pro organizoväni rozptylu a presunu cik. obyv. 
(Principles for organising the dispersal and transfer 
of gypsy population). 
84 15.1.66 Statut vladniho vyboru pro otäzky cik. obyv. 
(Statute of the Government Committee for Questions 
of Gypsy population). 
85 18.12.65 Hlavni smery k resent otäzek cik. obyv. (Main 
directions for solving questions of the gypsy population). 
413 
No. Date Document name 
86 1966 ooo Smernice a 
ukoly 
pro präci komist rad krajskych a 
okr. NV pro otazky c. obc. (Directives and tasks for 
RNC and DNC council committees). 
U1? 20.6.66 Informäcia o 
ülohach 
vyplyvajücich z vläd. uznesenia 
c. 502 (Information about tasks stemming from Govt. 
Decree No. 502). 
88 2.11.66 Kontrolnnzprava o plneni usneseni vl. vyboru - 1, Iin. 
Zdravotnictvi'. (Control report on fulfilling Govt. 
Committee decree - Ministry of Health). 
89 27.6.66 Usneseni vl. vyboru z 27.6.66 (Govt. Committee Decree). 
90 27.6.66 Zapis z jednäni vl. vyboru z 27.6.66 (Minutes of 
Govt. Committee meeting). 
91 1966 Detske domovy(r CSSR - Min. SkolstVi (Childrens 
V 
homes in CSSR - Min. of Education). 
92 1966 i Rozmi. stovani cik. mladezevdo svkol II cyklu, do uceb. 
a prac. pomeru. (Placing gypsy youth in secondary 
education, apprenticeships and work). 
i 93 15.12.66 Zakon c. 117/66 Sb. o nekterych düsledcich zanedbäväni 
pece o detL (Law No. 117/66 Sb. about some consequences 
of neglecting children). 
94 18.4.67 Zprava o plneni usnesen: C vlädy 
c. 502/65 - V1. Vybor. 
(Report on fulfilling Govt. Decree 502/65 - Govt. Comm. ) 
95 18.4.67 Zpräva - Priloha II (Appendix II to Report (94)). 
96 18.4.67 Navrh usneseni viady CSSR - Priloha I. (Proposed 
government decree - Appendix I to Report (94)). 
97 18.4.67 Celostätni harmonogram likvidace cik. osad, ctvrti a 
ulic. -Priloha III. (National plan for eliminating g. 
settlements, quarters and streets). 
98 15.5.67 Usneseni vlädy c. 159/67 ke zpräve o plneni usneseni 
vlädy 4.502. (Govt. Decree No. 159/67 after report on 
fulfilling Govt. Decree 502). 
414 
iýio. Date Document Name 
99 25.4.68 Zäkon c. 53/68 Sb o zmenach v organizaci a pusobnosti 
nekterych üstred. orgänu. (Law 53/68 Sb. about 
organisational changes of some central bodies). 
100 27.10.68 Ustavnz. zakon c. 143/68 o 
L. federaci. 
(Constitutional law No. 143/68 about Czechoslovak 
federalisation). 
101 7.11.68 Vlädni usneseni c. 384/68. (Govt. Decree No. 384/68). 
PERIOD AREA : North Moravia Region. 
102 1966 Navrh spolec. dohody (Prerov/Bardejov). 
(Proposal of a common agreement (Prerov/Bardejov). 
103 4.8.67 Zpräva o plneni vl. usneseni c. 502. 
(Report on fulfilling Govt. Decree 502). 
104 1967 Nekolik pohledü - Zdena Pizckova. (Some observations - 
Zdena Pizckovä) . 
105 1967? Pocet cik. u Sev. Nor. Kraj. (No. of gypsies in N. 
Moravia Region). 
106 1967 Zpräva 0 plneni vl1 usneseni c. 502/65. (Report on 
fulfilling Govt. Decree 502/65). 
PERIOD : (+). AREA : Fast Slovakia Region. 
107 1966 Cig. problem a jeho riesenie vo Vychodoslov. kraji. 
(Gypsy problem and its solution in E. Slovak Region - 
E. Davidova and J. Spiner). 
108 6.66 Zprava o plnenia vl. uznesenie c. 502/65 ve Vychodoslov. 
kraji. (Report on fulfilling Govt. Decree 502/65 
in E. Slovakia Region). 
109 29.6.66 Rozptyl cig. rod. do cesk. krajov-urcenie smernych 




PERIOD : AREA : Spisska Nova Ves District. 
No. Date Document Name. 
110 23.12.65 Kuipna zmluva - Arnutovce (Purchase contract - 
Arnutovice). 
111 1966 Riesenie otäzok cig. obyv.... do roku 1970. 
(Solving the gypsy question till 1970). 
112 1966 Plan - tetanovice (Plan of gypsy settlement - Letanovce) 
113 1966 Zprava o zacich c. p. (Report about gypsy pupils). 
11} 1966 Plan likvidace osady Podbrezova - Rudnany (Plan 
for eliminating settlement at Podbrezova - Rudnany). 
115 7.6.66 
01 Navrh na likvidaci cik. osady - Bystrany. (Proposal 
for eliminating gypsy settlement - Bystrany). 
116 21.1.66 Nävrh na plnenia opatr. k zabezpecenie uzn. Vlädy 
c-502. (Proposal for carrying out measures to fulfil 
Government Decree 502). 
117 10.6.66 Zpräva o previerke rozptylu cig. osady u obci 
Letanovce (Report on dispersing gypsy settlement in 
Letanovice). 
118 1.7.66 Dopis od A. D. (Ostrava) a odpoved' ONY. 
(Letter from A. D. (Ostrava) and DNC reply). 
119 1966 Rozptyl cig. rodin do c. krajov (Dispersal of gypsy 
families to Czech lands). 
120 18.7.66 Odsun cig. rodin do 
c. krajov (Removal of gypsy 
families to Czech lands). 
121 22.7.66 Likvidäcia cig. osad, vyplatene v roku 1965 
(Elimination of gypsy settlements, payments in 1965)- 
122 3.8.66 Priemluva za schvälenie - koupe rod. dom. 
(Agreement on purchase of a family house). 
116 
No. Date Document Name. 
123 1.9.66 Zäkladni ukazatele 9ýoctech cig. obyv. k. 1.9.66. 
(Basic statistics about gs. till 1.9.66). 
124 12.66 Vysledky cinnosti na 
üseku 
riesenie otaz. c. obyv. y. 
1966. (Result of activities in solving the gypsy 
question in 1966). 
A 
125 1967 Stat. prehlad prospiechu a chovanie 
ziakov 
cig. pov 
(Statistical survey of progress and behaviour of 
gypsy pupils). 
126 2.1.67 Vymähanie cestovneho od cig. obyv., ktori sa 
vratili z 
c. krajov. (Recovery of fares from 
gypsies who returned from the Czech lands). 
127 10.1.67 Zprava o pos itovani sluzeb doplnkove pece obc. c. p. 
(Report about services provided for gypsies). 
JrV 128 2.67 Sücasny stau riesenie problemov c. obyv. (Contemporary 
state of solving problems of gypsy population). 
129 15.2.67 Zprava o praci okresnej komisie za 1966. (Report 
on work of the distridt committee in 1966). 
130 31.12.67 Vykaz octe a pohybe cig. obyv. k 31.12.67. 
(1967 Census of gypsy population on 31.12.67). 
132 8.12.67 Poznämky k vykazu (Notes about making census of 
gypsy population). 
133 31.12.67 Vyikaz podle obci. (Census - by town and village). 
134 31.8.67 Prehfad 9anestnanosti cig. obc. k. 31.8.68 
(Survey of employment of gypsy citizens - 31.8.68. 
PERIOD : 
S). (after 7.11.68). Ate: Czechoslovakia (Federated state) 
135 9.12.68 Ustavni zai on 
c. 171/68 o zrizeni federälnich 
ministerev a fed. v" 0 (Constitutional law No-171 
on establishing federal ministries and committees). 
417 
No. Date Document Name. 
136 2.12.68 Navrh osnovy pro zpracovani zprävy ohodnoceni 
01 VV 41 vyvoje reseni ot. c. obyv. (Proposal for a program 
to evaluate irogress in gypsy question). 
137 15.5.70 Zpräva 9problematice cik. obyv. - MPSV-CSSR. 
(Report on problem of gypsy population - Federal 
:, inistry of Labour and Social Affairs). 
150 24.11.71 Zprava o soueasnern stavýrreseni otazek cik. obyv. 
V 
MPSV-CSSR. (Report on the contemporary situation - 
Federal Ministry of Labour). 
PERIOD ; 5). AREA : Czech Socialist Republic (CSR) 
138 8.1.69 
V/ .1 Z ,; 
Lon 
c. 2/69 Sb. CSR Orizeni ministerev a jinych 
ustrednich organu. (Law No. 2/69 on establishing 
ministries and other central bodies). 
139 14.7.69 Smernice 
c. 21 o vychove a vzdelavani vychovne 
zanedbanych a prospechove opozdenych cik. deti. 
Min. 
Skolstvi CSR. (Directive 21 on the education 
of educationally neglected and backward gypsy children- 
Czech Ministry of education). 
140 2.12.69 Zpräva o soucasnem stavu reseni otäzek cik. obyv. v 
CSR-PZPSV. (Report on contemporary state of solving 
questions of gypsy population in Czech lands - Min. 
of Labour). 
141 2.12.69 NQvrh usneseni vlady CSR - Priloha 1. (Proposal 
for a Czech government decree - appendix one). 
142 5.70 Sjezd v MPSV-CSSR (Seminar at Federal Min. of Labour). 
143 20.5.70 Zprava o pripravovanem reseni v prestehovani rodin 
cik. püvodu (Report on moving gypsy families -. a N. 
Bohemian NC (Most)). 
418 
No. Date Document Name 
vVyV/ 
144 25.11.70 Usneseni viady CSR/ x. 279 
ke 
zprave o soucasnem stavu... 
v 
(Govt. decree CSR No. 279 after the report on the 
contemporary situation). 
v 
145 25.11.70 Statut komise viady CSR pro otazky cik. obyv. 
(Statute of Czech Govt. Committee for Questions of 
Gypsy popillation). 
PERIOD AREA : Slovak Socialist Republic (SSR). 
146 11.68 Pleneni harmonogramu präce... za I-III stvrtrok 1968 a 
navrh planu na 1969 (Fulfilling work timetable 1st 
to 3rd quarters 1969 and 1969 plan). 
147 4.70 Koncepcie riesenie problemov vig. obyv. v rokoch 
1971-80. (Plan of solution of problems of gypsy 
population 1971-80). 
"1 V 148 3.71 Sprava o plneni planu a rozpoctu ONV... VIoku 1970 a 
rozpocet na rok 1971. (Report on fulfilling DNC 
plan and budget 1970 and 1971 budget). 
149 10.6.71 Metodickä üprava pre financovanie vydavkov urcenych 
pre riesenie cig. otazky na ONV a KNV. (Arrangements 
for financing payments for solving gypsy questions 
at DNC and RNC). 
PERIOD : O, AREA : North Moravia Region. 
151 31.12.68 Vykaz o poctu a pohybu osob cik. püvodu k 31.12.68. 
(Report on numbers and movements of persons of gypsy 
origin up to 31.12.68). 
152 31.7.69 Zpräva o plneni usneseni 
c. 502/65... na leta 1966-68 
HIN. (Report on fulfilling decree No. 502/65... 1966-68 
RNC). 
419 
No. Date Document Name 
v 
153 31.12.69 Soucasny stau v zajisteni pece o cik. obvy v CSSR a 
kraje. (Contemporary state in ensuring care of gypsy 
population in Czechoslovakia and region). 
156 1970 Nekolik poznamku o hospodarstvi v Ostrave - hieiN. 
(Some remarks about the economy in Ostrava). 
vvIvv 
157 1970/71 Prehled cik. deti ve skole v Ostrave (Survey of 
Gypsy children at school in Ostrava). 
159 12.68 Vysvetlinky pro jecdnorazovy vykaz.... k 31.2.68. 
(Explanatory instrudtions for 1968 census of Gypsies). 
160 31.12.68 Vykaz o pocte a pohybe cig. obyv. k. 31.12.68. 
(1968 census of Gypsies). 
10 
. 00 
161 7.2.69 Navrh na riesenie cig. problematiky Slov. när. organmi. 
(Proposal for solving the gypsy problem by Slovak 
national bodies). 
162 15.8.69 Stav riesenia problematiky cig. obyv. (State of 
solving the gypsy question). 
163 1970 Pocty podle obci (Numbers by community). 
164 10.4.70 1präva o riesenie cig. probl. za rok 1969 a navrh.. 
n. 1970. (Report on solving gypsy problem in 1969 
and proposal for 1970). 
166 11.9.70 Zprava o I. polrok 1970 (Report on first half year 1970). 
167/9 12.70 Vyuziti materiäln1ch a potenciälnich zdrojiökresu. 
(Use of material and potential resources of the district). 
168 29.12.70 Konecny nävrh organizäcie osidlen v okresu. (Final 
proposal for organising settlement in the district). 
170 31.12.70 Statisticke 
u4aje 
Docte, vekovej skladbe atd. k 
31.12.70. (Census/ of gypsies on 31.12.70). 
171 1971 Predbe$ne vysledky scitania ludu, domov a bytu k 1.12.70 
(Preliminary results of national census on 1.12.70). 
H2O 
No. Date Document Name 
172 29.4.71 Zprava (Report on budget and school attendance). 
173 6.71 Zpräva - komisie pre otäz. cig. obyv. (Gypsy affairs 
Committee report). 
174 12.8.71 Zpräva o hygenickej situäcii v cig. osadäch. 
(Report of hygenic situation in gypsy settlements). 
V. 
175 16.11.71 Trestna cinnost' pachana osobami c. p. roku 1970. 
(Punishable offences committed by gypsies in 1970). 
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